Expert report review

The expert could not determine why the product failed: what happens to the claim?

When the experts find where a product failed but not why, the buyer or injured user still carries the burden of proving a defect. Some states let a jury infer a defect once other causes are ruled out, and New Jersey refuses to draw it from the injury alone. In Dorn v. BMW (D. Kan. 2010) and Wang v. Maserati (3d Cir. 2026) car fire claims failed on the vehicle's age and service history.

An engineer from behind studies two cracked parts and a blank conclusion sheet

What does it mean when an expert reports the cause of a failure as undetermined?

Usually that the expert located where the failure began but could not identify the mechanism. Fire cases separate the two: origin is the place, cause is the failed part or process, and they may call for different experts.

Dorn v. BMW of North America, LLC, No. 09-1027-WEB, was decided by Judge Wesley E. Brown of the District of Kansas on September 30, 2010. On March 27, 2007, a fire in the garage of Curtis and Ann Dorn destroyed their 2000 BMW 528i and the Chrysler minivan parked next to it and caused structural damage to the garage and the house.

The Dorns' fire investigator, Tim Yandell, placed the origin near the headlamp assembly and gave the opinion that energized electrical wiring was the ignition source. Asked why he could not name the specific cause, he answered: "Because this is above my field of expertise." The court ruled that "Yandell will not be allowed to testify as to the cause of the fire." BMW's electrical engineer, Dennis Himmler, could not identify the cause either.

Wang v. Maserati North America, Inc., No. 25-1847, was decided by the Third Circuit on April 3, 2026, in a non-precedential opinion by Judge Hardiman. A Maserati stored in the integral garage of a New Jersey house that the Wangs rented out caught fire on Christmas Eve, and the fire significantly damaged the home. The plaintiffs' expert, Nicholas Palumbo, a retired fire investigator, concluded that the fire more likely than not began in the engine compartment. The court noted that "Palumbo was not qualified to opine on either vehicle engines or the causes of fires." The fire authorities and the other experts who addressed cause "either classified it as 'undetermined' or affirmatively ruled out the vehicle."

In both cases the finding of origin stood and the cause stayed open. What happened next depended on the state's rule for proving a defect without a named cause, and on what else the record showed about the vehicle.

Who carries the loss when nobody can say why the product failed?

The party who must prove the defect, which is the plaintiff. For accepted goods UCC 2-607(4) puts the burden of establishing any breach on the buyer, and product liability law requires proof of a defect.

Section 2-607(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: "The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods accepted." A warranty claim over a failed machine or vehicle therefore needs evidence that the goods did not conform when they were delivered.

Tort law puts the same proof on the injured user. In Dorn the court applied Kansas law, under which a defective product is required for any products liability, negligence or warranty theory, and it held that the warranty and negligence claims failed together with the product liability claim: "Therefore, plaintiffs cannot recover under any product liability theory."

An undetermined cause does not end the case by itself. It moves the dispute to a narrower question: whether the law of the state lets the plaintiff prove a defect by circumstantial evidence, and whether the record supplies that evidence.

Can a defect be proved without identifying what failed?

In some states, yes, if the plaintiff rules out other causes. Kansas and Illinois allow the inference on that condition. New Jersey law, applied in Wang, does not draw it from the fact of the injury.

The Kansas rule, as quoted in Dorn, reads: "In the absence of direct proof of a specific defect, it is sufficient if a plaintiff negates other possible causes." The court found that a jury could infer a defect in the BMW without a specific defect being named, because other causes had been ruled out, and still granted summary judgment for a reason explained below.

Illinois has a similar rule, traced to Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales. In Rizzo v. Corning Inc. (7th Cir. 1997) the court described the plaintiff's burden as showing that "the product failed at a time or in a manner it would not be expected to fail," with no misuse and no secondary cause. Under that approach, "the accident itself is sufficient evidence of a defect." In 2022 the Seventh Circuit applied the same Illinois rule in Bensenberg v. FCA US LLC to a front airbag and reversed summary judgment for the manufacturer.

New Jersey law took the other side in Wang. The plaintiffs asked the court to infer from the origin of the fire that the car was defective and that the defect caused the fire. The court refused: "New Jersey law does not allow this series of attenuated inferences. An inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from the mere fact that someone was injured."

