Expert report review

Is the opposing product expert qualified for every opinion in the report?

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence admits a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, and federal courts apply that test to each opinion in a report. In Calhoun v. Yamaha (3d Cir. 2003) an expert with a naval architecture degree was still kept from opinions on a jet ski throttle he had never operated. A review sets each opinion against the expert's record on that subject.

A closed diploma tube and a thin folder lie beside an industrial valve on a counsel table

What does Rule 702 require of a product expert's qualifications?

A witness may give expert testimony if qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Since the 2023 amendment the proponent must show the court that each requirement of the rule is more likely than not met.

Rule 702 opens with five routes to qualification: "A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The rule then sets four conditions for the testimony itself. The expert's specialized knowledge must help the trier of fact, the testimony must rest on sufficient facts or data, it must come from reliable principles and methods, and the opinion must apply those methods reliably to the facts of the case.

The 2023 amendment wrote the burden into the text. The party offering the expert must show the court that it is more likely than not that the requirements are met. The committee note to that amendment adds a rule for reports with several conclusions: "each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of the expert's basis and methodology."

The rule names no degree, license or certification for product cases. A mechanical engineer, a materials scientist, a psychologist who studies human factors and a former safety officer have all been offered as product experts in the decisions discussed here, and each of them was admitted for some opinions and kept from others.

Appellate courts give the trial judge room on this question. In Bradley v. Ameristep the Sixth Circuit wrote: "We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court's decision to exclude expert testimony."

How strictly do federal courts read the qualification requirement?

Liberally. The Third Circuit held in Pineda v. Ford (2008) that a broad range of knowledge, skills and training can qualify an expert, and that the witness need not be the best qualified expert available.

Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., No. 07-1191, was decided by the Third Circuit on March 24, 2008. On July 18, 2002, Jose Pineda, an automobile technician at a Lincoln-Mercury dealership in West Chester, Pennsylvania, was replacing the hinges on the rear liftgate of a 2002 Ford Explorer. The liftgate glass shattered while he was torquing a hinge nut and injured his leg. He sued Ford for failure to warn and withdrew a design defect claim before the Daubert hearing.

His expert, Craig D. Clauser, P.E., held B.S. and M.S. degrees in metallurgical engineering and materials science, had studied fracture mechanics and glass modeling, and had consulted on more than 200 cases involving failure of glass or other ceramics. The district court excluded him on three grounds, the first being his admission that he was not a warnings expert, and then granted Ford summary judgment. The court of appeals noted that the summary judgment "was based entirely on the absence of expert testimony on behalf of Pineda."

The Third Circuit reversed. "We have interpreted Rule 702's qualification requirement liberally," the court wrote, and a "broad range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert." It found that "Clauser's formal qualifications are unassailable," that his expertise in the stresses and other forces that might cause glass to fail was "more than sufficient to satisfy Rule 702's substantive qualification requirement," and that "a proper warning is also a solution to an engineering problem." The court held that "Clauser should have been qualified as an expert even though he may not have been the 'best qualified' expert."

The Sixth Circuit reached the same kind of result in Bradley v. Ameristep, Inc., No. 14-6087, decided August 24, 2015. King Bradley fell from a treestand on September 29, 2011, when two replacement ratchet straps broke a few minutes after he climbed in. His expert, Charles Powell, had more than 35 years of analyzing product failures and had analyzed polymer straps or webbing in load-bearing applications five or six times. The district court found that his expertise was in metallurgy. The court of appeals held that it abused its discretion when it concluded "that Powell's expertise was solely in the area of metallurgy," and reversed the summary judgment.

Clauser's admission that he was not a warnings expert did not decide the question in Pineda, and the label of metallurgist did not decide it in Bradley. In both cases the expert's training covered the physics of the failure.

Can an expert be qualified for one opinion and not for another?

Yes. In Calhoun v. Yamaha the Third Circuit wrote that an expert may be generally qualified but may lack qualifications to testify outside his area of expertise, and it upheld limits placed on three experts.

Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., Nos. 02-4098 and 02-4162, was decided by the Third Circuit on November 18, 2003. In June 1989, 12-year-old Natalie Calhoun rented a Yamaha Wavejammer WJ500G at the Palmas del Mar resort in Puerto Rico, crashed into an anchored boat and died. The warning on the craft gave 14 as the minimum recommended operator age. The plaintiffs claimed that the squeeze finger throttle, which resembles the brake lever of a bicycle, was defectively designed and that the warnings were inadequate.

Dr. Edward W. Karnes held a doctorate in experimental psychology and had headed human factors research at Martin Marietta for six years. He had no engineering degree. The district court qualified him on his experience in general design and operations and let him describe the throttle, but barred his theory that a stress reaction clenched the rider's hand on the throttle, his conclusion that the throttle design was defective and his opinion that the minimum age should be sixteen. The court of appeals wrote: "An expert may be generally qualified but may lack qualifications to testify outside his area of expertise."

