Expert report review
Expert testimony beyond the report: when is an undisclosed opinion excluded at trial?
In federal court a retained expert's report must contain a complete statement of all opinions the expert will express and the basis and reasons for them. An opinion missing from the report can be kept out under Rule 37(c)(1) unless the omission was substantially justified or harmless. Courts have allowed testimony that elaborates on the report and excluded new tests, new subjects and bare conclusions.

What must the report contain for the expert to testify on a point?
A complete statement of each opinion with its basis and reasons, plus the facts or data considered and the exhibits. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) lists these items, and the testimony at trial is measured against them.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a retained expert's written report to contain "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;" "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;" and "any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them." The report also lists the expert's qualifications and publications of the previous 10 years, the cases of the previous 4 years in which the expert testified, and the compensation.
Courts read the first item strictly. In Mitchell v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, decided on April 14, 2025, Magistrate Judge Robert J. Krask of the Eastern District of Virginia quoted Washington v. McKee, which puts first in the Rule 26 analysis the question whether the report contains a complete statement of the expert's opinions and the bases for them. Michael Mitchell had sued the moving company over household items damaged when he moved to Virginia from Iowa in 2023. His restoration specialist wrote that the damage "appears to be new and transit related" and that items were "economically unrepairable," without stating bases or reasons.
The court struck the disclosures of all three of Mitchell's witnesses. A two-page quote for a gun safe "does not identify an expert witness," and a moving professional's conclusion that items "were not wrapped to [his] standards" also came without a basis. The order ends: "Pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), Mitchell is not allowed to use these witnesses as experts at trial."
What does Rule 37(c)(1) do with an opinion missing from the report?
It bars the party from using the undisclosed information on a motion, at a hearing or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. The court may add or substitute fees, a jury instruction or other sanctions.
The rule states: "If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." In addition to or instead of that sanction, the court may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, may inform the jury of the failure, and may impose other appropriate sanctions.
The committee note to the 1993 amendment calls the rule "a self-executing sanction for failure to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), without need for a motion under subdivision (a)(2)(A)." It adds that "This automatic sanction provides a strong inducement for disclosure of material that the disclosing party would expect to use as evidence, whether at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion, such as one under Rule 56."
The burden sits with the party whose expert went beyond the report. In Jarrell v. Walmart Inc., decided on April 21, 2022, Judge Andrew P. Gordon of the District of Nevada wrote that "the burden is on the party facing the sanction" to show that the failure to comply with Rule 26(a) was substantially justified or harmless. In Gay v. Stonebridge Life the First Circuit, quoting its earlier decisions, added a limit from the other side: preclusion "is not a strictly mechanical exercise."
When is trial testimony a permitted elaboration of the report?
When it stays inside the opinions the report disclosed, so the other side could prepare for it. The First Circuit upheld such testimony in Gay v. Stonebridge Life in 2011; an Ohio district court drew the same line in 2022.
In Gay v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Co., decided on October 26, 2011, the cause of a death was in dispute. The insurer's expert, Dr. Paul Rizzoli, had disclosed a report stating that a hemorrhage "was a contributing cause of death." At trial he testified that the skull fracture was not "a major cause of death" and that it "doesn't seem like a mortal wound." On cross-examination he conceded that his report did not say either thing expressly. The jury returned a verdict for Stonebridge.
The First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Howard, held: "we readily conclude that the district court did not err in admitting Dr. Rizzoli's testimony, because it fell within the scope of his previously disclosed report." The court described the purpose of Rules 26 and 37 as preventing "the unfair tactical advantage that can be gained by failing to unveil an expert in a timely fashion." It added that any error would have been harmless under the test it applied: "whether this court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." The denial of a new trial was affirmed.
In Burnett v. White, No. 1:19-cv-43, Judge Timothy S. Black of the Southern District of Ohio ruled on April 29, 2022 on objections to the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's expert Dr. Stanley Skinner. Testimony about the outcomes had an intervention taken place stayed in: "it is simply untrue that the deposition testimony is outside the scope of the report," the court wrote, because the testimony "acts as a summary of that part of the report," and it added: "that is a basis for cross-examination, not a reason for exclusion."
Which changes at trial do courts treat as a new opinion?
