Examinations
Can an expert witness testify outside his or her field, and when does a case need a second expert?
Rule 702 admits opinion testimony of a witness qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education". Courts apply that test to each opinion separately. In 2001 the Eighth Circuit held that a trial court abused its discretion by letting a hydrologist give opinions on warehousing practices, and ordered a new trial. In 2002 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of a hydrogeologist whose opinion rested on groundwater models built by colleagues in a specialty he did not have.

Can an expert witness testify outside his or her field?
No. Rule 702 admits an opinion only of a witness qualified in the subject of that opinion, and the 2023 committee note requires each opinion to stay within what the expert's basis and method support.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 opens with the qualification clause: the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. The rest of the rule adds four conditions that the proponent must show the court are more likely than not met: the expertise will help the trier of fact, the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the opinion is a reliable application of them to the facts of the case.
Qualification is not decided once for the whole witness. In Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001), the same hydrologist was qualified for one group of opinions and unqualified for another. In Dura Automotive Systems of Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), a hydrogeologist could give one opinion about contamination and could not give the next one, which depended on mathematical modeling.
The committee note to the 2023 amendment states the same limit from the side of the opinion: each opinion must "stay within the bounds of what can be concluded" from a reliable application of the expert's basis and methodology.
How does a court decide what an expert is qualified to say?
The judge compares the witness's knowledge, skill, experience, training or education with the subject of each opinion. The party offering the witness carries the burden, and the standard is Rule 104(a).
The original committee note of 1972 reads the word "expert" broadly. The rule views the expert "not in a narrow sense": it covers physicians and physicists and also "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values. A degree is one of five listed sources of expertise, and experience is another.
The note to the 2000 amendment keeps experience as a sufficient basis and adds a condition. In some fields experience is "the predominant, if not sole, basis" for reliable testimony. A witness who relies solely or primarily on experience must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached and why it is a sufficient basis for the opinion. The gatekeeping role of the court "requires more than simply 'taking the expert's word for it.'"
The 2023 note says that the requirement that the expert be qualified is governed by the Rule 104(a) standard, the same preponderance standard that the amended text applies to the reliability conditions. The question for the judge is therefore whether the party offering the witness has shown it more likely than not that this person has expertise in this subject.
Does the expert have to be a specialist in the exact subfield?
Not always. In Huss v. Gayden the Fifth Circuit held in 2009 that an internist did not need board certification in cardiology or toxicology to explain why medical literature did not establish a causal link.
Huss v. Gayden, No. 04-60962 (5th Cir. June 10, 2009), was a suit against a physician and an obstetrics practice over Terbutaline, a drug given to the plaintiff during pregnancy, and her later cardiomyopathy. The plaintiffs called a toxicologist. The defense expert, Dr. Reddix, practiced internal medicine and was neither a cardiologist nor a toxicologist. The magistrate judge sustained an objection to his testimony on causation.
The Fifth Circuit held that the exclusion was an abuse of discretion and ordered a new trial. Its opinion says: "Rule 702 does not mandate that an expert be highly qualified in order to testify about a given issue." It continues: "Differences in expertise bear chiefly on the weight to be assigned to the testimony". In the court's words, "Dr. Reddix did not need to be board-certified in cardiology or toxicology"; his training and experience qualified him "to tell the jury why the literature does not establish a causal link."
The decision was not unanimous: Judge Higginbotham dissented and would have affirmed the exclusion. On the majority's reasoning a physician with general training may criticize a specialist's use of the medical literature, and the differences in expertise go to the weight that the jury gives the testimony.
What happens when part of the testimony falls outside the expert's field?
That part is inadmissible, and a verdict reached with it can be reversed. In Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel the Eighth Circuit found an abuse of discretion in admitting a hydrologist's opinions on warehousing practices and ordered a new trial.
The case arose from the 1993 Mississippi River flood. Wheeling, a steel manufacturer, sued Beelman, a warehouseman, for damage to about 3,000 tons of steel stored in Beelman's St. Louis warehouse. The jury found for Beelman. One of the witnesses was Dr. Curtis, a hydrologist who specialized in flood risk management.
The Eighth Circuit, in a decision of June 20, 2001, separated his testimony into two parts. He was qualified to say that Beelman was diligent and reasonable in assessing river data and in judging the foreseeable river levels and the risk to the warehouse. He was not qualified to say what efforts and levels of protection are consistent with good warehousing practices. He had never been employed by a warehouseman, had not studied or written about warehousing and had never prepared emergency plans for storage facilities.
The court described him as "eminently qualified to testify as an expert hydrologist regarding matters of flood risk management" and wrote that he "sorely lacked the education, employment, or other practical personal experiences" to testify about safe warehousing. The trial court "abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Curtis to give opinions specifically about warehousing practices". The court wrote that the improper opinions "went to the primary issue upon which the jury had to make a judgment" and that Wheeling "was prejudiced as a result". It agreed with several of Wheeling's allegations of error, this one among them, reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
May an expert rely on the work of a specialist in another field?
Yes, on facts or data of a kind experts in the field reasonably rely on. Under Dura Automotive the expert may not present, as his own, another specialist's contested professional judgment.
Rule 703 lets an expert base an opinion on facts or data that the expert has been made aware of or has personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data, they need not be admissible. The committee note gives the example of a physician who bases a diagnosis on statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions of nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records and X-rays.
Dura Automotive, decided on April 4, 2002, drew the limit. The dispute was about solvent contamination of the Main Street Well Field in Elkhart, Indiana, and about whether the CTS plant lay inside the well field's capture zone in the late 1970s. Dura's only expert, the hydrogeologist Nicholas Valkenburg, admitted that he was not an expert in mathematical groundwater models. Other employees of his firm had run the models, QuickFlow and SLAEM, and had made the judgments about their construction and calibration.
