Examinations
Psychological evaluation in an emotional distress claim: what does the examiner measure?
In a lawsuit for emotional distress, the psychologist or psychiatrist who examines the plaintiff answers questions that treatment does not ask: how the person functioned before the incident, which symptoms are present now, whether the test responses are credible, what caused the change and how far it limits daily life. Albert M. Drukteinis, MD, JD, wrote in Psychiatric Times that such claims require an assessment of causation in addition to an evaluation of disability.

What is a psychological evaluation in an emotional distress claim?
An examination of the plaintiff by a psychologist or psychiatrist for the lawsuit: interview, records and tests, ending in an opinion on the plaintiff's condition, its cause and its effect on functioning. Either side may retain the examiner.
Drukteinis described mental damage claims in Psychiatric Times in April 2007 as requiring an assessment of causation rather than only an evaluation of disability. He wrote that "the treating psychiatrist inherently will tend to accept the patient's account," that a good evaluation "relies heavily on corroborating information" and that "a referral to a forensic psychiatrist may be desirable."
Sarah A. Hall, a forensic neuropsychologist, and Mark I. Levy, a forensic psychiatrist, both of the Forensic Psychiatric Medical Corporation, describe the testing part of such an evaluation as an answer to a "membership question": which group of diagnosed people the examinee most resembles. Their firm runs the evaluation in two stages. The psychologist gives the tests first, and the psychiatrist then interviews the plaintiff, uses the results to guide the interview and asks about inconsistencies in the responses.
The result is a written report. It states the diagnosis or the absence of one, the severity and course of the symptoms, the causes the examiner considered and the effect on work, relationships and daily activities. Each conclusion in it rests on a test score, a record or something the examiner observed, and the report names which.
Why does the examiner start with the plaintiff's life before the incident?
Because a change can be measured only against a baseline. Drukteinis lists the preincident psychiatric history and records of functioning before and after the claim, including employment files and tax returns.
Drukteinis puts the question directly: "What is the preincident psychiatric history of the claimant?" He recommends collecting records of how the person functioned before and after the event, among them employment files and tax returns. Earlier treatment, earlier claims and earlier losses belong to the same baseline.
Hall and Levy give an example from an employment case. An accountant who had worked abroad claimed posttraumatic stress disorder from experiences at work. Testing pointed to a probable somatization disorder, significant depression and anxiety and a personality disorder, and the results closely matched an assessment made 3.5 years earlier. The authors wrote that personality disorders "by definition emerge in the late teens and early adulthood," so they could not be attributed to experiences in the plaintiff's adult employment.
A baseline can also favor the plaintiff. Records of steady employment, ordinary sick leave and no mental health treatment before the incident make a later change easier to date, and the examiner reports them with the same weight as earlier problems.
Does the plaintiff need a diagnosis such as PTSD?
Not for every claim. When the plaintiff alleges a disorder, the examiner tests the diagnosis: Drukteinis cites Simon's question whether a PTSD diagnosis rests solely on the claimant's own report of symptoms.
Drukteinis notes that pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life are matters on which a lay plaintiff may testify without expert help. A claimed psychiatric disorder is different: its diagnosis and its cause need an expert.
Among the five questions for assessing PTSD claimants that Drukteinis attributes to Simon, is this one: "Is the diagnosis of PTSD based solely on the subjective reporting of symptoms by the claimant?" Drukteinis also warns against the "dilution of the concept of trauma."
In one Hall and Levy example, a plaintiff alleged sexual discrimination and harassment and claimed PTSD. Testing suggested that she was "very likely to have overestimated the severity of her symptoms," and her history and test responses were "not supportive of the presence of PTSD." The authors concluded that her thinking style and interpersonal difficulties had probably contributed to the conflict at work.
Justine Durrell and Ronald Schwartz, writing from the plaintiff's side, said in the July 2014 issue of Advocate magazine that defense examiners work from the DSM and that additional diagnoses supply alternative theories of causation. A diagnosis in the report therefore cuts two ways. It describes the injury, and a second diagnosis may describe another cause for the same symptoms.
Which psychological tests does the examiner use?
