Expert witnesses

Patent eligibility under section 101: when does an expert declaration change the outcome of an Alice motion?

Whether a patent claims eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 is a question of law, and district courts often decide it on a motion to dismiss. Since 2018 the Federal Circuit has treated one part of the test as a question of fact: whether the claimed elements were well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan. That fact is where a technical expert's declaration counts, in court and before the USPTO.

An expert from behind sets a turned-away declaration beside a board of blank circles

What does an expert declaration add to a section 101 dispute?

Facts beneath the legal question: what was conventional in the field at the patent's date, what problem the prior systems had, and what the claimed combination changed. The expert's view on eligibility itself carries no weight.

Section 101 is one sentence. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."

The Supreme Court reads three exceptions into that text. In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, decided June 19, 2014, it repeated them: "Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable."

The Federal Circuit calls the final answer legal. In Berkheimer v. HP Inc., decided February 8, 2018, it wrote: "Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is ultimately an issue of law we review de novo." The same opinion added that the legal answer can rest on facts. A technical expert supplies those facts, and a declaration that stays with them is evidence. A declaration that announces the claims are eligible is argument.

What is the two-step Alice test?

Step one asks whether the claims are directed to a law of nature, natural phenomenon or abstract idea. Step two asks whether the claim elements, alone or in combination, add an inventive concept that amounts to significantly more.

The patents in Alice claimed a computerized scheme for mitigating settlement risk through a third-party intermediary. Justice Thomas wrote for a unanimous Court. At the first step the Court asked whether the claims were "directed to a patent-ineligible concept" and found that they were directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.

At the second step the Court searched for an "inventive concept," an element or combination that makes the claim amount to "significantly more" than the ineligible concept. It found none. The method claims required only "generic computer implementation," and the computer functions were "well-understood, routine, conventional" activities previously known to the industry. The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's judgment that the claims were ineligible.

Four years later Berkheimer turned on that phrase. Whether a given function was conventional at the patent's date is a statement about the history of a technology.

Why did Berkheimer turn conventionality into a question of fact?

Because the Federal Circuit held that whether a claim element or combination is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact, and facts pertinent to invalidity need clear and convincing evidence.

Berkheimer's U.S. Patent No. 7,447,713 covers digitally processing and archiving files in a digital asset management system. A parser splits files into objects, tags them and compares them with objects already in the archive. Redundant elements are not stored twice, and a change to one linked object carries through every archived document that contains it, which the patent calls one-to-many editing.

The district court granted summary judgment that the asserted claims were ineligible. The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Moore for a panel that also included Judges Taranto and Stoll, affirmed for claims 1 to 3 and 9, which it found directed to the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with no inventive concept. For claims 4 to 7 it vacated the judgment. Those claims recite storing data without substantial redundancy and one-to-many editing, and the specification describes benefits of both: "By eliminating redundancy in the archive 14, system operating efficiency will be improved," and one-to-many editing "substantially reduces effort needed to up-date files."

The court then stated the rule. The question whether a claim element or combination "is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact." Any fact pertinent to invalidity "must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." And prior publication is not the test: that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art "does not mean it was well-understood, routine, and conventional."

Expert evidence already figured in the case on a different issue. Claims 10 to 19 were held indefinite on the declaration of HP's expert, Dr. Schonfeld, and the opinion records that Berkheimer offered no expert testimony of his own.

Can factual allegations defeat a motion to dismiss?

Yes, when they are plausible and specific. The Federal Circuit held in Aatrix and Cellspin that eligibility may be decided on the pleadings only if no factual allegation, taken as true, prevents resolving the question as a matter of law.

Six days after Berkheimer, on February 14, 2018, the same court decided Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc. The patents covered systems for designing, creating and importing data into viewable electronic forms. The district court in Florida had dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) without claim construction and refused leave to file a second amended complaint.

Judge Moore wrote that eligibility can be decided on a motion to dismiss only when "there are no factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of law." The proposed pleading qualified: "There are concrete allegations in the second amended complaint" that individual elements and the claimed combination were not well-understood, routine or conventional. The court vacated the dismissal and reversed the denial of leave to amend. Judge Reyna dissented in part.

Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., decided June 25, 2019, repeated the point for patents on connecting a data capture device such as a digital camera to a mobile device over a short-range wireless link such as Bluetooth so that content is published automatically. Judge O'Malley wrote that "plausible and specific factual allegations that aspects of the claims are inventive are sufficient." The district court had erred by setting those allegations aside, and the court vacated the dismissal together with an award of attorney fees.

