Expert report review
Motion to exclude the opposing forensic accountant: when must it be filed, and what does the court need to see?
A motion to exclude the opposing forensic accountant is filed before trial, by the deadline in the scheduling order. In 2017 the Third Circuit reinstated a lost profits verdict and wrote that the proper way to challenge expert testimony is a Daubert motion filed before trial; a post-verdict motion is no substitute. The motion has to put the expert's sources before the court, because the judge rules on the record the parties build.

When should a motion to exclude the opposing damages expert be filed?
Before trial, by the Daubert deadline in the court's scheduling order. A challenge raised first after the verdict comes too late, and a motion filed just before the pretrial conference may be denied as untimely.
The rule comes from appellate practice. In Roberts Technology Group, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., decided by the Third Circuit on June 16, 2017 in a non-precedential opinion written by Judge Jordan, the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff's damages expert at trial and, after the verdict, attacked his lost profits figure by a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court of appeals wrote: "the proper way to challenge improper expert testimony is through a Daubert motion filed before trial." It added: "A motion for judgment as a matter of law is not an adequate substitute for those well-established mechanisms."
District courts enforce their own calendars. In Trane US Inc. v. Yearout Service, LLC, decided on June 20, 2019 by Judge Marc T. Treadwell of the Middle District of Georgia, the parties filed motions against each other's experts "long after the deadline for filing Daubert motions." The court wrote that "Both motions were untimely because they were filed or renewed shortly before the pretrial conference," which took place on May 15, 2019.
The deadline itself is set case by case in the scheduling order. Absent a stipulation or order, Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) makes rebuttal evidence due "within 30 days after the other party's disclosure," so the review that supports the motion is usually done inside that month.
Morton v. BCAP GDI 1, Inc., discussed below, gives a recent example from the District of Delaware: the plaintiffs moved against two defense experts, Anthony Abbott (D.I. 80) and Kellie Fedkenheuer (D.I. 82), the defendant moved against the plaintiffs' expert Julia Alcarez (D.I. 78), briefing on all three motions concluded on March 20, 2026, and the court decided all three in one memorandum order before a bench trial. Counsel who receives the opposing damages report therefore works on two tracks at once: a rebuttal report, if the party will offer its own accountant, and a list of grounds for exclusion that will go into the motion by the court's deadline.
Why did the post-verdict challenge fail in Roberts Technology v. Curwood?
Because it came after the jury had decided. The Third Circuit looked only at whether the trial record supported the verdict, found that it did and ordered the first jury's verdict reinstated.
The dispute over how the plaintiff's accountant handled costs reached the judge only after the jury had awarded lost profits. At that stage the question was no longer whether the method was reliable but whether the evidence the jury heard could support its award, and the Third Circuit held that it could. Curwood had been able to cross-examine the expert at trial, and the court of appeals named a Daubert motion before trial as the route Curwood should have used. For counsel the point is the calendar: an objection to an accountant's treatment of costs goes to the judge before trial, with the ledgers attached, or it turns into an argument about evidence the jury has already weighed.
Can a court still hear a motion to exclude filed after the deadline?
It may, but it does not have to. In Trane v. Yearout the court summarily denied one late motion filed as a routine motion in limine and heard the other because the opinions needed vetting.
In Trane, Yearout claimed losses from overtime and shift-work inefficiency, quantified by its expert Randy Lynn. One of his figures was "expenses of $281,481.96 due to overtime inefficiency."
The judge treated the two late motions differently. Yearout's own motion "was particularly irksome because it was filed as a routine motion in limine," and "The Court summarily denied Yearout's motion." The motion of the other side, GSC, had been dismissed without prejudice when a trial setting was canceled and "had not been timely renewed," but it "had been fully briefed." The court wrote that it could have ignored both motions, yet the disclosures contained so many problematic opinions that it "could not allow their experts to take the stand without some vetting."
