Expert witnesses
Business valuation expert witness in a shareholder dispute: fair value under New York BCL § 1118
In a New York shareholder dispute, a business valuation expert usually enters the case after a holder of at least 20% of the votes petitions for dissolution under Business Corporation Law § 1104-a and the corporation or the other shareholders elect to buy the petitioner's shares under § 1118. The dispute then turns on one figure: the fair value of those shares on the day before the petition was filed.

What does a business valuation expert do in a shareholder dispute?
The expert values the company and the petitioner's shares as of the statutory date, explains each method and adjustment, and answers the opposing expert. When the parties cannot agree on the price, the court sets fair value.
New York's Court of Appeals described the shift in Matter of Seagroatt Floral Co., decided on November 19, 1991. Once Seagroatt Floral and Henry J. Seagroatt elected to buy out the petitioners, "the misconduct charges became irrelevant. The issue became one of valuation."
In Matter of Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp. (1995), the court wrote: "The three major elements of fair value are net asset value, investment value and market value." It added that "the particular facts and circumstances will dictate which element predominates" and that "not all three elements must influence the result."
In Friedman and Rosenblum each side brought its own valuation expert. In Friedman, the trial court chose between the petitioners' expert and the corporations' expert, Kenneth McGraw. In Rosenblum v. Rosenblum (2024), Mr. Mercer valued the two companies for the plaintiff and Mr. Klein for the defendant, and a separate property expert, Mr. Feeny, valued the buildings for the plaintiff. The judge took inputs from both sides.
When does a New York shareholder dispute become a valuation case?
When a holder of at least 20% of the votes petitions for dissolution under § 1104-a and the corporation or other shareholders elect, within 90 days after filing, to buy the petitioner's shares at fair value under § 1118.
Section 1104-a applies to corporations whose shares are not listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market. The petitioner must hold shares representing 20% or more of the votes of all outstanding shares and allege either illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining shareholders, or that the corporation's property or assets are being looted, wasted or diverted for non-corporate purposes. The court considers whether liquidation is the only feasible means for the petitioners to obtain a fair return on their investment.
In Matter of Gould Erectors & Rigging (Third Department, January 12, 2017), the court applied the oppression test of Matter of Kemp & Beatley (64 N.Y.2d 63, 1984): oppression arises when the majority's conduct "substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the [shareholder's] decision to join the venture." The petitioner owned 24 of 98 shares of Gould Erectors & Rigging and 25 of 100 shares of Flach Crane & Rigging. He was removed as a director of both companies, lost access to his work computer and email, was fired on May 1, 2013 and did not receive the customary annual profit-sharing bonus, which was paid to John C. Flach, the president of both companies. The Third Department affirmed the order of dissolution.
Section 1118(a) gives the other shareholders or the corporation 90 days after the petition is filed, or a later time the court sets, to elect to buy the petitioner's shares at fair value. The election "shall be irrevocable unless the court, in its discretion, for just and equitable considerations, determines that such election be revocable." In Seagroatt, the Court of Appeals held that a second corporation that is not a shareholder of the company named in the petition "does not have standing to make an election to purchase," and that making two corporations jointly and severally liable for the price was error.
What does fair value mean under section 1118?
The statute does not define it. The Court of Appeals treats it as what a willing purchaser, in an arm's length transaction, would offer for the corporation as an operating business, valued as a going concern.
In Seagroatt, the court wrote that the statute "offers no definition of fair value and no criteria by which a court is to determine price" and that "there is no single formula for mechanical application." Citing Matter of Pace Photographers (71 N.Y.2d 737), it held that "the value to be ascertained is that of an interest in a going concern" and not a share of a business in liquidation.
Friedman v. Beway, decided on December 7, 1995, arose under § 623, the appraisal statute for dissenting shareholders. The petitioners held minority stakes in nine family-owned close corporations, and each corporation's sole asset was income-producing real estate in New York City. The board and the required majority approved a transfer of all the property to a new partnership; the petitioners voted against it and demanded appraisal.
