Expert witnesses
Patent invalidity expert: what must obviousness testimony prove after KSR v. Teleflex?
An invalidity expert who says a patent claim was obvious must be qualified in the technology of the patent, work through the factual questions of Graham v. John Deere Co., and explain why a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the way the claim does. The Federal Circuit has set aside obviousness findings built on hindsight and on generic testimony, and the challenger carries the burden by clear and convincing evidence.

What does an invalidity expert do in a patent case?
The expert compares the asserted claims with the prior art and testifies to the facts behind invalidity: what the references disclose, how they differ from the claims and what a person of ordinary skill knew.
Obviousness is a question of law resting on facts. In Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., decided by the Federal Circuit on December 24, 2008, Judge Moore wrote for the panel: "The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination." The jury or the judge still has to find the underlying facts, and the invalidity expert is the witness who supplies them in technical terms.
The expert reads each prior art reference, identifies where each claim element appears in it, and explains what a skilled person in the field would have understood from it at the relevant time. When no single reference discloses every element, the expert explains how a combination of references would have led to the claimed invention, and why.
When the defendant challenges validity, it retains the invalidity expert, and the patent owner answers with a validity expert. Both write reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, both are deposed, and both face motions under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The patent owner's expert works on the same factual questions from the other side: what the references do not teach, why a skilled person would not have combined them, and what objective evidence points the other way.
The cases below set the limits of that testimony. Each of them turned on what the expert said or failed to say, not on the prior art alone.
What does 35 U.S.C. 103 require the challenger to show?
That the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the invention as a whole would have been obvious, before the effective filing date, to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
Section 103 opens with the words "A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained" and then states the test: the claimed invention is unpatentable if, notwithstanding that it is not identically disclosed in the prior art, the differences between it and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.
Three elements of that sentence shape the expert's report. The comparison is with the claimed invention as a whole, so the expert cannot break the claim into pieces and find each piece somewhere without explaining the whole. The date is the effective filing date, so the expert writes from what was known then, not at the time of the report. The viewpoint is a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains, so the report has to define that person.
The last sentence of section 103 reads: "Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made." An inventor's path to the invention, whether long experiments or a quick idea, is not part of the analysis. An expert who argues that the inventor found the solution easily, or that the inventor's own notes reveal how simple it was, argues a point the statute excludes.
What standard of proof must invalidity testimony meet?
Clear and convincing evidence. In Microsoft v. i4i (2011) the Supreme Court held that section 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by that standard, including with prior art the PTO never considered.
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership was decided on June 9, 2011. Justice Sotomayor stated the question for the Court as "whether §282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence" and answered: "We hold that it does." The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The Court declined to lower the standard for prior art that the patent examiner never saw, but it allowed an instruction on that point: "the jury may be instructed to consider that it has heard evidence that the PTO had no opportunity to evaluate before granting the patent." An invalidity expert who relies on references that were not before the examiner therefore says so in the report, because counsel will ask for that instruction.
The standard decides cases. In InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGo Communications, Inc., decided on May 9, 2014, the Federal Circuit held that "VGo failed to meet its burden of proving invalidity of the '357 patent by clear and convincing evidence" and reversed the judgment of invalidity. The reason was the expert's testimony, discussed below.
How did KSR v. Teleflex change the obviousness analysis?
KSR (2007) rejected rigid use of the teaching, suggestion or motivation test. A person of ordinary skill has ordinary creativity, combinations yielding predictable results are likely obvious, and obvious to try can establish obviousness.
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. was decided in 2007, with Justice Kennedy delivering the opinion of the Court. The patent was U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565, the Engelgau patent, titled "Adjustable Pedal Assembly With Electronic Throttle Control." Claim 4 combined an electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so that the pedal's position could be sent to a computer controlling the throttle. The Court of Appeals had reversed summary judgment for KSR; the Supreme Court reversed again and held claim 4 obvious.
The Court said the teaching, suggestion or motivation test "captured a helpful insight," but added: "Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas." It wrote that "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim," because a court "can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ."
KSR also contains the sentences that set the standard for combinations. "A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." "The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." Where there are "a finite number of identified, predictable solutions," the Court wrote, "the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103."
The Court also identified the Federal Circuit's first error: "to foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve." And it wrote that "Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it." The same opinion warned that a factfinder "should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias."
Which factual questions does the expert answer?
The Graham questions, which KSR restated: the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, with any secondary considerations.
KSR quotes Graham v. John Deere Co.: "Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved." Graham added that "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented."
Each question becomes a part of the report. For scope and content, the expert identifies each reference, its date and what it discloses, with page and figure citations. For the differences, the expert goes element by element through the claim as construed by the court and states which elements each reference lacks. For the level of skill, the expert defines the person of ordinary skill by education and experience.
The level of skill is often disputed. In Zoltek Corp. v. United States, a case about methods for manufacturing controlled surface resistance carbon fiber sheet products, the Court of Federal Claims noted in 2000 that "[t]he parties agree that one skilled in the art would have at least a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering or chemistry." The 2010 decision recorded that "Zoltek disagrees with the Government's description of a person of ordinary skill in the art," and the court found that disagreement insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact. The expert's choice of that definition affects every later opinion, so the report gives reasons for it.