How does a court treat an expert declaration attached to the complaint?

As part of the pleading, if it states facts. In Sapphire Crossing (D. Del. 2020) the court accepted an expert's factual assertions about the inventive feature as true and recommended denying the motions to dismiss.

Sapphire Crossing LLC v. Quotient Technology Inc., C.A. No. 18-1717-MN-CJB, is a report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke dated April 1, 2020. In an earlier report of August 14, 2019, the court had found claim 19 directed to the abstract idea of "capturing, uploading and transferring data."

The plaintiff amended its complaint and attached the declaration of an expert, Mansoor Anjarwala, as an exhibit incorporated by reference. He identified the "specific inventive feature" as "the merging of a scanned image with the menu function" and stated that the prior art disclosed only the addition of logos or messages to print-outs.

The defendants made two objections that recur in these motions. First, they said the expert had conceded conventionality; the court answered that the supposed concession depended on the defendants' own claim construction, which it declined to adopt at that stage. Second, they said the declaration was untethered to the patent, which says nothing about inventiveness. The court acknowledged that the patent is silent on the point and found no "immediately-apparent inconsistency" between the declaration and the patent.

Relying on Berkheimer, the court characterized the expert's statements of unconventionality as factual assertions and not legal conclusions, which must be accepted as true at the pleading stage. It recommended denial without prejudice to raising eligibility again at summary judgment.

A procedural rule explains why the declaration was attached to the pleading. Under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court," a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) "must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." A declaration filed only with the opposition brief is a matter outside the pleadings, so the court either excludes it or converts the motion.

When do allegations fail at the pleading stage?

When they are conclusory. In Simio v. FlexSim (2020) the Federal Circuit disregarded a pleaded statement that a feature improves the functioning of the computer and affirmed dismissal and the denial of leave to amend.

Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Products, Inc., decided December 29, 2020, concerned U.S. Patent No. 8,156,468 on building simulation objects with graphical process flows instead of programming code. The district court in Utah dismissed under section 101 and denied leave to amend as futile.

Chief Judge Prost wrote: "We disregard conclusory statements when evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)." A statement that a feature "improves the functioning and operations of the computer" was, by itself, conclusory, and the supporting allegations repeated arguments the court had already rejected, such as greater efficiency and processing speed. The court also saw "no error in the district court's determining ineligibility without first conducting claim construction," because the patentee had not explained how the construction of any term would change the analysis.

The three decisions name the two sides of one line: Aatrix speaks of "concrete allegations," Cellspin of "plausible and specific factual allegations," Simio of "conclusory statements." For an expert the difference is practical. A sentence that the invention is unconventional or improves the computer is a conclusion. A paragraph that names the claim limitation, describes how systems worked before the filing date, cites the documents that show it and explains what the limitation changed states facts.

When does expert testimony fail at summary judgment?

When the patent contradicts it. In CareDx v. Natera (2022) the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of ineligibility because the specification's own admissions of conventionality controlled over the patentee's expert and other extrinsic evidence.

The three Stanford patents licensed to CareDx describe detecting a donor's cell-free DNA in the blood of an organ transplant recipient; a rising level can indicate rejection. Natera and Eurofins Viracor moved to dismiss. A magistrate judge recommended denial, and the district court denied the motions so that the parties could conduct limited discovery.

After expert discovery both defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court in Delaware, Chief Judge Colm F. Connolly presiding, first denied the motions because the warring extrinsic evidence of the three parties appeared to create a fact issue on conventionality. The court then reconsidered and granted them.

The Federal Circuit affirmed on July 18, 2022, in an opinion by Judge Lourie. The claims, it held, are directed to natural phenomena and recite "standard, well-known techniques in a logical combination" to detect them. The specification itself described the techniques as conventional and as "well within the skill of art." The opinion recounts that the district court found the fact issue non-genuine because of the "explicit contradiction between CareDx's extrinsic evidence" and the "numerous admissions of conventionality in the intrinsic record."

Berkheimer had left room for this result: "not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry." For the patentee's expert the first reading is therefore the specification. In CareDx the expert evidence of unconventionality did not survive the passages of the patents that called the techniques conventional.

Who carries the burden, and by what standard?

In court the challenger. A patent is presumed valid under 35 U.S.C. 282(a), the party asserting invalidity bears the burden, and under Berkheimer the facts behind an eligibility challenge must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 282(a) states: "A patent shall be presumed valid." The burden of establishing invalidity "shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." In Cellspin the Federal Circuit rejected a district court's view that issued patents are presumed valid but not presumed eligible.

