Examinations
Delayed diagnosis claims: what does the medical expert have to establish?
A delayed diagnosis claim needs two medical answers. A physician says when a careful doctor in the defendant's position would have ordered the test or referral that finds the disease. A second expert, in Mammarella and Delavern an oncologist, says what the disease looked like at that earlier date and what the delay changed. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld judgment for the doctors in Mammarella v. Evantash in 2014 because the second answer was missing.

What counts as a delayed diagnosis in a malpractice case?
A diagnosis made later than a reasonably careful physician would have made it. The National Academies define diagnostic error as a failure to establish an accurate and timely explanation of a patient's health problem or to communicate it.
The committee of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that wrote Improving Diagnosis in Health Care (2015) defined diagnostic error as "the failure to (a) establish an accurate and timely explanation of the patient's health problem(s)" or to "communicate that explanation to the patient." The committee concluded that "most people will experience at least one diagnostic error in their lifetime" and that diagnostic errors "are the leading type of paid medical malpractice claims."
A medical definition is not a legal one. A malpractice claim still needs proof that the delay fell below the standard of care and proof that the delay caused harm. In Mammarella and Delavern, discussed below, physicians in different specialties gave those two opinions. In Matsuyama a gastroenterologist testified both on the standard of care and on survival by stage.
The three cases involve a stomach test that was not ordered for about four years, a follow-up mammogram set six months out, and rectal bleeding attributed to hemorrhoids for about a year. In each, the experts had to describe the patient's condition at the earlier date.
What does the standard-of-care expert have to show?
That a reasonably careful physician in the defendant's position, given the symptoms and risk factors in the chart, would have ordered the test or referral earlier. In Matsuyama the expert named the tests an internist should have ordered.
In Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1 (2008), Kimiyoshi Matsuyama became a patient of Dr. Neil Birnbaum in July 1995, at age 42, with gastric complaints recorded since 1988; in 1994 a previous physician had noted that he might need an upper gastrointestinal series. He had risk factors for gastric cancer that the physician knew of: Asian ancestry, years of living in Korea and Japan, and smoking. Over about four years of visits the physician diagnosed gastrointestinal reflux disease and later nonulcer dyspepsia, and ordered neither an endoscopy nor an upper gastrointestinal series. In September 1998 a test for H. pylori came back positive, and no endoscopy or upper gastrointestinal series followed. In May 1999 imaging found a two-centimeter stomach mass, diagnosed as gastric adenocarcinoma, and he died the following October.
The plaintiff's gastroenterologist testified that "an internist exercising the expected standard of care would have ordered an upper gastrointestinal series X-ray or an endoscopy," based on the complaints, the symptoms and the risk factors. The Supreme Judicial Court found "ample evidence" that the physician breached the standard of care by not testing earlier.
In federal court, Rule 702 as amended effective December 1, 2023 requires the proponent of an expert to show the court that it is more likely than not that the testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data" and "is the product of reliable principles and methods." For a delayed diagnosis opinion the facts are the chart entries: what the patient reported, what the physician knew and on which date.
The specialty of the expert follows the claim. In Delavern v. Health Services of Clarion, a Pennsylvania case discussed below, the trial court denied the family practice summary judgment on the corporate negligence claim, relying in part on the opinion of the plaintiffs' family practice medicine expert. An oncologist testified on causation at trial.
Why does a delayed diagnosis case need a causation expert as well?
Because a late diagnosis is not harm by itself: the plaintiff must show what an earlier diagnosis would have changed. In Mammarella v. Evantash the claim failed when the only causation expert could not say.
On October 13, 2009, a screening mammogram was reported as showing two 6 mm nodules; the record later established there was one. On October 16 a follow-up examination reported no evidence of malignancy and advised a return in one year. On October 20 the patient's gynecologist, at the patient's request, scheduled a mammogram in six months. The April 22, 2010 study showed the nodule had grown to 8 mm, a biopsy on May 7 found cancer, and on May 27 a lumpectomy removed an 11 mm Stage I, Grade III tumor. Chemotherapy was recommended.
The treating oncologist, Dr. David Biggs, was the plaintiff's only causation expert. He conceded that he could not state to a reasonable degree of medical probability what treatment would have been needed in October 2009, agreed that he would be speculating if he did, and could not state the tumor's size or prognosis six months earlier.
Chief Justice Strine wrote for the Delaware Supreme Court on May 15, 2014 that a medical opinion "should be stated in terms of 'a reasonable medical probability'" and that "[a] doctor cannot base his expert medical opinion on speculation or conjecture." The court quoted 18 Del. C. § 6853(e)(3), under which no liability may rest on asserted negligence unless expert medical testimony is presented on the standard of care and "as to the causation of the alleged personal injury or death." The affidavit of merit filed at the start of the case could not stand in for that testimony at trial, and the judgment as a matter of law for the defendants was affirmed.
How does the expert estimate the disease stage at the earlier visit?
From the stage at diagnosis, the time elapsed and published data on the disease. In Delavern a Pennsylvania appellate court upheld a verdict built on such an estimate although no imaging or biopsy existed for the earlier visit.
In Delavern v. Health Services of Clarion, Inc., No. 858 WDA 2024, decided by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on January 6, 2025 in a non-precedential memorandum, Steven Delavern, then 31, reported rectal pain, bleeding and bowel problems at a family practice in July 2019. A physician assistant supervised by a physician diagnosed internal hemorrhoids and prescribed suppositories. He returned with worse symptoms in February 2020 and was referred to general surgery in July 2020. A colonoscopy in August 2020 found rectal cancer, later staged as stage four with spread to the lungs.
