Examinations
Can you refuse a court-ordered psychological evaluation, and what happens if you do?
A person can decline to cooperate with a court-ordered psychological evaluation, and the court can then act on the refusal. A California appellate court held in 2003 that a juvenile court may deny reunification services to a parent who refuses a valid evaluation order. The Arizona Supreme Court held in 2004 that a capital defendant who refuses the State's mental examination can lose his own mental health experts.

Can you refuse a court-ordered psychological evaluation?
You can decline to cooperate, but the court decides the consequence. Appellate courts in California and Arizona have allowed denial of reunification services and exclusion of the refusing party's own mental health experts.
In In re C.C., decided by the Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, on August 8, 2003 (No. E032112), a mother in a dependency case refused to leave her jail cell and refused to speak with the evaluating doctor. The court held that a juvenile court may, under the disentitlement doctrine, deny reunification services to a parent who refuses to comply with a valid court order for a psychological evaluation.
In Phillips v. Araneta (No. CV-03-0351-PR), decided in June 2004, the Arizona Supreme Court dealt with a capital defendant who gave notice that he would present mental health experts at the penalty phase and then refused to be examined by an expert selected by the State. The court held that if the defendant refuses a court-ordered examination, the trial judge may impose a sanction, "including preclusion" of the defendant's mental health evidence.
The two cases follow the same sequence. A valid order comes first, the person gets an opportunity to comply, and the consequence falls on what the person wanted from the court: services for a parent, mitigation evidence for a defendant.
When may a court order a parent to undergo a psychological evaluation?
In a California dependency case, only after the juvenile court has taken jurisdiction over the child. Before that finding, In re C.C. held, the court has no authority to order a psychological evaluation of a parent.
The Court of Appeal wrote that "a court has no authority to order a psychological evaluation of a parent until it has exercised dependency jurisdiction." It relied on Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 202-203, under which the parent's liberty and privacy interests give way only after a finding that the child is at risk and the court's assumption of jurisdiction over the child.
In C.C. the juvenile court had authorized a confidential psychological evaluation of the mother at the detention hearing, but the opinion notes that it does not appear the court ever ordered her to undergo one. The county Department of Public Social Services then requested two psychological evaluations, and a question arose whether they could be performed without her agreement.
For a parent the timing matters. A request to evaluate a parent made before jurisdiction can be opposed on the authority of C.C. and Laurie S. After jurisdiction the court may order the evaluation and attach consequences to a refusal.
What happened when the mother in In re C.C. refused?
The juvenile court granted her reunification services anyway, because it believed her refusal had blocked the expert evidence needed to deny them. The Court of Appeal reversed that order and sent the case back.
The child was born in January 1999 and was about three when the department filed its petition in March 2002, after the mother's arrest for corporal injury to a child under Penal Code section 273d. The mother was held in jail during the proceedings. The department reported that she was "refusing to receive psychological services" and had "refused to complete the psychological evaluations." A doctor reported that she refused to leave her cell and refused to speak with him, and all parties stipulated that she had continuously refused to submit to an evaluation.
The juvenile court concluded that it lacked authority to deny services, because the statutory route to denial required two expert evaluations and the mother's refusal had prevented them. The Court of Appeal disagreed and wrote: "The order of reunification services for Mother is reversed."
Why did the juvenile court think it could not deny services?
Denying services because of a parent's mental disability requires the evidence of two experts, each a psychiatrist or psychologist. With no evaluations there were no expert opinions, and the juvenile court believed it had to grant services.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5(b)(2) permits the court to deny services when the parent has a mental disability that "renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services." Family Code section 7827 defines a mentally disabled parent as one whose mental incapacity or disorder renders the parent "unable to care for and control the child adequately," and subdivision (c) requires that finding to rest on "the evidence of any two experts."
The opinion explains that courts have read the two-expert requirement of section 7827 into section 361.5(b)(2), although the text of section 361.5(b)(2) does not state it. Without the mother's cooperation the two evaluations could not be done, and the route to denial under that subdivision was closed. The Court of Appeal found another route in the disentitlement doctrine.
What is the disentitlement doctrine?
A party who refuses to obey a court's orders cannot ask that court for help in securing its own rights. In In re C.C. it let a juvenile court deny services to a parent who refused a valid evaluation order.
The Court of Appeal quoted MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277: "A party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court" while refusing to obey its orders. It summarized the principle: a party who refuses to comply with the court's directives "cannot seek the assistance of the court in securing its own legal rights."
Reunification services are something the juvenile court provides to a parent. Applied to the mother, the doctrine meant the court could withhold them from a parent who would not obey the order meant to show whether she could use them. The opinion did not decide that the mother must lose services; it gave the juvenile court the authority to make that choice.
