Expert witnesses

EMTALA expert witness: emergency medicine testimony on screening, stabilization and transfer

An EMTALA expert witness is usually an emergency physician who compares what a hospital did with the duties in 42 U.S.C. 1395dd: a medical screening examination, stabilizing treatment and an appropriate transfer. The private claim runs against the hospital, and courts do not treat it as a malpractice claim. The expert answers two narrower questions: did the hospital screen this patient the way it screens others with similar symptoms, and did it release a patient it knew was unstable?

A physician from behind stands by an empty gurney in a quiet emergency bay

What does an EMTALA expert witness do?

The expert reads the emergency department chart, the hospital's screening and transfer policies, the central log and the transfer papers, and gives medical opinions on the emergency condition, the screening, stabilization and the transfer.

The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act puts three duties on a hospital with an emergency department that participates in Medicare. Section 1395dd(a) requires an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the emergency department to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists. Subsection (b) requires the hospital to stabilize that condition with its own staff and facilities or to transfer the patient. Subsection (c) restricts the transfer of a patient who has not been stabilized.

Each duty turns on facts a physician reads in the record. Section 1395dd(e)(1) defines an emergency medical condition as one with acute symptoms of sufficient severity that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to place the patient's health in serious jeopardy, seriously impair bodily functions or cause serious dysfunction of a bodily organ. The expert asks whether this patient met that definition, what the hospital's written screening procedure called for with the presenting complaint, whether the staff followed it, what the physicians knew when the patient left, and whether a transfer met the statutory conditions.

Many complaints combine the federal claim with state negligence claims. In Battle v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, decided by the Fifth Circuit on September 20, 2000 (No. 99-60343), the family of a 15-month-old boy sued the hospital, two physicians and a physician group, Emergency Care Specialists of Mississippi, and the claims included EMTALA and negligence. Opinions in such a case are measured against two different yardsticks: the statute for the hospital and the state standard of care for the physicians.

In federal court a retained expert signs a written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). It states all opinions with the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered, the exhibits, the expert's qualifications with publications from the previous 10 years, the cases with testimony in the previous 4 years, and the compensation. Without a stipulation or court order the report is due at least 90 days before the date set for trial, and a rebuttal report within 30 days after the other side's disclosure.

What does EMTALA require of a hospital emergency department?

To screen anyone who comes to the emergency department and asks for examination or treatment, whatever the person's ability to pay, and then to stabilize an emergency medical condition or transfer the patient under the statute's conditions.

The regulation that carries out the statute, 42 CFR 489.24, reaches beyond the emergency department door. An individual "comes to the emergency department" when he or she presents at a dedicated emergency department and requests care, or presents elsewhere on hospital property and requests care for what may be an emergency. Hospital property is the main hospital campus, including the parking lot, sidewalk and driveway. The duty also covers a person in a hospital-owned ambulance.

Section 489.24(b) counts as a dedicated emergency department any department or facility, on or off the main campus, that is licensed by the state as an emergency department, is held out to the public as providing care for emergency medical conditions without an appointment, or provides at least one-third of its outpatient visits for urgent emergency conditions. The screening examination is performed by individuals "determined qualified by hospital bylaws or rules and regulations."

Money questions wait. Under section 1395dd(h) the hospital may not delay the screening examination or stabilizing treatment to ask about the method of payment or insurance status, and section 489.24(d)(4) bars seeking insurance authorization before the screening and initial stabilizing treatment are done. Registration that asks about insurance is permitted when it does not delay care or unduly discourage the patient from staying.

The duties end in defined ways. If the hospital screens the patient, finds an emergency medical condition and admits him or her as an inpatient "in good faith in order to stabilize" the condition, section 489.24(d)(2) treats its obligations under the section as met. If the patient is told the risks and benefits and refuses the examination, treatment or transfer, the hospital has met its duty and must take reasonable steps to obtain a written informed refusal (section 1395dd(b)(2) and (b)(3)).

Who can be sued under EMTALA, and for what?

