Examinations
Known complication or malpractice: what does the medical expert have to separate?
A complication listed on the consent form can happen in a well-performed operation, and a careless operation can cause the same complication. The label does not decide the case. In Mitchell v. Shikora the Pennsylvania Supreme Court let the jury hear that a bowel injury is a known risk of hysterectomy, while the two sides' experts disagreed about one step: whether the surgeon had to identify the anatomy before cutting.

Is a known surgical complication malpractice?
Not by itself. A malpractice claim needs care below the standard of the specialty and proof that this care caused the injury. A recognized complication can occur after careful surgery and can also result from a technical error.
California's civil jury instruction CACI No. 505, titled "Success Not Required," tells jurors that a medical practitioner "is not necessarily negligent just because [his/her] efforts are unsuccessful" or because the practitioner made an error "that was reasonable under the circumstances." The practitioner is negligent only if he or she "was not as skillful, knowledgeable, or careful as other reasonable" practitioners "would have been in similar circumstances."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote in its 2019 decision in Mitchell v. Shikora that "it is axiomatic that complications may arise even in the absence of negligence." In a footnote it added that negligence "may not be inferred merely from the occurrence of a complication" when the complication is known to occur without negligence.
The reverse inference fails as well. A bowel injury, a nerve injury or a bile leak can appear on the hospital's list of known risks and still be the result of a step that the standard of care required and the surgeon skipped. The medical expert has to say which of the two happened to this patient, and the answer comes from the operative report, the anesthesia record and the notes written after surgery, read against what the specialty required at the time.
Can the defense tell the jury that the injury is a known risk?
In Pennsylvania, yes, for limited purposes. In Mitchell v. Shikora (2019) the state Supreme Court held that evidence of a procedure's risks and complications may be admitted on the standard of care and on whether the surgeon deviated from it.
Dr. Evan Shikora was performing a laparoscopic hysterectomy on Lanette Mitchell. While the peritoneum was being opened, the surgeons smelled feces: the colon had been cut. Dr. Shikora stopped the hysterectomy, and a general surgeon performed an emergency loop ileostomy. Mitchell sued for medical negligence only. She did not plead battery or lack of informed consent.
The trial court excluded evidence of her informed consent but let the jury hear that bowel injury is a known risk of the operation. The jury returned a defense verdict. The Superior Court reversed and ordered a new trial. On June 18, 2019, in an opinion by Justice Todd (No. 55 WAP 2017), the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and reinstated the judgment for the doctors.
The Court wrote that "risks and complications evidence may clarify the applicable standard of care" and that "it may aid the jury in determining both the standard of care and whether the physician's conduct deviated" from that standard. It named the danger on the other side: "a jury might mistakenly conclude that an injury was merely a risk or complication of a surgery." The Court left that danger to trial judges and wrote that they "will serve their evidentiary gate-keeping function in this regard."
Mitchell applied the Court's earlier decision in Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d 1155 (Pa. 2015). As quoted in Mitchell, Brady held that evidence that a patient "affirmatively consented to treatment after being informed of the risks of that treatment is generally irrelevant to a cause of action sounding in medical negligence." The same opinion said that "Evidence about the risks of surgical procedures, in the form of either testimony or a list of such risks" may also be relevant in establishing the standard of care.
Does a signed consent form defeat a negligence claim?
No. Under Brady and Mitchell, the patient's consent is irrelevant to whether the operation met the standard of care. The form records which risks the patient was told about; the operative report records each step.
The Mitchell majority took the reason from Brady and quoted it: "The patient's actual, affirmative consent, therefore, is irrelevant to the question of negligence." In the same quoted passage, Brady warned that evidence of the patient's consent in a pure negligence action "can erroneously suggest to the jury that the patient has consented to negligence."
The form will be in the chart. Federal hospital regulations at 42 CFR 482.51(b)(2) state that "A properly executed informed consent form for the operation must be in the patient's chart before surgery," except in emergencies. For the medical expert the form answers one question: which complications were disclosed before the operation. The technique is described elsewhere, in the operative report.
When does an undisclosed risk become a separate claim?
When a reasonable practitioner would have disclosed the risk, a reasonably prudent patient told of it would have declined, and the omission caused the injury. New York sets out these elements in Public Health Law 2805-d.