Who is qualified to testify about obviousness?
A witness qualified as an expert in the pertinent art. In Sundance (2008) the Federal Circuit held it an abuse of discretion to let a patent lawyer without that expertise testify on invalidity.
In Sundance, DeMonte offered Mr. Bliss, a patent attorney, as an expert on patent law and procedure. The court noted that he "has no experience whatsoever in 'the field of tarps or covers,'" the field of the '109 patent on retractable segmented covering systems. He nevertheless testified on noninfringement and invalidity, including the factual predicates of obviousness and his conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious.
The Federal Circuit held that it is "an abuse of discretion to permit a witness to testify as an expert on the issues of noninfringement or invalidity unless that witness is qualified as an expert in the pertinent art." Such a witness may not testify as an expert on obviousness, the court wrote, nor on "any of the underlying technical questions," such as the scope and content of the prior art.
For a qualified technical expert, the court left one question open: whether that expert may give an opinion on the ultimate question of obviousness "is of course left to the discretion of the district court." The court did not order a new trial. It reversed the district court's grant of JMOL and held claim 1 obvious as a matter of law.
In practice, the qualification of the invalidity expert is checked against the definition of the person of ordinary skill. An expert whose education and work fall within or above that definition can testify about what such a person knew. An expert outside the field, however distinguished in another field, is exposed to the Sundance objection.
How must the expert explain the reason to combine references?
Specifically. In ActiveVideo v. Verizon (2012) the Federal Circuit found generic testimony insufficient because it bore no relation to a specific combination and did not explain why a skilled person would combine those references that way.
ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, was decided on August 24, 2012, with Judge Moore writing for a panel that included Judges Bryson and Dyk. Verizon's expert testified on obviousness at trial, and the district court granted ActiveVideo judgment as a matter of law on obviousness, which kept that defense from the jury.
The Federal Circuit affirmed. It wrote: "The opinion by Verizon's expert regarding the motivation to combine references was likewise insufficient." And: "This testimony is generic and bears no relation to any specific combination of prior art elements. It also fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does."
The conclusion followed: "Because the record evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to support a determination of obviousness, the district court's grant of ActiveVideo's JMOL on obviousness was not erroneous."
The sentence about combining elements "in the way the claimed invention does" sets the standard for the report. Saying that combining two references would be cheaper, faster or more efficient, without tying that reason to the particular elements of the particular references, is the kind of testimony the court called generic. The report names the elements taken from each reference, the reason a skilled person would have joined them in the arrangement the claim recites, and the evidence for that reason in the references or in the knowledge of the field at the effective filing date.
What makes an obviousness opinion hindsight?
Reasoning backward, with the patent as the guide. In InTouch v. VGo (2014) the Federal Circuit called the expert's testimony impermissible hindsight: she described what a skilled artisan could accomplish, not what would have been obvious.
InTouch Technologies v. VGo Communications concerned patents on mobile robots. Judge O'Malley wrote for a panel of Chief Judge Rader and Judges Lourie and O'Malley. The jury had found claims of two InTouch patents invalid as obvious on the testimony of VGo's expert, Dr. Yanco.
The Federal Circuit wrote: "Dr. Yanco's testimony was nothing more than impermissible hindsight." It explained: "Dr. Yanco simply opined what a skilled artisan could accomplish in 2011; that is not the relevant inquiry." The relevant inquiry, under section 103, is what would have been obvious before the effective filing date, and the expert had not addressed it.
The court found the combination unexplained as well. The expert "did not explain what reason or motivation one of ordinary skill in the art" would have had to combine the references, and she "failed to provide the glue to combine these references." It described her testimony as "vague" and said it "primarily consisted of conclusory references to her belief" that the combination would have been obvious.
The court reversed the judgment invalidating claim 79 of the '357 patent and of claim 1 of the '030 patent, finding the expert's analysis of the '030 claim flawed "for many of the same reasons." For the invalidity expert, the case turns on dates and reasons. The report states the effective filing date of each claim, cites only what was available before it, and explains why a person of ordinary skill at that date would have made the combination, using the references rather than the patent as the guide.
Must the invalidity expert address objective evidence of nonobviousness?
Yes, when it is in the record. In InTouch the Federal Circuit faulted the expert for not factoring the objective evidence into her analysis; in Sundance it found secondary considerations unable to overcome a strong case of obviousness.
Graham lists secondary considerations as part of the inquiry, and the patent owner usually offers them: commercial success, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others. The invalidity expert cannot treat them as the other side's business. In InTouch the court noted that Dr. Yanco "did not even factor the objective evidence of nonobviousness into her obviousness analysis."
Addressing the evidence does not mean conceding it. In Sundance the Federal Circuit considered the patent owner's secondary considerations and found that they could not overcome the strong prima facie case of obviousness for claim 1. The opinion that survives is the one that weighs the objective evidence and explains why it does or does not change the result.