In a private action, only the hospital. A person harmed as a direct result of a violation sues the participating hospital for the personal injury damages available under the law of its state, within two years of the violation.

Section 1395dd(d)(2)(A) gives an individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a hospital's violation a civil action against the participating hospital for the damages available for personal injury under the law of the state where the hospital is located, and for appropriate equitable relief. A medical facility that suffers a direct financial loss because of another hospital's violation may sue that hospital under subsection (d)(2)(B). Subsection (d)(2)(C) bars any action brought more than two years after the date of the violation.

Physicians face penalties instead of private suits under the statute. Under subsection (d)(1)(B), a responsible physician who negligently violates the section, including by signing a transfer certification when he or she knew or should have known that the benefits did not outweigh the risks, is subject to a civil money penalty of up to $50,000 per violation and, for gross and flagrant or repeated violations, to exclusion from Medicare and state health care programs. A hospital that negligently violates the section is subject to up to $50,000 per violation, or $25,000 if it has fewer than 100 beds (subsection (d)(1)(A)).

On-call coverage has its own rule. If an on-call physician fails or refuses to appear within a reasonable time and the examining physician orders a transfer because its benefits outweigh the risks without that physician's services, the transferring physician is not penalized under subsection (d)(1)(B). The protection does not extend to the hospital or to the on-call physician who failed to appear (subsection (d)(1)(C)).

Before the government imposes a penalty under subsection (d)(1), section 1395dd(d)(3) requires it, except where a delay would jeopardize health or safety, to ask the quality improvement organization to assess whether the patient had an emergency medical condition that was not stabilized. The organization generally gets at least 60 days for that review.

How is an EMTALA screening claim different from a malpractice claim?

Courts measure EMTALA screening against how the hospital screens other patients with similar symptoms, not against the professional standard of care, so a missed diagnosis does not by itself violate the statute.

In Battle the Fifth Circuit wrote that an appropriate screening is judged "by whether it was performed equitably in comparison to other patients with similar symptoms," and that "a hospital's liability under EMTALA is not based on whether the physician misdiagnosed the medical condition." A lumbar puncture that was not done and a delayed EEG did not, on their own, show disparate treatment.

The claim survived on the hospital's own written rule. Daniel Battle developed a fever and sores on his tongue in December 1994 and was seen at Memorial Hospital on December 24, on December 25, when a physician diagnosed a seizure disorder, and on December 26, when he was admitted. He was flown to Tulane Medical Center on December 27, and on January 19, 1995 a PCR test of his spinal fluid at the Whitley laboratory of the University of Alabama was positive for herpes simplex encephalitis. Memorial's nursing standards said that "infants and elderly are usually hospitalized if no definitive source for fever/infection" is found. The court held that "evidence that a hospital did not follow its own screening procedures can support a finding of EMTALA liability for disparate treatment," found conflicting evidence on whether the standard was followed, and vacated the judgment as a matter of law on the EMTALA claims.

In Cox v. Cabell Huntington Hospital, decided on March 2, 2012, the Southern District of West Virginia wrote of EMTALA, citing the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America (1992): "It is not a federal malpractice act."

Whether a screening claim also needs proof of an improper motive is unsettled. In Roberts v. Galen of Virginia the Supreme Court noted that the Sixth Circuit in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group read subsection (a) to require improper motive, that other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit in Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp. (1991), did not, and said the question "is not before us, and we express no opinion on it here."

The screening opinion therefore needs the written triage and screening protocol for the patient's complaint and evidence of how the hospital handled comparable patients, set against the chart of this visit.

What has to be proved on a failure to stabilize?

That the hospital knew of an emergency medical condition and transferred or discharged the patient before treatment made material deterioration unlikely within reasonable medical probability. Since Roberts v. Galen, no improper motive is required.

Under section 1395dd(e)(3) and 42 CFR 489.24(b), a patient is stabilized when no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer. For a woman in labor, stabilized means delivery of the child and the placenta. A transfer includes discharge: section 1395dd(e)(4) defines it as moving the patient outside the hospital's facilities at the direction of a person employed by or affiliated with the hospital, except a patient declared dead or one who leaves without permission.