Hall and Levy discuss the MMPI-2 and the PAI, both self-report inventories with validity scales, and the Rorschach. They write that accurate diagnoses cannot be made from test data alone, without records and an interview.
According to Hall and Levy, the MMPI-2, published in 1989, has 567 true or false items, eight validity scales and ten clinical scales, plus supplementary and content scales. The PAI, published in 1991, has 344 items rated on a four-point scale, with four validity scales, 11 clinical scales, five treatment scales and two interpersonal scales. They describe the PAI as "very useful in the detection of feigning, and symptom exaggeration."
The Rorschach compares a person's responses to inkblots with data from thousands of other respondents. Hall and Levy write that it can "get below the defensive 'radar'" of people who try to appear more impaired or more intact on self-report tests, which they call "fairly transparent."
Screening questionnaires are shorter. Ronda McCarthy, a physician board-certified in occupational medicine and a senior director of medical operations at Concentra, listed in Risk & Insurance in July 2025 the PHQ-9 for depressive symptoms, the GAD-7 for anxiety, the Impact of Event Scale-Revised for trauma-related distress, the Fear-Avoidance Beliefs Questionnaire for fear of movement or reinjury and the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology. Of the last she wrote: "A score below the cutoff indicates no exaggeration, while a score above suggests the need for further investigation."
Hall and Levy state that "accurate diagnoses cannot be made on the basis of test data alone." Their evaluation adds medical, employment, legal and law enforcement records and an in-depth interview about past and current functioning and the course of the symptoms. In a third example, a chief executive claimed wrongful termination and a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the strength of another expert's diagnosis of a reading learning disability. Repeat testing "did not substantiate" that diagnosis, and Hall and Levy found a scoring error in the other expert's data and a reading test that had not been validated for diagnosing learning disabilities.
How does the examiner check for exaggerated or feigned symptoms?
Through validity scales built into the tests, comparison of the plaintiff's account with records and observed behavior, and attention to incentives. Drukteinis writes that embellishment is more common than outright fabrication.
Drukteinis puts the problem this way: "A percentage of plaintiffs will grossly misrepresent or fabricate an injury; it is more common, though, for individuals to embellish or exaggerate a claim." He names three factors that can contaminate a patient's history: what he calls the mythical narrative, attribution theory and secondary gain, which "may be triggered by financial reimbursement."
Validity scales measure how a person approached the test. Hall and Levy warn that self-report tests are open to manipulation and recommend that forensic work rely on the validity scales with the highest reliability. A screen such as the SIMS, in McCarthy's description, flags a score for further investigation and does not decide the question by itself.
An invalid profile is a finding about the test session. In the Hall and Levy example of the accountant, validity measures suggested exaggeration or feigning, with possible malingering, and the authors wrote that it was "impossible to confirm the presence or absence of a 'true' posttraumatic stress disorder." The authors stated that limit in their conclusion. A conclusion that the plaintiff has no injury needs other data: records, observations and the course of symptoms over time.
How does the examiner connect the distress to the incident?
By ruling other causes in or out: earlier conditions, other stressors and events after the incident. Drukteinis notes that courts apply but-for and substantial factor tests and that a causal connection cannot be only a possibility.
Drukteinis lists the legal frame that the clinical opinion has to fit. Cause in fact is decided by a but-for or a substantial factor test, and proximate cause limits liability through foreseeability. A connection "must be shown to exist" and "cannot be only a possibility."
Earlier vulnerability does not end the claim. On the thin skull or eggshell plaintiff rule Drukteinis writes: "This does not mean that the full extent of mental damage must be foreseeable, only the nature of the damage." He also discusses intervening causes, including limits based on a plaintiff's "unusual sensitivity" to a stressor. For the examiner this means separating what the incident added from what was already there and stating both.
Workers' compensation claims use a different test. Drukteinis describes it as whether the injury "arose out of and in the course of employment," and notes that some jurisdictions exclude claims based on "ordinary stresses" of employment or on personnel actions. The same symptoms can therefore be assessed against different legal questions in a tort suit and in a compensation claim, and the examiner states which question the report answers.