The motion that GSC Construction, Inc. and Allied World Specialty Insurance Company had filed against Lynn (Docs. 82 and 129) was granted, and his overtime and shift-work inefficiency opinions were excluded; other opinions of his had already been excluded at the hearing. The court described its role in Daubert terms: trial courts act as gatekeepers so that "speculative and unreliable opinions do not reach the jury." It also said that it did not question Lynn's qualifications.
A party cannot count on the same indulgence. The order shows the two risks of a late filing: the motion may be denied without a hearing, and a motion labeled as a motion in limine that is in substance a Daubert challenge is treated as a late Daubert motion.
What does the court need to see to rule on a motion to exclude an accountant?
The opposing report, the sources behind each contested figure and the expert's account of how he used them. Courts have excluded opinions built on sources the expert never read and kept opinions built on ledgers the movant overlooked.
Trane shows the first half. Lynn applied a "productivity index" table from Management Methods Bulletin OT1. The court found that the studies behind the bulletin were limited or withdrawn, were not provided to the court and had not been read by Lynn. It noted that the method the industry accepts for proving such losses is the measured mile, which "uses actual facts and data from a project," and that Lynn relied only on payroll records and did not visit the job site. For shift work, Bulletin OT2 "simply describes" possible effects and contains "no data, merely speculation," and Lynn's percentages came "from my experience." The testimony, the court concluded, "lacks foundation, relevance, reliable principles and methods, reliable application, and helpfulness."
Morton v. BCAP GDI 1, Inc., a memorandum order of the District of Delaware issued after briefing closed on March 20, 2026, shows the second half. The plaintiffs argued that the defense damages expert, Kellie Fedkenheuer, set her gross profit margin by relying "solely on her conversations with" a company executive. The court found that her opinion "is based on more than personal conversations": she had reviewed the "general ledger detail and profit and loss by customer reports," and under Rule 703 an expert "may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed." The motion failed on that point because the record showed the documents the expert had reviewed.
A motion that avoids both outcomes attaches the opposing report and its exhibits, the excerpts of the expert's deposition in which he explains each source, the documents on which the contested figures rest, and, where the party has one, the report or declaration of its own accountant that rebuilds the calculation. Each ground in the motion points to a page of that record.
The same discipline applies to the discount rate, the period of loss and the costs deducted. In Morton the plaintiffs argued that the expert "arbitrarily selected the rate based on Delaware's usury statute," which, in their view, covers interest on past losses rather than future ones. The court held the discount rate analysis "sufficiently reliable to be admissible" because the expert had also considered the company's weighted average cost of capital and weighted average cost of debt, and it noted that it was not deciding whether reliance on the statute was correct.
Who carries the burden on a motion to exclude the opposing accountant?
The party offering the accountant. Since December 1, 2023, Rule 702 requires the proponent to show the court that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met.
The amended text of Rule 702 permits expert testimony if the proponent shows the court that it is more likely than not that the conditions are met, among them that "the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data" and that "the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods."
The Morton order states the same rule in its own words: the party seeking to offer expert testimony must show, "by a preponderance of the evidence," "that the proposed testimony satisfies each of the standards for admissibility under Rule 702."
The 2023 committee note explains why the amendment was made. It records that many courts had held that "the critical questions of the sufficiency of an expert's basis, and the application of the expert's methodology, are questions of weight and not admissibility," and states: "These rulings are an incorrect application of Rules 702 and 104(a)." A motion against a damages expert can therefore argue that a missing source or an untested projection is a question for the judge before it becomes a matter for cross-examination.
The burden does not relieve the movant of the work. The court rules on what is in front of it, and the motion is where the opposing side's gaps are shown.
What happens when the court excludes the opposing accountant shortly before trial?
The other side may serve a supplemental report, and the court decides whether to allow it. In Wirtgen v. Caterpillar the court found such a report untimely, admitted it under the Pennypack factors and allowed a two-hour re-deposition.
