Examinations

Tracing commingled funds: which rule does a forensic accountant apply?

Of $8,691.32 that an investor claimed out of the commingled bank account of Vaughan Motors, a dealer that resold used vehicles, the Fifth Circuit in 2001 held only $20.63 to be his: the lowest balance the account had reached. The rest became a general unsecured claim under the lowest intermediate balance rule. Tracing commingled funds means running the account history through such a rule, and the rule a court adopts sets the amount.

Hands sort the blank backs of checks into two wooden trays

What does tracing commingled funds mean?

Identifying how much of a mixed bank account, or of what was paid out of it, still represents a claimant's money. Dollars in one account cannot be told apart, so courts use assumptions about which money left first.

A claim to specific money, such as a constructive trust, an equitable lien or a trust beneficiary's claim, reaches only as far as the money can be followed. Where it cannot be followed, the claimant stands with the general creditors. In Cunningham v. Brown, decided on April 28, 1924, the Supreme Court found that it was "impossible to trace into the Hanover deposit of Ponzi after August 1st" the money the defendants had paid him before July 26. Without a traceable fund there was no constructive trust or equitable lien, and the defendants were creditors for their losses.

Tracing is arithmetic applied to a legal assumption. The forensic accountant lists every deposit and withdrawal in the account in date order, assigns each deposit to its source, and computes for each date how much of the balance belongs to the claimant under the rule the court applies. The rule supplies the assumption about whose money left the account first. The bank statements supply the numbers.

Because the result depends on both, an expert report on tracing states the rule used and the data. Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a retained expert's report contains "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them," "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them," and "any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them." The tracing schedule is usually that exhibit.

What is the lowest intermediate balance rule?

A tracing fiction under which the account holder spends his own money first. The claimant keeps a claim up to the lowest balance the account reached between the claimant's deposit and the bankruptcy petition.

The Fifth Circuit applied the rule on January 25, 2001, in the bankruptcy of Vaughan Motors. Jim Weathers, an outside investor, financed the wholesale purchase of used vehicles that Vaughan Motors resold. The down payments and later payments on the resale contracts were supposed to be forwarded to him. Instead the dealer "commingled them in its account" and kept using the money in its operations.

The court took the rule from the Tenth Circuit's 1987 decision in In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.: when trust funds are "commingled in accounts that were drawn upon, the trust beneficiary's recovery [is] limited to the lowest balance between the time of deposit of the overpayments and the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition." The rule is "grounded in the fiction that" the account holder withdraws non-trust funds first, which keeps as much of the trust money in the account as the balance permits.

The account "at one point, fell to $20.63." The court held that "only $20.63 of the $8,691.32 was traceable as a constructive trust on behalf of Weathers." The rest of his claim, like the claim of a second investor, Morgan Trust, became a general unsecured claim. The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts held a tax lien against the same funds, and the case went back to the bankruptcy court to decide whether the lien complied with the Texas Tax Code and what priority the comptroller's claim had. The Fifth Circuit did not publish the opinion.

The Second Circuit described the same rule in a forfeiture case as "drugs-in, last-out": tainted money is treated as still in the account so long as the balance never falls below the tainted amount.

Do later deposits put the claimant's money back?

No. Under the rule, money deposited after the account reached its low point is the account holder's own, and the claimant's share stays at that low point.

In Vaughan Motors the Fifth Circuit held that the claimant is entitled to the lowest intermediate balance "without the benefit of any deposits made after such balance was reached."

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware applied the same principle to a cash management system. EBS Pension, L.L.C. sought turnover of $5.7 million left over from the termination of an overfunded pension plan and claimed the Edison Brothers debtors held it in constructive trust. In an opinion by Judge Mary F. Walrath dated October 11, 2001, the court found that "the Debtors' cash was swept on a daily basis to a concentration account" and that "for some period each day the Debtors had no cash on hand."

The court quoted the Sixth Circuit's 1989 decision in First Federal of Michigan v. Barrow: "funds subsequently added from other sources cannot be subject to the equitable claim of the cestui que trust." Where trust money is drawn down, the trust amount "must be regarded as dissipated, except as to the balance." New deposits into the swept account did not re-create the trust funds, which "are lost under the LIBT."