Section 2805-d defines lack of informed consent as "the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis" to disclose the alternatives and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits that a reasonable practitioner would have disclosed. The right of action is limited to non-emergency treatment, procedures or surgery, and to diagnostic procedures that invade or disrupt the integrity of the body.
The patient must also prove that a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have undergone the treatment if fully informed, and that the lack of informed consent was a proximate cause of the injury. Subdivision 4 lists defenses. Two of them: the undisclosed risk was too commonly known to require disclosure, and the patient said he or she would undergo the treatment regardless of any risk.
California's instruction CACI No. 532 sets the minimum this way: "The patient must be told about any risk of death or serious injury or significant potential complications that may occur if the procedure is performed." Minor risks that are not likely to occur need not be explained. Among the authorities listed with the instruction is the California Supreme Court's statement in Arato v. Avedon: "We underline the limited and essentially subsidiary role of expert testimony in informed consent litigation."
A known complication therefore leads to two different questions. Was it disclosed? That is a consent question, decided largely from the form and the conversation before surgery. Was it caused by a departure from the standard of care? That is a negligence question, and a physician in the same specialty answers it.
How does the expert tell a known risk from a technical error?
By finding the step at which the injury happened and asking which precaution the specialty required before that step. In Mitchell the experts disagreed about whether the surgeon had to identify the anatomy below the incision first.
Mitchell's expert, Dr. Vadim Morozov, testified that cutting the colon without first identifying the anatomy below the incision breached the standard of care. The defense expert, Dr. Charles Ascher-Walsh, testified that the surgeons met the standard, that the initial "blind" incision carries known risks and that the injury could occur without negligence. Dr. Shikora acknowledged that bowel injury is a recognized complication. The jury chose between two accounts of the same step.
The operative report is the expert's main source for that step. Under 42 CFR 482.51(b)(6), an operative report "describing techniques, findings, and tissues removed or altered must be written or dictated immediately following surgery and signed by the surgeon." A report that names the injured structure but does not say how the surgeon identified it before the injury leaves a gap. The expert fills it from the other records or states that the record does not answer the question.
The 2000 committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 lists among the reliability factors "Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations." In a complication case the obvious alternative is the one the other side offers: the patient's anatomy, adhesions from earlier surgery, the underlying disease. An opinion that does not deal with it gives the other side a specific ground for attack.
What if the complication was recognized or treated late?
Then the dispute concerns the response to the complication. The expert has to establish when the complication became detectable, when it was treated and what earlier treatment would have changed for this patient.
In Zannini v. Liker, decided by the California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Eight, on January 31, 2022, the experts agreed that the cervical spine surgery of March 25, 2015 was not negligent. On April 5, 2015 the patient became acutely paralyzed and arrived at the emergency room at 5:25 p.m. The operating neurosurgeon left the hospital at about 7:17 p.m. to catch a flight and told the patient's wife that the on-call neurosurgeon would handle any surgery.
MRI images began around 8:10 p.m. The results reached the on-call neurosurgeon at 9:38 p.m. Surgery to remove a blood clot started at 11:35 p.m., about six hours after arrival. The patient remained partially quadriplegic.
The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Christopher Taylor, testified that the neurosurgeon breached the standard of care by leaving before surgery could be secured. The plaintiffs' neuroradiologist, Dr. Barry Pressman, could not quantify how much earlier surgery would have improved the prognosis. The defense expert, Dr. Howard Tung, testified that earlier surgery would not have changed the outcome. The jury found no negligence, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
The case turned on times. The records after surgery are where the expert finds them. Under 42 CFR 482.52(b)(3), a postanesthesia evaluation must be completed and documented by an individual qualified to administer anesthesia no later than 48 hours after surgery. That evaluation, the vital signs and the nursing notes give the expert the hours at which the first signs of a complication appeared and the hours at which someone acted on them.
Can a jury infer negligence when no one can say what went wrong?
In some cases. Under res ipsa loquitur a jury may infer negligence from an event that ordinarily does not occur without it. In New York, expert testimony may supply that premise when lay jurors cannot.
In States v. Lourdes Hospital, decided by the New York Court of Appeals on May 6, 2003, in an opinion by Judge Ciparick, the patient had surgery on July 25, 1995 to remove an ovarian cyst. The cyst was removed. She alleged that her right arm was injured during the operation, when it was positioned on a board, extended outward and rotated. She was later diagnosed with right thoracic outlet syndrome and reflex sympathetic dystrophy. She conceded that she had no direct evidence of negligence and relied on expert opinion that the injury would not have occurred without negligence.
