Expert report review

How do you review and rebut the opposing product defect expert's report?

A review of the opposing product defect report reads it against Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The reviewer checks what the expert inspected and tested, which causes he ruled out and how he valued the goods. Federal courts excluded defect opinions with gaps of this kind in Kumho Tire (1999), Cummings v. Deere (2008) and Ho v. Michelin (2013).

An engineer in a laboratory holds a cracked appliance part beside a caliper on the bench

What does a review of the opposing product defect report check?

Whether each opinion has a stated basis, whether the expert inspected and tested the item, how other causes of the failure were excluded, and whether the damages figure follows the warranty measure.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) lists what the report of a retained testifying expert must contain: a complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered, the exhibits, the expert's qualifications with publications from the previous 10 years, the cases in which the expert testified in the previous 4 years, and the compensation. A review starts by matching each opinion with the facts and data the report cites for it. An opinion with no listed basis goes to the top of the list.

Rule 702 sets the test the court applies. Since the amendment that took effect on December 1, 2023, the party offering the expert must show the court that it is more likely than not that the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and applies those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The 2023 committee note adds that each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what the expert's basis and methodology can support.

In a goods dispute the reviewer adds four questions about the product itself. What did the expert examine? What did he measure or test? Which other causes of the failure did he consider and how did he exclude them? How did he set the value of the goods as accepted and as warranted? The sections below take these questions in turn, with the court decisions that turned on each of them.

What does the reviewer need from the other side?

The report with every exhibit, the facts or data the expert considered, photographs and test records, the facts and assumptions counsel supplied, and access to the item through Rule 34 or UCC 2-515.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires the report to state the facts or data the expert considered in forming the opinions. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) protects most communications between counsel and a reporting expert, with three exceptions: communications about compensation, facts or data that counsel provided and the expert considered, and assumptions that counsel provided and the expert relied on. A defect opinion often rests on an assumption of this kind, for example that the buyer followed the maintenance schedule, and the review tests the opinion against it.

The failed item is often in the other side's hands. Rule 34(a)(1)(B) lets a party request to inspect, copy, test or sample designated tangible things in the responding party's possession, custody or control. The request must specify a reasonable time, place and manner for the inspection, and the written response is due within 30 days after service.

Before suit, UCC 2-515(a) gives either party, on reasonable notification to the other and for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and preserving evidence, the right to inspect, test and sample the goods, including goods in the other party's possession or control. The version of the Code enacted in the state whose law governs the contract applies.

When the opposing expert ran tests that changed the item, the reviewer checks them against ASTM E860-22, Standard Practice for Examining and Preparing Items That Are or May Become Involved in Criminal or Civil Litigation. ASTM lists the standard as active. Its section on significance and use describes the actions required for destructive testing when examination, testing or disassembly is likely to alter the nature, state or condition of the evidence.

  • The report is requested with every exhibit, photograph and test record it cites.
  • The list of facts or data considered is compared with the documents actually produced.
  • Counsel's communications are requested within the three exceptions of Rule 26(b)(4)(C).
  • The item is requested for inspection under Rule 34(a)(1)(B), with the time, place and manner stated.
  • Any test that changed the item is compared with the steps ASTM E860-22 describes for destructive testing.

Can a defect opinion stand if the expert never re-examined the product?

Sometimes, but courts have excluded opinions that rested on no inspection or testing of the item. In Cummings v. Deere the expert made no effort to re-examine or re-test the burned combine, and the court excluded him.

Cummings v. Deere & Co., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1108, was decided by the Southern District of Iowa on February 7, 2008. A 2004 John Deere 9660 STS combine was destroyed by fire on September 21, 2005 while harvesting soybeans near Malcom, Iowa. Dr. Charles Roberts, retained by the combine's insurer, travelled to the site on September 28, 2005 and inspected the combine and the field. His theory was a static electrical discharge.

The court found that Dr. Roberts "made no effort to re-examine or re-test any of the physical artifacts from the Cummings combine." His testing in Kansas "merely measured voltage" and "did not document any crop debris fires ignited by a static electrical discharge." He "did no testing or mathematical analysis" of the energy a charge on this combine could carry. The court found "too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered," held that the case needed "expert testimony as to the defective nature of Deere's product," and ruled that "his breach of warranty claim fails as a matter of law as well."

