Expert witnesses
Expert witness conflicts of interest: when do courts disqualify an expert?
A federal court disqualifies an expert witness for a conflict of interest when the moving party proves two facts: it reasonably believed its relationship with the expert was confidential, and it gave the expert confidential information. The Fifth Circuit applied this test in Koch Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux M/V in 1996. Such motions are granted rarely. A tie to a party without confidential information becomes a subject for cross-examination.

What test do federal courts use to disqualify an expert witness?
Two questions. Was it objectively reasonable for the first party to believe that a confidential relationship existed? Did that party disclose confidential or privileged information to the expert? The expert is disqualified only if both answers are yes.
"Federal courts have the inherent power to disqualify experts," Judge Edith H. Jones wrote for the Fifth Circuit in Koch Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux M/V, No. 94-30509, decided June 25, 1996. The opinion notes that lower courts have rejected a "bright-line" rule, and the panel took two questions from Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991): "First, was it objectively reasonable for the first party who claims to have retained the expert to conclude that a confidential relationship existed? Second, was any confidential or privileged information disclosed by the first party to the expert?" The next sentence of the opinion sets the threshold: "Only if the answers to both questions are affirmative should the witness be disqualified."
The burden sits with the movant. Koch Refining states: "The party seeking disqualification bears the burden of proving these elements." The court of appeals reviews the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion, and the opinion notes that cases granting disqualification are rare. In Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 6:06-cv-00530 (S.D. W. Va. June 10, 2008), the district court quoted earlier rulings: courts are "generally reluctant to disqualify expert witnesses, especially those ... who possess useful specialized knowledge," and the movant carries a "high standard of proof."
The Fifth Circuit also wrote: "Many lower courts have considered a third element: the public interest in allowing or not allowing an expert to testify." Rhodes cites Marvin Lumber, 113 F.R.D. 588 (D. Minn. 1986), for the same factor. The policy arguments under that heading are set out below, after the facts that courts check under the two questions.
When is the relationship between a party and an expert confidential?
Courts look at the contacts: a retainer, confidentiality terms, payment, documents marked confidential, a long series of discussions. The Fifth Circuit cited Mayer v. Dell, where one meeting with an expert who was not retained was not enough.
In Koch Refining the expert was Vinas. Continental Insurance Company had retained him in its coverage dispute with the barge interests, 5801 and OTC. According to the opinion, Continental paid him approximately $8,000 and received two detailed written reports of his opinions. The Fifth Circuit described a "long-standing series of interactions," not a first consultation, and let stand the trial court's finding that the expectation of confidentiality continued after Vinas was discharged.
In Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1991), there was no signed retention agreement. Wang's counsel, Thomas Scott, telephoned John Balde, a computer consultant, and sent him letters enclosing the patents, the prior art and a memorandum on the prosecution history. A letter of November 15 outlined potential defenses to Wang's suit. Balde sent a $1,540 invoice for his time, and on December 10, 1990 he called Scott to say that he believed the patents were invalid and was not interested in working on the matter. The NEC defendants later retained him. Judge Ellis found Scott's belief in a confidential relationship objectively reasonable: "Significantly, the November 15 letter was prominently labeled as confidential," and Balde said nothing when he received the materials. The court granted the motion to disqualify on May 9, 1991.
The record in Rhodes was longer. Dr. Elizabeth L. Anderson had signed a retainer and confidentiality agreements with the plaintiffs' counsel in Leach v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., a related state case, and the relationship lasted several months with about 28 telephone calls. When DuPont designated her as its class certification expert, she described her earlier work as a preliminary review. The court held that this history was not "sporadic or informal."
The line runs between those records and the facts of Mayer v. Dell. As Rhodes reads Koch Refining, courts declined to find a confidential relationship where the expert had met once with counsel and was not retained. A court reconstructs the whole course of contacts: who called whom, what was sent, whether the expert billed, and whether anything was marked confidential.
What counts as confidential information given to an expert?
Counsel's theories of the case, litigation strategy, trial tactics and work product such as memoranda and selected documents. The Fifth Circuit held in Koch Refining that purely technical information is not confidential.
Continental's counsel told the court in Koch Refining that it had "spent considerable time with Mr. Vinas explaining his entire theory of the case as well as trial tactics for the 1990 trial." The opinion, quoting Mayer v. Dell, treats "discussion of the [retaining party's] strategies in the litigation" as confidential information and then sets a limit: "However, purely technical information is not confidential." The trial court found that Vinas did receive confidential information, and the Fifth Circuit held that this finding was not clearly erroneous.
Judge Ellis treated the materials Scott sent in Wang Laboratories as attorney work product: "No experienced litigator would freely disclose these materials to opposing counsel." He named the memorandum on the patent file history and the November 15 outline of defenses as the clearest examples.
In Rhodes the plaintiffs' counsel had given Dr. Anderson a selection of documents that revealed counsel's mental impressions and a memorandum summarizing the case. The court treated both as work product and found the second question answered.
For a first call with a candidate, counsel can keep to the names of the parties, the court and the public description of the claims. Theories of the case, weak points, selected documents and draft defenses fall within the categories that these courts treated as confidential.