In practice the invalidity expert reads the patent owner's evidence of sales, praise, copying or industry need and tests its link to the claimed features. Whether that evidence has a nexus to the claimed features is a separate dispute with its own rules; the invalidity expert's report states that the evidence was considered and why it does not alter the conclusion.
Can expert testimony defeat summary judgment on obviousness?
Sometimes. KSR held that a conclusory affidavit does not by itself bar summary judgment, while courts such as the Court of Federal Claims in Zoltek denied summary judgment where qualified experts genuinely conflicted.
In KSR the Court wrote that "the district court can and should take into account expert testimony," but it rejected the idea that a "conclusory affidavit addressing the question of obviousness" automatically prevents summary judgment. The ultimate judgment remains "a legal determination," so a court may decide obviousness on summary judgment when the facts are not genuinely in dispute.
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, decided by Judge Edward J. Damich of the Court of Federal Claims (filed December 16, 2010, released for publication January 24, 2011), shows the other side of the rule. The court denied the motions to strike both sides' experts. Of the Government's expert it wrote: "The Court finds that Dr. Sullivan is qualified to serve as an expert here." Of the patent owner's witness, it noted that "Mr. Rumy is offered as an expert based on the knowledge he has accumulated over many years working in the industry."
Citing KSR, the court wrote that "Conflicting expert testimony can raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment as to the issue of obviousness," and denied the Government's motion for summary judgment of obviousness. The difference between KSR and Zoltek lies in the content of the testimony: a conclusory affidavit does not create a dispute, while two reasoned reports on the level of skill and the teachings of the references can.
What must the invalidity expert's report contain?
Every opinion with its basis and reasons, the facts or data considered, exhibits, qualifications with publications from the previous 10 years, testimony in the previous 4 years, and compensation, under Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;" "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;" "any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;" "the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;" "a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert"; and "a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case."
For an obviousness opinion, "basis and reasons" means the Graham analysis written out: the definition of the person of ordinary skill with reasons, a chart of the claim elements against each reference, the combination relied on, the reason to combine with its source, the expectation of success where relevant, and the treatment of any objective evidence. Opinions left out of the report are hard to add at trial.
Drafts of the report are protected under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), but communications with counsel are discoverable to the extent they "identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered" or "identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on." If counsel supplies the claim construction or the effective filing date as an assumption, the report says so.
Since the 2023 amendment of Rule 702, the proponent must show the court that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and applies them reliably to the case. The committee note says that "each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of the expert's basis and methodology." A combination that the references do not support, or a reason to combine that the expert cannot source, falls outside those bounds.
When is the invalidity expert deposed, and who pays for that time?
After the report is served. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) permits the deposition of any testifying expert, and Rule 26(b)(4)(E) requires the party taking it to pay the expert a reasonable fee, unless manifest injustice would result.
Rule 26(b)(4)(A) provides: "A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial." If a report is required, "the deposition may be conducted only after the report is provided." The patent owner's counsel uses the deposition to test the definition of ordinary skill, the dates of the references and the reason to combine, the points on which Sundance, ActiveVideo and InTouch turned.
Rule 26(b)(4)(E) adds that, "Unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery" pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D). The deposition time of the defendant's invalidity expert is therefore usually billed to the patent owner who takes it.
The patent owner's validity expert answers within the schedule set by the court. Without a stipulation or order, a report intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter is due "within 30 days after the other party's disclosure," under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii).
How does IAE find an invalidity expert for a patent case?
In the request, choose the case type Intellectual property and name the technology and the invalidity work in the field line. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and prior testimony.
The IAE page on intellectual property expert witnesses describes the patent specialties as electrical and mechanical engineers and chemists from the patent's field who compare the product with each claim element and assess obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103. The page notes that state courts and the PTAB apply their own rules to expert testimony, so the request names the court or the PTAB. For an invalidity search, the request also names the patent, the asserted claims and the technical field, so that candidates can be checked against the likely definition of ordinary skill.
The search costs $2,000 per case, paid in advance. Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that field by the disclosure deadline. Within 5 business days the firm receives 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years, the lists Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires. Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. If no candidate fits, the second search is free.
The firm chooses the expert, who bills the firm directly or through IAE under the agency option. The expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. IAE is not a law firm: case strategy, the choice of prior art and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.
Sources
- 35 U.S.C. 103, Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter (U.S. Code 2023, govinfo)
- KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (WIPO Lex)
- Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, No. 10-290 (U.S. June 9, 2011), opinion of the Court (full text, chanrobles.com)
- Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., Nos. 2008-1068, -1115 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 24, 2008), slip opinion
- ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., No. 2011-1538 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012), slip opinion (cafc.uscourts.gov)
- InTouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGo Communications, Inc., No. 13-1201 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2014) (Justia)
- Zoltek Corp. v. United States, No. 1:96-cv-00166, Document 408 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (Justia)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, with committee notes (LII, Cornell Law School)
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