In Smith v. Chrysler Group, No. 17-40901, the Fifth Circuit on November 26, 2018 dealt with a 2013 Jeep Wrangler that caught fire. The recall defect concerned a transmission oil cooler tube placed close to the power steering fluid return tube: tube-to-tube contact could tear a hole in the cooler tube and cause a leak. The Jeep had never been inspected for the defect, and the wreck was not preserved. The plaintiffs' fire cause expert first reported that he could not determine whether the recall defect caused the fire. His late supplemental report said it was more likely than not. The court held that he "does not explain his methodology" and that the report "failed adequately to connect the dots" between the new information and his conclusion. Summary judgment for Chrysler was affirmed.

Rule 703 does not require a personal inspection. An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed, and if experts in the field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data, they need not be admissible. The review therefore asks a narrower question: would a failure analyst in this field rely on these photographs, measurements or second-hand notes for this particular opinion?

Does the expert's method hold up under Kumho Tire?

The reviewer checks whether other experts in the field use the method and whether it was applied reliably to this item. Kumho Tire upheld excluding a tire analyst whose visual test had no outside validation.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael was decided on March 23, 1999. The Supreme Court held that the general principles of Daubert apply to all expert matters described in Rule 702, including technical and other specialized knowledge. The trial judge makes certain that an expert "employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."

The expert in Kumho, tire failure analyst Dennis Carlson, relied on visual and tactile inspection. His two-factor test said that if at least two of four signs of overdeflection were absent, a manufacturing or design defect caused the tread separation. No other industry experts were shown to use the test, and no published work validated it. His own assurance of accuracy did not establish reliability. The Court accepted that visual inspection can generally reveal tire abuse; the question was whether Carlson could reliably apply it to this tire.

Ho v. Michelin North America, No. 11-3334, decided by the Tenth Circuit on March 29, 2013 in an unpublished order, applied the same reasoning. The expert held a B.S. in physics and had nearly forty years in the tire industry. He examined the tire and blamed improper belt step-offs and a "dog ear," then ran drop tests on a single tire after his deposition. The panel agreed with the district court that "credentials alone do not suffice," called his answers "typical of the ipse dixit nature" of his testimony, and upheld the exclusion of the drop testing and summary judgment for Michelin.

The 2000 committee note to Rule 702 sets the standard for experience-based opinions. If the witness relies solely or primarily on experience, the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why it is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how it is reliably applied to the facts. A review quotes the place in the report where that explanation should appear and records whether it is there.

Did the expert rule out misuse, wear and other causes?

The Rule 702 committee note asks whether the expert adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations. A review lists each alternative cause and the data the expert used to exclude it.

The 2000 note to Rule 702 lists factors courts have used: whether the expert unjustifiably extrapolated an accepted premise into an unfounded conclusion, whether the expert adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations, and whether the expert was as careful as he would be in his regular professional work.

Crickenberger v. Hyundai Motor America, decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland on March 21, 2008, turned on alternatives that nobody excluded. The buyer's 2001 Hyundai XG-300 had been a Hertz rental car. The engine failed at about 63,700 miles, and Hyundai declined to replace it under its limited warranty. The buyer withdrew her expert. The record lacked information about maintenance and repairs while Hertz owned the car, showed irregular oil changes and noted an accident during her ownership. The court held: "Without expert testimony, Ms. Crickenberger's allegations of a defect in this case amount to 'mere speculation.'"

In Pro Service Automotive, L.L.C. v. Lenan Corp., No. 06-1324, the Eighth Circuit on November 22, 2006 reviewed a waste oil heater in a Missouri garage that burned down. The plaintiffs sued for strict liability and breach of implied warranty. Their chemical engineer said a hole in the combustion chamber's target wall caused the fire. The court wrote that he "provided no testing or other engineering analysis to support his causation opinion," noted that he could not say to any degree of probability that flames or gases escaped the heater, and held "that expert testimony was necessary to prove causation in this case."