What happens when an expert switches sides?
In Wang Laboratories, Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams and Rhodes v. DuPont the expert first worked for one side and then for the other in the same or a related case, and each court disqualified the expert.
Sterling Cordy was seriously injured in a 1991 bicycle accident at a railroad crossing and sued The Sherwin-Williams Company, which, he alleged, owned the crossing. His firm, Brown & Connery, retained James Marley Green, a forensic engineer who works on accidents involving bicycles, in May 1993. Green received a binder with the plaintiff's investigation and learned the plaintiff's theory and the defendants it targeted. On July 6, 1993 he resigned by letter and returned the $3,000 retainer. Defense counsel contacted him in October 1993 and retained him in November. His billing to the defense exceeded $14,500.
In Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575 (D.N.J. 1994), the court applied Wang Laboratories and wrote: "This is a clear case for disqualification." Sherwin-Williams could not use or consult Green in any way, and the order states that "any work done to date so far by Green shall not inure to the benefit of defendant Sherwin-Williams."
Rhodes describes a bright-line rule drawn from Wang Laboratories: disqualification is clear where "it is undisputed that the consultant was previously retained as an expert by the adverse party in the same litigation." The court held that Leach and Rhodes "functionally constitute the same case" for this purpose, with the same defendant, the same chemical, the same alleged conduct and experts applying the same risk-assessment method. It disqualified Dr. Anderson under that rule and, as an alternative ground, under the two-part test.
Koch Refining had a different pattern. The case arose from the 1987 sinking of the barge T/B OCEAN TRANSPORTER, which the M/V JENNIFER L. BOUDREAUX towed out of Corpus Christi on November 24, 1987. The court wrote: "Initially, we point out that this is not a case in which the expert switched sides." Continental had retained Vinas in its coverage dispute with the barge interests. After that dispute settled, Continental joined the barge interests against the tug interests, and the tug interests then contacted Vinas ex parte. "However, in the instant case, it was Continental that switched sides, not Vinas." The Fifth Circuit upheld the disqualification all the same.
Which policy factors can change the result?
Courts weigh conflicts and the integrity of the process against each party's access to experts and the experts' ability to work. They also ask whether another expert is available and whether time remains to hire one.
Koch Refining lists the arguments on each side. "The policy objectives favoring disqualification include preventing conflicts of interest," together with the integrity of the judicial process. "The main policy objectives militating against disqualification are ensuring that parties have access to expert witnesses," together with allowing experts to pursue their professional calling. The Fifth Circuit also recorded the concern that, if experts could be disqualified too easily, parties would create relationships with experts only to keep them away from the other side.
Two practical questions follow from that concern: whether another expert is available, and whether the opposing party had time to hire its own expert before trial. In Koch the district court noted that the tug interests could have retained their own naval architect in June 1990, more than three years before trial. Their counsel had ex parte contacts with Vinas and did not tell their opponents before trial that he would testify. The Fifth Circuit wrote: "The contention of dependency on his testimony rings somewhat hollow in light of that coyness." The panel limited its holding to "this very limited and specific factual scenario."
In Rhodes the court found no undue burden on DuPont, because Dr. Anderson was one of many experts DuPont had proposed. In Wang Laboratories, Judge Ellis tied the court's power to "the judicial duty to protect the integrity of the adversary process" and wrote that experts "must operate within the constraints of, and consistent with, the adversary process." He also stated that nothing in the ruling suggested that either party or the consultant had acted inappropriately.
A hearing is not always required. The Fifth Circuit wrote: "In some situations, a hearing may be required, but this was not one of them," because all the relevant facts were sufficiently evident to the trial court.
Can the court disqualify the law firm that hired the expert?
Yes. In Cordy a federal court in New Jersey disqualified the whole defense firm. In Shadow Traffic Network a California appellate court upheld disqualification of the firm that hired an accountant the other side had interviewed for one hour.
In Cordy the court first disqualified the two defense lawyers, Penders and Davis, and then extended the order to their firm, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin. New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a) on imputed conflicts did not clearly require that step, but the court applied its rationale: "The Court therefore imputes the disclosures to the entire firm." Penders testified that he "knew before authorizing Green's employment" that Green had given Brown & Connery an oral opinion unfavorable to the plaintiff. The court wrote: "Defense counsel's conduct was wanting." It found no evidence that Green had passed the plaintiff's information to Davis directly and still disqualified the firm, pointing to the plaintiff's interest in "a trial free from the risk that confidential information will be used against him." Sherwin-Williams received 30 days to select new counsel.
Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.App.4th 1067, was decided by the California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Four, on May 2, 1994. On July 19, 1993, counsel for Metro, Andrews & Kurth, interviewed Deloitte & Touche personnel, including the certified public accountant David Thompson, for about one hour. They discussed Metro's case theories, trial strategy and damages theories. Andrews & Kurth did not retain Deloitte & Touche, citing cost. On August 9, 1993, Latham & Watkins, counsel for Shadow, retained Thompson. The trial court disqualified the entire Latham & Watkins firm, and the Court of Appeal denied Shadow's petition.
