Examinations
Is a fire marshal's report admissible as evidence of the cause of a fire?
In a federal civil case a fire marshal's report can come in under Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Supreme Court has held that this exception covers factually based conclusions. Admission is not automatic. Courts strip out witness statements recorded in the report, exclude a cause line that names no method, and some state courts treat a fire official's cause opinion as speculation.

Is a fire marshal's report hearsay?
Yes, when a party offers it to prove what the report says about the fire. It comes in only through an exception, usually the public records exception in Rule 803(8) or its state counterpart.
A fire marshal's report is a statement made outside the courtroom. A party that offers it to prove where the fire started or what ignited it offers it for the truth of what it says, and the hearsay rule bars that use unless an exception applies. The marshal is not on the witness stand, and the other side cannot cross-examine a document.
Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence covers a record or statement of a public office if it sets out the office's activities, a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, or, in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation. A second condition follows in Rule 803(8)(B): "the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness."
Rule 803(6), the exception for records of a regularly conducted activity, is the other route parties try. It covers a record of an act, event, condition, opinion or diagnosis made at or near the time by someone with knowledge and kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity, again unless the opponent shows a lack of trustworthiness. In 1970 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to let a fire investigator's cause opinion in as an official record under the Federal Shop Book Rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1732. That case, Emmet v. American Insurance Co., is discussed below.
Which parts of a fire report fit the public records exception?
Three kinds of content: what the fire department did, what its officers observed under a duty to report, and, in civil cases, factual findings of a legally authorized investigation, such as an origin and cause investigation.
A fire report usually mixes material from all three clauses. The dispatch time, the units that responded and the time the fire was declared under control describe the office's own activities under Rule 803(8)(A)(i). An officer's description of what he saw on arrival, such as flames showing from a garage window, is a matter observed while under a legal duty to report under clause (A)(ii).
The origin and cause section belongs to clause (A)(iii), factual findings from a legally authorized investigation. That clause applies in a civil case, or against the government in a criminal case. A prosecutor in an arson case therefore cannot use it to put a fire marshal's cause finding before the jury against the defendant. In criminal cases clause (A)(ii) also excludes matters observed by law-enforcement personnel.
Each part of the report is tested on its own, so a court can admit the dispatch log and the scene observations and still keep out the cause conclusion or the interview notes. In EMK, Inc. v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., a product liability case over a garage fire, the District of Maine kept out the cause line of one official report and the interview statements recorded in another.
Can the marshal's opinion on the cause come in, or only the facts?
In federal court, opinions can come in. In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey (1988) the Supreme Court held that factually based conclusions or opinions are not excluded from the public records exception for that reason alone.
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey was decided on December 12, 1988. The question was whether the investigative findings clause, then numbered Rule 803(8)(C), covers only facts or also the conclusions an investigator draws from them. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that "factually based conclusions or opinions are not on that account excluded from the scope of Rule 803(8)(C)."
The Court attached two safeguards. First, "a trial judge has the discretion, and indeed the obligation, to exclude an entire report or portions thereof" that he finds untrustworthy. Second, the Court relied on "the opponent's right to present evidence tending to contradict or diminish the weight of those conclusions." In a fire case the second safeguard means that the defense investigator's report and testimony go before the same jury that reads the marshal's conclusion.
Beech concerned a Navy investigator's report on the crash of a training aircraft. The opinion says nothing about fire investigations. In fire cases the dispute therefore moves to the trustworthiness condition in Rule 803(8)(B) and to Rule 403, the rule the District of Maine applied in EMK.
How does a court decide whether a fire report is trustworthy?
The opponent carries the burden of showing a lack of trustworthiness. The Advisory Committee note lists factors: the timeliness of the investigation, the official's skill or experience, whether a hearing was held and possible motivation problems.
The burden sits with the side the report hurts. Under Rule 803(8)(B) the record comes in unless the opponent proves that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. A party that only disagrees with the marshal's conclusion has not carried that burden.
