Expert witnesses

Banking expert witness in a wire transfer fraud case: what makes a security procedure commercially reasonable under UCC 4A-202?

When a fraudster moves money out of a business account by wire, UCC Article 4A decides who absorbs the loss: the bank or its customer. The bank keeps the money only if it proves an agreed security procedure that was commercially reasonable and that it followed in good faith. Section 4A-202(c) calls reasonableness a question of law, yet in each of the three cases discussed below a party relied on an expert in banking or bank security.

Hands set a hardware token beside a face-down transfer slip on a warm bank desk

Who bears the loss when a fraudster sends a wire from a business account?

The bank, unless it proves three things under UCC 4A-202(b): an agreed security procedure, commercial reasonableness of that procedure, and acceptance of the order in good faith and in compliance with the procedure and the customer's written instructions.

Section 4A-202(a) covers the simple case: a payment order is the customer's order if the customer authorized it or is bound by it under the law of agency. A fraudulent order fails that test, so the bank turns to subsection (b).

Under 4A-202(b), if the bank and the customer agreed that payment orders would be verified "pursuant to a security procedure," an order the bank receives is effective as the customer's order "whether or not authorized." Two conditions follow. The procedure must be "a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized payment orders," and the bank must prove that it accepted the order "in good faith" and in compliance with the procedure and with any written agreement or instruction of the customer restricting acceptance.

If the bank cannot prove these points, section 4A-204(a) applies: the bank "shall refund any payment of the payment order received from the customer" and pays interest on the refundable amount.

The parties cannot rewrite this allocation in the account agreement. Section 4A-202(f) states that rights and obligations under sections 4A-202 and 4A-203 "may not be varied by agreement," except as those sections provide.

What counts as a security procedure under Article 4A?

A procedure established by agreement of the customer and the bank to verify that a payment order is the customer's or to detect errors. Codes, encryption and callbacks qualify. A signature comparison alone does not.

Section 4A-201 defines a security procedure as "a procedure established by agreement of a customer and a receiving bank" for one of two purposes: verifying that a payment order or a communication amending or cancelling it is that of the customer, or detecting error in the transmission or the content of the order.

The same section lists examples: "algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, callback procedures, or similar security devices." It also sets a floor. Comparison of a signature with an authorized specimen signature of the customer "is not by itself a security procedure."

The word "agreement" matters in litigation. In Upsher-Smith Laboratories v. Fifth Third Bank, Civ. No. 16-556 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2019), an employee of a Minnesota pharmaceutical company received an email purporting to be sent by the company's CEO and then calls from a man posing as a lawyer on a confidential acquisition. Between May 29 and June 16, 2014, she requested nine foreign exchange transfers totaling $52.5 million, all sent to banks in China or Slovakia. The bank recovered part of the money, and a footnote of the opinion puts the remaining loss at $39 million. The customer said that confirming each transfer with several of its employees was part of the protocol; the bank denied ever agreeing to that. Chief Judge John R. Tunheim wrote that "commercial reasonableness is a question of law for the court to decide," but "the elements of the security procedure are questions of fact." With the content of the procedure in dispute, the court denied the bank summary judgment on the Article 4A claim.

How does a court decide whether the procedure was commercially reasonable?

By the four factors of 4A-202(c): the customer's wishes expressed to the bank, the customer's circumstances known to the bank, alternative procedures offered to the customer, and procedures in general use by similarly situated customers and banks.

Section 4A-202(c) opens with the words "Commercial reasonableness of a security procedure is a question of law" and tells the court to determine it by considering "the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank," the circumstances of the customer known to the bank, "including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders" the customer normally issues, "alternative security procedures offered to the customer," and "security procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated."

The second sentence of 4A-202(c) gives the bank a shortcut. A procedure "is deemed to be commercially reasonable" if the customer chose it after the bank offered, and the customer refused, a procedure that was commercially reasonable for that customer, and the customer "expressly agreed in writing to be bound by any payment order, whether or not authorized," accepted by the bank in compliance with the procedure the customer chose.

The statute does not require the strongest procedure on the market. In Choice Escrow and Land Title v. BancorpSouth Bank, Nos. 13-1879 and 13-1931 (June 11, 2014), the Eighth Circuit applied Mississippi's version of Article 4A, the law the parties had chosen in their contracts, and quoted Official Comment 4 to section 4A-203: "The standard is not whether the security procedure is the best available."

If reasonableness is a question of law, what is left for the banking expert?

