Expert report review

Loss of chance in a medical malpractice case: how is the opposing expert's survival percentage tested?

Under the loss of chance doctrine a patient recovers for a reduced chance of survival or cure even when that chance was never above 50 percent. In Matsuyama v. Birnbaum (Mass. 2008) the jury found a 37.5 percent chance and the award was 37.5 percent of $875,000. The whole claim then rests on one number from the expert. A physician reviewer checks the stage, the statistics and the arithmetic behind that number.

Hands divide blank cards into a large pile and a small pile beside a stethoscope

What is the loss of chance doctrine?

A rule that treats the lost opportunity for a better outcome as the injury. The patient proves that negligence reduced the chance of survival or cure, and damages are measured by the size of the reduction.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated the theory in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1 (2008): "we recognize loss of chance not as a theory of causation, but as a theory of injury." It added: "Permitting recovery for loss of chance is particularly appropriate in the area of medical negligence."

Under the traditional rule a plaintiff must show that the negligence more likely than not caused the death or the harm. A patient whose chance of survival was 40 percent before the delay cannot meet that test, whatever the physician did. Loss of chance answers that case by changing what is counted as the harm.

The doctrine is state law, and the states differ. Minnesota adopted it in Dickhoff v. Green (Minn. May 31, 2013), concluding that "Minnesota law permits recovery for 'loss of chance' in a medical malpractice action." A federal court in Alaska refused to apply it in 1999. The first question for any reviewer is therefore which state's law governs the case.

How did Matsuyama v. Birnbaum turn a percentage into damages?

The jury found that the patient had a 37.5 percent chance of survival when the physician first saw him, valued the death at $875,000 and awarded 37.5 percent of that sum, $328,125, for the lost chance.

Kimiyoshi Matsuyama became a patient of an internist, Dr. Neil Birnbaum, in July 1995, at the age of 42. He had a history of stomach complaints and risk factors for gastric cancer. The physician ordered no diagnostic tests, diagnosed reflux and recommended over-the-counter medication. In 1998, after a positive H. pylori test, he still did not order an endoscopy with biopsy or an upper GI series. In May 1999 imaging revealed a mass. The diagnosis was gastric cancer, and the patient died that October.

The jury found the physician negligent and found the negligence a "substantial contributing factor" in the death. It found that the cancer was at stage 2 when treatment began and that the patient then had a 37.5 percent chance of survival. It set full wrongful death damages at $875,000 and awarded $328,125 for loss of chance, together with $160,000 for conscious pain and suffering. The loss of chance judgment was later amended to $281,310 to account for Social Security survivor benefits.

The court decided the case on July 23, 2008 and set out the calculation in five steps. The fact finder first calculates the total damages allowable for the death; next, "the patient's chance of survival or cure immediately preceding" the negligence; then the chance the patient had as a result of the negligence; then subtracts the third figure from the second; and last multiplies the total damages by that percentage. The court ended with a limit: "We emphasize that our decision today is limited to loss of chance in medical malpractice actions."

How large a reduction was enough in Herskovits?

Fourteen percentage points. The Washington Supreme Court held that medical testimony of a five-year survival chance reduced by a six-month delay in diagnosing lung cancer, 39 percent against 25 percent, was enough to send causation to the jury.

Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 99 Wn.2d 609 (1983), was decided en banc on May 26, 1983. Leslie Herskovits visited the defendant in December 1974. His lung cancer was diagnosed in June 1975, the lung was removed in July 1975, and he died on March 22, 1977, at the age of 60. The plaintiff's expert testified that a diagnosis in December 1974 would have given a 39 percent chance of surviving five years, and that at the later diagnosis the chance was 25 percent.

Neither figure was above 50 percent. The court held that testimony of such a reduction "is sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury."

It also limited the recovery: "Causing reduction of the opportunity to recover (loss of chance) by one's negligence, however, does not necessitate a total recovery against the negligent party for all damages caused by the victim's death." Damages were to be "based only on damages caused directly by premature death, such as lost earnings and additional medical expenses."

Where is the doctrine rejected, and on what reasoning?

In Crosby v. United States a federal court predicted that Alaska would not recognize the claim, because the Alaska statute requires proof under the traditional standard and because the court saw one compensable injury in a death case: the death.

Crosby v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924 (D. Alaska 1999), was decided by Judge Sedwick on April 9, 1999. Robert Crosby suffered a heart attack on March 7, 1992 on Amchitka Island and died on May 14, 1992 while awaiting a heart transplant. The complaint alleged that malpractice caused his death or, in the alternative, lessened his likelihood of survival.

