Examinations

Late expert disclosure: when does Rule 37(c)(1) keep the expert out, and what can still be fixed?

A party that misses an expert disclosure deadline in federal court cannot use that expert on a motion, at a hearing or at trial unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. That is Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. District courts in New Hampshire, Kentucky and Illinois have kept late experts in the case and cured the delay with depositions, rebuttal reports and fee awards. The court of appeals sees only the record made below.

A person from behind carries a stack of binders toward a closed courtroom door

When are expert disclosures due in federal court?

At the times the court sets in its scheduling order. Without a stipulation or order, expert disclosures are due at least 90 days before trial, and pure rebuttal evidence within 30 days after the other side's disclosure.

Rule 26(a)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure leaves the timing to the court. A party discloses expert testimony at the times and in the sequence the court orders. Absent a stipulation or a court order, the disclosure is due at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial. Evidence intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject identified by another party is due within 30 days after that party's disclosure.

In practice the scheduling order fixes the dates. Rule 16(b)(3)(A) states: "The scheduling order must limit the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions." Rule 16(b)(4) adds: "A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent."

Two of the cases discussed below turned on when the party asked for more time. In Gagnon v. Teledyne Princeton, Inc., a product liability suit over a forklift that tipped over and left its operator a quadriplegic, the expert deadline had been extended to April 30, 2004. The plaintiff asked for a further extension on May 3, three days after it passed. The court denied the request on May 21, and the disclosure arrived on June 14, 2004, about six weeks late. At oral argument in the First Circuit, asked why he had not told the judge that there was a problem, counsel answered: "We should have. We should have."

In Hicks v. Atrium Medical Corp., a bellwether case in the C-QUR hernia mesh multidistrict litigation in the District of New Hampshire, the court's expert deadline was September 17, 2019, and the parties agreed to move the deadline for the pathology expert to October 1, 2019. The pathologist was disclosed on December 12, 2019. Judge Landya McCafferty wrote that the plaintiffs could have communicated better by "requesting an extension of the October 1 deadline when it became clear that it was unrealistic."

What does Rule 37(c)(1) do when an expert is disclosed late?

It bars the party from using the late information or witness on a motion, at a hearing or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. The court may add or substitute other sanctions.

Rule 37(c)(1) applies when a party fails to provide information or to identify a witness as Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e) requires. Such a party "is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence" on a motion, at a hearing or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.

The same paragraph gives the court other measures. In addition to the bar or in its place, the court may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, may inform the jury of the failure, and may impose other appropriate sanctions, including the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i) through (vi).

The committee note to the 1993 amendment calls the provision "a self-executing sanction for failure to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a)." It lists examples of harmless violations, among them "the inadvertent omission from a Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosure of the name of a potential witness known to all parties" and "the failure to list as a trial witness a person so listed by another party."

The rule poses two separate questions: whether the delay had a sufficient reason, and whether it hurt the other side. They are joined by "or", so a yes to either one keeps the expert in the case. In Hicks and in D'Pergo the court found both.

What counts as substantial justification for a late expert?

Causes outside the party's control. Courts have accepted an expert's illness, if the replacement is disclosed within a reasonable time, and an explant facility's wrong report that a specimen was discarded. Trust in the opponent's assurances failed.

D'Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. sued Sweetwater Sound, Inc. for copyright infringement over a photograph of custom guitar necks, and the court had already found Sweetwater liable. Sweetwater's damages expert, Ellen Boughn, served her report on June 15, 2019, then had to withdraw because of serious health problems. Sweetwater told D'Pergo on April 23, 2020, and produced the report of a substitute, Gary Elsner, on July 15, 2020. Sweetwater moved, with D'Pergo's assent, for a 60-day continuance, and the trial, earlier set for August 18, 2020, was reset to October 5, 2020.

In an order of October 14, 2020, Judge McCafferty held that "An expert's incapacity to serve due to illness or death constitutes substantial justification" for the late disclosure of a substitute, "so long as the party seeking substitution discloses the new expert within a reasonable time." D'Pergo asked the court to strike every paragraph of the new report that had no counterpart in the old one. The court refused and wrote that "minor differences between the two opinions provides no grounds for exclusion of any portion" of the report.

In Hicks the delay came from the explant facility. The plaintiffs learned of the pathology specimen about two months before the original deadline. The facility first said it had discarded the specimen and then reversed itself, and it could not divide the specimen into slides before September 17, 2019. On October 2 the plaintiffs learned that the facility had sent both sides' slides to Steelgate instead of directly to their pathologist, Dr. Christine Knabe, who received her slides on October 11. On March 19, 2020, the court found the late disclosure substantially justified and harmless and denied the motion to strike.

