Examinations
Revocation of acceptance and substantial impairment: what does the goods expert measure?
A buyer who has accepted goods can still return them under UCC 2-608 if a defect substantially impairs their value to that buyer. Courts test this against the buyer's own needs and against objective evidence, and the objective part is where an expert comes in: what the defect is, what repair would take, whether repairs held and what use was lost. Six state court decisions issued between 1970 and 1989 set out how that evidence is weighed.

What does revocation of acceptance under UCC 2-608 let a buyer do?
It lets a buyer who has accepted goods send them back as if they had been rejected, when a nonconformity substantially impairs their value to that buyer. In Kesner v. Lancaster the buyer sought the $9,000 price, not repair damages.
The Oregon Supreme Court quoted the state's enactment of section 2-608, ORS 72.6080, in Jorgensen v. Pressnall (274 Or. 285, decided February 20, 1976). Subsection (1): "The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it: (a) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances."
Subsection (2) sets the timing: "Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it." Subsection (3) reads: "A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them."
Revocation is a different claim from warranty damages. In Kesner v. Lancaster (378 S.E.2d 649, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, February 17, 1989) the buyer of a used tractor-loader asked for revocation and the return of the $9,000 he had paid. The court rejected the seller's argument built on W. Va. Code § 46-2-714(2), the warranty damages provision, because, in the court's words, "this suit was not one based on a breach of warranty, but rather revocation of the contract."
The unit matters too. In Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey (78 Wn.2d 343, Supreme Court of Washington, September 10, 1970) a paint store owner had ordered toys, mostly stuffed animals, for a Christmas "Toyland," and the question was whether the shortfall substantially impaired the value of the total order.
How do courts decide whether a defect substantially impairs the value of the goods?
With a two-part test. The value of conforming goods is judged by the particular buyer's needs, and the impairment must be shown by objective evidence, not the buyer's assertion alone. Jorgensen v. Pressnall set out both parts.
The Jorgensen court quoted comment 2 to section 2-608: "The test is not what the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting; the question is whether the non-conformity is such as will in fact cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the seller had no advance knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances."
The first part, in the court's words: "This is a subjective question in the sense that it calls for a consideration of the needs and circumstances of the plaintiff who seeks to revoke; not the needs and circumstances of an average buyer." The second: "This is an objective question in the sense that it calls for evidence of something more than plaintiff's assertion that the nonconformity impaired the value to him; it requires evidence from which it can be inferred that plaintiff's needs were not met because of the nonconformity."
West Virginia used the same split in Kesner. "The subjective component of the test takes into consideration the particular buyer's needs and expectations." "The objective element focuses on the actual defects, which must not be trivial or insubstantial." In Hays the Washington court described the inquiry as "an objective factual determination of the buyer's particular circumstances rather than some unarticulated desires."
Courts differ on who decides. Hays called substantial impairment "a factual determination to be made by the trial court." In Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc. (262 N.W.2d 349, November 10, 1977) the Minnesota Supreme Court treated the question as legal on review and said "we need not defer to the ultimate conclusion drawn by the trial court."
Can a defect that is cheap to repair still substantially impair value?
Yes. Jorgensen held that the small cost of repair is not necessarily relevant, and Johannsen (Minn. 1981) found substantial impairment even where a defect is curable. Courts still bar revocation for trivial or easily corrected defects.
In Jorgensen the buyers took delivery of a mobile home on November 1, 1972. It leaked water and air, the "tip out" section that widens the living room had gaps, and doors, cabinets, vents and walls were defective. Leaks continued after repairs. The court accepted that the defects "probably could have been repaired at a relatively small cost" and still held that "the relatively small amount of money needed to repair the defect is not necessarily relevant because the impairment of the value to the purchaser may be substantial even though the cost of curing the defect may be relatively small." It found that "the value of the mobile home to plaintiffs as a residence was substantially impaired."
In Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co. (304 N.W.2d 654, April 10, 1981) the Minnesota Supreme Court described the test as "a commonsense perception of substantial impairment" and noted that "substantial impairment has been found even where the defect is curable."
The limit comes from the other side of the same test. In Gappelberg v. Landrum (654 S.W.2d 549, Court of Appeals of Texas, June 21, 1983) the court said the purpose of the requirement is "to preclude revocation for defects that may be easily corrected." Durfee put the line in terms of use: "Minor defects not substantially interfering with the automobile's operation" are no ground for revocation, while a defect that "substantially interferes with operation of the vehicle or a purpose for which it was purchased" may.
Do several small defects add up to substantial impairment?
They can. In Durfee frequent stalling combined with other defects in a new Saab was enough, and a Texas court quoted the rule that the combination of defects and the inability to obtain proper adjustments in a reasonable time decides.