Judge Posner wrote for the majority: "An expert witness is permitted to use assistants in formulating his expert opinion", and the assistants normally need not testify. But a scientist, however well credentialed, "is not permitted to be the mouthpiece of a scientist in a different specialty". The opinion illustrates the point with a thoracic surgeon who testifies that a radiologist negligently missed a lung cancer: on the radiology question the surgeon "would be, at best, just parroting the opinion of an expert in radiology".
The result followed from timing. Dura responded with affidavits from four employees or ex-employees of the firm who had worked on the project. These additional experts were disclosed after the deadline for expert reports, and the district judge granted a motion under Rule 37(c)(1) to strike the affidavits. Without them Valkenburg could say that the contamination might have come from the CTS plant if the plant lay in the capture zone, but could not say that it did lie there. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion and the summary judgment for CTS. Judge Diane Wood dissented.
Can a party call several experts in the same field?
The Federal Rules set no number. The court may exclude evidence that is needlessly cumulative under Rule 403 and may limit expert testimony at the pretrial conference under Rule 16(c)(2)(D).
Rule 403 permits a court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of, among other things, "undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." A second expert who repeats the first one's opinion on the same question is exposed to that objection.
Rule 16(c)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists among the matters for a pretrial conference "avoiding unnecessary proof and cumulative evidence, and limiting the use of testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702". The 1993 committee note says that the court may address "the need for, and possible limitations on, the use of expert testimony" and may limit such testimony when it would be unduly expensive given the needs of the case and the other evidence available at trial.
Two experts in different fields who answer different questions do not present cumulative evidence in that sense. A hydrologist on river levels and a warehousing specialist on storage practice, the pairing that the Wheeling record lacked, cover separate elements of the case.
What does each expert's report have to cover?
Every retained expert provides a report that he or she prepared and signed, with all opinions, their basis and reasons, the facts or data considered and the witness's own qualifications, under Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a written report "prepared and signed by the witness" from every witness retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony. The report contains "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them", the facts or data considered, the exhibits, the witness's qualifications with publications of the previous 10 years, a list of testimony of the previous four years and a statement of compensation.
The rule works witness by witness. When an opinion needs two specialties, each specialist signs a report on his or her own part, and the qualifications listed in each report are read against the opinions in that report. Dura is the example of what happens otherwise: the modelers were not disclosed as experts before the deadline, and their affidavits were struck.
The dates are in Rule 26(a)(2)(D). Absent a stipulation or a court order, expert disclosures are due at least 90 days before the date set for trial, and evidence intended solely to contradict or rebut another party's expert on the same subject is due within 30 days after that party's disclosure.
How does the other side raise the objection?
By comparing each opinion in the report with the qualifications stated in it, questioning the expert at deposition about training and experience on each subject, and moving to exclude the opinions that fall outside.
The material for the objection is already in the disclosure. The report states every opinion and lists the qualifications, publications and prior testimony. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) a party may depose any person identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial, after the report is provided. In Wheeling the gaps were of the kind a deposition establishes: no employment with a warehouseman, no study or writing on warehousing, no emergency plans prepared for storage facilities.
The motion asks the court to apply Rule 702 to specific opinions. The party offering the witness must then show that it is more likely than not that the witness is qualified on that subject. Both appellate opinions separate what the witness was qualified to say and what he was not.
A reviewer retained by the opposing party does the same comparison in writing. The review lists the opinions, sets each against the education, specialty and experience stated in the report, and marks the opinions for which the report shows no training or experience, as well as the places where the expert adopts another person's analysis.
How do you tell before retaining whether one expert is enough?
Write down each opinion the case needs and the discipline that produces it. Where two disciplines appear, either one witness has training or experience in both, or each part needs its own disclosed expert.
The three decisions give a working test. First, name the opinions: in Wheeling they were the foreseeable river level and the standard of care of a warehouseman. Second, ask for each opinion what knowledge, skill, experience, training or education the candidate has in that subject, in the terms of Rule 702.
Third, look at the steps that the expert will take from someone else. Routine data collection by assistants passes under Rule 703 and Dura. A step that requires discretionary professional judgment in another specialty, such as the calibration of a groundwater model, needs a witness who can defend that judgment under cross-examination.
Fourth, set the disclosure dates for every such witness at the start. In Dura the suit "was in its seventh year when the judge acted", and the Seventh Circuit wrote that reopening discovery for the additional experts would have extended the litigation and burdened CTS unreasonably.
How does IAE match a specialist to the questions of a case?
IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and a specialist from its public registry within one business day, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts.
The IAE expertise page lists three kinds of work: an examination on the client's questions, a specialist opinion for court, arbitration, investigation or negotiations, and a review of an expert report. The work is done by members of the public IAE registry with the relevant specialization. The client sends the report or the case materials and describes the task, and the secretariat confirms receipt the same day.
A review of another expert's report answers six questions: method, completeness, soundness of the conclusions, the expert's competence, form and procedure, and whether the report can be relied on. The competence question is the one discussed here: whether the expert's education, specialty and experience match the subject of the examination.
The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days, depending on the volume of materials, and a 48-hour rush is available for cases with tight deadlines. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case and can be verified in the registry by Member ID or QR code. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy; whether to move to exclude an opinion is a question for the client's attorney. Neither IAE nor the specialist guarantees the outcome.
Sources
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, with committee notes (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 703, Bases of an Expert's Opinion Testimony, with committee notes (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001) (Justia)
- Dura Automotive Systems of Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002) (Justia)
- Huss v. Gayden, No. 04-60962 (5th Cir. June 10, 2009) (Justia)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (LII, Cornell Law School)
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