The Advisory Committee's note on the proposed rule lists factors for evaluative reports: the timeliness of the investigation, the special skill or experience of the official, whether a hearing was held and at what level, and possible motivation problems. The same note collects cases decided before the rules, among them Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co., which denied admissibility to a State Fire Marshal's report of the cause of a gas explosion.
For a fire report the factors become concrete questions. How many days after the fire did the marshal examine the scene, and had debris been removed by then? What origin and cause training does the marshal have? Did anyone outside the fire department test the conclusion? Was the report written while a criminal investigation of the owner was open? The answers come from the report, the fire department file and the marshal's deposition.
What happened when a fire report named a cause without explaining it?
In EMK v. Federal Pacific Electric (D. Me. 2010) the court excluded a fire department's one-line cause statement under Rule 403. The report named no author, qualifications, method or alternative causes considered.
On January 28, 2005, the maintenance garage at Eaton Mountain Ski Area burned to the ground. The owner, EMK, Inc., sued Federal Pacific Electric Co. in November 2008, alleging that an electric baseboard heater made by Federal Pacific caused the fire. Two official reports existed: an incident summary report by State Fire Marshal Jacobs and a report by the Skowhegan Fire Department.
The remarks in the Skowhegan report read: "Fire cause determine to be a result of faulty electric heater in bathroom in garage." Federal Pacific argued that the report was not authorized by law and was untrustworthy. In an order on motions in limine dated January 7, 2010, Chief Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. did not decide those points. He assumed the statement might be admissible under Rule 803(8) and excluded it under Rule 403. He wrote that "the jury could well place undue emphasis on its summary causation conclusion" and that its probative value "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
The court noted that the report did not identify its author, the author's qualifications, the methods used or the alternative causes considered. It also said that EMK could try to present the author of the report to support the causation opinion. A witness on the stand can be asked how the cause was determined. A line in a form cannot.
Can witness statements written into a fire report be admitted?
Usually not through the report. Statements of third persons recorded in an investigative report are hearsay within hearsay, and each layer needs its own exception, as the District of Maine held in EMK.
Fire marshals interview owners, tenants, neighbors and firefighters and write down what they heard. The marshal's report may qualify as a public record, but the person who talked to the marshal was under no public duty to report. In EMK the incident summary report recorded statements of Eugene Kent, the owner of EMK, from interviews on January 29 and February 1, 2005.
The court granted Federal Pacific's motion to exclude them. It wrote that "Statements by third persons that are recorded in an investigative report are hearsay within hearsay," and held that the fire marshal's recitation of Mr. Kent's statements in the incident summary report "is not admissible under Rule 803(8)." The court relied on the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Mackey (1997).
The Supreme Court of Ohio reached the same point under state law in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp., decided April 16, 1975. Its syllabus states that "The hearsay rule includes within its scope written summaries of interviews conducted during an official fire investigation." In that case the fire chief gave the opinion that careless smoking was the probable cause of the fire, and an assistant fire chief and a state fire marshal had examined physical evidence that tended to exclude other causes.
A recorded statement can still reach the jury through the person who made it. The owner, the neighbor or the firefighter testifies, and the other side cross-examines.
Do state courts follow the federal rule?
Not all of them. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in 1970 that a fire official's report of the apparent cause is generally inadmissible, and Florida's public records exception has no clause for investigative findings.
Emmet v. American Insurance Co. was decided by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on May 22, 1970. The insurer of a former landlord sued a former tenant for fire damage it attributed to the tenant's negligence. The trial court admitted a report made to the District of Columbia Fire Department by one of its fire investigators, who did not testify. The report gave the "apparent cause of fire" as "careless smoking ignited mattress," and the trial court relied on that cause in finding against the tenant.
The appellate court reversed with instructions to grant a new trial. Its per curiam opinion states: "It is generally held that the report of an official of a fire department stating the apparent or probable cause of a fire is not admissible" because "such opinion is usually based upon hearsay and often is mere speculation or conjecture." It added: "Placing such an opinion in an official report adds nothing to its evidentiary weight." Emmet was decided eighteen years before Beech and applied the Federal Shop Book Rule, not Rule 803(8).
