Expert report review

Treating physician opinions under Rule 26(a)(2)(C): how does the other side check them?

A treating physician who will give opinions at trial is disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C): the subject matter and a summary of the facts and opinions, with no signed report. Courts require a full report when the physician formed an opinion outside the treatment, often at counsel's request. A reviewing physician on the other side dates each opinion against the chart and tests the summary against the rule.

A physician carries a thin folder down a clinic hallway, a stethoscope at the shoulder

What must a party disclose for a treating physician who will give opinions?

The physician's identity, the subject matter of the expected testimony under Evidence Rules 702, 703 or 705, and a summary of the facts and opinions. Absent a court order, the disclosure is due 90 days before trial.

Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to disclose the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703 or 705. A treating physician who will explain a diagnosis, a prognosis or the cause of an injury falls under that rule, although nobody hired the physician for the case.

A written report, prepared and signed by the witness, is required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B) only from a witness "retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case" or an employee whose duties regularly involve giving expert testimony. Every other witness who will give opinions is disclosed under subdivision (C), which asks for two things: the subject matter on which the witness will present evidence under Rules 702, 703 or 705, and a summary of the facts and opinions the witness is expected to give.

Subdivision (C) was added in 2010. The committee note names "physicians or other health care professionals" among the frequent examples and says such a witness "may both testify as a fact witness and also provide expert testimony." It also limits the content: "The (a)(2)(C) disclosure obligation does not include facts unrelated to the expert opinions the witness will present." What the physician saw and did during visits does not have to be summarized; the opinions and the facts they rest on do.

Timing follows Rule 26(a)(2)(D). Unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise, expert disclosures are due at least 90 days before the date set for trial. A scheduling order can set other dates, and the reviewer takes the deadline from the order in the case.

When does a treating physician have to write a full expert report?

When the opinion was not formed during the treatment. In Johnson v. Friesen (2023) the Eighth Circuit upheld the exclusion of a neurosurgeon's causation opinion written after months of record review at the attorney's request.

The committee note to the 1993 amendment said: "A treating physician, for example, can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any requirement for a written report." The text of Rule 26 never said whether a treating physician who gives opinions must comply with subdivision (B) or (C), and the courts of appeals answered by asking when and how the opinion was formed.

Johnson v. Friesen, No. 22-3335, was decided by the Eighth Circuit on August 18, 2023, in an opinion by Judge Loken. The plaintiff sued over a 2015 car accident in which the defendant admitted negligence. His neurosurgeon, Dr. Harold Hess, gave the only causation opinion. Johnson's attorney asked for it, and Dr. Hess spent several months reviewing medical records and photographs of the accident that the attorney sent before he wrote a letter linking the low back injury to the accident "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty."

The District of Nebraska found that the opinion was not formed during treatment, held Dr. Hess to the report requirement of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and excluded his testimony. With no causation expert left, the defendant won summary judgment, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It quoted the Seventh Circuit's decision in Meyers v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.: a treating physician who did not make the causation determination in the course of providing treatment "should be deemed to be one 'retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case.'" The opinion also cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore.

In Johnson the district court found the summary disclosure adequate under subdivision (C) and still excluded the opinion, because subdivision (B) applied. A reviewing physician therefore asks two separate questions about each opinion: does the summary describe it, and when, and on what material, was it formed.

What makes a treating physician's summary disclosure inadequate?

A list of topics without the opinions themselves. In Jones v. Colorado Casualty (D. Ariz. 2015) the court barred a treating physician's expert testimony because the disclosures said what he would address but not what he would say.

Jones v. Colorado Casualty Insurance Company was an insurance dispute over the handling of a work-related left shoulder injury. On October 19, 2015, Senior Judge James A. Teilborg ruled on the plaintiff's three disclosures for his treating physician, Dr. Dewanjee. The second and third were nearly identical. The third said the physician "will offer testimony (and already has in his deposition) as to the impact of the delay in care" and that he would testify that Jones suffered a left shoulder injury due to his workplace injury.