A review of a goods report keeps a four-column table: the alternative cause, the data the opposing expert cited about it, the test or observation used to exclude it, and the result. In warranty cases the usual rows are maintenance, prior repairs, accident damage, use outside the specification and wear. A row with an empty third column is the point for the deposition and the motion.

Is the opposing expert qualified for each opinion in the report?

Qualification is measured opinion by opinion. In Scottsdale Insurance v. Deere a certified fire investigator could testify where a combine fire began but not that its emissions system was defective.

Rule 702 admits a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. The qualification has to fit the opinion offered, and a report that contains several opinions can pass for some and fail for others.

Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Deere & Company, No. 14-1183-JTM, was decided by the District of Kansas on July 14, 2015. The owners bought two used 2012 John Deere S670 combines in March 2013, and on June 2, 2013 a fire destroyed one of them. The insurer, as subrogee of the owners, sued for breach of express and implied warranty and blamed the emissions control system. The court wrote that "Thompson's training and experience qualify him to provide opinion testimony about the origin of the fire," but that "Thompson's area of expertise does not extend to complex diesel emissions control systems." It found his Rule 26 report deficient and declined to strike his testimony because his deposition cured the prejudice to Deere. Summary judgment went to Deere on implied warranty; the express warranty claim survived.

The same split appears in Pro Service: the district court let the fire origin expert place the start of the fire at the heater and found him "not qualified to testify about what caused the hole itself." In Ho v. Michelin nearly forty years in the tire industry did not replace a reliable method.

The review therefore lists each opinion next to the qualification the report gives for it: degree, field, certification, testing experience with this type of product. Where the report offers an origin investigator for a design or materials opinion, the review says so in one line and cites the decision closest to the facts.

Does the damages figure follow UCC 2-714(2)?

The measure is the difference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show a different amount.

UCC 2-714(2) sets the measure for accepted goods: the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount. Under 2-714(3), incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be recovered in a proper case.

A review checks four points in the opposing valuation. Is the valuation date the date of acceptance or a later one? Are the two values stated separately, with a source for each? If a repair cost stands in for the difference in value, does the report explain why? Are incidental and consequential items listed apart from the difference in value, so that the court can see which part rests on 2-714(2) and which on 2-714(3)?

The burden sits with the buyer. Under UCC 2-607(4), the burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods accepted. Under 2-607(3)(a), a buyer who has accepted goods must notify the seller within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach, or be barred from any remedy. A review records when and how the defect was found, because the notice question and the valuation date both depend on that timeline.

What may a rebuttal report in a goods case cover?

Only evidence on the same subject matter the other side disclosed, served within 30 days under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) unless a stipulation or court order sets another date. Courts strike rebuttal reports that carry a party's own case.

Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) covers evidence "intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C)," and sets the default deadline "within 30 days after the other party's disclosure." Evidence that does more than rebut belongs in the initial disclosure.

In Pace v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., No. 2:23cv19-HSO-BWR, the Southern District of Mississippi on February 2, 2024 struck a homeowner's engineer who was designated on the rebuttal deadline to address wind damage to the roof. The court reasoned that "Causation is an essential element of Plaintiff's claim," so causation testimony belonged in the initial designation, and ordered that "his opinions will not be permitted at trial."

In Columbia Grain, Inc. v. Hinrichs Trading, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-115-BLW, a suit over a fire that destroyed two garbanzo bean elevators, the District of Idaho on October 30, 2015 excluded new testing that an expert placed in a rebuttal report to support his own earlier theory. The court wrote that "Rebuttal testimony cannot be used to advance new arguments or new evidence" and that supplementation under Rule 26(e) "does not cover failures of omission because the expert did an inadequate or incomplete preparation." Under Rule 37(c)(1), a party that fails to disclose as Rule 26(a) or (e) requires may not use that information at a hearing or at trial unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.

A rebuttal that stays on point can survive. In the Zimmer NexGen knee implant litigation (Batty v. Zimmer, No. 12 C 6279, N.D. Ill. June 12, 2015), the court admitted a rebuttal critique of the defense expert's finite element model, found it "sufficiently grounded in reliable scientific literature," and made its admission conditional on the court admitting the opinions it rebutted. The court excluded the same expert's initial opinions on the risk of component loosening, the adequacy of Zimmer's pre-market testing and its warnings.

