Expert report review

Motion to limit a toolmark examiner's testimony: what does the review supply?

A motion to limit asks the court to admit a toolmark or footwear examiner but restrict the conclusion to words the method can support. Federal and District of Columbia courts in Harris, Felix, Stevenson and Green barred match, absolute certainty and exclusion of all other sources, and some allowed consistent with. A review of the report gives the motion a list of the statements that exceed those limits and the facts behind each one.

A hand sets a thin motion folder beside a microscope and two marked metal pieces

What is a motion to limit toolmark testimony?

A request to admit the examiner but restrict the words the examiner may use, such as match, 100 percent certainty or exclusion of all other sources. Felix and Graham denied exclusion and granted limits in one order.

In United States v. Felix, No. 2020-0002, the District of the Virgin Islands granted a defense motion in part on November 28, 2022: the government's examiner could testify, but not to a match between the cartridge cases and the recovered firearm. In United States v. Graham, decided on February 20, 2024, the Western District of Virginia also granted a motion in part. It refused to exclude the examiner and ordered that her testimony comply with the Department of Justice uniform language. In both cases the defense proposed narrower wording than the court allowed.

Rule 702, as amended in 2023, requires the proponent to show the court that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and on reliable principles and methods reliably applied. The committee note says forensic experts "should avoid assertions of absolute or one hundred percent certainty" if the methodology is subjective and thus potentially subject to error. A motion to limit asks the court to apply that sentence to the words of a particular report.

A motion to limit asks for less than exclusion. The Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners keeps a Court Citations page in its Admissibility Resource Kit with a synopsis of each ruling, grouped into the periods 2016-2020 and 2021 to the present. Harris, Felix, Stevenson, Green, Graham and Bryant are among them, and AFTE posts copies of the orders.

Which limits have courts placed on firearm and toolmark examiners?

The common limits bar the word match, statistical or absolute certainty, exclusion of all other firearms and reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Some courts allow "consistent with" and require the examiner to say the judgment of sufficient agreement is subjective.

In United States v. Harris, No. 19-358 (RC), Judge Rudolph Contreras of the District of Columbia federal court held a Daubert hearing on October 15, 2020, and on November 4, 2020, denied the motion to exclude examiner Chris Monturo. He admitted the testimony to the extent it fell within the Department of Justice uniform language, under limits the government accepted: the examiner "will not use terms such as 'match,'" will "not state his expert opinion with any level of statistical certainty," and will not use the phrases "to the exclusion of all other firearms" or "to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty."

In United States v. Felix, No. 2020-0002, Judge Wilma A. Lewis of the District of the Virgin Islands granted the motion in part on November 28, 2022. The examiner "may not testify as to a match between cartridge cases and the recovered firearm." He could describe the theory and his procedures, say "whether the class characteristics matched," say "whether he found individual toolmarkings on the recovered cartridge cases to be consistent with" the test-fired cases, and use comparison photographs "to describe or show what he concludes were consistent toolmarks."

In United States v. Green, No. 2018 CF1 004356, Judge Robert Okun of the D.C. Superior Court ruled on April 1, 2024. The examiner "could testify that the relevant cartridge casings are consistent with having been fired from a particular firearm." He also had to make clear that the opinion rests on class agreement and "his subjective determination of sufficient agreement in individual characteristics or random imperfections," and had to state that "there currently is not a generally accepted statistical method for conveying the weight of an identification." He could not claim 100 percent certainty or a conclusion "based on a comparison to all other firearms or toolmarks." The court also refused the government's request to let the examiner say the evidence gives "extremely strong support" for a common source.

In United States v. Stevenson, No. 2021 CF1 000968, Judge Marisa Demeo of the D.C. Superior Court ruled on October 10, 2023, that "the expert is not permitted to make an unqualified opinion that specific bullets came from a specific gun," a sentence the order ends with the words "to the exclusion of other firearms." The expert "may testify that he conducted the appropriate comparison, and it resulted in an identification." In United States v. Graham, decided on February 20, 2024, in the Western District of Virginia, the examiner was held to the Department of Justice uniform language and barred from "reasonable degree of scientific certainty." In Abruquah v. State, decided on June 20, 2023, the Supreme Court of Maryland held by 4 votes to 3 that the trial court should not have allowed an unqualified opinion that the bullets were fired from the defendant's revolver. The method, it wrote, can support testimony that markings are "consistent or inconsistent" with those on bullets fired from a particular firearm.

Why do courts draw the line in different places?

Because they weigh the same studies differently. One court found an error rate as high as 2 percent significant and barred any match testimony; others found the false-positive rate low and allowed an identification stated without certainty.