What must the court do before denying services for a refusal?
Decide whether to order an evaluation, give the parent a reasonable opportunity to comply, and then rule on services, based on the evaluation if the parent submits or on the noncompliance if the parent refuses.
The Court of Appeal remanded with these steps. The juvenile court decides whether to order an evaluation. If it does, it gives the mother a reasonable opportunity to comply. If she submits, the court decides whether to grant or deny services under section 361.5(b)(2) on the basis of the evaluation. If she refuses, the court decides whether to deny services because of her noncompliance with the order.
The sequence gives the parent two protections: a consequence follows only a valid order, and the parent has a real chance to comply with it. A parent who refused before an order existed, or before jurisdiction, has not yet refused a valid order in the sense C.C. uses.
What sanction did In re C.C. describe for refusing a mental examination?
An issue sanction: an order that the issues to which the examination related be taken as established. In re C.C. described it when discussing Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002), a criminal competency case.
The C.C. opinion discussed Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, which arose in a criminal competency setting. According to C.C., Baqleh held that a trial court could impose an "issue" sanction, "i.e., an order that the issues to which the examination related be taken as established in favor of the prosecution." The opinion cited Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023, subdivision (b)(2), and 2032, subdivision (f), for that sanction.
C.C. also noted that Baqleh found the evaluation order in that case "procedurally defective and therefore invalid," and still discussed the result if the defendant refused a valid order. A party who wants to contest an order therefore looks first at whether the order itself is valid, because an invalid order cannot support the sanction.
Can a criminal defendant refuse the State's mental health examination?
He can, but in Arizona the trial judge may then preclude his own mental health evidence. Phillips v. Araneta (2004) applied this to a capital defendant who gave notice of mental health mitigation for the penalty phase.
The Arizona Supreme Court held that "once a defendant notifies the state that he intends to place his mental condition at issue during the penalty phase," the trial judge has discretion to order an examination by an expert chosen by the State or the court. If the defendant refuses to cooperate, the judge may impose a sanction, including preclusion.
The court relied on State v. Schackart, a case about mental state evidence at the guilt phase, and found that "the same considerations apply in both contexts." It doubted that telling the jury about the refusal would give the State a fair opportunity to rebut, and held that letting the State's expert listen to the defense testimony "does not provide an adequate opportunity to rebut" the defense experts. By analogy, the opinion also quotes the Arizona statute on defendants who raise an insanity defense, A.R.S. 13-3993(B): "the court shall preclude the defendant from offering expert evidence of the defendant's mental state."
Does the privilege against self-incrimination protect what is said in the examination?
Yes, and the order must say so. In Phillips the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the order compelling the examination because it did not expressly protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
The court held that a judge who orders the examination "must protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination." It declined to require the federal "seal and gag" procedure of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c), reasoning that sealing the results "could severely encumber the State's ability to rebut" mitigation, because follow-up after the examination is often needed.
The order under review did not contain that protection, so the court vacated it and remanded the case. A party facing an examination order can therefore read the order for three things: whether it limits the use of statements made during the examination, who receives the report, and when.
What can a party do instead of refusing?
Comply under the protections the order sets and test the result with a psychologist of its own. In both cases the refusing party risked more than the evaluation: reunification services in C.C., the defense mental health experts in Phillips.
A valid order leaves the party a choice between cooperating and bearing the consequence the court selects. In C.C. the consequence at stake was reunification with a three-year-old child; in Phillips it was the defendant's mental health mitigation at a capital sentencing.
Cooperation with the evaluation leaves its result open to challenge. The evaluator's data, methods and reasoning can be reviewed by another psychologist, whose review the party can use to cross-examine the evaluator or to support its own expert. The questions start with the order: what it asked the evaluator to assess, and whether the report stays within that scope.
What does IAE do when a party faces a court-ordered psychological evaluation?
A psychologist from the IAE registry writes an expert report on the client's questions or a review of the opposing psychologist's evaluation. Delivery takes up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.
The IAE page on forensic psychological evaluation covers child custody and parenting time, decision-making capacity in contract and will disputes, and emotional distress claims in civil cases. The questions are framed from the pleadings, the records and the opposing evaluator's report and are confirmed with the client before work starts.
The client sends the materials and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day and, within one business day, confirms the format, cost, deadline and the specialist from the registry; the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. For tight deadlines there is a 48-hour rush.
The specialist is listed in the public IAE registry and can be verified by Member ID or QR code. IAE is not a law firm, and neither IAE nor the psychologist guarantees the court's decision.
Sources
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Ready to discuss your case?
Send the materials: the secretariat will confirm the format, cost, deadline and the specialist within one business day.