The court dismissed the alternative claim. It wrote that "the Alaska Supreme Court would not recognize a cause of action for" loss of chance, and it read AS 09.55.540 as a statute that "clearly and unambiguously requires plaintiffs to establish" causation by the traditional more-likely-than-not standard. Two sentences give the reasoning: "loss of chance is not an injury as that term is commonly understood," and "there is one compensable injury in a wrongful death action, and that is the death itself."

The opinion also counted the jurisdictions as of 1999: "22 states recognizing the doctrine to some degree, 12 states rejecting its application, and 3 states undecided." It cited decisions of Texas and Maryland among those rejecting the theory and described the doctrine as one that "resists precise definition and is subject to varying interpretations and different applications."

In a state that follows the traditional rule the same percentage is used differently. The question becomes whether the chance before the negligence was above 50 percent, and a report that puts it at 55 percent is tested as closely as one that puts it at 37.5.

What does the survival percentage rest on?

On a finding about the stage of the disease at the time of the negligence and on published survival statistics for that stage. The Massachusetts court accepted such evidence and warned that a rate does not decide one patient's fate.

The court in Matsuyama considered the objection that statistics are unreliable and answered that "reliable expert evidence establishing loss of chance is more likely to be available in a medical malpractice case" than in some other areas of tort law. It added a caution: "A statistical survival rate cannot conclusively determine whether a particular patient will survive a medical condition."

Two further sentences mark the ground on which the percentage is fought. "Expert testimony is required to ascertain what measure" of a favorable outcome is medically appropriate, for example five-year survival. And: "Our decision today should not be construed to limit a defendant's right or ability vigorously" to challenge the statistical evidence.

In Matsuyama the jury's two findings were separate: stage 2 at the first visit, and 37.5 percent for that stage. Each has its own evidence. The stage in 1995, four years before the diagnosis, was a matter for expert inference. The rate comes from a study of other patients.

What does a physician reviewer check in the opposing expert's percentage?

The stage assigned to the date of the negligence and its basis in the chart, the source and population of the survival figures, the outcome measure, the chance after the negligence, and the subtraction between the two.

The reviewer works through the report and the chart with these questions:

  • On what findings in the records does the report assign the stage or severity on the date of the alleged negligence?
  • Which study or registry supplies the survival figure, from which years, and for which treatment?
  • Does the patient match the study population in age, tumor type and other conditions, or does the report apply a general figure?
  • Which measure is used: five-year survival, ten-year survival or cure, and is it the same measure before and after?
  • What chance does the report assign after the negligence, and from what evidence?
  • Is the reduction stated in percentage points, as in Herskovits (39 and 25), and does the arithmetic follow the five steps of Matsuyama?
  • Does the report address what treatment the patient would in fact have received and accepted at the earlier date?
  • Does the report list the studies among the facts or data considered, so that each number can be traced?

Which evidence rules apply to the percentage in federal court?

Rule 702 requires sufficient facts or data and a reliable method reliably applied, and Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires the report to state the basis of each opinion and the data considered. A percentage without a traceable source fails both.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that the testimony be "based on sufficient facts or data" and be "the product of reliable principles and methods." The 2023 committee note adds: "each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application" of the expert's basis and methodology. A survival figure that comes out of a study of one stage, applied to a patient whose stage is disputed, raises a question of application under that sentence.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them" and "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them." The studies behind a percentage belong in that list. A reviewer who cannot find them asks for them before the deposition, since under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) the deposition of a retained expert follows the report.

State courts apply their own rules of evidence, and the state decisions above were decided under them. The checks in the previous section do not depend on the forum.

What does IAE prepare when the case turns on a lost chance?

A review of the opposing medical expert report by a registry physician in the specialty of the care at issue. The signed PDF is issued within 5 business days once the format and cost are confirmed.

The review page for medical expert reports describes the work: for counsel who have received the other side's medical expert report in a malpractice, wrongful death or personal injury case, an IAE registry physician tests each opinion against the chart and Rule 702 and writes the review. The page also lists a rebuttal report.

The client sends the opposing report and the records it relies on and describes what to check. The review questions are agreed with the client before work starts. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV. A 48-hour rush is available for cases with tight deadlines.

The physician can be verified by Member ID or QR code and confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy; whether the governing state recognizes loss of chance is a question for the client's attorney. A review is evidence that the court weighs together with the other materials, and neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome.

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