The court applied "the principle we enunciated for such determinations under section 1118": fair value is "what a willing purchaser, in an arm's length transaction, would offer for the corporation as an operating business," and shares are valued "on their worth in a going concern, not in liquidation." The trial court worked in that order. It took the aggregate net asset value of the nine corporations, then each petitioner's proportionate share of it, and applied the discount for unmarketability to that share last.
On which date does the expert value the shares?
On the day before the petition was filed. Section 1118(b) fixes that date and excludes any element of value arising from the filing. A Monroe County court held in 2005 that it had no discretion to move it.
Under section 1118(b), when the parties cannot agree, the court may stay the § 1104-a proceeding and determine the fair value of the petitioner's shares as of the day prior to the date on which the petition was filed, exclusive of any element of value arising from the filing. The figure still takes in any adjustment or surcharge the court finds appropriate in the § 1104-a proceeding.
In Maxon v. Mirror Show Management (Supreme Court, Monroe County, March 22, 2005), the petitioner asked to move the valuation date to "a date towards the end of 2004," arguing that litigation over disqualifying the respondents' counsel had in effect stayed the case. Justice Kenneth R. Fisher refused and cited Matter of Vetco (2d Dept. 1999): "the court has determined that it has no discretion to change the date set forth in the statute for valuation."
The respondents then argued that the petitioner could have no discovery of events after the valuation date. The court called that argument "misplaced." Later records bear on "the ability of the corporation to actually make payment" for the shares and on whether the court should require a bond under § 1118(c)(2) before the purchase.
Can the expert apply a minority discount or a marketability discount?
A minority discount, no: the Court of Appeals rejected it in Friedman v. Beway. A discount for lack of marketability can apply: the First Department set 16% in Giaimo v. Vitale, and a trial court accepted 15% in Rosenblum.
Friedman held: "A minority discount would necessarily deprive minority shareholders of their proportionate interest in a going concern." The corporations' expert, Kenneth McGraw, worked in two steps. He first applied a 9.8% discount to net asset value, based on the prices of publicly traded real estate investment trusts, and then a 30.4% discount for unmarketability, based on the price drop when comparable public shares became restricted. He also proposed a further 14.6% for the transfer restrictions in the stockholder agreements.
The trial court removed the 9.8% step as a minority discount, rejected the 14.6% as unpersuasive and cut 9.4 points from the 30.4% as another minority element, which left 21%. The Court of Appeals found that McGraw's 30.4% compared registered and unregistered shares of the same minority stock, so the discount was "solely attributable to the difference in the marketability" of the shares. The trial court "erred in removing a nonexistent minority discount element," and the case went back "for a new determination of the appropriate discount for unmarketability." The refusal to add a discount for the transfer restrictions stood.
In Matter of Giaimo v Vitale (First Department, December 20, 2012), the respondent had elected under § 1118 to buy the petitioner's shares in two closely held corporations that held real estate, EGA Associates, Inc. and First Avenue Village Corp. The Referee declined to apply any discount for lack of marketability (DLOM). The First Department held that the motion court erred in treating the marketability of the real property as "exactly the same as the marketability of the corporations' shares": "There are increased costs and risks associated with corporate ownership of the real estate in this case."
The respondent's expert, Jeffrey L. Baliban, recommended a 20% DLOM; the studies and method he relied on reported a range between 8% and 30%. The court used his build-up method, which it said "best captures the DLOM applicable in this particular case," and concluded: "We conclude that a 16% DLOM against the assets of both corporations is appropriate."
The question also arose for limited liability companies in Rosenblum v. Rosenblum (Supreme Court, New York County, June 14, 2024). Justice Melissa A. Crane valued Kenneth Rosenblum's interests in 132 Realty LLC and Village Realty LLC after he withdrew as a 50% member. The court accepted the 15% marketability discount of the defendant's expert, Mr. Klein, at the holding company level. It pointed to the lack of an operating agreement and to litigation between the members since 1996: "The parties' inability to work together permeates every aspect of their relationship." The court added that this was not a minority discount, because the plaintiff "is a 50% shareholder."