EBS lost on a second ground as well: "EBS has failed to establish a sufficient nexus under the Begier case." The debtors had never paid EBS or identified any funds as belonging to it, and the availability of credit to the debtors did not supply the missing link.

Why don't tracing presumptions work in a Ponzi scheme?

Every dollar in the account came from a victim, so a presumption that favors one victim takes from another. In Cunningham v. Brown the Supreme Court refused such a presumption and applied the principle that "equality is equity."

Charles Ponzi began in December 1919 with $150 of capital. He issued 90-day notes promising $150 for every $100 lent and paid notes early, at 45 days, to draw in more lenders. Within eight months he took in $9,582,000 and issued notes with a face value of $14,374,000. By July 1 he was taking in about $1,000,000 a week. He stopped selling notes on July 26 after a public investigation began, and a newspaper report on August 2 declared him insolvent, which set off "a wild scramble." Withdrawals from his accounts at the Hanover Trust Company between July 19 and August 10 totaled $6,692,000.

The defendants were investors who got paid in that scramble, and the trustee sued to recover the payments as preferences. The lower courts treated the payments as the return of the defendants' own money, relying on the presumption of Knatchbull v. Hallett that a wrongdoer draws out his own money first. Chief Justice Taft rejected that for a fund made up entirely of money taken from many victims: applying it here "would be running the fiction of Knatchbull v. Hallett into the ground." The Court also held that the rule of Clayton's Case, first in, first out, did not apply, because Ponzi's withdrawals came before the defendants sought to rescind.

The Court reversed and held the payments to be preferences under section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act. "Those who were successful in the race of diligence" had obtained an unlawful preference, and the case called "strongly for the principle that equality is equity," which the Court treated as the spirit of the bankruptcy law.

In a fraud case the accountant establishes where the money in the account came from before tracing a particular investor's deposit. If every source was an investor, a tracing presumption decides between victims, and Cunningham is the Supreme Court authority against using it that way.

How does the government trace drug or fraud proceeds through a bank account?

By a tracing rule such as "drugs-in, last-out" or, for cash and account funds, under 18 U.S.C. 984, which spares the government from identifying the specific funds if it sues within 1 year of the offense.

In United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, decided on August 4, 1986, the Second Circuit dealt with about $3 million in five accounts of Banco Cafetero Panama and Banco Cafetero Colon. The government alleged that the funds were proceeds of a drug conspiracy. Between August 1983 and March 1985 some $46 million had moved out of First Interamericas Bank into an account of Banco Cafetero Panama at Irving Trust in New York, and millions were then transferred out of that account, including to an account of Banco Cafetero Colon, a branch office of Banco Cafetero Panama.

Judge Newman described two ways to trace through such accounts. Under "drugs-in, last-out," which the opinion also calls the lowest intermediate balance rule, tainted money stays in the account so long as the balance never falls below the tainted amount. Under "drugs-in, first-out," any single withdrawal, or an asset bought with it, is traced to the tainted deposit up to its amount. The government argued that it could use either approach at its option, and the court found that position "sufficiently correct" to prevail on the appeal.

The court set a limit on the choice: the government cannot obtain cumulative forfeiture because more than one tracing route exists. In the court's example, a $100 tainted deposit yields one $100 forfeiture. The opinion also described a pro rata or averaging approach, which the government did not claim and the court did not consider. A sixth account named in the complaints had a negative balance, and the claim against it was moot.

Section 984 of title 18 changes the task for fungible property in civil forfeiture. Where the property is cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, "funds deposited in an account in a financial institution" or precious metals, "it shall not be necessary for the Government to identify the specific property involved in the offense." Identical property in the same place or account is subject to forfeiture. The limit is time: no action under the section to forfeit property "not traceable directly to the offense" may be commenced more than 1 year after the offense. Funds in an interbank account are excluded unless the account holder knowingly engaged in the offense.

Do common-law tracing rules apply to withheld taxes in bankruptcy?

No. In Begier v. IRS the Supreme Court held that a debtor's voluntary payment of trust-fund taxes before bankruptcy was not a transfer of the debtor's property, without strict tracing through its accounts.

American International Airways fell behind on taxes it had collected or withheld and was required to hold in trust for the United States. The IRS required it to open a separate bank account, which the airline never funded fully. It paid "the IRS $695,000 from the separate bank account and $946,434 from its general operating funds." After the airline filed under Chapter 11, its trustee, Harry P. Begier, Jr., sued to recover the payments as preferences. The Bankruptcy Court let him recover most of the payments from the general accounts and none of those from the separate account.