Albert Bruton had been a lieutenant with San Diego's Marine Safety Services for sixteen years and had extensive experience with jet skis, but no formal training in engineering, psychology or human factors. He was allowed to explain how jet skis and their throttles work. He was not allowed to say which throttles were safer, because he "had no education or experience in product design of jet skis or accelerating mechanisms." His opinions on the substance of the warnings and on the age limit were excluded as unreliable.

Dr. Robert A. Warren held a bachelor's degree in naval architecture and marine engineering and had experience in marine accident reconstruction, and Yamaha accepted that his qualifications were generally sufficient. When he wrote his report he had never operated a jet ski, and he admitted that he had never examined diagrams of the different throttles used on jet skis. The district court let him describe the throttle and barred his testimony that it was unsafe. "Although Dr. Warren possessed expertise in relevant fields," the court wrote, "he failed to apply this expertise to the matter at hand." The judgment for Yamaha was affirmed.

Does an engineering degree qualify an expert to testify about any product?

No. In Florio v. Ryobi (D.N.J. 2020) a mechanical engineering professor with no circular saw experience was barred, while a Michigan court let an engineer without airbag experience testify and left that gap to the jury.

Florio v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc., Civ. No. 17-5518, was decided by the District of New Jersey on September 2, 2020. Brenda Florio injured her left hand while cutting a pine board with a Ryobi CSB135L circular saw bought at Home Depot for $35. The plaintiffs withdrew their warning claims and kept the design defect claim. Their expert, Dr. Gordon D. Moskowitz, was an emeritus professor at Drexel University with a 1964 PhD in mechanical engineering from Princeton. His publications dealt with subjects such as bipedal locomotion and electromyography. He had never written about circular saws, had no experience in power saw design or standards, and had not worked on a circular saw case before this one.

The court wrote that "Professor Moskowitz does not have 'specialized knowledge' respecting circular saw design" and noted that insofar as he familiarized himself with the relevant standards, "it was only in preparing to testify in this lawsuit." He had run no tests to inform his criticism of the saw's design. The court found that the testimony failed on qualifications, reliability and fit, barred it and granted summary judgment on the design defect claim.

State courts apply their own evidence rules, and some leave such gaps to cross-examination. In Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., No. 187002, an unpublished decision of August 26, 1997, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed the testimony of David Trombley, a licensed mechanical engineer and member of the Society of Automotive Engineers, about a driver's airbag in a 1991 Lincoln Continental that did not deploy in a collision. Trombley had worked for Ford and for General Motors Truck and Coach, though not on airbags, and the court noted that he lacked extensive experience pertaining directly to supplemental restraint systems.

The trial court had ruled that the objection went to the weight of his testimony. The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion and pointed to "the breadth of his scientific and engineering background, coupled with his independent research." Trombley had read enough materials to satisfy himself that he understood how an air bag system functions; Moskowitz had nothing on saws beyond his work for the case. The review looks for that kind of record: publications, earlier projects, testing and standards work on the type of product in dispute.

Can years in the industry replace formal training?

Experience can qualify an expert, but the committee note to Rule 702 requires an experience-based witness to explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached. In Calhoun a jet ski safety officer could explain operation, not design.

The committee note to the 2000 amendment of Rule 702 states that nothing in the amendment "is intended to suggest that experience alone", or experience together with other knowledge, skill, training or education, "may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony." The same note sets a condition: "If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached."

Calhoun drew the line inside one witness. Sixteen years of patrol work with jet skis gave Bruton enough to tell the jury how the craft and its throttle operate. The same years gave him no basis for comparing throttle designs, because his work had never involved designing them.

Bradley drew the line in the other direction. The Sixth Circuit counted 35 years of failure analysis and five or six earlier analyses of load-bearing polymer straps, and wrote: "Whether a proposed expert's experience is sufficient to qualify the expert to offer an opinion on a particular subject depends on the nature and extent of that experience."

For an expert who relies on experience, the review lists the concrete items the report cites: how many failures of this kind the expert has examined, for whom, over what period and with what results. It then checks whether the report explains how that experience leads to the conclusion about this product. A report that lists years in the industry and states a conclusion, with nothing between the two, does not meet the condition in the committee note.

What must the opposing report disclose about the expert's qualifications?

Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) the report states the witness's qualifications with all publications from the previous 10 years and lists the cases in which the witness testified at trial or by deposition in the previous 4 years.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists six parts of a retained expert's written report. Two concern qualifications: item (iv), "the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years," and item (v), "a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition." Items (i) and (ii) require a complete statement of all opinions with their basis and reasons, and the facts or data the witness considered in forming them.