The court found that the disclosures did not state the opinions or the facts behind them: "the disclosure fails to include what his actual opinions are regarding the issues." Part of the proposed testimony also went past medicine. An opinion on the reasonableness of the insurer's denial was "beyond even the outermost reaches of a treating physician's expertise." Dr. Dewanjee himself said he was not the proper person to ask about emotional and mental damages, and the court found he had no expertise on the financial impact of the delay.

The 2010 committee note warns in the other direction as well. The subdivision (C) disclosure is "considerably less extensive than the report required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)," and "Courts must take care against requiring undue detail." A reviewer does not fault a summary for being short. The reviewer marks a summary that lists subjects such as care, causation or future treatment without stating any opinion on them, and an opinion on a question outside the physician's practice.

What happens when a treating physician is not disclosed properly?

Rule 37(c)(1) bars the undisclosed opinions unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless. In Herrington v. DG Louisiana (2022) the court limited two treating physicians to their records and to opinions formed during treatment.

Under Rule 37(c)(1), a party that fails to provide information or identify a witness as Rule 26(a) or (e) requires may not use that information or witness on a motion, at a hearing or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. On motion, the court may also order payment of the reasonable expenses the failure caused, inform the jury of it or impose other sanctions.

In Herrington v. DG Louisiana, LLC, No. 22-1034, Judge Lance M. Africk of the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled on October 11, 2022, on two physicians the plaintiff had listed for "Medical Treatment." She had served neither a report nor a summary for either one. The court weighed four factors: the explanation for the failure, the importance of the testimony, the prejudice to the other side and the availability of a continuance. No explanation was offered, the pretrial conference was days away, and the court noted that "Testimony regarding medical causation is generally considered to be expert testimony." The physicians could testify "only as to information contained in their medical records and opinions formed during the course of their treatment."

In Jones the plaintiff argued the defect was harmless: the defense could read the records, rely on earlier disclosures and depositions or take a third deposition. The court rejected each argument and left Dr. Dewanjee as a percipient witness who "may testify only as to what he perceived during his visits with Plaintiff."

In both orders the treatment record marks the outer edge of the testimony. The review lists every opinion in the summary or the deposition that has no entry in the treatment record behind it, so that counsel can raise each one under Rule 37(c)(1).

Which opinions stay within the treatment?

Opinions about the physician's own diagnosis, choices and care of this patient. In the Taxotere litigation the court allowed a prescribing physician's account of his treatment decision but barred general opinions and opinions formed after he treated the plaintiff.

On January 12, 2021, Judge Milazzo of the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled in the Taxotere (docetaxel) products liability MDL, No. 16-2740, on the plaintiff's motion to exclude or limit two treating physicians in the Kahn case. Dr. Carl Kardinal chose the 2008 chemotherapy regimen. The court let him testify about how he weighed its risks and benefits, because proximate cause turned on whether he "would have changed his prescribing decision if he had known that Taxotere carried a risk of permanent alopecia."

Limits came with that permission. His testimony "must relate specifically to his treatment of Plaintiff Kahn." He could explain that he preferred docetaxel because he was concerned about the neurotoxicity of paclitaxel when he chose the regimen, but he could not give general testimony about that toxicity or opinions about paclitaxel formed after he treated her.

Dr. Zoe Larned was limited further. Nothing showed that she had discussed the hair loss with the patient, she conceded she was not qualified to diagnose its cause, and no summary disclosure had been served for her. The court barred her testimony on the cause of Kahn's hair loss and allowed her to discuss only drugs she considered for this patient: she "may not, however, discuss any drugs that she did not consider for Plaintiff Kahn."

A reviewing physician sorts each opinion into one of two lists. The first holds what the chart records: the diagnosis the physician made, the options weighed and the instructions given. The second holds opinions the chart does not record, such as general statements about a drug, conclusions about the cause of a condition the physician did not treat and opinions reached after the treatment ended. The Taxotere and Herrington orders drew their limits at the second list.

How does a reviewing physician test a treating physician's opinions against the chart?

By dating each opinion. The reviewer finds the chart entry where the opinion first appears, notes what the physician had seen by then and lists every opinion that appears only after counsel's request.