In practice the causation section of a report is a comparison over time. It sets out the symptoms before the incident, the symptoms after it and the other events in between, each with a date from the records, and explains why the examiner attributes the change to one of them.
How does the examiner measure the effect on work and daily life?
From records and observations of actual functioning, not from the diagnosis alone. Drukteinis asks what the claimant's actual level of functional psychiatric impairment is and writes that disability has to be shown rather than presumed.
Drukteinis frames the question as "What is the claimant's actual level of functional psychiatric impairment?" A diagnosis does not answer it. Two people with the same diagnosis can differ in whether they work, drive, sleep through the night or keep up with family and friends, and the damages follow those differences.
The data come from the same sources as the baseline: employment files, attendance and performance records, tax returns, treatment notes and, in the Hall and Levy model, the interview about past and current functioning and the course of the symptoms. The examiner compares the plaintiff's description of daily life with these records and with what the examiner observed during the sessions.
The answer is stated in terms the court can use: which activities the plaintiff stopped or reduced, since when and according to which records, and whether the limitation is continuing or has eased with treatment.
Can the plaintiff's own therapist give the opinion?
A treating therapist can describe the treatment. Drukteinis writes that the treating psychiatrist "inherently will tend to accept the patient's account" and that a referral to a forensic psychiatrist may be desirable.
A therapist works from what the patient reports and aims at recovery. A forensic examiner tests what the plaintiff reports against records and data and aims at an opinion for the court. Drukteinis treats testimony about a patient's "condition, prognosis, and the type of treatment necessary" as part of a treating psychiatrist's usual work, and he writes that independent forensic psychiatrists typically have access to collateral information.
The two roles produce different files. Treatment notes record symptoms and sessions over months. A forensic report adds testing with validity scales, collateral records and an explicit analysis of other possible causes. A plaintiff's lawyer who relies only on the therapist meets a defense examiner whose report contains all three.
The therapist's records still matter. They date the onset of symptoms and the course of treatment, and the forensic examiner reads them as part of the baseline and of the history after the incident.
What should the plaintiff's side ask for when a defense examiner tests the plaintiff?
The list of tests before the examination and the raw test data after it. Durrell and Schwartz advise sending the defense psychologist's scores, interpretation and computer printouts to the plaintiff's own psychologist.
Durrell and Schwartz cite Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249 for the rule that the examiner must provide a specific list of the diagnostic tests and procedures to be used. They also recommend setting the parameters of the examination before it takes place and limiting the type of information available to the defense expert, and they discuss limits on discovery of sexual history and of unrelated medical records.
After the examination they advise requesting the defense psychologist's raw testing data, including scoring, interpretation and computerized printouts, and sending it to the plaintiff's own psychologist. The Hall and Levy example of the chief executive shows what such data can reveal: a scoring error and a test not validated for the diagnosis it was used to support.
The plaintiff's psychologist then answers on the same data: whether the tests were scored correctly, whether their norms fit the plaintiff and whether the conclusions follow from the scores and the records.
What does IAE do in an emotional distress claim?
A psychologist from the IAE registry writes an expert report on the client's questions in an emotional distress claim. Delivery takes up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.
IAE's forensic psychological service covers child custody and parenting time, decision-making capacity in contract and will disputes, and emotional distress claims in civil cases. A psychologist from the IAE registry writes an expert report on the client's questions. The questions are framed from the pleadings, the records and the opposing evaluator's report and are confirmed before work starts.
The client sends the materials and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. Delivery takes up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry, can be verified by Member ID or QR code and confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A report is evidence that the court weighs with the rest of the record. Neither IAE nor the psychologist guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.
Sources
- Drukteinis A. M. Understanding and Evaluating Mental Damages. Psychiatric Times, vol. 24, no. 5, April 15, 2007
- Hall S. A., Levy M. I. The Importance of Psychological Testing Evaluations of Emotional Distress Claims in Employment Litigation. Forensic Psychiatric Medical Corporation (PDF)
- McCarthy R. Identifying psychological trauma in a workers' compensation case. Risk & Insurance, July 30, 2025
- Durrell J., Schwartz R. Defense mental exams and plaintiff's psychiatric diagnosis. Advocate magazine, July 2014
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