The publication list is the first place a reviewer looks. In Florio the list showed work on bipedal locomotion and electromyography and nothing on saws. The testimony list shows which products the expert has testified about, for which side and in which courts, and earlier testimony on the same product or the same failure mode is a source of statements to compare with the present report.

The lists also supply questions for the deposition. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) provides: "A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial." Answers about a missing publication, an earlier case left off the list or a license in another discipline then become part of the record for a Rule 702 motion.

A license is evidence of training in a discipline. Clauser's engineering license and his metallurgical degrees supported his opinion on glass failure in Pineda. The review records the discipline of each license and degree and compares it with the discipline of each opinion.

How does a reviewer test qualifications against each opinion?

By listing every opinion in the report, naming the knowledge each one needs and matching it with the degrees, publications, prior cases and work on this product that the report and the CV disclose.

The work follows a fixed order, because the same expert can pass for one opinion and fail for the next.

  • The reviewer copies out each opinion in the report, including opinions stated only in the summary or in the conclusion.
  • For each opinion the reviewer names the field it belongs to, for example materials failure, mechanical design, electrical systems, warnings and human factors, manufacturing quality or valuation.
  • The reviewer matches each opinion with the degree, license, publication, earlier case or project that the report or the CV cites for it.
  • The reviewer records what the expert did with the product in this case: inspection, operation, testing, review of drawings and of the standards that apply to it.
  • The reviewer marks the opinions for which the record shows neither training nor experience in that field, and cites the decision closest to the facts.

Is a gap in qualifications a ground for exclusion or a question of weight?

Both outcomes appear in the cases. Florio and Calhoun barred opinions outside the expert's field, Pineda and Bradley reversed exclusions, and the Michigan court in Taylor left a narrower gap to cross-examination.

Under Rule 702 the trial judge decides admissibility, and since 2023 the rule states that the proponent carries the burden of showing that the requirements are more likely than not met. A gap that leaves an opinion with no basis in the expert's training or experience is a ground for a motion to exclude that opinion. A record that is thin but present went to the jury in Taylor.

The cases mark the two ends. Moskowitz had nothing on saws, and Bruton had nothing on throttle design, so their opinions on those subjects were barred. Clauser and Powell had training in the physics of the failure, and the exclusions were reversed. Trombley had general engineering training and his own reading on airbags, and the trial court sent the dispute to the jury.

The review therefore sorts its findings into two groups. Opinions outside any field the expert has trained or worked in go into the motion, each with the decision closest to the facts. Opinions where the expert's record is thin but present go into the deposition outline and the cross-examination.

Who should review the opposing product expert's opinions and qualifications?

A specialist in the field of the opinion under review. A glass failure opinion of the kind in Pineda calls for a materials or failure analyst, and a warnings opinion for someone trained in warnings or human factors.

A reviewer who testifies is measured by the same rule. A rebuttal report is subject to Rule 26(a)(2)(B), including the list of publications from the previous 10 years and of testimony from the previous 4 years. Under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), absent a stipulation or court order, evidence "intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter" is due "within 30 days after the other party's disclosure."

Calhoun applies to the reviewer as well. A reviewer with a mechanical engineering background can address the design and testing of a throttle, and the opinions on how riders react to it belong to a reviewer trained in human factors. When one report contains opinions from several fields, the review either brings in a second specialist or states which opinions it does not address.

The review is also read by the judge who rules on the motion. It states the reviewer's own degrees, publications and earlier work on the same type of product, so that the court can compare the two records side by side.

What does IAE do when the opposing product expert's qualifications are in question?

IAE prepares a review of the opposing expert's report, or an expert report on the client's questions, for warranty and supply disputes in US courts. The signed document is issued within up to 5 business days.

The questions on the IAE product defect page are whether the goods were defective when delivered, whether the failure came from manufacturing or from misuse, and what the goods were worth as accepted. A review answers six questions about the opposing report, and one of them is the expert's competence: whether the expert's education, specialty and experience match the subject of the examination. The review also lists the tests the expert did not run and the conclusions the data do not support.

The client sends the opposing report with its exhibits and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The draft is checked for facts, and the signed PDF is issued within up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed. Cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.

The work is done by members of the public IAE registry with the relevant specialization, among them professors, doctors of science and holders of international certifications. Registry members passed the council's collegial attestation under the published Criteria Matrix. The Member ID in the document opens the specialist's category, specialization, attestation date and record status on the status check page or by QR code, and the specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case.

Materials are sent through the form on the contact page or by email and are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A review is evidence that the court weighs together with the other materials, and neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.

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