Examinations

Lack of informed consent lawsuit: what does the medical expert have to prove?

A patient can sue when a doctor performed a procedure without disclosing a risk that later caused harm, even if the procedure itself was done well. The claim has three parts: the risk was one that should have been disclosed, it materialized and caused the injury, and a reasonable patient told of it would have declined. Statutes in Florida, New York and Texas set the tests, and in Ohio the medical parts need a physician's testimony.

A blank consent clipboard and an unused pen sit beside surgical gloves on a clinic counter

What is a lack of informed consent claim?

It is a malpractice claim that the provider did not disclose the alternatives and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits a reasonable practitioner would have disclosed, and that the undisclosed risk caused the injury.

New York defines the claim in Public Health Law section 2805-d. Under subdivision 1, "Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose" the alternatives and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved, as a reasonable practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed them, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.

The claim is separate from a claim that the treatment itself was negligent. A surgeon may perform an operation exactly as the standard requires and still be liable if the patient was not told of a risk that then occurred. The reverse also holds: a perfect consent discussion does not answer a claim that the surgery was done badly.

Texas makes the point in its own way. Section 74.101 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that in a suit against a physician or health care provider based on failure to disclose or adequately disclose the risks and hazards of care, "the only theory on which recovery may be obtained is that of negligence in failing to disclose the risks or hazards" that could have influenced a reasonable person in deciding whether to give or withhold consent.

What must the doctor disclose before a procedure?

Under the New York and Florida statutes, the procedure, the medically acceptable alternatives and the substantial or reasonably foreseeable risks and hazards that physicians in the field recognize, in a form the patient can understand.

Florida's Medical Consent Law, section 766.103 of the Florida Statutes, describes the content from the patient's side. Subsection (3)(a)2 asks whether a reasonable individual, from the information provided, would have "a general understanding of the procedure, the medically acceptable alternative procedures or treatments, and the substantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed treatment or procedures" recognized among other physicians in the same or similar community who perform similar procedures.

New York uses the words alternatives, reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits. Neither statute requires a list of every possible complication. The question is which risks physicians in the field treat as worth disclosing for this procedure, and that is a medical question about frequency, severity and the existence of alternatives.

Texas adds an administrative layer. A medical disclosure panel classifies procedures into those that require disclosure of specified risks and those that do not, and section 74.106 attaches presumptions to that classification, discussed below.

Is the disclosure measured by what doctors do or by what patients need?

It depends on the state. Florida section 766.103(3)(a)1 uses an accepted standard of medical practice among providers with similar training in a similar community; Texas and New York refer to a reasonable person or practitioner.

The Florida statute contains two tests joined by "and" in paragraph (a). Under (3)(a)1, the provider's action in obtaining consent must be "in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community." Under (3)(a)2, a reasonable individual given the information would have the general understanding described above. A Florida claim therefore needs evidence of the professional standard for consent discussions, and that evidence comes from a physician.

New York's definition looks to what "a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed". Texas section 74.101 looks to risks "that could have influenced a reasonable person in making a decision to give or withhold consent." The wording differs, but in each version a physician has to tell the court what the risk was, how often it occurs and what alternatives existed at the time.

The expert's report should name the state's test and answer it in the statute's terms. An opinion written for a different standard leaves a gap the defense will point out.

Can a patient sue after signing a consent form?

Yes, but the form matters. In Florida a written consent that meets section 766.103(3) and is validly signed raises a rebuttable presumption of valid consent, and Texas section 74.106 attaches presumptions to disclosures made in the statutory form.

Florida subsection (4)(a) provides that a consent evidenced in writing and meeting the requirements of subsection (3), if validly signed by the patient or another authorized person, raises "a rebuttable presumption of a valid consent." Under (4)(b), a valid signature is one given by a person who under all the surrounding circumstances is mentally and physically competent to give consent. A form signed in the pre-operative area after sedation invites a question under (4)(b).

The presumption can be rebutted. The patient's account of the discussion, the clinic notes, the timing of the signature and the content of the form itself are all evidence. A form that names "bleeding, infection and death" but not the specific risk that occurred, for example nerve injury in a spine operation, may not meet (3)(a)2 for that risk.

In Texas, section 74.106(a)(1) provides that disclosure made as provided in section 74.104, or failure to disclose based on the inclusion of a procedure on the panel's list of procedures not requiring disclosure, creates a rebuttable presumption that the requirements were met, and the presumption is included in the charge to the jury. Under (a)(2), failure to disclose risks the panel requires to be disclosed "shall create a rebuttable presumption of a negligent failure to conform" to the duty, unless there was an emergency or disclosure was not medically feasible. Under (b), for procedures the panel has not addressed, the physician is under the duty otherwise imposed by law.

Does the patient have to prove he would have refused the procedure?

Yes, by an objective test. New York section 2805-d(3) requires proof that a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position, fully informed, would have declined, and that the lack of consent was a proximate cause of the injury.

The test does not ask what this patient says today, with the injury in view. It asks what a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would have decided. Florida's subsection (3)(b) states the same idea from the defense side: the provider is not liable if the patient "would reasonably, under all the surrounding circumstances, have undergone such treatment or procedure" had he or she been advised in accordance with paragraph (a).

The patient's position includes the medical facts: how severe the condition was, what the alternatives offered and what waiting would have meant. Those facts come from a physician. A patient with a progressing spinal cord compression has fewer reasonable options than a patient choosing elective cosmetic surgery, and the expert explains that difference to the jury.