The standard matters for experts on both sides. The challenger's expert has to support conventionality with evidence that meets the clear and convincing standard, and Berkheimer says that disclosure of an element in a piece of prior art does not by that fact make it well-understood, routine and conventional. At summary judgment the patentee's expert has a narrower task, to show a genuine dispute of material fact. For claims 4 to 7 in Berkheimer the Federal Circuit vacated summary judgment on that ground.

Before the USPTO the standard is lower. The agency's memorandum to examiners of December 4, 2025 states that eligibility in examination is decided on the preponderance of the evidence, weighing all the evidence of record.

What should an eligibility declaration contain?

The declarant's basis for knowing the field at the relevant date, the claim limitation at issue, how prior systems worked, dated documents that show it, and what the limitation changed. It should not state legal conclusions.

The decisions above supply a checklist. The perspective is that of "a skilled artisan in the relevant field," so the declaration states the declarant's training and work in that field at or near the patent's date. The subject is the claim, so each fact is tied to claim language; the USPTO puts the same requirement in these words: "there must be a nexus between the invention as claimed and the evidence provided in the declaration."

The facts are historical. What did existing systems do, what could they not do, and where is that recorded? Sapphire Crossing accepted a declaration that contrasted the claimed merging step with what the prior art disclosed. Simio rejected bare statements of improvement.

The declaration must be consistent with the specification, as CareDx shows, and with the claim construction the party will later advance. And it stops short of the legal answer. The USPTO memorandum says that an opinion on eligibility itself "is not entitled to any weight," although the underlying factual basis may be persuasive. Courts apply the same division when they separate factual assertions and legal conclusions.

How are eligibility declarations used before the USPTO?

As evidence under 37 CFR 1.132 to rebut a section 101 rejection. Since December 2025 the USPTO has issued memoranda on subject matter eligibility declarations, telling examiners to weigh them and applicants how to file them.

Rule 132 is short: when a claim is rejected, "any evidence submitted to traverse the rejection or objection on a basis not otherwise provided for must be by way of an oath or declaration under this section."

The agency's first response to Berkheimer was a memorandum to the examining corps dated April 19, 2018. It lists four ways an examiner may support a finding that an additional element is well-understood, routine and conventional: an express statement in the specification or by the applicant during prosecution, a court decision listed in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, a publication describing the state of the art, or official notice. If the applicant challenges official notice, the examiner must answer with one of the first three items or with an affidavit or declaration "setting forth specific factual statements and explanation."

On December 4, 2025 the Director of the USPTO issued a memorandum to the Patent Examining Corps titled "Subject Matter Eligibility Declarations." It describes the declaration as optional and filed under Rule 132. On who may sign, it says: "Any person who has knowledge of the facts being asserted in the declaration may sign the declaration," for example an inventor, an inventor's co-worker or an independent expert, and "No special qualification other than knowledge of the facts is required." Its examples include showing that a claimed step cannot practically be performed in the human mind, that the claim improves the functioning of a computer or another technology, and that an unconventional arrangement of known elements supplies the inventive concept. The examiner must consider a compliant declaration on the merits and explain, on all the evidence of record, why the rejection has or has not been overcome.

The USPTO's eligibility page lists two later documents. A memorandum of April 30, 2026 on best practices for submitting these declarations supersedes the Director's earlier best practices memorandum of December 4, 2025. A memorandum of September 29, 2026, addressed to patent applicants and practitioners, adds a flowchart with two parts, formal compliance and review on the merits, states that it does not revise the December 4, 2025 memorandum to examiners, and gives advice to applicants: "Consider submitting SMEDs separately from other evidence," file early, because "Submitting the SMED as early as possible in prosecution may be advantageous," and consider the source, because "Evidence from disinterested parties may be more persuasive than those from interested parties." It adds: "The ultimate determination of eligibility resides with the Primary Examiner."

Can eligibility be challenged at the PTAB, and how is expert testimony weighed there?

Not in inter partes review, which is limited to sections 102 and 103. Post-grant review, filed within 9 months of grant, reaches any invalidity ground under section 282(b)(2) or (3). Unsupported expert testimony gets little or no weight.

Under 35 U.S.C. 311(b), a petitioner in inter partes review may request cancellation "only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications." Eligibility is outside that list.