Florida's code is written differently from the federal rule. Section 90.803(8) of the Florida Statutes admits records and reports of public offices that set out the office's activities or matters observed under a legal duty to report, excluding in criminal cases matters observed by police and other law enforcement personnel, unless the sources or other circumstances show a lack of trustworthiness. It contains no clause for factual findings from investigations. The clause on which Beech turned has no counterpart in the Florida text, so a party in a Florida court cannot rely on Beech to bring in a fire marshal's cause conclusion under section 90.803(8).
The same fire report can therefore meet different rules depending on whether the claim is tried in federal court or in a state court, and on the state. Counsel checks the evidence code of the forum before deciding whether to build the cause case on the report or on a witness.
Is the fire marshal's testimony better evidence than the report?
Testimony lets the court and the other side test the method. In Emmet the investigator never testified; in EMK the court left room for the report's author to support the cause opinion in person.
A report admitted under Rule 803(8) arrives without its author. The jury reads the conclusion, and the opponent can answer only with its own evidence. A marshal who testifies can be asked where he started the examination, which artifacts he removed and where they went, which hypotheses he considered and what data excluded each one. The answers go into the record and can be compared with the scene photographs.
Both cases above turned on this difference. In Emmet the trial court decided the case on the cause stated in a report whose author did not appear, and the judgment was reversed. In EMK the court excluded the fire department's cause line and noted that EMK could try to present the report's author to support the causation opinion.
When the marshal takes the stand, the gaps in the written report become questions for cross-examination. A report that names no edition of a method, no excluded hypotheses and no laboratory results gives the opposing lawyer a list of topics before the deposition starts.
What does a review of a fire marshal's report check?
The source of each statement in the report, the date and scope of the scene examination, the stated method and the hypotheses ruled out, and whether the cause section rests on interviews rather than physical evidence.
A review starts by sorting the report into the three Rule 803(8) categories: office activities, observations made on duty and investigative findings. Everything that came from an interview is marked with its source, because under EMK that material does not ride in on the report.
Next comes the cause section. The reviewer checks whether the report names its author and the author's training, describes the scene examination and its date, lists the artifacts removed and where they went, and names the hypotheses considered and the data used to exclude each one. These are the items the District of Maine found missing when it excluded the Skowhegan cause statement.
Last, the reviewer compares the marshal's conclusion with the physical evidence that still exists: the scene photographs, the removed wiring and appliances, the laboratory results. If the conclusion rests on what an owner or a neighbor said and the scene data point elsewhere, the review states this with page references, so that counsel can use it in a motion in limine or at the marshal's deposition.
What does IAE do when a fire marshal's report decides the cause in the file?
IAE prepares expert reports on the client's questions and reviews of the opposing investigator's report for subrogation, product liability, arson defense and coverage disputes in US courts, up to 5 business days after format and cost are confirmed.
The fire origin and cause page describes the work: where the fire started, what ignited it, how it spread and whether an appliance, the wiring or a person's act caused it. The investigator answers the questions agreed with the client, working from the scene record, photos, removed artifacts and witness accounts. In a review the investigator lists each hypothesis the opposing report considered, checks what data excluded the others and which edition of NFPA 921 was applied; the current edition is the 2024 edition.
The client sends the fire marshal's or fire department's report with its attachments, the scene photographs, evidence logs and the opposing expert's report if one has been served, and states whether the fire scene still exists. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. Cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.
A report that only rebuts the opposing investigator on the same subject is due within 30 days after that disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise. Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix; the Member ID or QR code in the document opens the specialist's record. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. A review is evidence the court weighs with the other materials. Neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm.
Sources
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803, Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay, with Advisory Committee notes (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Emmet v. American Insurance Co., 265 A.2d 602 (D.C. 1970) (Justia)
- EMK, Inc. v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., No. 1:08-cv-00383, Document 53 (D. Me. Jan. 7, 2010) (Justia)
- Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d 122 (1975) (vLex)
- The 2026 Florida Statutes, section 90.803, Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial (Florida Senate)
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