The California court held that a retention interview can produce confidential communications even when the expert is never retained. Once the moving party proves that confidential information reached the expert, "a rebuttable presumption arises that the information has been used or disclosed" by the firm that hired the expert, and that firm must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that no disclosure occurred. A one-hour interview was enough there. In Mayer v. Dell, as Koch Refining describes it, the federal court found no confidential relationship where the expert met once with counsel and was not retained. State law decides which approach applies in a state court case.
Can the other side depose or use your consulting expert?
Ordinarily not. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), facts known and opinions held by an expert retained only to prepare for trial are discoverable only under Rule 35(b) or on a showing of exceptional circumstances.
Rule 26(b)(4)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure begins: "Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert" who was retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness. The exceptions are a physical or mental examination report under Rule 35(b) and a showing of exceptional circumstances under which the party cannot practicably obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
When discovery is allowed, Rule 26(b)(4)(E) makes the party seeking it pay the expert a reasonable fee for the time spent and, for discovery under subparagraph (D), a fair share of the fees and expenses the other party reasonably incurred in obtaining the expert's facts and opinions, unless manifest injustice would result.
A testifying expert is in a different position. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A), "A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial," and if a report is required, the deposition takes place after the report is provided. Disqualification motions usually arise when the other side tries to hire a former consultant as its own testifying expert, as in Wang Laboratories, where the NEC defendants retained Wang's former consultant. Judge Ellis granted Wang's motion and in the same ruling denied Wang's request for discovery into what use, if any, Balde had made of its confidential information.
What if the expert has ties to a party but received no confidential information?
Under the two-part test that tie does not lead to disqualification. The other side raises it on cross-examination, and in United States v. Abel the Supreme Court wrote that proof of bias is almost always relevant.
In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, decided December 10, 1984, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "Bias is a term used in the 'common law of evidence' to describe the relationship between a party and a witness" that may lead the witness to slant testimony for or against a party. The opinion adds: "Proof of bias is almost always relevant." Repeat work for the same law firm or a financial interest in a party is the kind of relationship that definition covers.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) gives the other side the material for that cross-examination. The report of a retained expert includes "a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition" and "a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case." A candidate who has testified several times for the same law firm or the same party appears on that list.
Professional codes add their own duties. The NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers, as revised in July 2019, states in section II.4.a: "Engineers shall disclose all known or potential conflicts of interest that could influence or appear to influence their judgment or the quality of their services." Section III.4.b states: "Engineers shall not, without the consent of all interested parties, participate in or represent an adversary interest" in a specific project or proceeding in which the engineer gained particular specialized knowledge on behalf of a former client or employer.
What should a conflict check cover before an expert is retained?
The names of all parties, related companies, insurers and law firms, and a written question about any earlier contact about the dispute. Theories and work product stay with counsel until the candidate answers.
Each step below answers a fact that one of the courts above examined: an insurer that later changed sides in Koch Refining, a consultant without a signed agreement who sent an invoice in Wang Laboratories, a one-hour interview in Shadow Traffic, and a defense firm that knew of the earlier engagement in Cordy. Counsel can work through them in this order:
- List every party, parent and affiliated company, insurer and law firm in the case, including firms and insurers that appeared earlier.
- Send the list to the candidate before any discussion of the merits.
- Ask the candidate whether anyone connected to the case has contacted, interviewed, paid or retained him or her, and when.
- Read the candidate's list of testimony from the last 4 years for the same parties, firms and insurers.
- Get the answers in writing and keep them in the case file.
- Sign an engagement letter with confidentiality terms before sending theories, memoranda or selected documents, and mark confidential material as confidential.
- Stop and choose another candidate if the answer reveals an earlier contact with the other side about the same dispute.
How does IAE check expert witness candidates for conflicts?
Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. The request lists the parties and counsel for that check, and within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates.
The request on the expert witness page asks for the field of expertise, the case type, the state and court, your side, the expert disclosure deadline, and the parties and their counsel for the conflict check. The form asks you not to include privileged or sealed information: the conflict check uses the names of the parties and counsel.
Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in your field by your deadline. The search costs $2,000 per case and is paid in advance; candidate names and CVs come after payment. Within 5 business days you receive 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony from the last 4 years and publications from the last 10 years. If no candidate fits, the second search is free, and if IAE finds no candidates, it refunds the fee.
The expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. The optional agency arrangement invoices hours at the expert's rate plus $100 per hour, fixed fees, minimum charges and surcharges plus 40%, and expenses at cost, and the expert then bills through IAE: one invoice, a retainer, monthly invoices, payment by ACH or wire within 15 days, and the search fee credited to the first invoice. IAE is not a law firm. Case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.
Sources
- Koch Refining Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux M/V, No. 94-30509 (5th Cir. June 25, 1996) (FindLaw)
- Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1991) (Justia)
- Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 6:06-cv-00530 (S.D. W. Va. June 10, 2008)
- Cordy v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575 (D.N.J. 1994) (text of the opinion)
- Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.App.4th 1067 (1994) (Justia)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII)
- United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (LII)
- NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers (revised July 2019)
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