Expert witnesses

Can you subpoena an expert who has not been retained, and what must you pay?

An expert who was never hired can be subpoenaed, but Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lets the court quash a subpoena that seeks the expert's opinion or unrequested study. The court can instead order testimony if the serving party shows substantial need and pays reasonable compensation. In Kaufman v. Edelstein (1976) the Second Circuit held that experts have no privilege to refuse, and that prior opinions are easier to compel than new ones.

A hand offers a plain envelope and a blank check to an expert seen from behind in a hallway

Can you subpoena an expert who has not been retained?

Yes, but the expert can move to quash. Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii) protects an unretained expert's opinion and study, and the court may order testimony only on a showing of substantial need and with reasonable compensation.

Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iii) lets a subpoena command a person to "attend and testify", to "produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things" or to "permit the inspection of premises". An expert is a person like any other. The 1991 Advisory Committee Note states that experts are not exempt, and the duty to give evidence binds them too.

The same note explains why the rule adds protection. "A growing problem has been the use of subpoenas to compel the giving of evidence and information by unretained experts." Compelled testimony, the committee wrote, "may threaten the intellectual property of experts denied the opportunity to bargain for the value of their services."

The result is a rule with two steps. The expert, or a party, moves to quash under Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii). The party that served the subpoena then has to justify it under Rule 45(d)(3)(C).

What exactly does Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii) protect?

An unretained expert's opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert's study that was not requested by a party. Facts the expert witnessed are not protected by this clause.

The text: the court "may, on motion, quash or modify the subpoena" if it requires "disclosing an unretained expert's opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert's study that was not requested by a party."

Each element narrows the protection. The expert must be unretained. The information must be opinion or the product of the expert's own study. And it must not describe the specific events in dispute. An engineer who saw the bridge collapse is a fact witness about what she saw. The same engineer's published analysis of why such bridges fail is the expertise the clause protects.

The 1991 note describes the protection as "appropriate protection for the intellectual property of the non-party witness" and notes: "Arguably the compulsion to testify can be regarded as a "taking" of intellectual property." The rule "establishes the right of such persons to withhold their expertise", at least until the party seeking it makes the showing the rule requires.

When will a court still order the expert to testify?

When the serving party shows a substantial need that cannot otherwise be met without undue hardship and the expert will be reasonably compensated. The court then orders appearance under specified conditions.

Rule 45(d)(3)(C) provides that "in the circumstances described in Rule 45(d)(3)(B), the court may, instead of quashing or modifying a subpoena, order appearance or production under specified conditions" if the serving party "shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship" and, under clause (ii), the subpoenaed person "will be reasonably compensated."

The 1991 note ties the standard to another rule: the showing "is the same as that necessary to secure work product under Rule 26(b)(3) and gives assurance of reasonable compensation." Substantial need is a high bar. A party that could hire its own expert on the same question will struggle to show that its need "cannot be otherwise met".

The conditions are the court's to set: the scope of the questions, the length of the deposition, the place, the fee. A party that serves a subpoena on an unretained expert should be ready to propose them.

Which factors guide the court's decision?

The 1991 note lists the Kaufman v. Edelstein factors: facts or opinion, a prior opinion or a new one, a unique expert, whether a comparable witness would testify willingly, and oppression by repeated testimony.

The note says the court's discretion "should be informed by" five considerations. The first is "the degree to which the expert is being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the case rather than in order to give opinion testimony". The second is "the difference between testifying to a previously formed or expressed opinion and forming a new one".

The third is "the possibility that, for other reasons, the witness is a unique expert". The fourth is "the extent to which the calling party is able to show the unlikelihood that any comparable witness will willingly testify". The fifth is "the degree to which the witness is able to show that he has been oppressed by having continually to testify".

Read together, the factors favor compelling an expert who knows facts, who already formed and expressed the opinion sought, and whom no one else can replace. They favor protecting an expert who would have to do new work and who is called again and again because of a reputation in the field.

What did Kaufman v. Edelstein decide?

That experts have no constitutional or statutory privilege against compelled testimony, and that a trial judge has discretion to excuse an expert. The Second Circuit refused to block subpoenas for two experts' prior opinions in the government's IBM antitrust case.

Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, was decided on April 20, 1976, in an opinion by Judge Friendly. The government, in its civil antitrust suit against IBM, subpoenaed two computer industry experts from Coopers & Lybrand and Arthur D. Little. It sought their opinions from 1960 through 1972 and their accounts of the advice they had given clients, not new opinions or new studies, and offered to pay them as experts. According to the government's affidavits, the witnesses first agreed and then declined at their firms' direction; one of them called his expertise "a proprietary asset."

The court wrote: "Admittedly there is no constitutional or statutory privilege against the compulsion of expert testimony." A judge may excuse an expert in a proper case, and the relevant factors include "the difference between testifying to a previously formed or expressed opinion and forming a new one." The court treated a refusal to quash as a clear abuse of discretion only in an exceedingly rare case.

The court also described the procedure. The witness "must attend, see just what questions are propounded to him, allow the trial court to rule upon them", and only then refuse and face contempt. The appeals were dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the petitions for mandamus were denied.

What happens when a treating provider with opinions already formed is subpoenaed?

In Omerovic v. University of Vermont Medical Center (2018) the Vermont Department of Labor allowed the deposition of a treating physician assistant, limited to opinions already formed, with no new research and fair market pay.

In Omerovic v. University of Vermont Medical Center, Opinion No. 15-18WC, decided on November 13, 2018, a workers' compensation case, the defense subpoenaed the claimant's treating provider, a physician assistant, for a deposition about the causes of the claimant's condition. Her employer moved to quash, arguing that compelled testimony of an unretained expert violated the rules. The Vermont rule is based on the federal one, and the ruling quoted the federal Advisory Committee Note on the difference between a previously formed opinion and a new one.

