Expert report review

When does a court appoint a neutral accounting expert, and how do the parties challenge the neutral's work?

When the parties' forensic accountants reach different damages figures, a federal court can add a neutral. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 lets it appoint its own expert witness, and Civil Rule 53 lets it appoint a master where there is "the need to perform an accounting or resolve a difficult computation of damages." The two neutrals work under different rules, and each party's own accountant then reviews the neutral's report as well.

An accountant sits between two stacks of ledgers with a calculator and a ruler on the desk

What can a court do when the parties' forensic accountants disagree?

Leave the choice to the factfinder or bring in a neutral: an expert witness under Rule 706, a master under Rule 53, which names an accounting and a difficult computation of damages, or a technical advisor who does not testify.

Two admissible damages reports normally go to the jury, or to the judge in a bench trial, as two answers to the same question. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 give the court two further tools. Under Rule 706 the court appoints an expert who reports findings to the parties and may testify. Under Rule 53 it appoints a master who conducts proceedings and makes or recommends findings for the judge.

The Advisory Committee's note on the proposed Rule 706 records that "actual appointment is a relatively infrequent occurrence" and that the possibility of an appointment "must inevitably exert a sobering effect on the expert witness of a party and upon the person utilizing his services." A third option, an advisor to the judge who gives no evidence, rests on the court's inherent power and is discussed below.

State courts use their own versions. The Minnesota Supreme Court and New York's Appellate Division, discussed below, dealt with neutral evaluators of businesses and marital property in divorce cases.

Why do two forensic accountants reach different damages figures?

The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence traces many such conflicts to assumptions: the but-for scenario, the legal guidance each expert received, projections against actual results, and which costs were fixed or avoided.

The 2011 third edition of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (National Research Council) includes a chapter on economic damages by Mark A. Allen, Robert E. Hall and Victoria A. Lazear. The authors compare a study that extrapolates from the past with one built on actual data after the harmful act and describe that difference as a common source of disagreement in damages (p. 438).

Disagreement over the alternative scenario, they write, is generally a legal question, but "opposing experts may have been given different legal guidance and therefore made different economic assumptions, resulting in major differences in their damages estimates" (p. 439). On costs: "Disputes frequently arise over whether particular costs are fixed or variable." One side argues that most costs were not avoided when sales were lost; the other argues that many costs are variable (p. 450).

Where two methods applied to the same firm give different numbers, the chapter says, "there is usually an underlying difference in assumptions" (p. 444).

The first edition, published by the Federal Judicial Center in 1994, made the same point in Hall and Lazear's chapter: "Many conflicts between the damages experts for the plaintiff and the defendant arise from different characterizations of the harmful event and its effects" (p. 482). A neutral accountant who starts from a list of these assumptions for both reports can tell the court which of them produces the gap.

Can the judge hire an economist who advises the court without testifying?

In rare cases, yes. In Reilly v. United States the First Circuit held that Rule 706 does not govern technical advisors, who are not witnesses and may not contribute evidence, and upheld an economist hired to help with damages.

Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, was decided by the First Circuit on December 14, 1988, in an opinion by Judge Selya. Heather Reilly suffered severe brain damage at birth at Newport Naval Hospital in December 1984, and her parents sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Liability was conceded, and the case was tried to the judge on damages.

During the damages phase Judge Pettine appointed Dr. Arthur Mead, an economist at the University of Rhode Island, as a technical advisor. The judge wanted a guide through the "maze of economic theory and fact" on lost earning capacity and future care, and help in "reconciling the testimony of at least two outstanding experts." The advisor did not testify and was not cross-examined.

The First Circuit held that Rule 706 "does not embrace expert advisors or consultants" and that advisors of this sort "are not witnesses, and may not contribute evidence." The power to appoint them rests on the court's inherent power to provide itself with the instruments it needs to perform its duties. Such appointments, the court wrote, "should be the exception and not the rule" and be reserved for "truly extraordinary cases."

