Examinations
Doctrine of equivalents: how is an equivalent element proved?
A product that does not literally meet every limitation of a patent claim can still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. In Graver Tank (1950) the Supreme Court asked whether the substitute "performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." Since Warner-Jenkinson (1997) the comparison is made element by element, at the time of infringement, and a narrowing amendment made during prosecution can bar it.

What is the doctrine of equivalents?
A rule that lets a patent owner prove infringement when the accused product lacks a claim element in literal terms but contains an equivalent of it, a substitute with insubstantial differences.
Infringement is tested claim by claim and element by element. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, decided March 3, 1997, the Supreme Court put the question this way: "Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention?" An identical element is literal infringement. An equivalent element is infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Graver Tank explained why the doctrine exists. In Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, decided May 29, 1950, Justice Jackson wrote that "outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement." Without the doctrine, a competitor could "make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent" and stay outside the claim, which would "convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing." The opinion adds: "one may not practice a fraud on a patent."
The Court restated a rule from Union Paper-Bag Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120: if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way and accomplish substantially the same result, "they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape." A patentee may invoke the doctrine against a device "if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." That three-part question is known as the function-way-result or triple identity test.
The doctrine has a cost for the public, and the Supreme Court said so in 1997. In Warner-Jenkinson the Court shared the concern of the Federal Circuit dissenters that the doctrine "has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims," and wrote: "There can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement." The Court kept the doctrine and limited it: equivalence is tested element by element and as of the time of infringement, and prosecution history estoppel can bar it for an amended element.
Where does the function-way-result test come from?
From Graver Tank (1950), a welding flux case. The trial court found that manganese silicate in the accused flux was the equivalent of magnesium silicate in the patented flux, and the Supreme Court affirmed that finding of fact.
The Jones patent covered an electric welding process and fluxes. The patented flux was essentially a combination of alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride. The accused Lincolnweld flux was similar, but it used manganese silicate where the patented composition used magnesium silicate. Manganese is not an alkaline earth metal, so the claim words did not reach the ingredient literally.
The district court "held four flux claims valid and infringed and certain other flux claims and all process claims invalid." The Supreme Court restored that decree in an earlier decision, 336 U.S. 271, and on rehearing considered only infringement of the four valid flux claims.
The evidence on equivalence came from several kinds of witnesses and documents. Chemists testified that manganese and magnesium behave alike in many reactions. A metallurgist testified that alkaline earth metals often occur in manganese ores and serve the same purpose in fluxes. A chemist testified that "in the sense of the patent" manganese could be counted as an alkaline earth metal. Recognized texts on inorganic chemistry corroborated the testimony. Prior art patents to Miller and Armor disclosed manganese silicate in welding fluxes. There was no evidence that Lincolnweld came out of independent research, and "the trial judge visited laboratories with counsel and experts."
The Court explained how to weigh such evidence. "What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case." Consideration must be given to "the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent," the qualities it has in combination with the other ingredients and the function it is intended to perform. "An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability" of the substitute with the claimed ingredient.
The judgment of infringement was affirmed. Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented, Justice Douglas also wrote separately, and Justice Minton took no part.
Is equivalence judged element by element or for the whole product?
Element by element. Warner-Jenkinson requires an equivalent for each claim element the product lacks, and the doctrine may not be stretched so far that it eliminates an element entirely.
Hilton Davis owned U.S. Patent No. 4,560,746 on ultrafiltration of dye through a porous membrane. The claim recited pressures of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g. and a pH of approximately 6.0 to 9.0. Warner-Jenkinson ran its process at pressures of 200 to nearly 500 p.s.i.g. and at a pH of 5.0. Hilton Davis conceded that there was no literal infringement, and the jury found that Warner-Jenkinson infringed "under the doctrine of equivalents." A divided en banc Federal Circuit affirmed.
Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, set the rule: "Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention," and "the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole." The doctrine must not be "allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in its entirety."
For the expert this rule sets the structure of the analysis. A report that compares the accused process with the invention as a whole and calls them equivalent answers no element. A report that finds an equivalent for the pH limitation must say which feature of the accused process corresponds to that limitation and why the difference between 5.0 and the claimed range is insubstantial, without reading the lower limit out of the claim.
In footnote 8 the Court addressed weak cases: where the evidence is such that "no reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent," district courts must grant partial or complete summary judgment. An equivalents opinion that does not tie each substitute to a claimed element gives the other side the ground for that motion.
Which test does the expert apply: function-way-result or insubstantial differences?
Either, as long as it answers the question for each element. Warner-Jenkinson declined to choose, found the triple identity test better suited to mechanical devices than to other products and processes, and left refinement to the Federal Circuit.