Gagnon came out the other way on this question. The plaintiff said he had relied on the defendants' assurances, including a compliance plaque and a compliance matrix, that the forklift met ANSI/ASME standards; that two engineers retained earlier had lost his confidence and were discharged; and that stability testing cost about $30,000 and could not be finished in time. The First Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's implied ruling that the failure was not substantially justified. It wrote that "a continuing responsibility rests on parties to investigate their causes of action" and that "Too facile an acceptance of representations from adversaries is dangerous."

When is a late expert disclosure harmless?

When the other side can still answer it before trial. Courts ask about surprise, the chance to cure it, disruption of the trial, the importance of the evidence and the reason for the delay.

The First Circuit's list, which Gagnon took from Macaulay v. Anas, covers "the history of the litigation, the proponent's need for the challenged evidence," then "the justification (if any) for the late disclosure, and the opponent's ability to overcome its adverse effects." The court added: "Surprise and prejudice are important integers in this calculation."

The Sixth Circuit uses five factors from Howe v. City of Akron: "the surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered;" "the ability of that party to cure the surprise;" "the extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial;" "the importance of the evidence; and" "the nondisclosing party's explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence." The Eastern District of Kentucky applied that list in two of the cases below.

In Hicks the court quoted the First Circuit's description of a harmless late disclosure as one that "occurs long before trial and is likely subject to correction without much harm to the opposing party." The parties had extended deadlines and postponed the first trial of the bellwether pool until September 2020, and the court gave the defendants the opportunity to depose Dr. Knabe, to designate their own pathology expert and to amend or supplement their other expert reports.

In Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., decided in the Eastern District of Kentucky on January 11, 2017, the plaintiffs served the report of David Porta on November 1, 2016. The court gave the defendants 30 days to depose him and leave to disclose their own rebuttal expert by February 7, 2017, limited to his opinion that the seat back failed, and wrote that the extension should not affect the March 13, 2017 trial date. The motion to strike came from Federal Insurance Company, one of the two defendants, and the court wrote: "Any prejudice, however, can be cured by granting Federal an opportunity to depose Porta."

In General Linen Service, Inc. v. General Linen Services, LLC, decided by the District of New Hampshire on August 27, 2015, the plaintiff's expert put damages at $793,307, more than $600,000 above its earlier estimate, and counted 10 lost customers and 33 lost prospects, while the discovery answers had identified about five lost customers and said nothing about potential customers. The report came about four months before discovery closed and more than five months before trial. The court found no violation of Rule 26(e), added that any violation would have been harmless, and wrote that admitting the evidence "creates no danger of a trial by ambush."

Is exclusion automatic once the deadline is missed?

No. The committee note calls the sanction self-executing, but courts weigh the factors first, and when exclusion ends the case the First Circuit has required findings on harm before it would affirm.

Without its experts the Gagnon plaintiff could not prove his claims, and on March 2, 2005, the day after the district judge struck the expert evidence, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On February 13, 2006, the First Circuit vacated that judgment. The district court, the panel wrote, "made no findings on the issue and engaged in no discussion of it," meaning harm, and the panel noted that "preclusion is the death knell of plaintiff's case." It remanded for the harm analysis.

The same opinion described review of such rulings as "highly deferential" and said Rule 37(c)(1) "clearly contemplates stricter adherence to discovery requirements." The remand did not excuse the delay. It returned the harm question to the judge who had to answer it first.

Judges often pick a narrower order. In Doe 1 v. City of Chicago, a sex discrimination suit by five paramedics against the City and its Fire Department, the City's expert Dr. Malcolm Cohen relied on an Excel spreadsheet of overtime and promotion calculations. His report was due on August 9, 2019. The City produced the spreadsheet on September 6, three days after his deposition. The City conceded that "any calculations performed by Dr. Cohen should have been included with his expert reports on August 9, 2019." Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani found the failure neither substantially justified nor harmless and still declined to exclude: "Exclusion is an extreme and harsh remedy."

His order of October 18, 2019 reopened expert discovery for a second deposition of Dr. Cohen of no more than three hours, limited to the spreadsheet and his amended report. The plaintiffs' expert got 14 days after that deposition to amend his sur-rebuttal, and the City had to pay the plaintiffs' reasonable expenses for the motion and the court reporter.

The moving party's own request also counts. In D'Pergo the court observed that D'Pergo "seeks exclusion of portions of Elsner's report, but does not request additional time to respond to it." The continuance had been granted so that D'Pergo could depose the substitute and update its own report or file a rebuttal.

Can a late opinion come in as a supplement to the report?