A new test or method, a new subject of testimony and a conclusion whose basis the report never gave. In Rembrandt v. Johnson & Johnson the Federal Circuit upheld the exclusion of testing first described on cross-examination.
Rembrandt Vision Technologies sued Johnson & Johnson Vision Care over U.S. Patent No. 5,712,327, which claims a soft gas-permeable contact lens with a tear-wettable surface layer. The parties agreed that a soft lens has a Shore D hardness of less than five. Rembrandt's expert, Dr. Thomas Beebe, Jr., wrote in his report that he had stacked 24 hydrated lenses around a stainless steel ball and probed them with a probe 2.54 mm long. On cross-examination, after the method was challenged, he testified that he had cut the lenses into quarters and stacked the quarters on a flat surface. He called the report a "typo."
The district court struck the testimony under Rules 26 and 37 and entered judgment of noninfringement as a matter of law, because Beebe was the only evidence that the lenses were soft. On August 7, 2013 the Federal Circuit affirmed: "there is simply no excuse for Dr. Beebe waiting until cross-examination to disclose his testing procedures." The testing had been disputed before trial, and Beebe never supplemented his report. The court also found harm: "Such a late change in course significantly hampered JJVC's ability to adequately cross-examine Dr. Beebe."
A new subject is treated the same way. In Burnett the court sustained the objection to Dr. Skinner's testimony on the loss of functioning in body systems and struck those lines of the deposition, writing that "Defendant was entitled to know that Dr. Skinner would testify to the loss of functioning in certain body systems." In Jarrell the court found the defense expert's report "deficient under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B)(i) in most respects," because "Jarrell was entitled to know the substance of McIntire's opinions, and the bases and reasons for them, through his report."
A bare conclusion fails even when it is on the right subject. In Cripe v. Henkel Corp., decided by the Seventh Circuit on June 7, 2017, the plaintiffs relied on the evaluations of treating physicians, one of whom wrote "[c]ognitive disorder secondary to toxic encephalopathy" without explaining why she reached that conclusion. Judge Easterbrook quoted an earlier decision: "An expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies nothing of value to the judicial process."
When is an undisclosed opinion harmless?
When the other side was not surprised, or can still cure the surprise before trial without disrupting it. A federal court in Virginia weighed five factors, including the importance of the evidence and the explanation for the omission.
Mitchell listed the five factors of the Southern States decision: "the surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered"; "the ability of that party to cure the surprise"; "the extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial"; "the importance of the evidence"; and "the non-disclosing party's explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence." The court found that "Mitchell has not yet explained his deficient disclosures, nor has he attempted to cure his error."
A chance to depose the expert does not cure the gap by itself. In Jarrell the court wrote: "Merely stating that Jarrell could have deposed McIntire is insufficient to meet this burden," and "Reopening discovery would likely delay trial, resulting in prejudice to Jarrell." It excluded the opinions that were not adequately disclosed and kept one that was, on whether the fall "significantly changed her underlying cervical condition." The claimed unreliability of that opinion, the court wrote, "is fodder for cross examination."
In Rembrandt the harm came from reliance. Johnson & Johnson had built its defense around the method described in the report and chose not to call a competing expert, and Rembrandt had stood behind the report at summary judgment. When the method changed on cross-examination, the defense was facing a test it had not prepared to meet.
Can the expert close the gap with a supplemental report?
Only in time. Rule 26(e)(2) extends the duty to supplement to the report and the deposition, and changes must be disclosed by the time pretrial disclosures are due. Rule 37(c)(1) covers failures under Rule 26(e) as well.
Rule 26(e)(2) states that for an expert whose report must be disclosed, "the party's duty to supplement extends both to information included in the report and to information given during the expert's deposition." It continues: "Any additions or changes to this information must be disclosed by the time the party's pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due."
Rule 37(c)(1) applies to a party that fails to provide information "as required by Rule 26(a) or (e)." A supplement served on time brings a corrected point into the disclosure. A point that first appears at trial, as Beebe's new test did, has no supplement behind it, and the Federal Circuit counted the missing supplement against Rembrandt.
The same duty binds the party's own expert. If the opposing review or the deposition has exposed a gap in one's own report, the time to fill it is before the pretrial disclosures, through a supplement that the other side can answer.
Do state courts apply the same rule?