The choice of law is therefore the first line of a review of an undetermined-cause report. The same report can support a jury question in one state and summary judgment in another.

When has an unexplained failure been enough for a verdict?

In Rizzo v. Corning the Seventh Circuit upheld a $182,000 verdict for a coffee carafe that broke in half about five months after purchase, although the plaintiffs' expert was barred from testifying about the cause of the break.

Rizzo v. Corning Inc., Nos. 96-1597 and 96-1689, was decided on January 23, 1997, in an opinion by Chief Judge Posner. A glass carafe made by Corning, used in a coffeemaker made by Mr. Coffee, broke about five months after purchase and spilled coffee heated to between 170 and 180 degrees Fahrenheit, which gave Mr. Rizzo second-degree burns. The jury awarded $182,000, including an award to Mrs. Rizzo for loss of consortium.

The district court directed a verdict against the plaintiffs on the theory that required proof of a specific defect, so the case went to the jury only under the Tweedy inference. The district judge barred the plaintiffs' expert, a consultant with a master's degree in materials engineering, from giving his opinion on the cause of the break and let him testify about where the crack began. The court of appeals wrote that "the judge found Moore qualified to testify about the origin of the crack." The defense expert attributed the break to a crack from the carafe striking a wall, which the Rizzos denied.

The defendants argued that the inference does not fit fragile products. The court disagreed: "A carafe designed to be used for years, not months, breaks in half without being dropped or banged," and that kind of failure is unusual enough for a jury to infer a defect. The judgment was affirmed.

What must the evidence rule out?

Misuse, outside causes and causes introduced after sale, such as repairs, maintenance and earlier accidents. In Dorn, Wang and Piltch the claims failed because those possibilities remained open on the record.

In Dorn the Dorns had bought the BMW on May 19, 2000. By March 2007 the odometer showed at least 53,300 miles. Joe Self BMW had serviced the car 17 times in seven years and had worked in its engine compartment repeatedly, the last time six weeks before the fire. The court found no factual basis for an inference that the defect existed when the car left BMW's control, and granted summary judgment.

In Wang the vehicle had been sold new in 2018 and bought by the tenant about two years later. It was used, had been purchased more than three years before the fire and had received maintenance, including an emissions recall action and work on the tire pressure monitoring system and the instrument cluster. The court held that "the Wangs failed to negate other potential causes of the vehicle's failure."

Piltch v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-1965, decided by the Seventh Circuit on February 11, 2015, concerned a 2003 Mercury Mountaineer whose airbags did not deploy in a 2006 crash and again in a February 2007 crash on black ice. The owners did not confirm that the restraint control module had been reset after the repairs that followed the first crash. The court wrote that "it remains a reasonable possibility that the air bag failed to deploy due to not being reset," and rejected the res ipsa loquitur theory.

Why did the product's age and service history decide Dorn and Wang?

Because the plaintiff has to show that the defect existed when the product left the manufacturer's control. Years of use and work by third parties give other explanations for the failure.

The defect has to be the manufacturer's. In Dorn the court found that a jury could infer some defect, but the plaintiffs showed no factual basis for a reasonable inference that it existed when the car left BMW's control seven years earlier, after more than 53,000 miles and repeated dealer work in the engine compartment.

In Wang the court made the same point under New Jersey law. The vehicle was used, had been bought more than three years before the fire and had been serviced, and "without more" the plaintiffs could not prove a defect that existed when it left Maserati's control.

A review therefore reads the service history as closely as the fire scene. It lists every repair, recall action, part replacement and accident in the record, with dates and the systems involved, and checks whether the report addresses each one or ignores it.

When does the claim need an expert on the defect?

When the question lies outside a lay juror's understanding. In Piltch the owners disclosed no expert, and summary judgment for Ford was affirmed. In Wang the court required expert proof under New Jersey law.

In Piltch the owners never served an expert report, even after an extension of the deadline. In 2009 they had sold the Mountaineer to a mechanic who reprogrammed the vehicle's blackbox and wiped the data from both crashes. The court wrote that "expert testimony on an issue is required when the issue is not within the understanding of a lay person," and that a lay person could not tell whether the circumstances of the 2007 crash should have triggered deployment. It affirmed the judgment for Ford.

