Expert report review
Summary judgment in a medical malpractice case: what must the expert affirmation contain?
A malpractice case can end before trial on a motion for summary judgment, and the motion is decided on physicians' written opinions. In New York the defendant must first show, through an expert, that there was no departure from accepted practice or that it caused no injury; the plaintiff then needs a physician's affirmation that answers each point with facts from the chart. A conclusory opinion on either side loses.

What is summary judgment in a malpractice case?
It is a ruling without trial that one side wins because no genuine dispute of material fact exists. In a malpractice case the dispute is about medicine, so the motion and the opposition rest on physicians' affirmations or declarations.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the court grants summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. New York's CPLR 3212(b) says the motion is granted if the claim or defense is established sufficiently to warrant judgment as a matter of law, and denied if any party shows facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact.
A malpractice claim has elements that a jury cannot decide without medical testimony: what the accepted practice required, whether the defendant departed from it and whether the departure caused the injury. On a summary judgment motion these elements are argued through sworn written opinions. The physician who writes the opinion may be the same expert who would testify at trial, and the document is read with the attention a deposition gets.
For the reviewing physician the motion is a concentrated version of the whole case. The defense affirmation sets out the defense theory, and the opposition has a deadline measured in weeks, not months.
What must the defendant show first in New York?
The defendant must establish the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice or that the plaintiff was not injured by it, and must address and rebut the specific allegations in the bill of particulars.
The New York courts state the defendant's burden in these terms. In Sanders v Shutler, decided by the Supreme Court, Suffolk County on February 28, 2025, the court required the movant to establish "the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice or that the plaintiff was not injured thereby," and to address and rebut the specific allegations of malpractice in the bill of particulars.
The rule behind this burden comes from the Court of Appeals. Sanders quotes Winegrad v New York University Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851, on the consequence of a missing prima facie showing: "The failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers." The plaintiff's affirmation is therefore never read until the defense papers clear the first bar.
The bill of particulars sets the scope. A defense expert who answers three of the five departures alleged leaves two standing, and the motion fails on those two unless they are abandoned.
What happens if the defense expert's affirmation is conclusory?
The motion is denied without regard to the opposing papers. In Perre v Vassar Brothers Hospital (2008) the Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed denial because the hospital's expert affidavit was wholly conclusory.
In Perre the plaintiff alleged that hospital staff were negligent, including in failing to prevent an infection and to prescribe proper antibiotics. The hospital moved for summary judgment, the Supreme Court, Dutchess County denied the motion, and on June 17, 2008 the Appellate Division affirmed. The court found that the hospital's expert affidavit "was wholly conclusory and did not attempt to refute by specific factual reference" the allegations of negligence.
A conclusory affirmation is one that states the result without the route: "the care was at all times within accepted standards" without naming the order, the time, the finding and the guideline that make it so. The reviewing physician marks each such sentence and compares it with the chart. Where the defense expert asserts a fact, for example that antibiotics were started on time, the reviewer checks the medication administration record for the actual time.
This review matters even when the defense papers look strong, because a gap in the prima facie showing ends the motion before the plaintiff's own expert is weighed.
What must the plaintiff's expert do once the burden shifts?
Raise a triable issue of fact with competent evidence. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, and general, conclusory allegations of malpractice unsupported by competent evidence do not meet it.
The Court of Appeals set the framework in Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, decided on November 11, 1986 in an opinion by Judge Alexander for a unanimous court. Maria Alvarez sued Prospect Hospital and other defendants for malpractice. One defendant, Jesse D. Stark, moved for summary judgment. The Supreme Court denied the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and granted Dr. Stark's motion.
Sanders v Shutler cites Alvarez together with Winegrad and Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, for the two-stage test. The movant first makes a prima facie showing; then the opponent must show a triable issue of fact. Sanders states the plaintiff's side of the rule: "general and conclusory allegations of medical malpractice" that are "unsupported by competent evidence" do not defeat the motion.
The plaintiff's physician therefore answers the defense expert point by point, with references to the chart, and states what the accepted practice required at the date of care and how the defendant's care differed. An attorney's affirmation, or a physician's letter that repeats the complaint, does not supply the medical opinion the second stage requires.
Can an expert who addresses only causation defeat the motion?
Not on departure. In Sanders v Shutler the court held that an affidavit focused on causation, without addressing the defendants' showing on departure, did not raise a triable issue of fact on departure.
In Sanders the court found that the defendants met their prima facie burden on departure. The plaintiff's surgeon-expert, Dr. Ferzoco, wrote an affidavit that "focuses primarily on the element of causation" and did not address the specific assertions of the defense experts on departure, so the court held it insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on whether the defendants departed from the accepted standard of care. The rule follows from the burden: the plaintiff answers each element on which the defense made its showing.
The reviewing physician therefore maps the defense affirmation before writing anything: which paragraphs address departure, which address causation, and for which defendants. The opposition affirmation follows the same map. Where two defendants of different specialties moved together, the opposition may need two physicians, each within the specialty of the care at issue.
What form must the expert's affirmation take?
In New York, an affirmation must meet CPLR 2106, which requires an affirmation of truth made under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York. In federal court, Rule 56(c)(4) requires personal knowledge, admissible facts and competence.