Not always in the same words. Pennsylvania's Rule 4003.5(c) bars trial testimony that is inconsistent with or goes beyond the fair scope of the expert's discovery testimony, and its courts ask whether the discrepancy prevented a meaningful response.
In Brady v. Ballay, Thornton, Maloney Medical Associates, Inc., decided on December 8, 1997, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania quoted Rule 4003.5(c): the expert's trial testimony "may not be inconsistent with or go beyond the fair scope of his testimony in the discovery proceedings." The court wrote that "the accent is on the word 'fair'" and asked whether the discrepancy "is of a nature which would prevent the adversary from preparing a meaningful response," or would mislead the adversary as to the nature of the response.
The defense expert, Dr. Ferroni, had written before trial that Dr. Thornton acted correctly and that the injury was "neither predictable nor preventable according to the records at my disposal." At trial he testified that the baby's condition became critical because of fluctuating heart rates and that the lack of oxygen led Thornton to use the vacuum extractor. The majority held that this testimony "clearly exceeded the fair scope" of the report, but found no "prejudice or unfair surprise" and affirmed without a new trial. Judge Olszewski dissented and would have granted one.
The case lines up with the federal decisions on the two questions courts ask: whether the testimony went beyond the disclosure, and whether that hurt the other side. In state court a reviewer checks the state's own rule and its test before comparing the report with the expected testimony.
What does a reviewer compare between the report and the expected testimony?
Each opinion the expert is expected to give, set against the report's statement of opinions, bases, facts or data and exhibits, and against the deposition. Gaps support a motion in limine; elaborations become material for cross-examination.
The work starts with a table. One column lists each opinion as it appears in the report, with its page. The next columns give the stated basis and reasons, the facts or data considered, the method described and the exhibits. A last column records what the expert said on the same point at deposition. The comparison then marks every place where the deposition or a later filing goes further than the report.
Each mark falls into one of four kinds that the decisions above recognize: a new subject, as in Burnett's body-systems testimony; a new test or method, as in Rembrandt; a conclusion without basis or reasons, as in Mitchell and Cripe; or an elaboration that stays within a disclosed opinion, as in Gay and the first group of objections in Burnett. The first three support a motion to exclude under Rule 37(c)(1). The fourth goes to cross-examination.
The same table serves the party's own expert. Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i) applies to both sides, and a reviewer who finds that the party's own report omits the basis for an opinion gives counsel time to supplement it under Rule 26(e)(2) before the pretrial disclosures are due.
What does IAE do when the opposing expert may go beyond the report?
IAE reviews the opposing expert's report for method, completeness, reasoning and qualifications, and prepares deposition questions on request. Format, cost, deadline and specialist are confirmed within one business day; the signed PDF follows in up to 5 business days.
The review answers six questions about the report: whether the method fits the object and the questions and was followed at every stage; whether all objects, materials and questions were examined; whether the conclusions follow from the examination, with no contradictions or inadmissible assumptions; whether the expert's education, specialty and experience match the subject; whether the report meets the formal and procedural requirements of the jurisdiction; and whether it can be relied on. The third question covers the bare conclusions that Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i) and the courts above reject.
The client sends the report, the deposition transcript or other case materials and describes the task: a review of the opposing report, deposition questions, or both. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day, and within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry. The client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days, and a 48-hour rush is available for cases with tight deadlines.
Every reviewer is a member of the public IAE registry and can be verified by Member ID or QR code, and the reviewer confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy; whether to move to exclude an opinion is a decision for the client's attorney. Neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees that the court will exclude any testimony.
Sources
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37, Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions, with committee notes (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Mitchell v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-308 (E.D. Va. Apr. 14, 2025)
- Jarrell v. Walmart Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01219-APG-VCF (D. Nev. Apr. 21, 2022)
- Gay v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Co., No. 10-1559 (1st Cir. Oct. 26, 2011) (FindLaw)
- Burnett v. White, No. 1:19-cv-43 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2022)
- Rembrandt Vision Technologies, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., No. 2012-1510 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2013), slip opinion (Patently-O)
- Cripe v. Henkel Corp., No. 17-1231 (7th Cir. June 7, 2017) (FindLaw)
- Brady v. Ballay, Thornton, Maloney Medical Associates, Inc. (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1997) (FindLaw)
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