The court called it advisable that the parties learn the advisor's identity before the appointment and have a chance to object, that the judge give the advisor a written job description or instructions on the record in the presence of all counsel, and that the advisor file an affidavit at the end attesting compliance with it. The government had raised no objection when the judge announced the plan at an April 10, 1987 chambers conference, and the court held the objection waived. A party's accountant who learns of such a plan has to raise objections and proposed safeguards at that point, because the advisor's work will not be tested by cross-examination.

When may a court appoint a master for an accounting?

When an accounting or a difficult computation of damages is needed on issues decided without a jury. Rule 53(a)(1)(B)(ii) makes this an exception to the general requirement of some exceptional condition.

Rule 53(a)(1) limits the grounds. Unless a statute provides otherwise, a master may be appointed only to perform duties the parties consent to, to address pretrial and posttrial matters that an available district judge or magistrate judge cannot address effectively and timely, or to hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings on non-jury issues. That last ground requires either "some exceptional condition" or "the need to perform an accounting or resolve a difficult computation of damages."

The 2003 committee note says that subparagraph (a)(1)(B)(ii) carries forward the old exemption for "matters of account and of difficult computation of damages," and adds: "This approach is justified only as to essentially ministerial determinations."

Rule 53(a)(3) adds a cost check: in appointing a master, the court "must consider the fairness of imposing the likely expenses on the parties and must protect against unreasonable expense or delay."

Who can serve as the neutral, and how are objections to the person handled?

A Rule 706 expert must consent, and the parties may nominate candidates. A master must not have a relationship that would disqualify a judge under 28 U.S.C. 455, unless the parties consent after disclosure, and the parties are heard first.

Under Rule 706(a) the court "may order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to submit nominations." It "may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own choosing," but "may only appoint someone who consents to act."

Rule 53(a)(2) bars a master who has "a relationship to the parties, attorneys, action, or court that would require disqualification of a judge under 28 U.S.C. §455," unless the parties, with the court's approval, consent after the master discloses any potential grounds. Before appointing a master the court must give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard (53(b)(1)). The appointing order must state the master's duties and the circumstances in which the master may communicate ex parte with the court or a party (53(b)(2)).

State appellate courts hold trial judges to reasons on the choice of person. In Pryba v Pryba (N.Y. App. Div., 3d Dept, February 4, 2010) the court held that in a matrimonial action "Supreme Court is authorized to appoint an independent appraiser to value marital property," a decision reviewed for abuse of discretion. Because the trial court gave no reasons for rejecting a party's objections to the appraiser it chose, the Appellate Division reversed the appointment and remitted the matter so the court could "articulate its rationale or, in its discretion, appoint another independent appraiser."

How did the Federal Circuit treat a court-appointed expert in Monolithic Power?

It upheld the appointment. The district court had faced starkly conflicting party experts, appointed its own, told the jury and had the parties share the fees; the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. O2 Micro International Ltd., 558 F.3d 1341, was decided by the Federal Circuit on March 5, 2009 (No. 2008-1128). The district court in this patent case faced what the appellate court called "starkly conflicting expert testimony" and said at a case management conference: "I find this extremely difficult to understand." It appointed an independent technical expert and instructed the parties to share his reasonable fees and expenses.

The jury learned that the court had appointed the expert and heard a limiting instruction: "You should not give any greater weight to Professor Santi's opinion testimony than to the testimony of any other witness simply because the court ordered the parties to retain an independent witness." Jurors were told to assess the nature of and basis for his opinion as they would any other witness's opinion.

The Federal Circuit quoted a treatise stating that court appointment of experts "is a rarity" and still found "no abuse of discretion in this case." The same procedure is open to a court facing two damages reports that it cannot reconcile.

How does a party challenge a master's accounting?

By filing objections, or a motion to adopt or modify, within 21 days after the report is served, unless the court sets another time. Objections to findings of fact are decided de novo unless the parties stipulate otherwise.