Does the expert deduct the tax on built-in capital gains?
In part. In Giaimo v. Vitale, the First Department rejected both a flat refusal and a full deduction, and accepted reducing the built-in gains tax to present value, because the tax would be paid only in the future.
The corporations in Giaimo held appreciated real estate. A sale of the buildings would trigger capital gains tax at the corporate level, and the court held that "embedded capital gains taxes in assets held by 'C' corporations will affect" what a buyer of the shares would pay. The petitioner argued that such a discount can never be included in fair value, and the court disagreed.
The respondent read an earlier case, Wechsler, as one that "always requires that the BIG discount be calculated at 100% of the projected tax." The court rejected that reading. A 100% discount "necessarily implies that following the hypothetical sale, the purchaser would immediately liquidate all of the real estate and realize the full capital gains impact." The motion court had found no financial reason for the properties to be sold in the foreseeable future.
The Referee and the motion court had reduced the value of the corporations' assets by the present value of the BIG tax, and the First Department kept that method: "the reduction of BIG to present value appropriately adjusts for embedded capital gains taxes that will not be paid until some time in the future." It modified the judgments to vacate the principal amounts, applied the 16% DLOM and, because the judgments had been paid, ordered the petitioner to repay the amount of that discount.
Which valuation method will a New York court accept?
No single formula. Courts weigh net asset value, investment value and market value by the facts of the case. In Friedman and Rosenblum, both real estate holding cases, the courts worked from net asset value.
In Friedman, the trial court rejected the petitioners' expert, who had "valued these shares as if petitioners were co-tenants in the real estate rather than corporate shareholders," and "adopted the net asset-based valuation methodology employed by Kenneth McGraw, the corporations' expert." The net asset values themselves came from figures the parties stipulated, and the Court of Appeals corrected only the discount.
In Rosenblum, both entity experts used net asset value: book values of the assets adjusted to market, adjusted liabilities subtracted, and a marketability discount considered last. The dispute moved to the two buildings, 132 Thompson Street and 35-39 Christopher Street. The court found the defendant's comparable analysis "not credible" and disregarded it, and found the plaintiff's rent projections "inflated and speculative."
It accepted the defendant's net operating income, built on "actual contract rents": $869,222 for Thompson Street and $757,912 for Christopher Street. It took the plaintiff's comparable sales and capitalization rates, because the defendant's rates rested on inappropriate comparables, and directed the parties to recalculate with that combination.
In Giaimo, the Referee rejected the petitioner's real estate expert's testimony on the appropriate appreciation rate, and the First Department found no basis to disturb that finding. The court wrote that "valuation of closely held corporations is not an exact science" and that the particular facts and circumstances of each case control.
Which records does the valuation expert need?
In Maxon, the court ordered five years of financial statements, budgets, projections, expense records and shareholder agreements. Section 1104-a(c) separately opens three years of financial books and records to the petitioner within 30 days of filing.
Section 1104-a(c) requires the directors or those in control of the corporation, no later than 30 days after the petition is filed, to make the corporate financial books and records for the three preceding years available to the petitioners for inspection and copying under reasonable working conditions.
In Maxon, the court ordered production of employee handbooks, financial statements of all three related entities, interim financial statements, cash flow projections, annual budgets, capital expenditure budgets, a fixed asset summary with depreciation, corporate charge card records, expense reimbursement claims, unusual or non-recurring income and expense items, shareholder and employment agreements, and corporate and financial records for 2004 and 2005. Citing Gerzof v. Coons, it held that disclosure for the previous five years was "appropriate and reasonable."
The court gave two grounds. Only the § 1104-a dissolution proceeding was stayed pending the valuation, and the stay could not "preclude" the derivative claims of corporate waste. Discovery was also needed to decide whether the alleged misconduct, if proven, "adversely impacted upon the 'fair value' of the corporation."
Who pays interest and expenses after the court sets fair value?