The Court wrote that "the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry." The triple identity test "may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices," but "it often provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or processes." The insubstantial differences test, in the Court's words, "offers little additional guidance" on what makes a difference insubstantial. The Court left the refinement of the formulation to the Federal Circuit.
Under either framing the expert does the same work. For a mechanical element the expert identifies the function the element performs in the claimed combination, the way it performs that function and the result. For a chemical ingredient or a process step, Graver Tank directs attention to the purpose of the ingredient in the patent, its qualities in combination with the other ingredients and its intended function. Each of these points is a fact the expert can support with drawings, test data or literature.
The way prong can also work against the patentee. Graver Tank described the doctrine working in the other direction: where a device is so far changed in principle that it performs the same function in a substantially different way, the doctrine can be used to "restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for infringement." An expert who shows the same function and result but a different mechanism has given the defense its answer to the way prong.
What evidence proves that an element is equivalent?
Testimony of persons skilled in the art, technical literature, prior art and tests showing that the substitute does the same work and was known to be interchangeable with the claimed element at the time of infringement.
Graver Tank gives a working list: chemists and a metallurgist who described how the substitute behaves, recognized textbooks, earlier patents that used the substitute for the same purpose, and the absence of independent research by the accused infringer. Each category answers a different part of the question. Textbooks and patents show what persons skilled in the art knew. Tests and expert explanations show function, way and result.
Known interchangeability is one of the "express objective factors" Warner-Jenkinson took from Graver Tank. The Court fixed its date: the proper time for evaluating equivalency "is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued." A source that shows interchangeability needs a date before or during the accused conduct. A handbook published after the infringement period ended does not prove what was known while the accused product was sold.
The accused infringer's own development records can cut either way. Warner-Jenkinson said that the need for independent experimentation can be evidence of what a skilled practitioner knew, or did not know, about interchangeability. If the defendant's engineers had to run a long test program to find a substitute, that program can be evidence that the interchangeability was not known.
The expert may rely on materials that are not themselves admissible. Under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, if experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data, "they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted." Product datasheets, internal test reports and supplier catalogues fall in that group when engineers in the field use them.
Does the accused infringer's intent or copying matter?
No. Warner-Jenkinson held that intent plays no role in the doctrine of equivalents. Copying or independent design counts only for what it says about the knowledge of a person skilled in the art.
The Federal Circuit had explained the doctrine by reference to copying and designing around, and the Supreme Court found that explanation unsatisfying because it is hard to tell a copyist from an innovator who works around the claims. The Court held that "intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents."
The facts of copying still enter the case, but through a different door. The skilled practitioner's knowledge matters, the Court wrote, "rather for what it tells the fact-finder" about the similarities and differences between the claimed and accused elements. Graver Tank noted that there was no evidence that Lincolnweld resulted from independent research; under Warner-Jenkinson that fact goes to known interchangeability, not to bad faith.
An expert report that accuses the defendant of copying answers a question the equivalence analysis does not ask. The technical expert addresses what the substitute does, how it does it, what result it gives and what a person skilled in the art knew about it on the date of the accused conduct.
When does the prosecution history bar an equivalent?
When the patentee narrowed the claim by amendment for a reason related to patentability. If the record does not show the reason, Warner-Jenkinson presumes it was related to patentability and bars equivalents for that element.
The pH limitation in the Hilton Davis patent was added during prosecution. The Booth patent "disclosed an ultrafiltration process operating at a pH above 9.0," and the upper limit of 9.0 was added to distinguish it. The record did not explain the lower limit: "the reason for adding the lower limit of 6.0 is unclear." The accused process ran at pH 5.0, below that lower limit.
The Court placed the burden on the patentee. Where the patent holder is unable to establish a reason for an amendment, "the court should presume that the PTO had a substantial reason related to patentability," and estoppel then bars the doctrine of equivalents as to that element. The presumption can be rebutted if the patentholder establishes that the amendment had a purpose unrelated to patentability. The Court reversed and remanded so that the Federal Circuit could consider whether reasons for the lower limit had been offered and whether further opportunity to establish them would be proper.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote a concurrence "to add a cautionary note on the rebuttable presumption": applied rigidly, the new presumption could treat unfairly patentees whose prosecutions were complete before the rule was announced.
The technical expert works from the file history the attorneys provide: which words were added to the claim, in response to which rejection and over which reference. Whether those facts create an estoppel is argued by counsel. The expert's equivalence opinion should state which claim version it applies and whether the element at issue was amended.
Who decides equivalence, the judge or the jury?