Justice Marshall wrote for the Court on June 4, 1990. The trust under 26 U.S.C. 7501 arises when the taxes are collected or withheld, not when they are segregated or paid over, and the common-law tracing rules were "unhelpful in this special context." Relying on floor remarks by Representative Edwards that "[t]he courts should permit the use of reasonable assumptions," the Court concluded that "any voluntary prepetition payment of trust-fund taxes out of the debtor's assets" is not a transfer of the debtor's property. The voluntary payment itself supplied the required nexus between the trust and the funds paid. The opinion states: "We hold that the funds paid here were not the property of the debtor prior to payment." Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment.

The Begier nexus test came up again in Edison Brothers, where the claimant lost because the debtors had never paid it anything and had never identified any funds as belonging to it.

What records does a tracing analysis need?

Statements for every account the money passed through, for the whole period between the claimant's deposit and the claim date, with the deposit items, checks and wire details that identify each source and payee.

The lowest intermediate balance rule turns on the lowest balance in the period, so the accountant works with the balance after each transaction, not month-end figures. In Vaughan Motors the decisive number was a single low point of $20.63. In Edison Brothers the decisive fact was a nightly sweep of cash to a concentration account.

Money that moves between accounts is followed through each transfer. In Banco Cafetero the government followed funds out of First Interamericas Bank into a Banco Cafetero account at Irving Trust and then on to accounts at other banks. A missing statement for one account in the chain leaves the money at that account unexplained.

Records held by the other side are requested under Rule 34, which lets a party ask another party "to inspect, copy, test, or sample" items in its possession, custody or control, with a written response due "within 30 days after being served." For nonparties such as banks, Rule 34(c) points to Rule 45, under which a nonparty can be compelled to produce "documents and tangible things."

Source identification comes before the arithmetic. A deposit that the statement shows only as a transfer from another account is traced back through that account, and a deposit of mixed checks is broken down by item. The schedule then carries each source in its own column, so the court can see the result under the rule it adopts.

Who chooses the tracing method, and how does the report present it?

The court chooses by the type of claim and the governing law. The expert applies the rule to the records and can present the result under each rule the parties dispute.

Vaughan Motors and Edison Brothers applied the lowest intermediate balance test to trust and constructive trust claims in bankruptcy. Cunningham refused a presumption that would have favored the investors who were paid first. Banco Cafetero accepted the government's choice between last-out and first-out tracing for forfeiture, without cumulative recovery. Begier replaced common-law tracing with the nexus of a voluntary payment for trust-fund taxes. Section 984 removed the need to identify specific funds in civil forfeiture actions brought within 1 year.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs whether the accountant's application comes in. The proponent must show the court that it is "more likely than not" that the testimony "is based on sufficient facts or data," that it is "the product of reliable principles and methods," and that the expert applied them reliably to the facts of the case. A schedule that skips an account in the chain or uses month-end balances where the rule needs the low point fails the first of those conditions.

When the parties dispute the rule, the report can run the same transactions under each method and state the result under each one. The court picks the rule as a matter of law, and the amount under that rule is already in the record. Under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), a report offered "solely to contradict or rebut" the other side's tracing on the same subject is due "within 30 days after the other party's disclosure," absent a stipulation or court order.

What does IAE do when funds have to be traced?

A forensic accountant from the IAE registry writes an expert report on the questions agreed with the client and follows funds through bank statements and ledgers. Delivery takes up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.

IAE's forensic accounting service covers lost profits and other damages, solvency on the date of a transfer, and tracing of funds in commercial, bankruptcy and partnership disputes. The expert follows funds through bank statements and ledgers, one account after another. A forensic accountant from the IAE registry writes an expert report on the client's questions or a review of the opposing expert's report, and IAE frames the questions from the ledgers, tax returns and bank statements in the record and confirms them before work starts.

The client sends the materials and describes the task, and the secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The signed PDF is issued within up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, and a 48-hour rush is available for cases with tight deadlines.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and can be verified by Member ID or QR code. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy; legal questions are for the client's attorney. A report is evidence that the court weighs with the rest of the record, and neither IAE nor the accountant guarantees the outcome.

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