Examinations
Preference claim in bankruptcy: how does a forensic accountant test the ordinary course and new value defenses?
A vendor paid in the 90 days before its customer's bankruptcy can be sued for the money under 11 U.S.C. 547. The defenses are arithmetic. In Sparrer Sausage (7th Cir. 2016) a recalculated payment-timing baseline cut the exposure on 23 invoices worth $586,658.10 to $60,679, and $63,514 of unpaid new value erased the rest. A forensic accountant builds that analysis out of invoice and payment records.

What makes a payment a preference under section 547(b)?
Five elements: a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor, for an antecedent debt, made while the debtor was insolvent, within 90 days before the petition, that gives the creditor more than Chapter 7 would.
Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code lists the elements in paragraphs (1) through (5). The 90-day window in paragraph (4) stretches to one year before the petition when the creditor was an insider at the time of the transfer. Paragraph (5) compares what the creditor received with what it would have received in a Chapter 7 case if the transfer had not been made.
Two subsections allocate proof. Under section 547(f) the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days before the petition. Under section 547(g) the trustee has the burden of proving that a transfer is avoidable under subsection (b), and the creditor has the burden of proving that an exception in subsection (c) applies. The defenses are the creditor's case to make.
Since the 2019 amendment the trustee may avoid a transfer only "based on reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case" and taking into account the creditor's known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses under subsection (c). A creditor that answers a demand letter with a documented defense analysis puts that analysis in front of the trustee before a complaint is filed.
Small claims fall out by statute. In a case of a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts, section 547(c)(9) protects transfers when the aggregate value of the property affected is less than a threshold that the Judicial Conference adjusts every three years. The threshold was $7,575 until March 31, 2025 and has been $8,575 since April 1, 2025.
What is the ordinary course of business defense?
Section 547(c)(2) protects payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business of both parties if the payment itself was made in the ordinary course between them or according to ordinary business terms.
The defense has two alternative branches. The first looks at the two parties: was this payment made the way the debtor had been paying this creditor? Courts call it the subjective test. The second looks at the market: was the payment made according to ordinary business terms? A creditor needs one of the two, and each calls for different data. The first needs the history of the account. The second needs evidence of terms in the trade.
The Supreme Court set the reach of the defense in Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (Dec. 11, 1991). ZZZZ Best Co. borrowed $7 million in December 1986 and filed a Chapter 7 petition in July 1987. In the 90 days before the filing it made two interest payments totaling about $100,000 and paid a loan commitment fee of about $2,500. The Ninth Circuit had held the exception unavailable to long-term creditors. Justice Stevens, for a unanimous Court, wrote that payments on long-term debt, as well as payments on short-term debt, may qualify, because the text of the statute draws no line between the two.
The Court did not decide whether those payments were in fact ordinary. It reversed and remanded, and left it to the Court of Appeals to decide whether the payments were made in the ordinary course and according to ordinary business terms.
How does a forensic accountant test whether the payments were ordinary?
By measuring the days between invoice and payment in a historical period and comparing the preference-period payments with that baseline. Courts use an average-lateness method or a total-range method, and the choice of period and range decides the result.
Unsecured Creditors Committee of Sparrer Sausage Co. v. Jason's Foods, Inc., No. 15-2356 (7th Cir. June 10, 2016) is the worked example. Jason's Foods, a wholesale meat supplier, had sold to Sparrer Sausage since February 2, 2010. Sparrer filed under Chapter 11 on February 7, 2012. In the 90 days before the petition it paid 23 invoices totaling $586,658.10. The supplier conceded that the payments were preferences and relied on subsections (c)(2) and (c)(4).
The parties had stipulated to a historical period ending November 7, 2011: 235 invoices paid within 8 to 49 days, with an average invoice age of almost 25 days. The bankruptcy judge cut the period off at April 15, 2011, which left 168 invoices paid within 8 to 38 days and an average of 22 days. He then treated 16 to 28 days, the average plus or minus 6, as ordinary. Twelve preference-period invoices fell inside that range. Eleven, paid within 14, 29, 31, 37 and 38 days and totaling $306,110.23, did not.
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Sykes, accepted the shorter period. After April 15, 2011 the share of invoices paid 30 or more days after issuance had reached 46.3 percent, against 5.95 percent before. The court also accepted the average-lateness method, which uses the average invoice age in the historical period, over the total-range method, which uses the minimum and the maximum. It rejected the range. The 16-to-28-day bucket captured only 64 percent of the historical invoices, and the court asked why payments made at 14 days were excluded when that interval was common in the historical period. Adding two days to either end of the range, the court wrote, would have captured 88 percent. The court called the narrower baseline "excessively narrow but also arbitrary."
The court found nothing in the record to suggest that payment within 14, 29 or 31 days of issuance was unusual. Only the invoices paid 37 and 38 days after issuance were out of the ordinary. They totaled $60,679.00, against $306,110.23 under the bankruptcy judge's range.
Which records does the payment analysis need?
Invoice-level history for the preference period and for a baseline period well before it: invoice date, due date, payment date, amount and terms for every invoice, with the source documents available to the other side.