The master files the report and promptly serves a copy on each party, unless the court orders otherwise (53(e)). Under 53(f)(2) a party may file objections to, or a motion to adopt or modify, the master's order, report or recommendations "no later than 21 days after a copy is served, unless the court sets a different time."

Acting on the report, the court must give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, may receive evidence, and may adopt, modify, wholly or partly reject or resubmit it to the master with instructions (53(f)(1)). Objections to findings of fact are decided de novo unless the parties, with the court's approval, stipulate that the findings will be reviewed for clear error, or that findings of a master appointed by consent or for pretrial and posttrial matters will be final (53(f)(3)). Objections to conclusions of law are decided de novo (53(f)(4)).

For the party's forensic accountant the 21 days are the time to check the master's schedules line by line against the records and to prepare the points that counsel puts into the objections.

Who pays a court-appointed accounting expert or master?

In most civil cases the parties pay, in the shares the court sets, and the court can later tax a court-appointed expert's compensation as costs under 28 U.S.C. 1920(6). A master's pay is allocated under Rule 53(g).

For a master, the court fixes compensation on the basis and terms stated in the appointing order (53(g)(1)). It is paid by a party or parties, or from a fund or subject matter of the action within the court's control (53(g)(2)). The court allocates payment "after considering the nature and amount of the controversy, the parties' means, and the extent to which any party is more responsible than other parties for the reference to a master," and an interim allocation may be amended after a decision on the merits (53(g)(3)).

A Rule 706 expert's fee is fixed by the court and, in an ordinary civil case, split between the parties as the court orders (706(c)). 28 U.S.C. 1920(6) lists "Compensation of court appointed experts" among the costs a judge or clerk may tax, and a bill of costs, once allowed, is included in the judgment.

A party's own accountant is treated differently. In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., decided June 15, 1987, the Supreme Court held that, absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary, a federal court taxing a prevailing party's expert witness fees "is bound by the limit of § 1821(b)." A neutral's fee can therefore be shifted as taxable costs, while a party's own expert fee above the statutory witness fee stays, absent a contract or statute, with the party that retained the expert.

Can a party sue a neutral accountant over the valuation?

In Minnesota, no. In Peterka v. Dennis (2009) the state Supreme Court treated a court-appointed neutral CPA as a Rule 706 expert and held him immune from suit for acts performed under the appointment.

In Peterka v. Dennis, decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court on May 7, 2009 (No. A07-165), divorcing spouses agreed to have their business assets, including interests in two home-building companies, valued by a neutral evaluator. An order and stipulation signed by the district court on September 30, 1997 appointed Stephen Dennis, a CPA, and the judgment later stated that the parties "retained Steve Dennis, CPA, JD, as an independent neutral."

The wife later sued him and his firm for breach of contract and professional malpractice. She argued that he should have used the fair market value of inventory instead of its book value and that her share was undervalued by $746,672.

The appointing order had not mentioned Rule 706. The court held that it "amounted to the appointment of Dennis as a Rule 706 expert witness" and that "Expert witnesses appointed under Rule 706 are entitled to immunity from suit for acts performed pursuant to the appointment." It reinstated summary judgment for Dennis and his firm. A challenge to a neutral's method, such as book value against fair market value of inventory, therefore belongs in the case where the neutral reports, while that report can still be answered.

What does IAE do when a neutral or the opposing accountant files a damages report?

A forensic accountant from the IAE registry writes a review of the opposing expert's damages report or an expert report on the party's questions, in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.

The IAE forensic accounting page covers lost profits and other damages, solvency on the date of a transfer, and tracing of funds in commercial, bankruptcy and partnership disputes. The expert rebuilds lost profits from ledgers and tax returns. Assumptions that counsel supplied and the expert relied on are discoverable under FRCP 26(b)(4)(C)(iii).

The client sends the reports or the case materials and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, cost, deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days; cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix, and the Member ID or QR code on the document opens the specialist's status. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case. A review is evidence that the court weighs with the other materials. Neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm.

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