In Battle the court held that "the duty to stabilize does not arise unless the hospital has actual knowledge" of the unstabilized emergency medical condition. The plaintiffs' experts testified that a "seizure disorder" is an emergency medical condition because deterioration is likely to occur, and the court held that a jury could find the hospital released Daniel even though the doctors knew he had seizures that had not been stabilized.

Roberts v. Galen of Virginia set the federal rule on motive. Wanda Johnson was run over by a truck in May 1992 and treated at a hospital in Louisville, Kentucky, for injuries to the brain, spine, leg and pelvis. About six weeks later, with her health still "in a volatile state," the hospital transferred her to a nursing facility in Indiana, where her condition deteriorated significantly. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the hospital. On January 13, 1999, the Supreme Court reversed (No. 97-53) and held that section 1395dd(b) "contains no express or implied 'improper motive' requirement."

Pregnancy cases add a definition. Under section 489.24(b), a woman having contractions is in true labor unless a qualified provider certifies, after a reasonable time of observation, that she is in false labor. In Morin v. Eastern Maine Medical Center, a woman 16 weeks pregnant came to the emergency room with contractions, tests showed that the fetus was dead, and she was discharged home; that evening she delivered the fetus in her bathroom. Chief Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. wrote on July 28, 2010, that "EMTALA, however, turns on a determination, not a diagnosis," and that "whether a patient is a pregnant woman having contractions is a fact, not a diagnosis."

When is a transfer appropriate under EMTALA?

When the patient asks in writing or a physician certifies that the benefits outweigh the risks, and the transfer meets subsection (c)(2): risk-minimizing treatment, an accepting facility, records, qualified transport and any added requirements of the Secretary.

Section 1395dd(c)(1) bars the transfer of a patient who has not been stabilized unless the patient or a legally responsible person requests it in writing after being told of the hospital's obligations and the risks, or a physician signs a certification that the expected medical benefits outweigh the increased risks. When no physician is present in the emergency department, a qualified medical person may sign the certification after a physician, in consultation with that person, has made the determination, and the physician countersigns it later.

Under subsection (c)(2) the transfer also has to be appropriate. The sending hospital provides the treatment within its capacity that minimizes the risks. The receiving facility has available space and qualified personnel and has agreed to accept the patient and provide treatment. The sending hospital sends the available medical records. The transfer is made by qualified personnel and transportation equipment, with life support measures as needed. Under subparagraph (E) the Secretary of Health and Human Services may add other requirements.

Receiving hospitals carry a duty as well. Under 42 CFR 489.24(f), a participating hospital with specialized capabilities or facilities, such as burn units, shock-trauma units or neonatal intensive care units, may not refuse an appropriate transfer of a patient who needs those services if it has the capacity to treat the patient. Section 1395dd(i) protects a physician or qualified medical person who refuses to authorize the transfer of an unstabilized patient, and an employee who reports a violation, against adverse action by the hospital.

On a transfer claim the expert checks the certification form and its time, the call to the accepting facility, the list of records that went with the patient, and the ambulance crew and equipment against the patient's condition at departure.

Which hospital records does the expert need?

The emergency department chart and nursing notes, the central log entry, the on-call list for that day, the screening, on-call and transfer policies in force, the transfer certification and acceptance records, and the receiving facility's chart.

42 CFR 489.20(r) obliges every hospital, sending or receiving, to keep three sets of EMTALA records. Medical and other records related to individuals transferred to or from the hospital are kept for 5 years after the date of the transfer. The hospital keeps an on-call list of physicians on its medical staff or with privileges who are available to provide the treatment needed after the initial examination to stabilize patients. It also keeps "a central log on each individual who comes to the emergency department," which records whether the person refused treatment, was refused treatment, or was transferred, admitted and treated, stabilized and transferred, or discharged.

Section 489.24(j) requires written policies for the times when a particular specialty is not available or the on-call physician cannot respond because of circumstances beyond his or her control. If the hospital permits on-call physicians to schedule elective surgery during on-call time or to hold simultaneous on-call duties, its written policies must keep emergency services available. Section 489.20(q) requires a sign posted conspicuously in the emergency department that states patients' rights under section 1867 of the Social Security Act.

