Examinations
Could the driver have avoided the crash? How a reconstructionist answers
Whether a driver could have avoided a crash comes down to two quantities: the time and distance the driver had from the moment the hazard could be seen, and the time and distance needed to perceive it, react and stop. Courts have accepted such calculations when every input came from the evidence. They have rejected them when an average reaction time was applied without foundation or when the avoidance opinion was a conclusion without numbers behind it.

How does a reconstructionist decide whether a crash was avoidable?
He compares the time and distance available from the point where the hazard became perceivable with the time and distance needed to perceive, react and brake or steer. If more was available than needed, the crash was avoidable.
In Bowers v. Marzano, No. 41362-1-II, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, reviewed such a calculation. In August 2008 Walter Bowers drove a Subaru through a stop sign, and Pamela Marzano's truck struck its passenger side on a road with a 35 mph limit. His passenger, Colin Bowers, suffered severe head injuries. The plaintiff's reconstructionist, Walter Becinski, put Marzano's speed at 41 mph. He relied on the truck's crash data, which showed steady engine RPMs before impact, and on photographs with no tire marks until about five feet before impact.
Becinski then fixed the point of notice. The Subaru was moving at about 15 mph, which gave Marzano 2.53 seconds between the moment the car could be seen entering her path and the impact. With a perception-reaction time of 0.67 seconds, an attentive driver at 41 mph would have begun braking 111.8 feet before the intersection and stopped in 74.9 feet, leaving more than 36 feet between the truck and the Subaru.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Marzano and called the opinion speculation. The Court of Appeals reversed in 2012. It held that Becinski "derived his calculations from facts and evidence of speed and distance," so his opinion created a genuine issue of material fact on whether Marzano could have avoided the collision, and the case went back for trial.
What perception-response time does a reconstructionist use?
A value tied to the event and the driver: whether the hazard was expected, the lighting, the driver's condition. Values in published research and court records run between about 0.7 and 2.5 seconds, and the choice changes the result.
Paul Olson and Michael Sivak defined perception-response time in 1986 as the time from the first sighting of an obstacle until the driver applies the brakes. They measured it for 64 unalerted drivers, 49 young and 15 older, who came over the crest of a hill and found an obstacle in their lane. The 95th percentile was about 1.6 seconds for both age groups (Human Factors, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 91-96).
The values in court records differ. In Theonnes v. Hazen, decided by the Washington Court of Appeals in 1984, the plaintiff's reconstructionist used three-quarters of a second. In Bowers the figure was 0.67 seconds. In Keesee v. Donigan, decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 2000, the defense expert testified to 1.5 seconds and said it can vary by as much as four-tenths of a second between individuals. In Fuller v. Tramel, a 2015 Michigan Court of Appeals case about a pedestrian struck at night, the human factors expert used 1.5 seconds as a normal time.
Road designers use a longer figure. Section 4.11.1 of the Texas Department of Transportation Roadway Design Manual computes stopping sight distance with a brake reaction time of 2.5 seconds. In Madison v. Thurman, decided by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, on October 27, 1999, the defense reconstructionist cited the AASHTO reaction time of 2.5 seconds and then ran his numbers with 1.5 seconds. The manual uses that value to design roads. For one crash the expert has to say why the chosen value fits that driver and that event, and Keesee is the case where an expert could not.
Can the expert apply an average reaction time to the driver in the case?
Only with a foundation. In Keesee v. Donigan the Supreme Court of Virginia ordered a new trial because the expert applied average figures to a driver he never tested, with no evidence the driver fell within the average range.
On September 8, 1996, at about 3:15 a.m., Howard Donigan was driving at no more than 35 mph on State Route 655 in Amherst County, Virginia, when a large fallen tree limb blocked his lane. He steered so that his driver-side tires passed through a small gap, but the passenger-side rear tire struck the limb and his vehicle was thrown into the path of April Keesee's car. His headlights lit about 75 to 100 feet ahead.
The defense reconstructionist, Stephen Chewning, testified that a driver needs on average three-quarters of a second to perceive a hazard and another three-quarters to react, 1.5 seconds in all, an "industry standard" used since the 1930s. At 35 mph a car covers 51.3 feet per second. On voir dire he agreed that vision, physical condition and cognitive ability affect reaction time. He had not tested Donigan: "No, I've put him into an average category." Defense counsel used the 1.5 seconds in closing to argue that Donigan had no time to avoid the collision.
On January 14, 2000, in Record No. 990181, the court held that admitting the testimony was an abuse of discretion. Its probative value "rested on assumptions about Donigan that had no factual basis in the record," and it was inadmissible without foundation evidence that his physical and mental characteristics placed him within the average range of persons tested. Chewning was the only expert on the point and counsel stressed his figures in closing, so the court rejected the harmless error argument and remanded for a new trial.
How is stopping distance calculated?