The reviewer builds a table with one row for each opinion in the summary, the deposition and any letter to counsel. Each row records the date of the first chart entry containing the opinion, the records and images the physician had on that date, and where each later document came from: the patient, another provider or counsel.

Causation gets its own rows. A treating physician writes a history, and the history often repeats the patient's account of the event. A chart entry that records back pain after a car accident records what the patient said. A statement that the accident caused a disc herniation is an opinion, and the reviewer looks for the visit, the imaging and the reasoning that produced it. In Johnson the opinion came in a letter written after months of review of the records and photographs the attorney supplied.

Specialty comes next. Rule 702 requires the proponent to show that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and on reliable principles and methods, and the committee note to the 2000 amendment requires a witness who relies on experience to "explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached" and "why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion." An emergency physician's opinion on the long-term course of a spinal injury goes into the review with the training and practice the physician's records show.

Then the deposition. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) lets a party depose "any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial," and Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) requires the party seeking discovery to pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent responding, unless manifest injustice would result. The reviewer's table becomes the order of questions: when each opinion was formed, on which records, and who supplied them.

Can the other side see what counsel sent the treating physician?

The communications fall outside Rule 26(b)(4)(C), which protects attorney communications only with witnesses who must give a written report. Drafts of the subdivision (C) disclosure stay protected under Rule 26(b)(4)(B).

Rule 26(b)(4)(C) extends the work product protection of Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) to communications between the party's attorney and "any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)." The 2010 committee note adds that "The rule does not itself protect communications between counsel and other expert witnesses," and treating physicians disclosed under subdivision (C) are among those other witnesses.

Drafts are treated differently. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) protects "drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded," and the note states: "This protection applies to all witnesses identified under Rule 26(a)(2)(A)." A draft of the summary prepared by counsel is protected by that rule. The cover letter that sent the records to the physician and asked for a causation opinion is outside Rule 26(b)(4)(C).

For the reviewer these letters date the opinion. In Johnson the causation opinion was itself a letter to the attorney, written after the attorney's request and months of review of the material the attorney sent. The review places each communication in the opinion table next to the opinion that followed it.

How does the other side answer a treating physician's opinion?

With its own expert evidence, due within 30 days after the subdivision (C) disclosure unless the court sets other dates, and with objections under Rules 37(c)(1) and 702 where the disclosure or the basis falls short.

Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) sets the default deadline for evidence "intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C)": 30 days after the other party's disclosure. The rule names subdivision (C), so the 30 days run after a treating physician's summary as they run after a retained expert's report.

The rebuttal physician answers the opinions the summary discloses. Where the summary is too thin to answer, the review says so and lists the missing opinions, and counsel decides whether to raise the gap with the court before the 30 days end.

Rule 702 applies to a treating physician who gives expert testimony in the same way it applies to a retained one. Under its current text the proponent must show the court "that it is more likely than not" that the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data and is the product of reliable principles and methods applied reliably to the facts of the case. The committee note to the 2000 amendment asks whether the expert "has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations." For a causation opinion built on the patient's history, the reviewer lists the alternatives the chart itself records: earlier imaging, earlier complaints of the same pain and degenerative findings.

What does IAE do when the other side discloses a treating physician's opinions?

A physician in the relevant specialty from the IAE registry reviews the disclosure and the chart and writes a review or a rebuttal report, in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.

The medical review page lists the treating physician disclosure among the reviewer's checks: a treating physician who was not retained discloses the subject matter and a summary of facts and opinions under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), and opinions outside that summary draw an objection. The IAE reviewer checks each opinion against the chart and against Rule 702: sufficient facts, a reliable method and its reliable application to this patient.

IAE agrees the review questions with the client before work starts. The client sends the disclosure, the deposition transcripts and the chart and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day, and within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the physician from its registry. The client approves the candidate and the CV. The draft is checked for facts, and the signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix. The Member ID in the document opens the specialist's record on the status check page or by QR code, and the specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials go through the contact form or to info@iaexperts.com and are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. The court weighs a review together with the other evidence. Neither IAE nor the physician guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm.

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