Examinations

Discount for lack of marketability: how do the Tax Court and the IRS test it?

A discount for lack of marketability lowers the value of a business interest that cannot be sold quickly for cash. In federal estate and gift tax cases the Tax Court sets it case by case: 35 percent for a 20.74 percent stake in Jung (1993), 30 percent in Mandelbaum (1995), 35 percent in Jones (2019). Each time the court tied the figure to the company's own facts, such as dividends, transfer restrictions and the size of the block.

Hands rest on a thick closed valuation binder beside a sleeve of blank stock certificates

What is a discount for lack of marketability?

A deduction from the value of an ownership interest for its relative lack of marketability. The IRS job aid defines marketability as the ability to quickly convert property to cash at minimal cost.

The working definitions come from the Discount for Lack of Marketability Job Aid for IRS Valuation Professionals, dated September 25, 2009 and developed by the IRS Engineering/Valuation Program DLOM Team. It takes the meaning of marketability from the International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms: "the ability to quickly convert property to cash at minimal cost." A DLOM, in the job aid's words, is an amount or percentage deducted from an interest's value for the relative absence of marketability.

The job aid states its own status on its cover and in the header of every page: "This Job Aid is not Official IRS position," and it "may not be used or cited as authority for setting any legal position." It was written for the IRS's own appraisers, and its disclaimer tells them that the analyst "must get behind the data used to support a DLOM choice rather than simply using summary statistics."

The question comes up with stock and partnership units in closely held companies, where no exchange quotes a price. The estate and gift tax regulations then direct the appraiser to the company's finances, its outlook and the control that the block carries, and the cases below show how the Tax Court turns those facts into a percentage.

How does a discount for lack of control differ from a marketability discount?

A control discount accounts for the holder's inability to direct the company, a marketability discount for the inability to sell the interest quickly. The Tax Court has applied both and rejected a figure that counted the lack of control twice.

The estate tax regulations name control as a factor of value. Where closely held stock has no selling prices or bid and asked prices, 26 CFR 20.2031-2(f)(2) lists among the factors "the degree of control of the business represented by the block of stock to be valued." The same paragraph names the company's net worth, prospective earning power and dividend-paying capacity, "the good will of the business; the economic outlook in the particular industry," and the values of securities of corporations engaged in the same or similar lines of business that are listed on an exchange.

In Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, decided November 29, 1982, Judge Whitaker valued the decedent's stock in four closely held family corporations: 20.4 percent of Andrews, Inc., 21.6 percent of W.F. & H.H. Andrews Co. and 20 percent of each of the other two. The IRS argued that no discount for lack of control or for lack of marketability should apply, because the hypothetical seller would be a family member who shared control. The court allowed both discounts.

The same opinion shows the limit. The court found improper the 40 percent discount for marketability and control proposed by the petitioner's expert Wendin, because the weighting of factors in the same valuation already took lack of control into account, excessively in the court's view. The IRS expert had used a 25 percent closed-end fund discount and flotation discounts of 11.9 to 20.74 percent, and another expert, Lefko, used 45 percent. The opinion does not state the percentage the court applied.

In Mandelbaum, discussed below, the control carried by the block is one of ten factors of the marketability discount, and the court found that for Big M it called for an average discount.

Why does the fair market value standard allow these discounts?

The estate and gift tax regulations value the interest transferred at the price between a hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller, and they list the degree of control as a factor of that price.

Under 26 CFR 20.2031-1(b), fair market value for the estate tax "is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller," "neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." The gift tax regulation, 26 CFR 25.2512-1, uses the same test and adds: "All relevant facts and elements of value as of the time of the gift shall be considered."

For interests in partnerships and proprietorships, 26 CFR 20.2031-3 applies the willing buyer test to the net amount a buyer would pay. It calls for a fair appraisal, as of the valuation date, of all tangible and intangible assets of the business, including goodwill, a look at the earning capacity the business has shown, and the stock factors of 20.2031-2(f) and (h) to the extent they apply. The return should include complete financial and other data, with copies of any reports of examinations of the business by accountants, engineers or other technical experts made as of or near the valuation date.

The test prices the block that actually passes, so a 20 percent block is valued as a 20 percent block, not as 20 percent of the whole company. The buyer and the seller in that test are hypothetical, and that is the point on which the family attribution argument failed.

Does family control rule out a minority discount?

Not under Estate of Bright, decided by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc in 1981. The court held that the estate's stock cannot be lumped with a relative's shares, because the willing seller is hypothetical.

In Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, decided October 1, 1981, the estate held a 27½ percent block in East Texas Motor Freight Lines, affiliated corporations and Southern Trust and Mortgage Company. During her life Mary Frances Smith Bright and her husband had held a 55 percent community property control block. Her husband, H. R. Bright, was executor and trustee of the trust her will created for the children and owned the other 27½ percent individually. The government argued that he would sell the estate's block only together with his own, as a 55 percent control block, so the estate's shares should be valued with a control premium.

The en banc court rejected the argument. It held that "the 'willing seller' is not the estate itself, but is a hypothetical seller," and that "family attribution cannot be applied to lump the estate's stock to that of any related party." Under the ruling the stock "is deemed to be held by a hypothetical seller who is related to no one." Judge Rubin, joined by four other judges, dissented, and Judge Tate filed a separate dissent.

A year later the Tax Court followed Bright in Andrews: "We see no reason to depart from such established precedent." The willing buyer and the willing seller, Judge Whitaker wrote, must be "truly hypothetical."

How do appraisers measure the size of the discount?

With restricted stock studies, pre-IPO studies, option-based models and the Mandelbaum factors, among other methods. The IRS job aid reviews each one and names its weaknesses.

Restricted stock studies compare the prices of public companies' shares that could not be resold for a period with the prices of their freely traded shares. On page 17 the job aid names their main weakness: they rely on historical market data. Pre-IPO studies compare private sales of shares before an initial public offering with the offering price. According to page 20 of the job aid, they have fallen somewhat from favor because of a significant number of problems identified in their use.

Several methods use option prices. For the approach based on long-term traded options, the job aid reports that its authors viewed the results as a "benchmark minimum price when applied to privately held companies," and it notes that an owner of a private company "does not have the ability to hedge the investment." The Longstaff model "assumes perfect market timing and, therefore, derives an upper bound" and "should not be used blindly."

The cost of flotation approach, built on what a public offering of the stock would cost, leaves out the risk of uncertain holding periods, and the job aid describes it as not applicable to minority interests. The bid-ask spread approach "provides an illiquidity discount only." For the Mandelbaum approach the job aid notes that the courts "have emphasized, however, the process defined in Mandelbaum as opposed to the actual quantitative result."

What are the Mandelbaum factors?

Ten factors Judge Laro of the Tax Court used in Mandelbaum v. Commissioner in 1995 to set a discount for one company's stock. The court started from 35 and 45 percent and reached 30 percent.

Mandelbaum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-255, filed June 12, 1995, concerned gifts of stock in Big M, Inc., a family-owned women's apparel retailer in New Jersey, made on six dates between December 31, 1986 and December 30, 1990. The company had 9,643 shares outstanding. The IRS expert, Mallarkey, applied a 30 percent marketability discount on all six dates. The petitioners' expert, Grabowski, applied 75 percent for 1986 through 1989 and 70 percent for 1990.

The studies Grabowski relied on showed an average discount of 35 percent for restricted stock and 45 percent for IPOs. The court wrote: "we use these figures as benchmarks of the marketability discount for the shares at hand." It then weighed a nonexclusive list of factors: the value of the corporation's privately traded securities against its publicly traded securities; its financial statements; its dividend-paying capacity, dividend history and prior dividends; the nature of the corporation, its history, its position in the industry and its economic outlook; its management; the degree of control transferred with the block; restrictions on transferability; the period an investor must hold the stock to realize a sufficient profit; the corporation's redemption policy; and the cost of a public offering, such as legal, accounting and underwriting fees.

For Big M the financial statements, the dividend policy, the nature and outlook of the company, its management and its redemption policy pointed to a below-average discount. Control called for an average discount, the transfer restrictions and the cost of a public offering for an above-average to average one, and the holding period was neutral. The court held "that a 30-percent marketability discount is to be applied."

Both experts lost on method. The court was "troubled by the fact that Mallarkey relied primarily (if not entirely) on the restricted stock studies," and it found "Grabowski's heavy reliance on the Shareholders' Agreements especially troublesome."

Can the discount be taken from the average of published studies?

The IRS job aid says no: "Blanket approaches using historical averages are not sustainable; a case-specific analysis is needed." In Jones the Tax Court accepted the expert who tied the discount to the partnership's own facts.

On page 18 the job aid reports that courts "rejected the use of the average restricted stock study results in favor of performing a detailed, comprehensive comparison with underlying restricted stock data." On page 17 it warns that "using measures of central tendency without an examination of the underlying data leads to the opportunity for mischaracterization," and on page 31 it says: "One size discount should not apply to all."

Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-101, decided August 19, 2019 by Judge Pugh, applied that test to two experts. The gifts of May 28, 2009 included 10,267.67 limited partner units in Seneca Jones Timber Co. and voting and nonvoting shares of Seneca Sawmill Co., which held a 10 percent general partner interest in the partnership. The estate's expert, Reilly, applied a 35 percent discount for lack of marketability. He supported it with empirical studies and with the partnership's own facts: a buy-sell agreement, no history of transfers, an indefinite holding period, a recent reported loss and unpredictable distributions.

The IRS expert, Schwab, applied 30 percent and did not consider the buy-sell restrictions. At trial he conceded that they would increase his discount by "something like 1%, 2%." The court said he was "guessing," found Reilly's discount "appropriate and adequately explained" and held that 35 percent was proper. It valued the partnership units at $380 each. The gift return had reported $230 a unit, and the notice of deficiency had determined $2,511, later increased to $2,530.

How do buy-sell agreements and transfer restrictions affect the discount?

Restrictions on who may buy the interest support a larger marketability discount. A price fixed in an option or buy-sell agreement is generally disregarded as the value unless the agreement is a bona fide business arrangement.

Under 26 CFR 20.2031-2(h), "little weight will be accorded a price contained in an option or contract" where the decedent was free to dispose of the shares at any price during life. In other cases "such price will be disregarded in determining the value of the securities" unless the agreement is a "bona fide business arrangement and not a device to pass the decedent's shares" to family members for less than full consideration. For agreements entered into or substantially modified after October 8, 1990, the paragraph refers to section 2703 of the Internal Revenue Code and to 26 CFR 25.2703.

The agreement can still raise the discount without setting the price. In Mandelbaum the restrictions on transferability pointed to an above-average to average discount. In Jones the buy-sell agreement was one of the facts Reilly used to support 35 percent, and the court accepted that figure.

Mandelbaum also shows the other half of the test. The court faulted Grabowski because his "determination of fair market value focuses only on a hypothetical willing buyer," while the regulation asks for a price at which a willing seller would also part with the stock.

Can events after the valuation date change the discount?

Events not foreseeable on the valuation date do not change the value as of that date, but the Tax Court has used them as evidence of that value. In Jung it did so and allowed 35 percent.

Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 412, decided November 10, 1993 by Judge Chabot, valued 168,600 voting shares of Jung Corp., a 20.74 percent interest, as of the decedent's death on October 9, 1984. The IRS proposed a 10 percent marketability discount. The court allowed 35 percent. It reasoned that the analysis must look at a market for the decedent's 20.74 percent interest, not for the company as a whole: "We conclude, and we have found, that a 35-percent marketability discount should be allowed." It found a fair market value of $4,400,000.

The company's later sale to Kendall and its liquidation came after the valuation date. The court held that neither event was foreseeable on October 9, 1984, so neither changed the value as of that date. It still used them: "we do consider these events as evidence of the October 9, 1984, value."

The Tax Court is not bound by either side's percentage. In Mandelbaum it found both experts' analyses unpersuasive and reached 30 percent through its own weighing of the ten factors. In Jones it adopted Reilly's 35 percent and called Schwab's adjustment for the buy-sell restrictions a guess.

What does IAE do when a valuation discount is disputed?

An IAE appraiser prepares an expert report on the fair market value of the interest or a review of the opposing appraisal against USPAP, in up to 5 business days. The interest and the valuation date are confirmed first.

The IAE valuation page covers the fair market value of a business or an ownership interest as of the date the case needs, for estate and gift tax disputes, divorce, condemnation and shareholder cases. For closely held stock the appraiser works from the factors of 26 CFR 20.2031-2(f)(2): net worth, earning power, dividend-paying capacity and the control the block carries, with USPAP Standard 9. A review under USPAP Standards 3 and 4 gives an opinion on the quality of the opposing appraisal: comparables, adjustments, discount and capitalization rates, the effective date and the support for each conclusion.

IAE confirms the questions, the interest and the valuation date with the client before work starts. The secretariat confirms receipt of materials the same day and, within one business day, the format, cost, deadline and the appraiser from the registry; the client approves the candidate and the CV. Cases with tight deadlines can use a 48-hour rush.

Appraisers are listed in the public IAE registry and can be verified by Member ID or QR code. The appraiser confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. IAE is not a law firm, and neither IAE nor the appraiser guarantees the decision of the court or the IRS.

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