Post-grant review is wider. Under 35 U.S.C. 321(b) the petitioner may raise "any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b)," and paragraph (2) covers invalidity "on any ground specified in part II as a condition for patentability." Section 101 is in part II of Title 35. The petition must be filed "not later than the date that is 9 months after the date of the grant of the patent."

The Board's rule on experts is 37 CFR 42.65(a): "Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight." The next sentence excludes one subject altogether: "Testimony on United States patent law or patent examination practice will not be admitted." A declaration on conventionality filed with a petition or a patent owner response therefore has to carry its sources with it.

Which expert does counsel need, and when?

An engineer or scientist who worked in the patent's field at about the filing date. The patentee needs that person before the complaint or the amended complaint. The challenger needs one before summary judgment.

The Federal Circuit's test is framed from the viewpoint of a skilled artisan in the relevant field, so the declarant's value lies in first-hand knowledge of what was routine in that field in the relevant year: a software architect for a data management claim, a molecular biologist for a diagnostic method, an electrical engineer for a signal processing claim.

Timing differs by side. Aatrix and Cellspin turn on what the complaint alleges, and Sapphire Crossing shows a declaration attached to an amended complaint after a first adverse ruling. A patentee who expects an Alice motion can retain the expert while the complaint is being drafted. A defendant who loses the motion to dismiss on factual grounds needs an expert for the summary judgment record, as in CareDx.

If the expert will testify, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 applies: the proponent must show the court that it is more likely than not that the expert's knowledge will help the trier of fact, that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and on reliable principles and methods, and that the opinion applies them reliably to the facts of the case. The report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states all opinions with their basis, the facts or data considered, the exhibits, qualifications with publications of the previous 10 years, testimony of the previous 4 years and compensation.

How does IAE find a technical expert for a section 101 dispute?

In the request choose the case type Intellectual property and name the technology, the patent's filing date and the forum. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and prior testimony.

The IAE page on intellectual property expert witnesses lists six specialties: electrical and mechanical engineers, chemists, software engineers, damages economists and consumer survey experts. IAE chooses the specialty by the technology in dispute and the question the firm needs to prove. The page notes that state courts and the PTAB apply their own rules to expert testimony, so the request names the court or the PTAB.

The request form asks for the field of expertise, the case type, the state and court, the firm's side, the expert disclosure deadline, the parties and their counsel for the conflict check, and a short description of the case. For an eligibility dispute the description can give the patent number, the claim limitation said to be conventional and the date as of which the field has to be described. The form asks not to include privileged or sealed information.

Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that field by the deadline. The search is paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment. Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. Within 5 business days the firm receives 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years. If no candidate fits, the second search is free; if IAE finds no candidates, it refunds the fee.

The firm chooses the expert, who bills the firm directly or through IAE under the agency option. IAE is not a law firm: case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.

Sources

  1. 35 U.S.C. § 101, Inventions patentable (LII, Cornell Law School)
  2. 35 U.S.C. § 282, Presumption of validity; defenses (LII, Cornell Law School)
  3. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, No. 13-298 (U.S. June 19, 2014) (LII, Cornell Law School)
  4. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., No. 17-1437 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2018) (Justia)
  5. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., No. 17-1452 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2018) (Justia)
  6. Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 18-1817 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 2019) (Justia)
  7. Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Products, Inc., No. 20-1171 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 29, 2020) (FindLaw)
  8. CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., No. 22-1027 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 2022) (Justia)
  9. Sapphire Crossing LLC v. Quotient Technology Inc., C.A. No. 18-1717-MN-CJB (D. Del. Apr. 1, 2020), report and recommendation (U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware)
  10. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 (LII, Cornell Law School)
  11. USPTO memorandum of April 19, 2018, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)
  12. USPTO memorandum of December 4, 2025 to the Patent Examining Corps, Subject Matter Eligibility Declarations
  13. USPTO memorandum of September 29, 2026, Subject Matter Eligibility Declarations (SMEDs) under 37 CFR 1.132: Flowchart for Analysis and Best Practices
  14. USPTO, Subject matter eligibility (guidance and memoranda page)
  15. 37 CFR § 1.132, Affidavits or declarations traversing rejections or objections (LII, Cornell Law School)
  16. 37 CFR § 42.65, Expert testimony; tests and data (LII, Cornell Law School)
  17. 35 U.S.C. § 311, Inter partes review (LII, Cornell Law School)
  18. 35 U.S.C. § 321, Post-grant review (LII, Cornell Law School)
  19. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 (LII, Cornell Law School)
  20. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII, Cornell Law School)

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