Rarely. Rule 26(e) covers correcting inaccuracies and filling gaps, and courts look past the label. A new theory served as a supplement after the deadline is treated as a late disclosure.

Rule 26(e)(1) requires a party to supplement or correct a disclosure in a timely manner if it learns that the disclosure is incomplete or incorrect in some material respect and the correction has not otherwise been made known to the other parties. For an expert who must give a written report, Rule 26(e)(2) extends the duty to the report and to the expert's deposition testimony, and changes must be disclosed "by the time the party's pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due." Unless the court orders otherwise, pretrial disclosures are due at least 30 days before trial.

Bentley v. Highlands Hospital Corp., a medical case in the Eastern District of Kentucky, tested that duty. On October 6, 2016, Judge Amul R. Thapar ruled on objections to a magistrate judge's order covering five expert documents. He wrote that "substance triumphs over form: The Court will look past the party's label." Supplementation is limited to "correcting inaccuracies" or "filling interstices" in an earlier disclosure, and the rule "is not a license to freely amend expert reports to bolster a party's position."

The court kept out a supplemental report of April 29, 2016 that added a negligent retention theory and new criticism of peer review, a nursing report of the same date with new examples of failures, and an "amended" report of May 23, 2016 with new differential diagnosis opinions served after the supplementation deadline. It reinstated a corrected nurse's name and a separate report that it found to be a proper and timely rebuttal under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii).

In Doe 1 v. City of Chicago the court reached the opposite result for an amended rebuttal report that contained no new opinions and only removed references to another expert. It treated that document as a permissible supplement and added that, even if it had violated Rule 26(e), the violation was harmless because the plaintiffs could still use the original report for impeachment.

Does calling the expert a rebuttal witness extend the deadline?

Only for evidence intended solely to contradict or rebut the other side's expert on the same subject, and that evidence is due within 30 days after the other disclosure unless the court sets other dates.

Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) gives a 30-day period for rebuttal evidence, counted after the other party's disclosure, absent a stipulation or court order. A report that offers a theory of its own falls under the main deadline in the scheduling order.

In Smith the plaintiffs' expert deadline was August 1, 2016, and the defendants' was September 2, 2016. The plaintiffs had listed Porta in their initial disclosures as a possible rebuttal expert. The court assumed for the sake of argument that he was one, and even then his November 1 report came a month after the 30-day window closed. The label did not change the result on timing. The court kept Porta because the defendants could still depose him and answer him before the March 2017 trial.

In Bentley the same question went the other way for one report. The court found a report of May 9, 2016 to be proper rebuttal under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), served on time, and reinstated it, while the same expert's earlier supplemental report with a new pharmacology opinion stayed out.

Can a new expert report be filed on appeal?

No. The record on appeal consists of the papers and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript and the docket entries. Rule 10(e) corrects omissions made by error or accident and adds no new evidence.

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure begins: "The following items constitute the record on appeal:" It lists "the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court;" "the transcript of proceedings, if any; and" "a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the district clerk." A report that was never filed below is not among them.

Rule 10(e)(2) covers something "material to either party" that "is omitted from or misstated in the record by error or accident." Such an omission may be corrected on stipulation of the parties, by the district court before or after the record has been forwarded, or by the court of appeals. Under Rule 10(e)(1), a dispute about whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court goes to that court.

On appeal the party challenges the ruling on the late expert. In Gagnon the First Circuit reviewed the exclusion for abuse of discretion, upheld the finding that the delay was not substantially justified, and vacated the judgment because the harm question had not been decided. The case went back to the district court for that decision. The court of appeals did not decide the harm question or weigh the expert evidence itself.

In Gagnon, counsel told the First Circuit at oral argument that he should have raised the problem with the judge before the April 30, 2004 deadline. In Hicks, Judge McCafferty wrote that the plaintiffs could have requested an extension of the October 1, 2019 deadline once it became clear that it was unrealistic. Under Rule 16(b)(4) a schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.

What does IAE do when an expert report is needed on a tight deadline?

IAE prepares an expert report on the client's questions. Receipt is confirmed the same day; format, cost, deadline and specialist within one business day; the signed PDF follows in up to 5 business days.

The client sends the case materials and describes the task: what to examine or check. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day, and within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry. The client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts.

The specialist prepares the document, and the draft is checked for facts. The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days, depending on the volume of materials. For cases with tight deadlines there is a 48-hour rush, and deadlines are confirmed when the order is placed, so the client can match them against the dates in the scheduling order.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and can be verified by Member ID or QR code. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy; whether to seek an extension or to oppose a motion to strike is a question for the client's attorney. A report is evidence that the court weighs with the rest of the record, and neither IAE nor the expert guarantees the outcome.

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