In Wirtgen America, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., a patent case in the District of Delaware over seven patents and nearly 20 claims, Judge Joshua D. Wolson granted Caterpillar's Daubert motion on February 5, 2024. He concluded that Wirtgen's damages expert, Dr. Pallavi Seth, "failed to properly apportion her damages estimate." Dr. Seth then served a supplemental report that removed Wirtgen's minimum willingness to accept and applied her previously disclosed calculations to the entirety of the accused profits; she described the change as "purely a mathematical exercise."
The court's opinion of February 9, 2024 found that "Dr. Seth's supplemental report qualifies as an untimely disclosure," because her theory of how to use the method was new. The court then weighed the Pennypack factors. On prejudice it wrote: "I conclude that the prejudice is relatively minor, even though the disclosure is on the eve of trial." The prejudice could be ameliorated "by permitting Dr. Seth's deposition." Allowing the report "will not disrupt the orderly and efficient presentation of trial." There was "no evidence that Wirtgen acted in bad faith or willfully," and the analysis was "critically important to Wirtgen's case."
The court permitted Caterpillar to re-depose Dr. Seth on her apportionment and her change in approach, and wrote: "That deposition may not exceed two hours." It declined to bar Wirtgen's fact witnesses from discussing damages, rejected Caterpillar's remaining challenges and treated most of them as questions of weight: "Caterpillar's criticisms therefore go to weight, not to admissibility."
Late disclosure is governed by Rule 37(c)(1): a party that fails to provide information as Rule 26(a) or (e) requires "is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." In Wirtgen a successful motion was followed by a second report from the same expert, and the movant had to review that report on short notice.
Should every ground against the accountant go into the first motion?
Yes. In Wirtgen the court found that Caterpillar could have raised a methodology challenge in its first Daubert motion and had chosen to spend its pages on other arguments.
Caterpillar attacked the supplemental report on grounds that it could have raised against the original report. The court wrote that the earlier omission "was a product of a tactical decision to focus more space on other arguments," and concluded: "So Caterpillar got its bite at the apple, even if it was a little later in the process."
Page limits for briefs make the choice real. A review that ranks the weaknesses of the opposing calculation by their effect on the total gives counsel the order: which grounds go into the motion and which can be left to cross-examination. In Wirtgen the late challenge was heard, but most of Caterpillar's criticisms ended as questions of weight for the jury.
Does a pretrial ruling preserve the objection for appeal?
If the ruling is definitive, yes. Rule 103(b) says a party need not renew an objection after the court rules definitively on the record, before or at trial; counsel must clarify whether a ruling is definitive when in doubt.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a), a party may claim error in a ruling to admit evidence only if the error affects a substantial right and the party, on the record, "timely objects or moves to strike" and "states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context."
Rule 103(b) addresses pretrial rulings. "Once the court rules definitively on the record," before or at trial, "a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal." The 2000 committee note explains that when the ruling is definitive, a renewed objection at trial "is more a formalism than a necessity," but when the court "appears to have reserved its ruling or to have indicated that the ruling is provisional," the party should raise the issue again. The note states: "The amendment imposes the obligation on counsel to clarify whether an in limine or other evidentiary ruling is definitive when there is doubt on that point."
Morton shows what a provisional ruling looks like. The court held that the expert's damages calculation on one counterclaim "will be conditionally admitted subject to a later Rule 702 determination by the trial judge." A party facing such a ruling renews its objection when the testimony is offered.
Does a bench trial change how a motion against an accountant is decided?
It can. In Morton the court said the concerns behind Rule 403 are minimal in a bench trial, declined to exclude the expert's factual narratives and left the criticisms of her rate and margin for cross-examination.
The Morton order notes that if the case were going to a jury, the court would likely agree with the plaintiffs about several of the expert's statements. Because the case would be tried to the bench, "the concerns underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 403, such as confusion and unfair prejudice, are minimal." The plaintiffs had called those narratives "an inappropriate rehashing of BCAP's theory of the case that will not assist the trier of fact." The court answered that it "will not exclude Ms. Fedkenheuer's factual narratives" because "they are limited and provide context to her opinions."