The Felix court described "the near total subjectivity countenanced by the AFTE Theory, where there is no actual guidance" for the sufficient agreement standard, but still held the method testable. It relied on open, sample-to-sample studies because a "'closed-set' design is simpler than the problem encountered in casework." After setting inconclusive answers aside, it listed error rates of 0 percent in the Keisler study, 1.5 percent in Ames I, and 2 percent for bullets and 1.86 percent for cartridge cases in Ames II, and concluded that "an error rate ranging as high as two percent for the field is significant," though not enough to exclude all testimony.

The Green court treated "the rate of false identifications" as the critical inquiry and found the rates low even under the five percent benchmark used by PCAST, with inconclusive answers set aside. It found that testability, peer review and error rate favored admission, that standards weighed against it and that general acceptance was neutral. It distinguished earlier District of Columbia decisions because its record held ten additional studies whose designs meet PCAST's recommendations.

The Stevenson court found the known false-positive rate very low, citing the Keisler and Heat Map studies, and held that the standards and controls factor weighed against admission without barring it. It rejected the defense's proposed limit that would have let the expert say only that items "cannot be excluded" from a particular firearm.

For a motion this split matters in two ways. The record of studies before the court decides which limit is available, and the review has to say which studies cover the kind of mark and tool in the case.

What does a review supply to the motion?

A list of statements in the report and disclosure that exceed the limits courts have imposed, gaps in documentation and verification, and the studies that bear on the type of mark. Each item cites the page and the rule.

The first part of the review is a wording table. Each sentence of the report and of the signed expert disclosure is set against the limits in Harris, Felix, Green and Stevenson and against the Department of Justice uniform language. Words such as match, came from, 100 percent, to the exclusion of all other, or reasonable degree of scientific certainty are flagged with the page where they appear.

The second part covers the method. The draft OSAC toolmark standard 2024-S-0002 provides that "an opinion of the same source shall not be based solely on agreement of potential subclass characteristics," requires documentation that lets another examiner understand the analysis without the specimens, and says "a statement of conclusion alone, without supporting documentation, is insufficient." Where the file does not show how subclass marks were ruled out, the motion can ask that the examiner be limited to class characteristics, the limit the defense sought in Felix and Green.

The third part covers verification and studies. The review records whether a second examiner verified the result and how. It also states which validation studies used the same kind of tool and material and how they counted inconclusive answers, because Felix and Green turned on those counts.

The review does not ask the court to decide the case. It gives counsel the facts the motion has to state, with the sources a judge can check.

How do courts treat inconclusive results in the error-rate argument?

Courts have refused to count them as correct and refused to count them as errors. Felix said both approaches fail; Graham said an inconclusive result does not attribute a casing to the wrong firearm.

The Felix court wrote that "inconclusive responses are not properly classified as correct responses," but that "counting inconclusive responses as errors is not a satisfactory solution." It then reported error rates with inconclusive answers set aside.

The Graham court said that an inconclusive result "is not an error in the sense that it falsely attributes a cartridge or casing to the wrong firearm," and that "the focal point of the inquiry should be on the rate of false positives." Green made the same choice in different words.

A review that cites error rates states how each study treated inconclusive answers and how many there were. The AFTE paper by R. Grzybowski and co-authors adds that earlier figures of 12 percent for firearms and 26 percent for toolmarks, reported by Peterson and Markham, counted inconclusive responses as incorrect. The review states that caveat whenever it cites those figures.

Can the same kind of motion be made against a footwear examiner?

Yes. Department of Justice footwear examiners report one of six fixed conclusions and are barred from claiming uniqueness, exclusion of all other footwear, a zero error rate or 100 percent certainty, so the same wording table applies.

The Department of Justice uniform language for footwear took effect on August 15, 2020, for department examiners. Its six conclusions are source identification, inclusion based on class and randomly acquired characteristics, inclusion based on class characteristics, inconclusive, support for exclusion and source exclusion. A conclusion "is not based on a statistically-derived or verified measurement or comparison to all other footwear items."

The examiner shall not assert that a source conclusion rests on the uniqueness of an item, shall not use the terms individualize or individualization, and shall not assert that the known shoe made the impression to the exclusion of all other footwear. Either inclusion must come with an explanation that other footwear with indistinguishable characteristics could also have made the impression.

A state laboratory may use other terms, and the uniform language says other terminology is not for that reason erroneous. A motion against a state footwear examiner therefore asks the court to impose the limits, as the courts in Harris and Graham did for firearms examiners when the government accepted the department's language.

When should the motion be filed, and what happens if it is not?