It is the distance covered during the perception-response time plus the braking distance. With speed V in mph, time t in seconds and deceleration a in ft/s², the formula is 1.47Vt + 1.075V²/a, in feet.
The constant 1.47 converts miles per hour to feet per second, so the first term is the distance traveled before the brakes take effect. The second term is the braking distance at a constant deceleration. The TxDOT manual tabulates both parts with t = 2.5 seconds and a = 11.2 ft/s². At 30 mph the reaction distance is 110.3 feet and the braking distance 86.4 feet, 196.7 feet in all. At 45 mph the parts are 165.4 and 194.4 feet, 359.8 feet in all.
Speed enters the braking term squared. In the TxDOT table the braking distance at 45 mph is 2.25 times the distance at 30 mph. The manual gives 11.2 ft/s² "as the deceleration threshold for determining stopping sight distance." For a particular crash the reconstructionist uses the friction of the actual road: in Theonnes the speed was calculated from the skid marks and the road's coefficient of friction.
The point of perception sets where the count starts. In Bowers it was the moment the Subaru could be seen moving into the intersection, 2.53 seconds before impact. In Fuller the human factors expert derived it from the reach of the headlights. At 41 mph a vehicle covers about 60 feet per second, so moving the starting point by one second moves the result by about 60 feet.
If the driver was speeding, does that make the crash avoidable?
Not by itself. Courts ask whether the crash would have happened at the lawful speed. In Theonnes v. Hazen the court found it would have, so the excess speed was not a proximate cause.
In Theonnes v. Hazen, 37 Wash. App. 644, a 9-year-old boy rode his bicycle out of a driveway onto a two-lane street with a 35 mph limit and was struck by the respondent's car. The plaintiff's reconstructionist, Terry Turner, calculated from the skid marks and the friction of the road that the car was going 42 mph. With a three-quarter-second reaction time, he put the driver 59 feet from the boy when she first saw him. The physical evidence showed the brakes engaged about 10 to 12 feet before the point of impact.
The court accepted those numbers for the appeal and worked out the lawful-speed case. At 35 mph the car would have been about a quarter of a second from impact when the brakes engaged. "The collision would have happened even if the car was traveling at the 35 m.p.h. speed limit," and "it would be sheer speculation that anything could have been done by the driver in that 1/4 second to avoid the collision." Turner's further opinions that the driver could have avoided the boy at 30 mph or by evasive action were "mere conclusions." On February 27, 1984, the court affirmed summary judgment for the driver.
Bowers came out the other way. Becinski computed that at 30 mph Marzano would have had 1.86 seconds, or 81.84 feet, to brake. Over the 2.53 seconds of notice at 41 mph Marzano had 152.13 feet. The court noted that the road had the same 35 mph limit as in Theonnes, compared those feet with the 59 feet in Theonnes and held that "reasonable minds may differ" on avoidability, so a jury had to decide. The two cases differ in their numbers: 59 feet in Theonnes against about 152 feet in Bowers.
How is avoidability judged when the hazard was hard to see?
The expert works out when the hazard became visible to an attentive driver, from headlight reach, street lighting and the pedestrian's path, and starts the perception-response time at that moment.
In Fuller v. Tramel, No. 321285, a pedestrian was struck at about 11:30 p.m. on August 4, 2011, while crossing Eight Mile Road outside a crosswalk. The road had eight lanes and a median, the night was clear and dark, there was no street lighting, and the limit was 40 mph. The driver said he was going 40 to 45 mph and did not see the pedestrian until just before impact.
The plaintiff's human factors expert, Robert Pachella, Ph.D., did not reconstruct the crash. He assumed 40 mph, a walking speed of 3 mph and about 18 feet walked into the roadway. Under headlights alone the pedestrian would have been visible between 150 and 280 feet away, 2.6 to 4.6 seconds before impact. With a 1.5-second perception-reaction time that left 1.1 to 3.1 seconds of braking, and the car could stop on dry pavement in about 77 feet. Pachella concluded that the driver could have stopped before hitting the pedestrian or substantially slowed.
The trial court refused to consider the report. On August 4, 2015, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by refusing to consider the report and found a jury question on breach because "a reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff was visible in the roadway." Darkness and the lack of street lighting did not relieve the driver of his duty to watch the road as conditions permitted; the jury could weigh those conditions.
The National Transportation Safety Board reached a similar finding about the crash of March 18, 2018, at 9:58 p.m. in Tempe, Arizona, where a test vehicle with an automated driving system struck a pedestrian. The system first detected her 5.6 seconds before impact, at 45 mph. During the 31.5 minutes the vehicle was moving, the operator spent 34 percent of her time looking down toward the bottom of the center console. In report NTSB/HAR-19/03, adopted November 19, 2019, the Board found that "had the vehicle operator been attentive, she would likely have had sufficient time to detect and react to the crossing pedestrian to avoid the crash or mitigate the impact."
What data does the avoidance calculation start from?