Graver Tank called a finding of equivalence a determination of fact. Warner-Jenkinson did not decide whether a jury must make it, but required summary judgment where no reasonable jury could find two elements equivalent.
In Graver Tank the trial judge decided equivalence after hearing many experts and witnesses and visiting laboratories. The Supreme Court held that "a finding of equivalence is a determination of fact" and that the trial court's decision "should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous."
In Warner-Jenkinson the Federal Circuit had held that equivalence is a question for the jury. The Supreme Court noted that holding, said that whether it would agree "is not a question we need decide today," and declined to take the issue up. Footnote 8 gives the judge a role in every case: when no reasonable jury could find two elements equivalent, the court must grant partial or complete summary judgment.
Because the question is factual, the expert's report and testimony are the evidence the fact finder weighs. In Graver Tank the Court relied on the same kinds of proof the trial judge heard: chemists, a metallurgist, textbooks and prior patents.
How is an equivalent under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) different from the doctrine of equivalents?
Section 112(f) sets the literal scope of a means-plus-function element: the structure in the specification and equivalents thereof. The doctrine of equivalents reaches beyond literal scope, and Warner-Jenkinson held the 1952 Act did not abolish it.
Under 35 U.S.C. 112(f), "An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function" without the recital of structure, and such a claim "shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." The word "equivalents" here is part of claim construction: it defines what the claim covers literally.
Warner-Jenkinson rejected the argument that the doctrine of equivalents did not survive the Patent Act of 1952. The Court found the 1952 Act "not materially different" from the 1870 Act on this point and read the means-plus-function paragraph, then section 112, paragraph 6, as a narrow response to the Halliburton decision. The reference to equivalents in that paragraph is a limit on means claims, and Congress's limited action "should not be overread for negative implications."
A means-plus-function element therefore gets two separate analyses when both theories are pleaded. The first identifies the corresponding structure in the specification and compares the accused structure with it under section 112(f). The second applies the doctrine of equivalents element by element. Section 112(b) requires claims "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter" the inventor regards as the invention, and both analyses start from the claim words.
What does the expert report on equivalents contain?
Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), every opinion with its basis and reasons, the facts or data considered and the exhibits. On equivalents that means a separate analysis for each missing element, with dated sources for known interchangeability.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them," the facts or data considered, exhibits, the witness's qualifications with publications from the previous 10 years, testimony from the previous 4 years and the compensation. The rule covers all opinions, so the equivalence analysis belongs in the opening report next to the literal infringement analysis.
For each element not met literally the report states the claimed element as construed by the court, the corresponding feature of the accused product, the function, way and result of each, the differences and why they are insubstantial, and the sources showing that the substitute was known to be interchangeable at the time of infringement. Test data and drawings go in the exhibits.
Rule 702 requires the party offering the expert to show the court that it is more likely than not that the testimony is "based on sufficient facts or data" and that the expert applied reliable principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. A sentence that an element is equivalent, with no function, way and result and no source for interchangeability, leaves nothing for the court to test. Under Rule 705 the expert may state the opinion first, "But the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination."
The other side answers with a rebuttal report. Unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise, a report offered solely to contradict or rebut the other side's expert on the same subject matter is due within 30 days after that disclosure (Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii)).
What does IAE do when a patent case turns on equivalents?
An IAE expert maps each claim element to the accused product and, for each element not met literally, prepares an equivalence analysis, or reviews the opposing technical report. The document is issued in up to 5 business days.
The patent expertise page describes the infringement work as claim charts that map each claim element to the accused product, with equivalents tested element by element under Warner-Jenkinson (1997), and acts under 35 U.S.C. 271(a): making, using, selling, importing. For a product that lacks one element of the claim, the page answers that it infringes only if it contains an equivalent of that element, and the expert names an equivalent for each missing element.
A review of the opposing technical report checks that each element is mapped to the product, that the expert applied the claim construction in the case and that the opinion rests on sufficient facts or data under Rule 702(b). For equivalents that means checking whether the report addresses each missing element separately and whether its interchangeability sources are dated to the time of infringement.
IAE chooses the expert by the technical field of the patent and confirms the patent, the asserted claims and the questions before work starts. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day; within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the expert from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV. The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines.
Every expert is a member of the public IAE registry, verifiable by Member ID or QR code, and states in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. A report is evidence that the court weighs with the other evidence; neither IAE nor the expert guarantees the outcome. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.
Sources
- Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (LII)
- Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (LII)
- 35 U.S.C. 112, Specification (LII)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses (LII)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 703, Bases of an Expert's Opinion Testimony (LII)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 705, Disclosing the Facts or Data Underlying an Expert's Opinion (LII)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (LII)
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