CPLR 2106 lets a signed statement affirmed as true under the penalties of perjury be used in place of an affidavit, with the same effect, and requires the phrase "under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York." The current text of the section on the New York Senate site shows a revision dated November 28, 2025.
Form defects have consequences. In Sanders the court excluded the affirmation of one plaintiff's expert, Dr. Haber, because it did not substantially comply with CPLR 2106: it lacked the statements that the penalties of perjury may include a fine or imprisonment and that the affirmation may be filed in a court proceeding. The opinion that was excluded could not be weighed at all, whatever it said about the medicine.
In federal court, Rule 56(c)(4) provides that "An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge," must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence and must show that the declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Under Rule 56(c)(1), each factual assertion cites particular parts of materials in the record. For an expert declaration this means the chart pages, the deposition lines and the literature relied on are cited, not summarized.
When do conflicting expert opinions require a trial?
When both sides submit competent expert opinions that conflict on a material point. Sanders v Shutler states that summary judgment is not appropriate in that situation, because the credibility of the experts is for the trier of fact.
The word competent carries the rule. Two opinions conflict in the legal sense only if both meet the form requirements, both address the element in dispute and both rest on facts in the record. An opinion that misstates the chart or relies on a fact the record contradicts does not create a genuine conflict; it creates a point for the reply papers.
The reviewing physician tests the plaintiff's draft affirmation against that standard before it is filed: every fact cited is checked against the source page, every standard named is tied to the date of care, and every causation statement is framed as a medical probability rather than a possibility.
Does the expert have to be disclosed before the affirmation is filed?
In New York, no. CPLR 3212(b) provides that the court shall not decline to consider an expert's affidavit merely because the expert exchange under CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) was not furnished before the affidavit was submitted.
This sentence of CPLR 3212(b) protects a party whose expert disclosure has not yet been exchanged when the motion is heard. The opposing physician can sign an affirmation even if his or her name has not appeared in the 3101(d) response.
The timing rule for the motion itself is in CPLR 3212(a). Unless the court sets an earlier date, the motion must be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown, and a court-set deadline may be no earlier than 30 days after the note of issue. The reviewing physician's work often has to fit into the weeks between the motion and the return date.
What if the plaintiff needs more facts to oppose the motion?
In federal court, Rule 56(d) lets the court defer or deny the motion, allow time for discovery or issue another order if the nonmovant shows by declaration that it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.
A Rule 56(d) declaration names the missing facts and explains why they matter. In a malpractice case these are often the native audit trail of the electronic chart, the pump or monitor logs, or the deposition of a nurse who has not yet been examined. The reviewing physician can state which missing records bear on which element, which gives the declaration the specificity the rule expects.
Under Rule 56(e), if a party fails to properly support or address an assertion of fact, the court may give it an opportunity to cure, consider the fact undisputed for the motion or grant summary judgment if the materials show the movant is entitled to it.
How does a reviewing physician read the defense expert's affirmation?
Against the chart and the bill of particulars: each alleged departure must be answered, each factual statement must match the record, and each opinion must name the standard, the time and the reason, or the prima facie showing fails.
The review is a list, worked in order. The first check is scope: are all defendants and all alleged departures addressed? The second is the record: does each fact the expert relies on appear in the chart at the time stated? The third is the standard: is it the standard of the defendant's specialty at the date of care, and is it named? The fourth is causation: does the expert explain why the outcome would have been the same, or only assert it? The fifth is form: CPLR 2106 or the applicable oath, signature, date and the expert's qualifications.
The result is a memorandum for counsel with page references, and where the defense showing survives the review, a draft outline of the opposing affirmation that answers each point the defense made.
What does IAE do when a summary judgment motion rests on a medical expert?
A physician from the IAE registry in the specialty of the care at issue tests the defense affirmation against the chart and writes a review of the opposing expert's report in up to 5 business days, with a 48-hour rush.
The IAE page on review of the opposing medical expert report is written for counsel who have received the other side's medical expert report in a malpractice, wrongful death or personal injury case. The registry physician tests each opinion against the chart and Rule 702 and writes the review; the review questions are agreed with the client before work starts.
While the physician only consults, Rule 26(b)(4)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ordinarily bars discovery of facts known and opinions held by an expert retained in anticipation of litigation who will not testify. If counsel decides to use the physician's opinion in the motion papers or at trial, the physician is disclosed and signs the affirmation or report.
The client sends the motion papers with the defense affirmation, the chart, the bill of particulars and the deposition transcripts. IAE confirms receipt the same day and the format, cost, deadline and physician within one business day, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry, can be verified by Member ID or QR code and confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. IAE is not a law firm, and neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees how the court will rule.
Sources
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, Summary judgment (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Duty to disclose; general provisions governing discovery (LII, Cornell Law School)
- New York CPLR 3212, Motion for summary judgment (New York State Senate)
- New York CPLR 2106, Affirmation of truth of statement (New York State Senate)
- Sanders v Shutler, 2025 NY Slip Op 35484(U), Supreme Court, Suffolk County, February 28, 2025 (New York Official Reports)
- Perre v. Vassar Brothers Hospital, Appellate Division, Second Department, June 17, 2008 (FindLaw)
- Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320, Court of Appeals of New York, November 11, 1986 (Leagle)
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