Expert report review

Expert opinion based on facts not in evidence: what does a reviewer compare with the record?

Under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence an expert may base an opinion on facts or data he has been made aware of or personally observed, and those facts need not be admissible if experts in the field reasonably rely on them. Rule 702(b) requires that the testimony rest on sufficient facts or data. Courts exclude opinions built on assumptions the record contradicts, as in Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas and Moore v. International Paint.

An expert from behind sets loose pages beside a thin court file and a thick report

What facts may an expert base an opinion on?

Facts or data the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. The 1972 Advisory Committee Note names three sources: firsthand observation, presentation at trial, and data presented to the expert outside court.

Rule 703 opens with one sentence: "An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed." The rule does not require the expert to have seen anything himself. It requires that the facts be facts in the case.

The 1972 Advisory Committee Note lists where those facts come from. "The first is the firsthand observation of the witness, with opinions based thereon traditionally allowed." The second, presentation at the trial, may take the form of "the familiar hypothetical question or having the expert attend the trial and hear the testimony establishing the facts." The third "consists of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception."

Most retained experts work from the third source. They read records, depositions and documents that counsel sends them. A reviewer therefore starts with a question the opposing report does not always answer clearly: for each fact the opinion needs, which of the three sources did it come from, and where in the record is it?

Must the facts behind the opinion be admissible?

No, if experts in the field would reasonably rely on that kind of facts or data. Otherwise inadmissible facts reach the jury only when their probative value substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.

The second and third sentences of Rule 703 read: "If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."

The 2000 amendment added that last sentence. Its committee note explains that when an expert reasonably relies on inadmissible information, the information does not become admissible simply because the opinion is admitted. If such information is disclosed to help the jury evaluate the opinion, the judge must give a limiting instruction on request.

For a reviewer the test has two parts. Does the field rely on this kind of material at all? A hearsay statement in an incident report may be standard input in one discipline and unknown in another. And does the opinion use the material the way the field does, as one input checked against others, or as the only support for the conclusion?

What does "sufficient facts or data" under Rule 702(b) require?

The testimony must rest on enough underlying facts or data to support the opinion. The 2000 note says the phrase covers hypothetical facts, but only those that are supported by the evidence.

Since the 2023 amendment, Rule 702 admits expert testimony only if the proponent shows the court that it is more likely than not that four conditions are met. Condition (b) is that "the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data." Conditions (c) and (d) ask for reliable principles and methods and for a reliable application of them to the facts of the case.

The 2000 Committee Note explains condition (b): "The amendment requires that expert testimony be based on sufficient underlying 'facts or data.'" It adds: "The language 'facts or data' is broad enough to allow an expert to rely on hypothetical facts that are supported by the evidence." The limit sits in the last four words. A hypothetical that the evidence does not support is not a fact or datum under the rule.

The same note recognizes that "when facts are in dispute, experts sometimes reach different conclusions based on competing versions of the facts." A disputed fact and an unsupported fact are different problems. An expert may adopt one side's version of a disputed fact if evidence supports it. He may not supply a fact that no evidence supports.

When do an expert's assumptions become conjecture?

When they are so contrary to the record or so speculative that they amount to guesswork. In Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas the court excluded an economist's projection of a mother's loss built on such assumptions.

Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), arose from an air crash in which the plaintiff's son died. Her economist, Dr. Edmund Mantell, projected her pecuniary loss. Judge Milton Pollack examined the assumptions one by one in a decision of June 13, 1983.

The economist assumed the son would have devoted between 20 and 26.8 percent of his disposable income to his mother, while the only evidence in the record was an annuity of about 6 percent that would have ended in 1979. He projected earnings with price inflation of 7.89 percent a year instead of wage inflation, and assumed the high inflation of the 1970s would continue. He ignored New York State taxes and applied a constant federal rate of 11.7 percent to a rising income. He taxed the mother's investment income at 23 percent, a higher rate than her son's. Combined with the inflation assumption, his 8 percent discount rate implied a negative real after-tax return for the rest of the century.

The court wrote that Rule 703 "does not, however, allow an expert to base his opinion on assumptions and data that are so contrary" to the record or so speculative that they amount to conjecture. It added: "An expert's opinion that is founded in conjecture that is inconsistent with the record has no evidentiary value." The court described the assumptions as "no more than conjecture and wild speculation," said it had "a duty to inquire into the trustworthiness of the underlying data," and held that an expert "may not rely principally on inconsistent assumptions that are biased toward the party" that retained him. It excluded the testimony beyond what the jury had already heard, and also relied on Rule 403.

Each assumption in Shatkin was tested against material already in the case: the annuity, the wage data and the tax rates.