The doctrine has three conditions: the event ordinarily does not occur without negligence, it was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive control, and the plaintiff did not contribute to it. The Court held that expert testimony "may be properly used to help the jury 'bridge the gap' between its own common knowledge, which does not encompass the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to reach a conclusion that the occurrence would not normally take place in the absence of negligence, and the common knowledge of physicians, which does."
The Guide to New York Evidence, rule 3.02, adds that a defendant "may rebut the inference of negligence with evidence that tends to cast doubt on the plaintiff's proof" and that a jury "may, but is not required to, draw the inference of negligence." In a res ipsa case the known complication is the defense's answer to the first condition: if the injury occurs at a known rate without negligence, the premise that it ordinarily does not occur without negligence is in dispute, and both sides' experts address that premise.
What must the expert's opinion on a complication contain?
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, sufficient facts or data, reliable principles and methods, and a reliable application of them to this patient. The party offering the expert must show the court that this is more likely than not.
Rule 702 requires that the testimony be "based on sufficient facts or data," that it be "the product of reliable principles and methods," and that the opinion apply those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The 2023 committee note states that expert testimony may not be admitted unless the proponent shows the court "that it is more likely than not" that these requirements are met, and that "each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded" from a reliable application of the expert's basis and methodology.
A statement that an injury is a known complication describes a population of patients. The jury decides about one patient. An opinion for the defense that stops at the published complication rate does not say whether the precautions were taken in this operation. An opinion for the plaintiff that infers a breach from the injury alone does the same in reverse. Each side's expert has to tie the opinion to the entries in this chart: the technique recorded, the findings, the times, the response.
Which records does the expert need in a complication case?
The consent form, the history and physical, the anesthesia evaluations, the operative report and everything written after surgery: orders, vital signs, nursing notes, imaging and the report of any repair operation.
Federal hospital regulations name several of these documents and set times for them, and the times become part of the expert's chronology:
- A medical history and physical examination completed and documented before surgery, within the time limits of the regulation, except in emergencies (42 CFR 482.51(b)(1)(i)).
- A properly executed informed consent form in the chart before surgery, except in emergencies (42 CFR 482.51(b)(2)).
- A preanesthesia evaluation by an individual qualified to administer anesthesia, performed within 48 hours before surgery (42 CFR 482.52(b)(1)).
- An operative report describing techniques, findings and tissues removed or altered, written or dictated immediately after surgery and signed by the surgeon (42 CFR 482.51(b)(6)).
- A postanesthesia evaluation no later than 48 hours after surgery (42 CFR 482.52(b)(3)).
- The operating room register, which must be complete and up to date (42 CFR 482.51(b)(5)).
What does IAE do in a surgical complication case?
A physician in the relevant specialty from the IAE registry writes an expert report on your questions. The signed document is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.
The physician builds a timeline from orders, vital signs, nursing notes and imaging, then compares each decision with the specialty's guidelines in force at the time of care. We frame the questions from the chart, the operative notes and, if there is one, the opposing expert's report, and we confirm the questions before work starts.
Send the chart, the operative report, the consent form, the anesthesia record and the other side's expert report if it has been disclosed. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, cost, deadline and the specialist from the registry, and you approve the candidate and the CV before work starts. For cases with tight deadlines there is a 48-hour rush.
The specialist confirms in the document that they have no interest in the outcome of the case. The Member ID and status of the expert are open in the public IAE registry and can be checked by QR code. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy; legal questions are for your attorney.
Sources
- Mitchell v. Shikora, No. 55 WAP 2017 (Pa. June 18, 2019), majority opinion (Justia)
- States v. Lourdes Hospital, N.Y. Court of Appeals, May 6, 2003 (LII)
- Guide to New York Evidence, rule 3.02 Res Ipsa Loquitur (New York State Unified Court System)
- New York Public Health Law section 2805-d (New York State Senate)
- CACI No. 505, Success Not Required (Justia)
- CACI No. 532, Informed Consent: Definition (Justia)
- Zannini v. Liker, No. B302404 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2022) (Justia)
- 42 CFR part 482, subpart D, sections 482.51 and 482.52 (eCFR)
- Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and committee notes (LII)
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Ready to discuss your case?
Send the materials: the secretariat will confirm the format, cost, deadline and the specialist within one business day.