In Wang the Third Circuit rejected a categorical rule that every case about a complex machine needs an expert. It applied the New Jersey test instead, which requires expert testimony where "the average juror" cannot "deduce what happened without resort to . . . technical knowledge," and found that a car fire with an undetermined cause met that test.

Rizzo shows the other end. A carafe that breaks in half in ordinary use is a failure a jury can assess, and the expert testimony about the origin of the crack was enough to go with it.

What if the expert says the cause is outside his field?

Then the cause opinion needs another expert. In Dorn and Wang the fire investigators could place the origin but conceded that the cause was beyond their expertise, and no expert in either case named a cause in the vehicle.

Rule 702 admits an expert opinion only from a witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education for that opinion, and the proponent must show the court that the requirements are more likely than not met. A fire investigator who places the origin in the engine compartment is giving one opinion. The mechanism, such as a failed wire, connector or component, is a second opinion, and it is a question for an electrical or mechanical engineer who examines the remains.

Dorn shows what happens when only the first opinion is offered. Yandell's origin opinion stood, his cause opinion was barred, and BMW's electrical engineer could not identify the cause. The plaintiffs were left with an inference, and the car's history defeated it.

When the opposing report stops at origin, the review states which further examinations would have been needed to reach cause: which parts were collected, which were examined under magnification or tested, and which were never removed from the scene.

Does the seller have to prove what else caused the failure?

Not in these decisions. The burden stayed with the plaintiffs, and the defense won in Dorn, Wang and Piltch by pointing to causes the plaintiffs had not ruled out, without proving which one occurred.

In Dorn the defense expert could not identify the cause, and the defense still obtained summary judgment, because the plaintiffs had not negated the possibility that service work or seven years of use caused the fire. In Wang the defense pointed to the maintenance and recall history. In Piltch it pointed to the possibility that the module had not been reset.

Rizzo shows the limit of that approach at trial. The defense expert offered a specific alternative, a crack from striking a wall, and suggested that abrasive cleaning might have weakened the glass. The Rizzos denied both, the jury found for them, and the court of appeals noted that the defendants did not argue that their expert's evidence was conclusive, which would have meant "requiring the jury to find that the Rizzos were lying."

A defense report that lists alternative causes is reviewed the same way as a plaintiff's report: each alternative needs data in the record, such as the service entry, the damage pattern or the witness statement that makes it possible.

What does a review check when the opposing report calls the cause undetermined?

Which causes the expert considered, what data eliminated each one, which parts were never examined, whether the expert was qualified for each conclusion, and what the service history and the governing state law require.

The review works through the report in a fixed order.

  • The reviewer lists every cause the report considered and the data the expert used to keep or eliminate each one.
  • The reviewer lists the parts and data that were never examined or were lost, such as components left at the scene or a wiped event data recorder.
  • The reviewer checks which conclusions are about origin and which are about cause, and whether the expert is qualified for each under Rule 702.
  • The reviewer lists the age, mileage or hours of use, earlier accidents, repairs and recall actions in the record, and checks whether the report addresses each one.
  • The reviewer identifies the state whose law governs and the elements it requires for proving a defect without a named cause.

What does IAE do when the cause of a product failure is reported as undetermined?

IAE prepares a review of the opposing expert's report, or an expert report on the client's questions, for warranty and supply disputes in US courts. The signed document is issued within up to 5 business days.

The questions on the IAE product defect page are whether the goods were defective when delivered, whether the failure came from manufacturing or from misuse, and what the goods were worth as accepted. The expert reads fracture surfaces, wear and repair marks and decides whether the failure is a manufacturing flaw or misuse. Testing likely to change the item follows ASTM E860-22. A review of the opposing report lists the tests the expert did not run and the conclusions the data do not support.

The client sends the opposing report with its exhibits and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The draft is checked for facts, and the signed PDF is issued within up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed. Cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.

Registry members passed the council's collegial attestation under the published Criteria Matrix. The Member ID in the document opens the specialist's category, specialization, attestation date and record status on the status check page or by QR code, and the specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case.

Materials are sent through the form on the contact page or by email and are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A review is evidence that the court weighs together with the other materials, and neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.

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