Before trial, so the court can rule on a record. Without an objection, overstated testimony is reviewed only for plain error; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed convictions on that basis in Williams v. United States in 2016.

In Williams v. United States, No. 13-CF-1312, decided on January 21, 2016, a firearms examiner testified without objection that markings were "unique to that gun and that gun only." The court reviewed only for plain error, found that no precedent in the jurisdiction limited such testimony and that "the government's internal policy does not constitute binding law," and affirmed the judgment except for two counts that merged into the felony murder conviction.

The cases above show how a ruling is reached. Harris held a Daubert hearing before ruling. In State v. Bryant a Maryland trial court ruled on a motion in limine on June 14, 2023, and allowed the examiner to testify within limits mirroring Harris. Six days later the Supreme Court of Maryland decided Abruquah, which the Bryant opinion had noted as pending, and held that the unqualified source opinion given at Abruquah's trial should not have been admitted.

A motion needs the government's signed expert disclosure and the case file, and the review needs time after both arrive. Under Rule 16(a)(1)(G)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the court sets the disclosure deadline sufficiently before trial to provide a fair opportunity for the defendant to meet the government's evidence, and a schedule that leaves room for the review and the motion is requested at that stage.

What happens at trial after a limiting order?

The order fixes the words the examiner may use, and the remaining criticism goes to cross-examination. Harris and Stevenson both treated the unresolved reliability concerns as matters for cross-examination rather than exclusion.

Harris rejected the Rule 702(d) and Rule 403 challenges and treated the reliability concerns as issues for cross-examination. Stevenson held that the defense's remaining concerns were better addressed on cross-examination than through exclusion. Bryant called the testimony "proper fodder for crossexamination rather than exclusion."

A limiting order gives counsel a fixed standard for objections. If the examiner says match after an order that bars it, the objection rests on the order. The review marks in advance where the report's wording and the order differ, so that counsel can object at the moment the barred words are used.

The order also shapes the defense examiner's testimony. Under Rule 16(b)(1)(C) the defense, at the government's request, discloses its own expert's opinions in writing, signed by the witness, if the defense requested the government's expert disclosure and the government complied. A defense examiner who explains to the jury why a court limited the wording works within the same record.

What does IAE do when counsel prepares a motion to limit an examiner's testimony?

IAE reviews the opposing examiner's report for criminal defense and cargo loss cases in US courts, including whether the verification is recorded and who performed it. Delivery takes up to 5 business days, or 48 hours on rush.

The review checks the case file against the standard for that kind of mark. For a footwear report it checks whether the examiner analyzed the questioned print before the known shoe, documented class characteristics and characteristics of use, and recorded the conclusion. Toolmarks on lock cylinders and seals are compared with test marks made by the suspect tool.

IAE confirms the questions with the client before work starts. The secretariat confirms receipt of the materials the same day, and within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry. The client approves the candidate and the CV before work begins.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry, verified by Member ID or QR code, and confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials are sent through the contact form or by email and are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. The court weighs a review with the other evidence, and neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy; whether to file a motion is a decision for counsel.

Sources

  1. United States v. Harris, No. 19-358 (RC) (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2020), memorandum opinion (copy posted by AFTE)
  2. United States v. Felix, No. 2020-0002 (D.V.I. Nov. 28, 2022), memorandum opinion (copy posted by AFTE)
  3. United States v. Green, No. 2018 CF1 004356 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2024), order (copy posted by AFTE)
  4. United States v. Stevenson, No. 2021 CF1 000968 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2023), order (copy posted by AFTE)
  5. United States v. Graham, No. 4:23-cr-00006 (W.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2024), memorandum opinion (copy posted by AFTE)
  6. State of Maryland v. Delonte Bryant, No. 22-K-15-000572 (Cir. Ct. Wicomico County June 14, 2023), opinion (copy posted by AFTE)
  7. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, with committee note to the 2023 amendment (LII)
  8. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16 (LII)
  9. U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Footwear Discipline, effective August 15, 2020
  10. OSAC Proposed Standard 2024-S-0002, Standard Test Method for the Examination and Comparison of Toolmarks for Source Attribution, draft version 1.0, November 2023 (NIST)
  11. Grzybowski R. et al., Firearm/Toolmark Identification: Passing the Reliability Test Under Federal and State Evidentiary Standards (AFTE)
  12. Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners, Admissibility Resource Kit, Court Citations
  13. Williams v. United States, No. 13-CF-1312 (D.C. Jan. 21, 2016), District of Columbia Court of Appeals
  14. Abruquah v. State, No. 10, September Term 2022 (Md. June 20, 2023), Supreme Court of Maryland

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