Speed and position at the point of perception, the moment braking began, the friction of the road and the sight lines. The event data recorder supplies speed, accelerator and brake status for 5 seconds before a crash.
Under Table I of 49 CFR 563.7, an event data recorder stores indicated vehicle speed, accelerator pedal position as a percentage of full, and service brake on or off for the 5.0 seconds before time zero, at 2 samples per second. The brake flag gives the time at which braking began, and the speed record gives speed at each half second.
NHTSA's final rule of December 18, 2024 raised pre-crash recording to 20 seconds at 10 Hz. A final rule scheduled for publication on May 18, 2026 delays compliance to September 1, 2028 and phases it in: 25 percent of applicable vehicles produced between September 1, 2028 and August 31, 2029, and 100 percent on and after September 1, 2031. In the Tempe crash the system detected the pedestrian 5.6 seconds before impact, earlier than the 5-second window that Table I requires.
Other inputs come from the scene. In Bowers the reconstructionist combined the truck's crash data with photographs of the tire marks. In Theonnes the speed came from skid marks and the road's coefficient of friction. When the vehicle is held by the other party, Rule 34(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reaches "any designated tangible things," and under Rule 34(b)(2)(A) the party served must respond in writing within 30 days.
How is an avoidance opinion challenged?
By testing each input against the record: the point of perception, the reaction time and its foundation, the speed and the deceleration. Under Rule 702 the proponent must show the court each requirement is more likely than not met.
Since December 1, 2023, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 admits expert testimony only if the proponent shows the court that it is more likely than not that the testimony will help the trier of fact, is based on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and applies them reliably to the facts of the case. The committee note says the amendment "clarifies that the preponderance standard applies to the three reliability-based requirements added in 2000." Chief Justice John Roberts transmitted it to Congress on April 24, 2023.
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, decided March 23, 1999, the Supreme Court applied the Daubert gatekeeping obligation to "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge. The goal, Justice Breyer wrote, is an expert who "employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." The Court upheld the exclusion of a tire failure analyst who relied mainly on visual and tactile inspection.
Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a retained expert's report must contain a complete statement of all opinions with the basis and reasons for them and the facts or data considered. In an avoidance opinion those are the speed, the point of perception, the reaction time and the deceleration, each with its source. A rebuttal report is due within 30 days after the other party's disclosure unless the court sets another time (Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii)).
The cases above give the review its questions. Is the point of perception tied to evidence of when the hazard became visible, as in Bowers and Fuller? Is a reaction time applied to the driver with a foundation, which Keesee required? Was the lawful-speed case computed, as in Theonnes? In Madison v. Thurman the defense reconstruction counted 7.25 seconds between the turn lane and the point of impact and left the driver at most 2.25 seconds to react, while the plaintiff's expert said the driver "probably" could have stopped or swerved. The trial court put 100 percent of the fault on the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeal found no manifest error and affirmed.
What does IAE do when avoidability is disputed?
IAE prepares an expert report on the client's questions or a review of the opposing reconstruction in up to 5 business days, with a 48-hour rush for cases with tight deadlines.
The accident reconstruction service answers how the vehicles moved before impact, what the event data recorder shows about speed and braking, and whether the damage on each car fits the claimed crash. The engineer sets the point of impact, the impact angle and pre-crash speeds from crush on both vehicles, tire marks, gouges, the police diagram and video. IAE confirms the questions with the client before work starts.
Where a vehicle has an event data recorder, the engineer checks the download against the scene evidence. For the other side's vehicle the engineer lists for counsel what needs to be measured and downloaded at an inspection under Rule 34(a)(1)(B).
The client sends the report or the case materials and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day, and within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry. The client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts, the draft is checked for facts, and the signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix, and the Member ID in the document can be checked by QR code. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Neither IAE nor the engineer guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm.
Sources
- Bowers v. Marzano, No. 41362-1-II (Wash. Ct. App., Div. II, 2012)
- Theonnes v. Hazen, 37 Wash. App. 644, 681 P.2d 1284 (Feb. 27, 1984)
- Keesee v. Donigan, Record No. 990181 (Va. Jan. 14, 2000)
- Fuller v. Tramel, No. 321285 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished)
- Madison v. Thurman, No. 32,401-CA, 743 So. 2d 857 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. Oct. 27, 1999)
- P. L. Olson, M. Sivak, Perception-Response Time to Unexpected Roadway Hazards, Human Factors 28(1): 91-96 (1986)
- Texas Department of Transportation, Roadway Design Manual, 4.11.1 Stopping Sight Distance
- NTSB, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018, NTSB/HAR-19/03
- 49 CFR 563.7 Data elements, Table I (govinfo)
- NHTSA, Event Data Recorders, final rule, RIN 2127-AM78, Federal Register Doc. 2026-09849
- Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 2023 committee note
- Supreme Court of the United States, amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence transmitted April 24, 2023
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34
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