In the Ohio case discussed below, the Supreme Court of Ohio left this element to the jury without expert testimony. The medical background on which the jury decides it still comes from the physicians.

When does the doctor not have to disclose a risk?

New York section 2805-d(4) lists defenses: the risk is too commonly known, the patient said he would undergo the procedure regardless or asked not to be told, consent was not reasonably possible, or disclosure would substantially harm the patient's condition.

Under subdivision 4(a), the defense applies where "the risk not disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure." Under 4(b), it applies where the patient assured the practitioner that he or she would undergo the treatment regardless of the risk, or did not want to be informed. Under 4(c), it applies where "consent by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible." Under 4(d), it applies where the practitioner reasonably believed that full disclosure would substantially and adversely affect the patient's condition, and used reasonable discretion in what was disclosed.

Subdivision 2 narrows the claim itself. In New York the right of action for lack of informed consent is limited to non-emergency treatment, procedure or surgery, and to diagnostic procedures that involve invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body. A claim about a conversation before a prescription, without an invasive procedure, falls outside it.

Under Texas section 74.106(a)(2), the failure to disclose may be found not negligent if there was an emergency or disclosure was not medically feasible for another reason. Whether a situation was an emergency, and whether there was time to talk, are medical questions on which the chart and the expert carry the weight.

Is a medical expert required in an informed consent case?

In Ohio, yes. In White v. Leimbach (December 8, 2011) the Supreme Court of Ohio held that expert medical testimony is required to establish the material risks of a procedure and that an undisclosed risk materialized and caused the injury.

Robert White had a discectomy at L5-S1 in March 1998 that relieved his pain. After a fall in August 1998, his neurosurgeon, Dr. Warren Leimbach, recommended a second discectomy. The surgeon knew that the second operation carried a greater risk of a bad outcome. He and a second-opinion physician testified that they disclosed the risks; White said he would not have consented had he known. After the October 1998 operation White had worse and persistent pain, and in 2003 the Whites sued for lack of informed consent.

The trial court directed a verdict for the surgeon. The court of appeals vacated it. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and reinstated the directed verdict. It applied the three elements of Nickell v. Gonzalez (1985): the physician failed to disclose the material risks and dangers of the proposed therapy, the undisclosed risks materialized and proximately caused the injury, and a reasonable person in the patient's position would have declined the therapy had the risks been disclosed. The majority held that expert testimony is needed for the first two elements and that the jury decides the third.

Justice Pfeifer concurred only in the judgment. He wrote that requiring expert testimony on materiality conflicted with Nickell, because under the reasonable-patient standard a jury can decide materiality. Other states answer the question in their own ways, and the request to the expert names the state for that reason.

How does the expert link the undisclosed risk to the injury?

The expert names the specific risk that was not disclosed, shows from the records that it occurred, and states to a reasonable degree of medical probability that it caused the injury, not merely that it could have.

White lost on this element. No expert testified that it was more likely than not that the undisclosed greater risk of nerve damage materialized and caused White's injury. The physicians who testified allowed only that the pain could possibly be related to the surgery. A witness's agreement on cross-examination that the surgery was the "most likely cause" of the pain was not enough for the Supreme Court of Ohio, because the same witness testified that the surgery did not affect White's condition.

The expert's work on causation has three steps. The first is to name the risk: not a general category, but the complication the records show, such as a dural tear, a nerve root injury or a specific drug reaction. The second is to show in the operative report, the imaging and the post-operative notes that this complication occurred. The third is to explain why the patient's injury follows from that complication and not from the underlying disease or another event, as the fall did in White.

New York section 2805-d(3) states the causation requirement in the statute: the lack of informed consent must be a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which recovery is sought.

Which records does the medical expert need for an informed consent claim?

The signed consent form with its date and time, the pre-operative clinic notes, patient education materials, the anesthesia record, the operative report, post-operative notes and imaging, and any communications in the patient portal.

The consent form shows what was written; the clinic notes show what was discussed and when. The anesthesia record shows when sedation began, which matters for the time of the signature under Florida's subsection (4)(b). The operative report and imaging show which risk occurred. Portal messages and printed handouts can show what the patient was told outside the visit.

Where there is a recording or a written summary of the consent discussion, the expert reads it against the statute's list: the procedure, the alternatives, the substantial risks. The expert also says which alternatives were medically acceptable at the date of the procedure and whether the document names them.

Does an informed consent claim need a certificate of merit?

In Pennsylvania, yes. The note to Rule 1042.3 states that the certificate of merit requirements apply to lack of informed consent claims, so the certificate is filed with the complaint or within 60 days after it is filed.

In Womer v. Hilliker (2006) the plaintiff's complaint joined a negligence count with an informed consent count, and both ended with a judgment of non pros because no certificate was filed. Other states have their own pre-suit and early expert requirements for malpractice claims, and counsel check whether an informed consent count is covered by them.

What does IAE do in an informed consent case?

A physician in the relevant specialty from the IAE registry writes an expert report on the client's questions or a review of the opposing expert's report. Delivery takes up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.

The IAE medical expert report page covers standard of care, causation and the medical record in malpractice, wrongful death and personal injury cases. The physician builds a timeline from orders, vital signs, nursing notes and imaging, then compares each decision with the specialty's guidelines in force at the time of care. The questions are framed from the chart, the operative notes and the opposing expert's report.

The client sends the records listed above and, where there is one, the opposing expert's report, and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. Delivery takes up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry, can be verified by Member ID or QR code and confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A report is evidence that the court weighs with the rest of the record. Neither IAE nor the physician guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.

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