Expert witnesses
Antitrust economist expert at class certification: what must the damages model show?
In a price-fixing or monopolization class action, the economist's model decides whether there is a class at all. Under Rule 23(b)(3) the court certifies a damages class only if common questions predominate. In Comcast v. Behrend (2013) the Supreme Court reversed a certification because the plaintiffs' model measured damages from four theories of harm, while the district court had accepted only one.

What does an antitrust economist do in a class action?
The economist builds the models that answer two questions for the whole class: whether the conduct raised prices or otherwise injured class members, and by how much. The court tests both models before it certifies.
The claim comes from section 4 of the Clayton Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. 15(a). Any person "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" may sue in federal district court and "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." On a prompt motion the court may also award simple interest on actual damages for the period between service of the pleading and judgment, if it finds the award "just in the circumstances" after considering three factors listed in the statute. All three concern conduct in the litigation: claims or defenses so lacking in merit as to show delay or bad faith, violation of rules that sanction dilatory behavior, and conduct primarily meant to delay the case or increase its cost.
Each class member must therefore show injury, and the class must show the amount. One model addresses antitrust impact: whether the alleged conspiracy or exclusion raised the prices that members paid. The other measures damages, in price-fixing cases as an overcharge, the difference between the prices actually paid and the prices that would have been paid without the conduct.
In the railroad fuel surcharge litigation discussed below, the plaintiffs' economist, Dr. Gordon Rausser, built two regression models. His "common factor model" identified seven variables that determine shipping prices. His damages model controlled for those variables to isolate price increases caused by the alleged conspiracy.
What must a class prove under Rule 23 before the model matters?
Four prerequisites under Rule 23(a), and for a damages class two findings under Rule 23(b)(3): common questions predominate over individual ones, and a class action is superior to other methods of deciding the dispute.
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a class "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable," questions of law or fact common to the class, claims or defenses of the representatives typical of the class, and representatives who will "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
A class seeking money damages proceeds under Rule 23(b)(3). The court must find that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Among the pertinent matters the rule lists "the likely difficulties in managing a class action."
The economist's work goes to predominance. If impact and damages can be proved with evidence common to the class, those questions are common. If each member needs its own proof of injury, individual questions may overwhelm the common ones, and certification fails.
Procedure frames the timing. The court decides certification "at an early practicable time" (Rule 23(c)(1)(A)). It may certify a class only on particular issues (Rule 23(c)(4)) or divide it into subclasses (Rule 23(c)(5)). Under Rule 23(f), a party may petition the court of appeals for permission to appeal the certification order within 14 days after the order is entered, or within 45 days if the United States is a party.
What did the Supreme Court decide in Comcast v. Behrend?
On March 27, 2013, the Court held 5-4 that the class was improperly certified. The damages model must measure only the damages attributable to the theory of antitrust impact the court accepted, and this one did not.
The class covered more than 2 million current and former Comcast cable subscribers in the Philadelphia "cluster," described in the opinion as 16 counties in Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey. The plaintiffs alleged that Comcast swapped its cable systems outside the region for competitors' systems inside it, eliminating competition and keeping prices above competitive levels.
They offered four theories of antitrust impact: that clustering let Comcast withhold local sports programming from satellite competitors, reduced competition from "overbuilders" that build competing cable networks, reduced benchmark competition that customers use to compare prices, and increased Comcast's bargaining power with content providers. The district court accepted only the overbuilder theory as capable of classwide proof.
The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. James McClave, built a regression model comparing actual prices in the Philadelphia area with hypothetical "but for" prices and calculated class damages of $875,576,662. He conceded that the model did not isolate damages from any one theory: the figure combined all four. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed certification and refused to consider that argument, treating it as an attack on the merits that did not belong at the certification stage.
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito. A model offered to support a theory of liability must "measure only those damages attributable to that theory." Courts must conduct a "rigorous analysis" of Rule 23 even where it overlaps with the merits. Without a model limited to overbuilder deterrence, "Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class." Justices Ginsburg and Breyer wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.
Can a class include members the model shows were not injured?
Not many. In 2019 the D.C. Circuit assumed a small number might be tolerated, but upheld the finding that 2,037 uninjured shippers, 12.7% of the class in the plaintiffs' own model, defeated predominance.
The defendants in In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation were the four largest U.S. freight railroads: BNSF, CSX, Norfolk Southern and Union Pacific. Their customers alleged a conspiracy to fix rate-based fuel surcharges, the charges added to base shipping prices when fuel costs rise. The proposed class covered more than 16,000 shippers that paid such surcharges for unregulated services between July 1, 2003 and December 31, 2008.