The Seventh Circuit said the baseline should be the norm established by the debtor and the creditor in the period before, preferably well before, the preference period. The accountant therefore pulls the full account history and tests more than one cut-off date, because the cut-off moves the average. In Sparrer the stipulated period gave an average of almost 25 days and the truncated period gave 22.
The working file is a table with one row per invoice: number, date, amount, due date under the stated terms, date and amount of the payment that cleared it, and the days between invoice and payment. Out of that table come the average, the minimum and maximum, the share of invoices inside each candidate range and the same figures for the preference period. Each figure in the report is traceable to a row, and each row to an invoice and a bank record.
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, as amended effective December 1, 2024, lets the court admit a summary, chart or calculation offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible records, and requires the proponent to make the underlying originals or duplicates available for examination or copying. A summary that functions only as an illustrative aid is governed by Rule 107.
A retained expert's report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states all opinions with the basis and reasons for them and the facts or data considered. For a preference analysis the facts or data are the invoice table, the cut-off dates tested and the reason for the range chosen. In Sparrer the Seventh Circuit wrote that the bankruptcy judge "offered no explanation for the narrowness of this range."
How does the new value defense reduce the claim?
Under section 547(c)(4) a preferential payment is protected to the extent that the creditor afterwards gave the debtor new value, such as goods shipped on credit. The accountant nets each payment against the later shipments in date order.
Section 547(a)(2) defines new value as money or money's worth in goods, services or new credit. Subsection (c)(4) applies when, after the transfer, the creditor gave new value that was not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest and on account of which the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to the creditor.
In Sparrer the supplier delivered $63,514 of meat products between January 18 and February 6, 2012 and was never paid for them. That amount exceeded the $60,679 left after the ordinary course analysis, so the liability was entirely offset and the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of $242,595.32.
Whether new value must remain unpaid was the question in Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (In re BFW Liquidation, LLC), No. 17-13588, 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2018). Bruno's Supermarkets paid Blue Bell $563,869.37 in 13 payments during the preference period, and Blue Bell delivered $435,705.65 of merchandise in about 1,700 deliveries. The bankruptcy court counted only new value that remained unpaid and let the trustee recover $438,496.47. The Eleventh Circuit treated an earlier statement that new value must remain unpaid as dictum, construed the subsection anew and held that it "does not require new value to remain unpaid." It vacated the judgment and remanded for a new calculation.
The calculation is a running ledger. Payments and deliveries are listed by date, each payment creates exposure, and each later delivery reduces it. Where the rule in Blue Bell applies, the accountant also checks, delivery by delivery, whether the payment that later covered it was itself avoidable.
What should a creditor do when a preference demand arrives?
Check the five elements and the small-claim threshold, pull the account history, and have the ordinary course and new value figures computed before answering. Under section 547(g) the creditor carries the burden on every exception.
The first pass is on the trustee's elements. Was each payment inside the 90 days? Was it on account of a debt that existed before the payment, or was it a prepayment or a payment on delivery? Does the total stay under the section 547(c)(9) threshold of $8,575? A contemporaneous exchange for new value is a separate exception under section 547(c)(1), which protects a transfer that was intended as a contemporaneous exchange for new value and was in fact substantially contemporaneous.
The second pass is the analysis described above. The creditor's own ledger is usually enough to start: invoices and payment dates for the period used as the baseline and for the preference period, shipments made after each challenged payment, and the credit terms in force. The debtor's records fill the gaps once the case is in discovery.
The third pass is presentation. Because the trustee must now take into account known or reasonably knowable defenses before suing, a response that attaches the invoice table and the netting ledger gives the trustee something specific to weigh. Whether to settle and at what figure is a decision for the creditor and its bankruptcy counsel. The accountant supplies the numbers and the method behind each one.
What does IAE do in a preference dispute?
A forensic accountant in the IAE registry writes an expert report on the client's questions or a review of the opposing expert's report, in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.
The forensic accounting page lists three kinds of questions: solvency on each transfer date, tracing of funds through bank statements and ledgers, and damages. The questions are framed out of the ledgers, tax returns and bank statements in the record. The report answers the questions agreed with the client. In a preference case those are the days-to-pay history, the netting of payments against later shipments and, where the presumption of section 547(f) is contested, solvency on the payment dates.
A review of the opposing report goes line by line against the record and Rule 702: sufficient facts or data and a reliable application of the method. Absent a stipulation or a court order, a report offered solely to contradict or rebut the other side's expert on the same subject is due within 30 days after that disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii).
The client sends the demand letter or complaint, the invoice and payment history, the credit terms, the shipment records and the questions. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist chosen in its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. Cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.
Registry members passed the collegial attestation of the council under the published Criteria Matrix, and the Member ID or QR code in the document opens the specialist's record. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case. The report is evidence the court weighs with the other materials. Neither IAE nor the specialist guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm.
Sources
- 11 U.S.C. 547, Preferences (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991) (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Unsecured Creditors Committee of Sparrer Sausage Co. v. Jason's Foods, Inc., No. 15-2356 (7th Cir. June 10, 2016), Justia
- Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (In re BFW Liquidation, LLC), No. 17-13588 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2018), govinfo.gov
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII, Cornell Law School)
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