In Battle the court vacated the judgment on the screening claim because of a written nursing standard on hospitalizing infants with fever. A request for production in an EMTALA case therefore asks for the policy manuals in force on the date of the visit along with the chart.

Do state pre-suit and expert rules apply to an EMTALA claim?

Courts split on pre-suit rules for the EMTALA count itself. State expert-qualification statutes still govern any state malpractice claim pleaded in the same complaint against the emergency physicians.

Section 1395dd(f) says the statute does not preempt state or local law requirements except where a requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of the section. Courts disagree on which pre-suit rules conflict.

In Cox the patient alleged that he was discharged without being adequately screened or stabilized and pleaded only an EMTALA claim. The hospital moved to dismiss because he had not followed West Virginia's Medical Professional Liability Act, which requires pre-suit notice and a "screening certificate of merit executed under oath by a qualified expert." Judge Robert C. Chambers denied the motion and held that these requirements "directly conflict with the Plaintiff's federal EMTALA claims, and are therefore preempted." The court followed Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass'n (4th Cir. 1994), which, as Cox describes it, held that Virginia's pre-suit requirements for malpractice actions directly conflict with EMTALA, and noted that the certificate asks a physician whether care fell below the standard of care, a different question from EMTALA's disparate-screening test.

Cox declined to follow Hardy v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. (2d Cir. 1999), which it described as holding that New York's pre-suit requirements did not conflict with EMTALA, and Draper v. Chiapuzio (9th Cir. 1993), which it described as holding that a state's pre-suit requirements do not directly conflict. The court described the requirements in those cases as "non-burdensome notice of claim requirements" and wrote that a bare notice-of-claim requirement "conflicts only minimally with EMTALA's statute of limitations."

State claims against the emergency physicians keep their own expert rules. In a Florida negligence action against a physician providing emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department, section 766.102(9) admits expert medical testimony only from physicians, osteopathic physicians, podiatric physicians and chiropractic physicians with "substantial professional experience within the preceding 5 years while assigned to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department." That experience is judged by the custom and practice of emergency coverage in hospital emergency departments in the same or similar localities. Under section 766.102(12), an expert who testifies on the standard of care for or against a Florida physician also needs a Florida license or an expert witness certificate.

Texas changes the standard of proof. Section 74.153 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, as amended by H.B. 2362 in 2019, covers health care liability claims arising out of emergency medical care in a hospital emergency department or obstetrical unit, or in a surgical suite immediately following evaluation or treatment in the emergency department. The claimant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician or provider, with willful and wanton negligence, deviated from the care reasonably expected of an ordinarily prudent physician or provider in the same or similar circumstances. The rule does not reach care given after the patient is stabilized and receiving care as a nonemergency patient. The amendment took effect on September 1, 2019, and applies to actions commenced on or after that date.

How does IAE find an emergency medicine expert for an EMTALA case?

In the IAE request, choose the case type Medical malpractice, name the specialty, for example emergency medicine or obstetrics for a labor case, and give the state and court. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates.

The medical malpractice expert witness page lists emergency department care among the case types and emergency physicians among the specialties IAE searches for, with EMTALA screening and stabilization named on the emergency care card. The state rules on the same-specialty requirement are covered in the article on medical malpractice expert witness requirements. The request also asks for the side, the expert disclosure deadline, and the parties and their counsel for the conflict check. Please leave out privileged or sealed information.

Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that specialty by that deadline. Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. For each candidate the firm receives a CV, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years, the lists that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires.

The search costs $2,000 per case, paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment. If no candidate fits, the second search is free; if IAE finds no candidates, it refunds the fee. The expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. Under the agency option, for hours at the expert's rate plus $100 per hour, for fixed fees, minimum charges and surcharges plus 40%, and for expenses at cost, the expert bills the firm through IAE on one invoice, and the search fee is credited to the first invoice.

IAE is not a law firm. Case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.

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