The facts under the legal question: which procedures similar banks and customers used at the time, what the bank's own system flagged, what the customer was offered and refused, and whether staff followed the procedure.

The factors in 4A-202(c) turn on facts that the statute does not supply: which procedures were "in general use" by comparable banks in the year of the fraud, how often and in what amounts this customer normally sent wires, and which alternatives the bank offered. Those points come from records and from witnesses with banking operations experience.

In Choice Escrow, the Eighth Circuit recorded that the parties agreed that the 2005 guidance of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council on authentication in internet banking provided the applicable standards of commercial reasonableness. The district court's order records that the parties and their respective experts were in agreement on that point.

The expert also reads the bank's own data. In Patco, the bank's software scored four of the fraudulent withdrawals between 563 and 790, against the customer's usual range of 10 to 214, and the customer's expert testified about manual reviews at her other banking clients that used the same security product.

What did the First Circuit find unreasonable in Patco?

The bank asked challenge questions on every transaction, did not monitor the high risk scores its own system produced and did not notify the customer. Together those failures made the procedure commercially unreasonable.

Patco Construction Co. v. People's United Bank, No. 11-2031, was decided on July 3, 2012, in an opinion by Chief Judge Lynch. The opinion describes Patco as "a small property development and contractor business located in Sanford, Maine." In six withdrawals between May 7 and May 14, 2009, fraudsters took $588,851.26 out of its online account. The bank blocked or recovered $243,406.83. The residual loss was $345,444.43.

The bank's security product scored each transaction on a scale of 0 to 1,000 and triggered challenge questions above a score of 750 or above a dollar threshold. In August 2007 the bank set the dollar threshold at $100,000. On June 6, 2008, it lowered the threshold to $1, so challenge questions appeared on every Patco transaction. The court reasoned that this raised the chance that keylogging malware would capture the answers.

Patco's normal risk scores ran between 10 and 214. Four of the fraudulent withdrawals scored 790, 720, 563 and 785. The bank did not manually review those transactions or notify Patco, although, as the court noted, it "had the capability to conduct manual review of high-risk transactions" and could call a customer when it detected fraud. Patco's expert testified that "keylogging malware was a persistent problem throughout the financial industry." The court also wrote that the bank had adopted one dollar rule of $1 for all its customers instead of fitting the rule to Patco's circumstances.

The First Circuit held that "these collective failures, taken as a whole, rendered Ocean Bank's security procedures commercially unreasonable." It reversed summary judgment for the bank on the Article 4A count, affirmed dismissal of the negligence count, left open what obligations Article 4A places on the customer, and suggested that the parties consider resolving the matter by agreement.

Why did the customer lose in Choice Escrow?

The bank had offered dual control, the customer declined it in writing, and the customer's own expert agreed that dual control could be a commercially reasonable procedure. The $440,000 loss stayed with the customer.

On March 17, 2010, a third party who had obtained an employee's login through a phishing attack ordered a $440,000 wire out of the account of Choice Escrow and Land Title to a bank in Cyprus. BancorpSouth executed the order, and recovery failed.

The bank had offered four measures: user IDs and passwords, device authentication with challenge questions for unrecognized computers, daily dollar limits, and dual control. Under dual control one user creates a payment order and a second authorized user with separate credentials must approve it before the bank receives it. Choice Escrow set no daily limits and declined dual control, signing a waiver that acknowledged the risks of single-user control.

In the district court (W.D. Mo., No. 10-03531-CV-S-JTM), Magistrate Judge John T. Maughmer granted the bank summary judgment. The order quotes the customer's own expert, Brad Maryman. Asked whether dual control, on the assumptions stated in the question, would be a commercially reasonable security procedure, he answered: "I believe it could, yes." The order adds: "The experts in this case agree that the fraud would not likely have occurred" if the customer had used dual control.

On appeal the customer argued that a reasonable procedure requires the bank to review each order against the customer's usual activity. Its expert had said such transactional analysis "could be a very effective aid in deterring fraudulent payment order transactions." The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Wollman, wrote that "Article 4A never mentions transactional analysis" and rejected the argument. The court affirmed judgment for the bank and reversed the dismissal of the bank's counterclaim for attorney's fees under the indemnification clause, holding that this part of the clause "is not inconsistent with Article 4A."

What do good faith and compliance add to the bank's burden?

A reasonable procedure is not enough. The bank must also prove that it followed the procedure and any written customer instruction, and that it acted honestly and observed reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.