How is the review used at the deposition and in a Rule 702 motion?

Counsel uses it to question the expert after the report is served under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and to frame a motion under Rule 702, where the party offering the expert carries the burden of showing admissibility.

Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) a party may depose any person identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial, and when a report is required, the deposition may take place only after the report is provided. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), unless manifest injustice would result, the party seeking discovery pays the expert a reasonable fee for the time spent responding.

Rule 705 lets an expert state an opinion and give the reasons for it without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court orders otherwise, but the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination. The 1975 note explains that the rule assumes the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge needed for effective cross-examination. The review supplies that knowledge: it lists the data each opinion depends on and the data the expert did not have.

A reviewer who only advises counsel can stay a consulting expert. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), facts known and opinions held by an expert retained in anticipation of litigation who is not expected to testify are ordinarily not discoverable, except under Rule 35(b) or on a showing of exceptional circumstances. If the reviewer is later designated to testify, the full report of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) is due.

The motion itself is decided by the trial judge, and in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, decided December 15, 1997, the Supreme Court held that abuse of discretion is the standard for reviewing that ruling. Joiner also held that nothing requires a court to admit opinion evidence connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert, and that a court may conclude there is "simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." A review written column by column, as described above, puts each gap in front of the judge with its source.

What does IAE do when a party needs a review of a product defect report?

IAE prepares a review of the opposing expert's report or an expert report on the client's questions for warranty and supply disputes in US courts. The signed document is issued within up to 5 business days.

The work covers the questions listed on the IAE product defect page: whether the goods were defective when delivered, whether the failure came from manufacturing or from misuse, and what the goods were worth as accepted. A review of the opposing report lists the tests the expert did not run and the conclusions the data do not support. Testing likely to change the item follows ASTM E860-22, and IAE confirms the questions with the client before work starts.

The client sends the opposing report with its exhibits and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The draft is checked for facts. The signed PDF is issued within up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, and cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix. The Member ID in the document opens the specialist's category, specialization, attestation date and record status on the status check page or by QR code. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case.

Materials go through the contact form or to info@iaexperts.com and are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A review is evidence that the court weighs together with the other materials, and neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.

Sources

  1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (LII)
  2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34, Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things (LII)
  3. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37, Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions (LII)
  4. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, with Committee Notes (LII)
  5. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 703, Bases of an Expert's Opinion Testimony (LII)
  6. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 705, Disclosing the Facts or Data Underlying an Expert's Opinion (LII)
  7. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), opinion of the Court (LII)
  8. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (LII)
  9. Cummings v. Deere & Co., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (Justia)
  10. Smith v. Chrysler Group, L.L.C., No. 17-40901 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2018) (Justia)
  11. Ho v. Michelin North America, Inc., No. 11-3334 (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2013)
  12. Crickenberger v. Hyundai Motor America, Court of Appeals of Maryland, No. 81, Sept. Term 2007 (March 21, 2008)
  13. Pro Service Automotive, L.L.C. v. Lenan Corp., No. 06-1324 (8th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006)
  14. Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Deere & Company, No. 14-1183-JTM (D. Kan. July 14, 2015) (Justia)
  15. Pace v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., No. 2:23cv19-HSO-BWR (S.D. Miss. Feb. 2, 2024)
  16. Columbia Grain, Inc. v. Hinrichs Trading, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-115-BLW (D. Idaho Oct. 30, 2015) (GovInfo)
  17. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Products Liability Litigation (Batty v. Zimmer, Inc.), No. 12 C 6279 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2015) (Justia)
  18. UCC § 2-515, Preserving Evidence of Goods in Dispute (LII)
  19. UCC § 2-607, Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden of Establishing Breach (LII)
  20. UCC § 2-714, Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods (LII)
  21. ASTM E860-22, Standard Practice for Examining and Preparing Items That Are or May Become Involved in Criminal or Civil Litigation
  22. Supreme Court of the United States, order of April 24, 2023 amending Federal Rules of Evidence 106, 615 and 702, effective December 1, 2023 (congressional package)

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