The motion was denied with conditions. The deposition could last no more than three hours, at a reasonable time and place of her choosing within 50 miles of Burlington and by December 31, 2018. "She shall have no duty to perform any new research or analysis, or to formulate any new opinions." She would testify only to opinions formed during treatment or expressed afterward and their reasons. The parties had to pay fair market value for her time at an hourly rate, including reasonable preparation time.

The parties, the ruling noted, "simply seek to depose her treatment, observations, and opinions that she has already formed and disclosed." That is the line the Kaufman factors draw.

Does the same protection cover the other side's retained expert?

No. Under the 1991 note the clause does not apply to an expert retained by a party, whose information is governed by Rule 26(b)(4). Courts split on whether Rule 45 can reach the other side's retained expert.

The note is explicit: Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii) "does not apply to the expert retained by a party, whose information is subject to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4)." A retained expert's opinions are disclosed through the report and the deposition under Rule 26, not protected as the expert's intellectual property.

Whether the other side may also serve a document subpoena on that expert is a separate question. In Marsh v. Jackson, 141 F.R.D. 431 (W.D. Va. 1992), the magistrate judge quashed subpoenas for two retained experts' entire files, holding that "Rule 26(b)(4) remains a limitation on the right of access by an opposing party" and declining "to construe the Rules in a manner that would rewrite them."

In Roman v. City of Chicago, No. 20 C 1717 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2023), Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani denied a motion to quash a document subpoena to the plaintiff's retained police practices expert. He wrote that the Rule 26(a) disclosures "were meant to be the floor, rather than the ceiling, of written discovery", that the discovery sought "must still be within the broad scope of Rule 26", and that he did not find the reasoning in Marsh persuasive.

What if the expert was disclosed but not yet retained?

The court may treat the expert as the party's. In Sines v. Darling Ingredients (D.N.M. 2022) a subpoena was quashed for an expert the plaintiffs disclosed and called "anticipated (but currently unretained)": discovery proceeds under Rule 26.

In Sines v. Darling Ingredients Inc., a miscellaneous proceeding decided by Judge James O. Browning on May 17, 2022, the defendant served a subpoena on an air dispersion expert whom the plaintiffs had listed in their initial disclosures as an air and odor dispersion expert and described in their response as "anticipated (but currently unretained)". The defendant sought payment records, the expert's publications on odor emissions and materials on a dispersion model, and said it did not seek his opinions.

The court held that the plaintiffs "cannot have it both ways": an expert disclosed as theirs is their expert. It ruled that "discovery against a party's expert must proceed under rule 26, and not under rule 45", found that the plaintiffs had "a legitimate interest in all parties following the Discovery Plan", quashed the subpoena and denied the motion to enforce it.

For the party that names an expert early, the case cuts both ways. The name brings the protection of Rule 26 and the court's discovery plan. It also commits the party to that expert.

Who pays an expert who is compelled to testify?

The party that serves the subpoena. Service requires tendering fees for one day's attendance and mileage, and a court ordering testimony under Rule 45(d)(3)(C) requires that the expert be reasonably compensated.

Rule 45(b)(1) requires that a subpoena demanding attendance be served by "tendering the fees for 1 day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law". For an unretained expert that is the starting point, not the end. Under Rule 45(d)(3)(C)(ii) the court orders testimony over the expert's objection only on the condition that the expert "will be reasonably compensated" by the party that served the subpoena.

The Vermont ruling in Omerovic set the measure as fair market value for the witness's time, expressed as an hourly rate and including reasonable preparation, and left the rate to the parties with a conference before the Department if they could not agree.

Rule 45(d)(1) adds a general duty: "A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena." Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) the court must quash a subpoena that "subjects a person to undue burden."

Where can an unretained expert be made to appear?

Within the geographic limits of Rule 45(c): for a trial, hearing or deposition, within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business in person, or within the state in limited cases.

Rule 45(c)(1)(A) lets a subpoena command attendance "within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person". Rule 45(c)(1)(B) extends it to the state where the person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business in person, if the person is a party or a party's officer, or is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial expense.

Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(ii) the court must quash or modify a subpoena that "requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c)." An expert who lives across the country may be out of reach for live testimony. In Omerovic the deposition was set at a place of the witness's choosing within 50 miles of Burlington.

What are the risks of building a case on a reluctant expert?

The expert cannot be made to prepare, may be limited to prior opinions, may resist every question and will not sign the report a retained expert would. A willing expert avoids those limits.

The 1991 note says experts are not exempt from giving evidence "even if they cannot be compelled to prepare themselves to give effective testimony". A compelled expert answers what is asked and nothing more. Omerovic barred new research and new opinions. Kaufman allowed questions about opinions the witnesses had already given clients.

A compelled expert is also a hostile one. The witness did not choose the case, may resent the subpoena and owes the serving party no help in framing the testimony. The motion practice under Rule 45(d)(3) takes time that a disclosure deadline may not allow.

For an opinion that the case needs, the reliable route is an expert who agrees to the engagement, studies the record and signs a report that meets Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

How does IAE find an expert who is willing to take the case?

Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search by the deadline, and within 5 business days it sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, 4 years of testimony and 10 years of publications.

The request form on the IAE expert witness page asks for the field of expertise, the case type, the state and court, the firm's side, the expert disclosure deadline, the parties and their counsel for the conflict check and a short description of the case. The search costs $2,000 per case, paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment.

Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. If no candidate fits, the second search is free, and if no candidates are found, the fee is refunded.

The firm chooses the expert, who bills the firm directly or through IAE under the agency option. The expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. IAE is not a law firm: whether to subpoena a witness, whom to retain and how to present the case stay with the attorney.

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