The Eighth Circuit in Choice Escrow applied the UCC definition: good faith "means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." Honesty was conceded. On fair dealing, the court wrote that "the March 17 payment order was not so unusual that it should have raised eyebrows."

The second prong is where an expert on bank operations is heard. In Upsher-Smith the court pointed to the amounts of the fraudulent requests, their urgency and the employee's request for secrecy, and wrote that these factors, though not decisive at that stage, "cast doubt" on the bank's good faith in carrying out the requests. The court also noted the bank's "apparent failure to undertake a risk assessment" with the customer. Whether a bank would have paused such transfers under its own policies is a question of banking practice, and that is the subject of the expert's testimony.

Compliance is proved from the bank's logs: who authenticated, what the system displayed, whether a callback was made, and whether a written restriction of the customer was on file.

Can the customer still avoid the loss, and what are the deadlines?

Yes, under 4A-203(a)(2), if the customer proves the order was not caused by its own people or by information obtained through its own systems. A customer who objects later than one year after notification loses the claim.

Even when the bank proves everything required by 4A-202(b), section 4A-203(a)(2) bars it from enforcing or retaining payment "if the customer proves that the order was not caused, directly or indirectly," by a person entrusted with duties to act for the customer on payment orders or the security procedure, or by a person who obtained access to the customer's transmitting facilities or obtained, through a source controlled by the customer and without the bank's authority, information facilitating breach of the security procedure. The section adds that this applies "regardless of how the information was obtained or whether the customer was at fault."

For that defense the customer usually needs a digital forensics expert: the question is whether the credentials leaked through the customer's computers or through the bank's side.

Two periods run against the customer. Under 4A-204(a), a customer that does not notify the bank within a reasonable time "not exceeding 90 days" after notification of the debit loses interest on the refund, though the bank "is not entitled to any recovery from the customer" for that failure. Under 4A-505, a customer that does not object "within one year after the notification was received" is precluded from claiming that the bank may not retain the payment.

When do courts admit or limit a banking expert's testimony?

Courts admit testimony on industry practice, the bank's policies and the reasonableness of its procedures when the witness has banking experience. They stop the witness at conclusions of law, which belong to the judge.

In Upsher-Smith the bank moved to exclude all three of the customer's experts: Michael J. Doyle, a credit risk advisor with nearly forty years in banking, Nelson F. Everhardt, an anti-money laundering compliance consultant, and Robert F. Geary, a risk management consultant with more than three decades in the industry. Their opinions covered, among other subjects, "the reasonableness of the security procedures employed by FTB" and whether the bank followed its own policies.

The bank argued that each expert lacked the requisite expertise in the area of foreign exchange transfers. The court answered: "Even without operational experience with FX transfers, this knowledge renders the witnesses qualified." On testimony about federal banking regulations, the court said it "may help the jury assess industry norms." The court denied all three motions and reserved the question of legal conclusions for trial.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the proponent must show the court that it is more likely than not that the expert's knowledge will help the trier of fact, that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and reliable principles and methods, and that the opinion applies them reliably to the facts of the case. A retained expert's report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states all opinions with their basis, the facts or data considered, the exhibits, qualifications with publications of the previous 10 years, cases in which the witness testified in the previous 4 years, and compensation.

Counsel can screen a candidate on four points: years in wire or treasury operations, knowledge of the authentication guidance in force in the year of the fraud, prior rulings that limited the candidate's testimony, and ties to either bank or to the security vendor.

How does IAE find a banking expert for a wire fraud dispute?

In the request choose the case type Commercial dispute and name the field: wire transfer operations, bank security procedures or digital forensics. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and prior testimony.

The IAE page on commercial litigation expert witnesses lists seven specialties: damages, forensic accounting, business valuation, solvency, securities, insurance claims handling and industry specialists. A banking operations witness is an industry specialist. The page notes that state courts apply their own rules on expert admissibility, so the request names the state and the court.

The request form asks for the field of expertise, the case type, the state and court, the firm's side, the expert disclosure deadline, the parties and their counsel for the conflict check, and a short description of the case. For a wire fraud dispute the description can give the date and amount of the transfers and the security procedure in the account agreement. The form asks not to include privileged or sealed information.

Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that field by the deadline. The search is paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment. Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. Within 5 business days the firm receives 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years. If no candidate fits, the second search is free; if IAE finds no candidates, it refunds the fee.

The firm chooses the expert, who bills the firm directly or through IAE under the agency option. IAE is not a law firm: case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.

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