Section 1118(b) lets the court award interest at an equitable rate for the period between the filing and payment. If the election comes after the 90 days, § 1118(c) permits an award of the petitioner's reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees.
Interest is discretionary. In Giaimo, the judgments carried prejudgment interest at 4%, and the petitioner asked for 9%, pointing to the respondent's misconduct. The First Department refused: "Interest is not awarded as a penalty or to punish a party, it is a cost imposed for having the use of another party's money."
Under section 1118(c)(1), if the election is made more than 90 days after the filing and the court grants the petition, the court may award the petitioner "his reasonable expenses incurred in the proceeding prior to such election, including reasonable attorneys' fees." Under (c)(2), at any time before the actual purchase, the court may require a bond or other acceptable security sufficient to secure the fair value of the petitioner's shares.
In Rosenblum, the First Department had earlier held that the trial court "did not improvidently exercise its discretion" in declining prejudgment interest on the withdrawal distribution (214 A.D.3d 440). The 2024 decision treated that ruling as law of the case: the court "cannot award plaintiff any prejudgment interest on its withdrawal distribution."
What changes when the shareholder dispute is in federal court?
The expert's written report must follow Rule 26(a)(2)(B), and under Rule 702 the party offering the expert must show the court it is more likely than not that the opinion rests on sufficient facts and reliable methods.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) lists six parts: a complete statement of all opinions with the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered, the exhibits, the expert's qualifications with publications from the previous 10 years, the cases with trial or deposition testimony in the previous 4 years, and the compensation for study and testimony.
When management projections or other inputs reach the valuation expert through counsel, Rule 26(b)(4)(C) applies. It protects most communications between counsel and a reporting expert but leaves open those about compensation, facts or data that counsel provided and the expert considered, and assumptions that counsel provided and the expert relied on.
Rule 702, as amended by the Supreme Court's order of April 24, 2023 with effect from December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show the court, more likely than not, that the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data and is the product of reliable principles and methods, reliably applied to the facts of the case. Absent a stipulation or court order, the disclosure is due at least 90 days before trial, and a rebuttal report within 30 days after the other party's disclosure.
How does IAE find a business valuation expert for a shareholder dispute?
In the IAE request, choose the case type Commercial dispute and name the calculation, for example fair value of shares under BCL § 1118. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and prior testimony lists.
The commercial litigation expert witness page lists business appraisers for the fair value of shares in a shareholder buyout. The request also asks for the state and court, the side, the expert disclosure deadline, and the parties and their counsel for the conflict check; in a close corporation dispute that list includes the corporation, the other shareholders and any related entities. Please leave out privileged or sealed information.
Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that field by that deadline. Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel, and the file for each candidate lists testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years.
The search fee is paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment. If no candidate fits, the second search is free; if IAE finds no candidates, it refunds the fee. The expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. Under the agency option the expert bills through IAE, with a retainer, monthly invoices, payment by ACH or wire within 15 days, and the search fee credited to the first invoice.
IAE is not a law firm. Case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.
Sources
- New York Business Corporation Law § 1118, Purchase of petitioner's shares (New York State Senate)
- New York Business Corporation Law § 1104-a, Petition for judicial dissolution under special circumstances (New York State Senate)
- Matter of Seagroatt Floral Co., 78 N.Y.2d 439 (1991) (LII)
- Matter of Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 87 N.Y.2d 161 (1995) (Justia)
- Matter of Giaimo v Vitale, 2012 NY Slip Op 08778 (App. Div. 1st Dept. December 20, 2012)
- Matter of Gould Erectors & Rigging, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00228 (App. Div. 3d Dept. January 12, 2017)
- Maxon v. Mirror Show Management, Inc., 2005 NY Slip Op 50601(U) (Sup. Ct. Monroe County March 22, 2005)
- Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 2024 NY Slip Op 32075(U) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 14, 2024)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses (LII)
- Supreme Court of the United States, order amending the Federal Rules of Evidence (April 24, 2023)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII)
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