The case went to the D.C. Circuit twice. In 2013 the court vacated the first certification order in light of Comcast, faulted the district court for not addressing the model's propensity toward false positives and required a "hard look at the soundness of statistical models." On remand the district court in 2017 found Dr. Rausser's opinions admissible but denied certification. It identified three flaws: inflated damages for intermodal traffic, damages on legacy contracts signed before the alleged conspiracy began, and negative overcharges for 2,037 class members. Any one of them defeated predominance.
Judge Katsas wrote for a panel with Chief Judge Garland and Judge Rogers and affirmed on August 16, 2019. The court assumed, for the sake of argument, that a class may contain a de minimis number of uninjured members. It repeated the district court's reading of the "few reported decisions" on the point, which "suggest that 5% to 6% constitutes the outer limits of a de minimis number," and wrote: "The 12.7 percent figure in this case is more than twice that approximate upper bound." The district court had also looked at raw numbers, and the plaintiffs had proposed no way to separate the uninjured shippers from the others. "Given the need in this case for at least 2,037 individual determinations of injury and causation," common issues did not predominate.
The figure of 2,037 came from the plaintiffs' own damages model, which returned negative overcharges for those shippers.
Is passing a Daubert challenge enough to certify the class?
No. In Rail Freight the district court admitted the economist's opinions and still denied certification. In Comcast the Supreme Court reversed certification without ruling on admissibility, because the model did not fit the accepted theory.
The Supreme Court granted review in Comcast on whether a district court may certify a class without resolving whether the plaintiff class introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony. Comcast had not objected to Dr. McClave's testimony under Rule 702 or Daubert. The dissent argued that Comcast had forfeited the objection and that the writ should be dismissed. The majority accepted that Comcast could not argue inadmissibility, but held that Comcast could still argue that the evidence failed to show damages capable of measurement on a classwide basis, and decided the case on that ground.
The D.C. Circuit in Rail Freight did not decide whether Rule 23 requires a model to be more reliable than Rule 702 requires for admission. It found the question unnecessary because the model, even if fully reliable, showed uninjured members beyond any de minimis share.
The two cases separate two tests. Admissibility under Rule 702 asks whether the expert's method is reliable and reliably applied. Predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) asks whether the admitted evidence proves impact and damages for the class with common proof. In Rail Freight, Dr. Rausser passed the first test and the class failed the second.
How long can the fight over class certification last?
Years. In Rail Freight the class period ended in 2008, the D.C. Circuit vacated the first certification in 2013, the district court denied certification in 2017 and the appeal ended in August 2019.
Rule 23(f) gives a party 14 days after the certification order is entered, or 45 days if the United States is a party, to petition the court of appeals for permission to appeal. In both cases discussed above, appellate courts ruled on certification before any trial on the merits.
In Comcast the district court certified the class, a divided Third Circuit panel affirmed (655 F.3d 182), and the Supreme Court reversed on March 27, 2013.
Rail Freight took two trips to the D.C. Circuit. The class period ran between July 1, 2003 and December 31, 2008. The court of appeals vacated the first certification order in 2013 (725 F.3d 244). On remand the district court found Dr. Rausser's opinions admissible and denied certification in 2017 (292 F. Supp. 3d 14). The D.C. Circuit affirmed on August 16, 2019, and reissued the opinion on August 30, 2019.
How does IAE find an economist for an antitrust class action?
In the request, choose the case type Commercial dispute and name the calculation needed, such as a classwide damages model. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and lists of prior testimony.
The IAE page on commercial litigation expert witnesses lists 7 specialties and names among the damages economists' work "damages models for antitrust class actions." The page notes that state courts apply their own rules on expert admissibility and asks firms to name the state, the court and the type of calculation in the request. The form also asks for the firm's side, the expert disclosure deadline, the parties and their counsel for the conflict check and a short description of the case, without privileged or sealed information.
Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that field by that deadline. The search costs $2,000 per case, paid in advance. Within 5 business days the firm receives 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years, and each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel.
If no candidate fits, the second search is free. The firm chooses the expert, who bills the firm directly or through IAE under the agency option, and the expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. IAE is not a law firm: case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.
Sources
- 15 U.S.C. 15, Suits by persons injured (U.S. Code, 2023 edition, govinfo.gov)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, Class Actions (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (Justia)
- In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, No. 18-7010 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 16, 2019, reissued Aug. 30, 2019) (Justia)
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