What did the Fifth Circuit say in Moore v. International Paint?

In an unpublished 2013 decision it affirmed exclusion of an exposure opinion whose assumed facts differed frequently and substantially from the undisputed record, while noting that estimation from an incomplete record is normal for experts.

In Moore v. International Paint, L.L.C., No. 13-30281 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 2013), the district court excluded an expert's opinion on cumulative exposure. The Fifth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The opinion is unpublished and, under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4, is not precedent except in limited circumstances, but it sets out the circuit's earlier statements in one place.

The court repeated that the requirement of sufficient facts "is in all instances mandatory," quoting Hathaway v. Bazany, and that testimony "not based upon the facts in the record but on altered facts and speculation" should be excluded, quoting Guillory v. Domtar. An expert, it said, may not "overcome th[e] evidentiary lack" with "the furtive inclusion" of supposed facts not in the record.

The court also stated the other side of the rule. "Reliable expert testimony often involves estimation and reasonable inferences from a sometimes incomplete record," and "a few scattered errors in an expert report are not necessarily grounds for exclusion." Exclusion was upheld because the expert's assumed facts differed frequently and substantially from the undisputed record, and many of his assumptions had no apparent rationale.

Moore gives the reviewer a scale. One wrong figure is a point for cross-examination. A pattern of assumptions that depart from the record, each tilted the same way, is a ground for a motion.

Can the other side learn which facts counsel told the expert to assume?

Yes. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) leaves discoverable the communications that identify facts or data counsel provided and the expert considered, and assumptions counsel provided and the expert relied on.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) requires the report to contain "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming" the opinions. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) generally protects communications between the party's attorney and the reporting expert, but not to the extent that they "identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed" or "identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed."

The difference between the two exceptions is useful. Facts counsel provided are discoverable if the expert considered them, even if he rejected them. Assumptions are discoverable if he relied on them. An instruction such as "assume the decedent would have supported his mother for thirty years" is exactly the kind of assumption a reviewer wants to see, because it is not a fact in the record at all.

Rule 705 sets the stage for using all this at trial. "Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion, and give the reasons for it, without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination." The reviewer's job is to make sure counsel knows, before that cross-examination, which facts are missing from the record.

How does a reviewer test the factual basis of the opposing report?

He lists every fact the opinion depends on, finds its source in the record, marks the facts that are assumed or contradicted, and where the method permits recalculates the result with the figures the record does contain.

The reviewer builds an assumption table from the opposing report and the materials listed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), and fills it in row by row.

  • Write down each factual premise of each opinion, including numbers, dates, durations and rates.
  • Find the source of each premise: firsthand observation, trial testimony, a document in the record, or an instruction from counsel.
  • Mark premises that no document supports and premises that a document contradicts, with the page reference.
  • For premises based on inadmissible material, record whether the field reasonably relies on that kind of material.
  • Rerun the calculation with the record figure wherever the method uses one, and report how much the result changes.
  • Turn each marked premise into a deposition or cross-examination question.

What if the facts are disputed rather than missing?

Then the opinion is tested on whether evidence supports the version the expert adopted. The 2000 note accepts that experts reach different conclusions on competing versions of the facts, and the reviewer says which version each opinion uses.

A report that adopts the plaintiff's account of an accident is not unsupported merely because the defendant tells it differently. Under the 2000 note the question is whether the hypothetical facts are "supported by the evidence." The reviewer therefore identifies the evidence behind the version used, for example a witness statement or a measurement, and checks whether the expert's own description matches it.

Two problems can be checked directly in the record. The first is selection: the report cites the parts of a deposition that support its version and omits a later correction by the same witness. The second is drift: the report starts from a disputed fact and then treats it as settled when it builds the next step. Both can be shown from the record, and both are stated in the review as facts with page references, so that the court can check them without relying on the reviewer's view of the dispute.

What does IAE do when the opposing report rests on facts that are not in the record?

An IAE specialist from the public registry checks the method, the materials used and whether the conclusions follow from them, and prepares deposition questions. Format, cost, deadline and specialist are confirmed within one business day.

The client sends the opposing report and the case materials and describes the task: which opinions to check and against which record. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts.

Among the six questions a review answers are whether all objects, materials and questions were examined and whether the conclusions follow from the examination, with no contradictions or inadmissible assumptions. A check of the factual basis falls within those two questions. The review can be ordered together with deposition questions for the opposing expert.

The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines. The specialist confirms that he has no interest in the outcome and can be verified in the IAE registry by Member ID or QR code. IAE is not a law firm, and a review is evidence that the court weighs with the rest of the record.

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