On the substance, the court wrote twice that the plaintiffs' criticisms were "better suited for cross-examination" or "better reserved for cross-examination." The plaintiffs had argued that one calculation was "mere arithmetic" outside the remit of an economic damages expert; the court admitted it conditionally.
For counsel the practical point is that in a bench trial the same judge who rules on the motion also weighs the testimony. The review of the opposing report serves both purposes: it supports the motion and, if the motion fails, it becomes the outline of the cross-examination.
What does a review of the opposing report contribute to the motion?
It traces each contested figure to its source, marks the figures without one and rebuilds the calculation. Those findings become the grounds of the motion, the exhibits that support them and, if needed, a rebuttal report.
A review written for counsel answers the questions that the cases above turned on. Which document supports each input? Did the expert read the study he cites? Were fixed costs and avoided costs separated? Is the discount rate tied to the company or borrowed from a statute? Did the expert test the projection he used?
If the party decides to offer its reviewer at trial, the reviewer becomes a testifying expert. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) a party may depose any expert whose opinions may be presented at trial, and if a report is required, only after the report is provided. A reviewer who stays a consultant is protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(D), which ordinarily bars discovery of facts known or opinions held by an expert who will not testify, except as provided in Rule 35(b) or on a showing of exceptional circumstances.
The timing then follows the court's schedule: the rebuttal report within the period for rebuttal disclosures, the motion by the Daubert deadline, and a further review if a supplemental report arrives after a ruling.
What does IAE do when counsel is preparing a motion against the opposing accountant?
A forensic accountant from the IAE registry reviews the opposing damages, solvency or tracing report and prepares a review, a rebuttal report or deposition questions in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.
The IAE review page for forensic accounting is written for attorneys facing the other side's damages, solvency or tracing report. The reviewer rebuilds the opposing calculation from the record, marks each figure without a source and writes a rebuttal report within the Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) period or the court's schedule. The page lists three documents: a review of the opposing report, a rebuttal report and deposition questions.
The page cites decisions in which errors in damages reports led courts to exclude them: a model that did not measure damages attributable to the remaining theory of liability (Comcast v. Behrend, 2013), profits computed for a bundle of products instead of the product at issue (Shure v. ClearOne, 2021) and lost profits built on a projection the expert never tested (Jacked Up v. Sara Lee, 2018).
The client sends the opposing report or the case materials and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. Cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.
Specialists are members of the public IAE registry and can be verified by Member ID or QR code; each confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees how the court will rule on the motion, and IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.
Sources
- Roberts Technology Group, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., No. 16-3079 (3d Cir. June 16, 2017) (not precedential)
- Trane US Inc. v. Yearout Service, LLC, No. 5:17-cv-42-MTT, Document 184 (M.D. Ga. June 20, 2019) (Justia)
- Wirtgen America, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00770-JDW, Memorandum Opinion (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2024)
- Morton v. BCAP GDI 1, Inc., C.A. No. 24-1432-JLH-EGT, Memorandum Order on Daubert motions (D. Del.; briefing closed March 20, 2026)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, with committee notes (28 U.S.C. App., Office of the Law Revision Counsel)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 103, Rulings on Evidence, with notes (28 U.S.C. App., 2023 edition, GovInfo)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII, Cornell Law School)
Read also
All articles
SEC disgorgement: how is the amount calculated, and how does a defense forensic accountant review the SEC's number?
In an SEC enforcement case disgorgement is the gain the defendant is ordered to give up. Since Liu v. SEC in 2020 that number is limited to net
Loss calculation in federal fraud sentencing: how does a defense forensic accountant review the government's number?
In a federal fraud case the loss figure moves the guideline range more than any other number. Since November 1, 2026, the loss table in USSG 2B1.1
Prejudgment interest calculation: how do you check the other side's numbers?
Prejudgment interest can add a large figure to a damages award, and each input of the calculation is set by a statute, a contract or a court'sExpert report review
Ready to discuss your case?
Send the materials: the secretariat will confirm the format, cost, deadline and the specialist within one business day.