The plaintiffs' oncologist, Thomas Cartwright, M.D., testified that the cancer was probably stage one or two in July 2019 and that five-year survival was roughly 80-90% at that stage and 10% at stage four. No imaging or biopsy had been done in July 2019. The defense called the staging speculative, pointing to his answer on cross-examination that "it's kind of speculation" and to his admission that he would not stage a patient from experience alone.
The court held that the testimony, viewed as a whole, was sufficiently certain on increased risk of harm, and that uncertainty about the exact stage in July 2019 did not make it speculative. The judgment of $7,291,398.51, which included delay damages on a jury verdict of $6,970,783, was affirmed.
The two cases split on the point that decided them. Dr. Biggs in Mammarella said he could not estimate the tumor's size or prognosis six months earlier. Dr. Cartwright in Delavern gave an estimate for the earlier date and explained what it rested on.
What is loss of chance, and do all states accept it?
Loss of chance treats a reduced chance of a better outcome as the injury. Massachusetts adopted it in Matsuyama in 2008 and counted at least twenty states and the District of Columbia that accept it, and ten that refused.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Supreme Judicial Court on July 23, 2008: "we recognize loss of chance not as a theory of causation, but as a theory of injury." The plaintiff still proves causation by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, proves that the negligence reduced the patient's chance of a more favorable outcome. The holding is limited to medical malpractice claims.
The court required expert testimony "to ascertain what measure of a more favorable outcome is medically appropriate" and "to apply these rates to the particular clinical circumstances of the patient." It rejected the argument that survival statistics are speculation: "But survival rates are not random guesses." The jury found that Mr. Matsuyama was at stage 2 when the negligence occurred, with a 37.5% chance of survival; the plaintiff's expert had put survival at stage 2 at 30% to 50%, and the defense expert at 25% to 40%.
Damages are proportional. In the court's example, full damages of $600,000, a 45% chance of survival before the negligence and a 15% chance after it give an award of $180,000. In the case itself the jury awarded $328,125, which is 37.5% of $875,000.
According to the opinion, the highest courts of at least twenty states and the District of Columbia had adopted the doctrine, and the high courts of ten states, among them Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Texas and Vermont, had refused. Delaware and Oregon held that loss of chance claims are incompatible with their wrongful death statutes, without deciding whether such claims are otherwise actionable. Which rule applies is a question of state law, and the causation opinion has to answer the question that state law asks.
What does Pennsylvania's increased risk of harm rule require of the expert?
An opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the delay increased the risk of the harm the patient suffered. If the expert says that much, the question whether the delay caused the injury goes to the jury.
The Delavern court relied on Vicari v. Spiegel, quoting Billman v. Saylor: when a plaintiff cannot show causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty but can show that the conduct increased the risk of harm, "the question of whether the conduct caused the ultimate injury should be submitted to the jury." The expert still states the increased risk with reasonable medical certainty.
The opinion is judged as a whole. Under Mazzie, which the court cited, an expert fails the test if he or she testifies only that the conduct "possibly" caused the result. The court found that Dr. Cartwright stated with reasonable certainty that the thirteen-month delay increased the risk of the negative outcomes. According to the plaintiffs' brief, which the court quoted, he testified that the delay reduced Mr. Delavern's life expectancy and necessitated procedures that affected his quality of life.
The Delaware and Pennsylvania cases asked the causation expert different things. In Mammarella the expert had to say what treatment the patient would have needed at the earlier date. In Delavern the expert had to say that the delay increased the risk of the harm that followed.
Which records does the expert need to build the timeline?
Every record that dates a symptom, an order, a result or a call: office notes, imaging reports and images, pathology, laboratory results, phone notes and scheduling records. The Mammarella opinion lists six dated entries between October 2009 and May 2010.
The Mammarella timeline came from such records: the mammogram report of October 13, 2009, the follow-up report of October 16, the gynecologist's call on October 20 with the six-month scheduling, the April 22, 2010 study, the May 7 biopsy and the May 27 surgery with the tumor's size and grade. Each date fixes what the physicians knew at that point and what the tumor measured when it was next seen.
In Matsuyama the record reached back to gastric complaints noted in 1988 and a previous physician's 1994 suggestion of an upper gastrointestinal series, and the opinion records that the defendant knew of the patient's risk factors. In Delavern the visits of July 2019, February 2020 and July 2020 and the colonoscopy of August 2020 marked the thirteen months that the jury weighed.
The expert works through these entries in date order and states, for each one, what a careful physician would have done with the information then in the chart and what the disease looked like on that date.
What does IAE do in a delayed diagnosis case?
A physician in the relevant specialty from the IAE registry writes an expert report on the standard of care and causation, built on a timeline of the chart. Delivery takes up to 5 business days.
The IAE medical expert report service covers standard of care, causation and the medical record in malpractice, wrongful death and personal injury cases. The physician builds a timeline of orders, vital signs, nursing notes and imaging, then compares each decision with the specialty's guidelines in force at the time of care. The expert separates general and specific causation and checks the record set for missing notes and gaps in orders.
The client sends the chart, the imaging and pathology reports and, where there is one, the opposing expert's report, and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. Delivery takes up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry, can be verified by Member ID or QR code and confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A report is evidence that the court weighs with the rest of the record. Neither IAE nor the physician guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.
Sources
- National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Improving Diagnosis in Health Care. The National Academies Press, 2015, Summary
- Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1, 890 N.E.2d 819 (2008), opinion text (CounselStack)
- Mammarella v. Evantash, No. 548, 2013 (Del. May 15, 2014), opinion (Justia)
- Delavern v. Health Services of Clarion, Inc., No. 858 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2025), non-precedential memorandum
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, with committee notes (U.S. Code, GovInfo)
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