Durfee bought a new 1974 Saab Sonett coupe for $5,651. Its defects included a faulty seatbelt warning, a shift knob that came off, a dashboard rattle, windshield-washer and heater malfunctions and a defective muffler. About five months after purchase the car began to stall, and the stalling was never cured. The car went to the dealer for the 1,000-mile inspection in July 1974, again in September 1974 and for the 6,000-mile inspection in November 1974, and was towed to a dealer in Duluth in December 1974 and again in late February 1975. Parts were sometimes unavailable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's refusal to allow rescission and held that "in combination with the frequent stalling of the Saab, plaintiff has shown substantial impairment."
Gappelberg concerned an Advent Model YB125 big-screen television bought for $2,231.25 plus a trade-in. It arrived with a damaged screen, a faulty color convergence board, a red spot, a chipped mirror, a slight screen tilt and minor scratches, and it stopped working three weeks after the sale. The court quoted Oberg: "It is the combination of defects and inability to obtain proper adjustments in a reasonable time" that provides the criteria for finding substantial impairment. For an expert, that means listing every defect found, including those the buyer did not mention, and dating each repair visit.
What does the expert measure to prove substantial impairment?
The defect and its cause, what repair would take and cost, whether earlier repairs held, and how the defect limits the use the buyer bought the goods for. Courts want that objective evidence beyond the buyer's own assessment.
Jorgensen asks for "evidence from which it can be inferred that plaintiff's needs were not met because of the nonconformity." Each item of expert work answers part of that. A description of the defect and its cause separates a nonconformity from wear or misuse. A repair estimate measures the cost side. A repair history, with dates and outcomes, shows whether the seller cured. A measurement of lost performance ties the defect to the buyer's purpose.
Kesner shows the cost side and its limits. The loader's transmission had pulled away from its housing, the bolts holding it were rusted and stripped, the transmission and frame rails had cracked and been welded together, several A-frame bolts were missing and one steering clutch was defective. The buyer's mechanic estimated at least $720, 36 hours at $20 an hour, for the mounting bolts, frame rails and steering clutch, and said he "could not estimate the cost of any additional repairs" until he took the transmission apart. The court noted that the estimate did not cover internal damage. An estimate that stops at the visible damage should say so, as this one did.
Johannsen shows the use side. The 1977 Ford Model 9700 tractor, bought for about $26,000, jumped out of fourth gear, leaked hydraulic fluid, had a fuel restriction problem and blew its frost plugs at first use. The buyer could use it on 150 of his 330 acres, and plowing 50 acres of sweet corn ground took two weeks instead of under four hours. Figures of that kind answer the objective part of the Jorgensen test.
What if the defect could not be seen when the buyer accepted the goods?
Under 2-608(1)(b) the buyer may revoke if acceptance was reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. Kesner held that a reasonable inspection that misses the defect meets this test.
In Kesner both parties testified to a visual inspection before the sale. The defects surfaced only after the machine stopped and the buyer removed the seats, floorboard and belly pan. The court held that a buyer who reasonably inspects goods and misses the defect has met the difficulty of discovery requirement, unless the defect is reasonably apparent or the buyer has special expertise. With that holding the court did not need to reach the seller's assurance that the loader was in "fine shape."
The court also held that the Uniform Commercial Code applies to an isolated sale by a person who is not a merchant. The seller in Kesner was not a merchant, and the buyer paid by personal check without a written contract.
The expert's part in a discovery dispute is a description of where the defect sat and what it took to reach it: which panels came off, which parts were disassembled, what a walk-around inspection and a test run would and would not reveal. In Kesner the record showed the seats, floorboard and belly pan removed and a transmission still to be opened.
Does the seller get another chance to repair after the buyer revokes?
Courts split. In Johannsen the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the seller has no right to cure defects that substantially impair value. In Gappelberg a Texas court ended the right to repair at revocation but kept a right to replace.
Johannsen rejected the argument that the seller's cure right under section 336.2-508(2) carries over to revocation: "we hold that the seller has no right to cure defects which substantially impair the good's value." The dealer's employee had not told the buyer about Ford's May 1977 letter, and the dealer said the hydraulic repair could not be made "until replacement parts became available in April, 1978."
Jorgensen tied cure to the text of 2-608(1)(a), which covers goods accepted on the assumption that a nonconformity "would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured." The court said: "A seller does not have an unlimited amount of time to cure the nonconformity." In that case a series of repair requests produced workmen "not prepared to make repairs," and three repairmen later worked about ten hours each without satisfying the buyers.
Gappelberg held that "the right to cure by repair ends when the buyer justifiably exercises his right to revoke acceptance," but that the buyer "is obligated to permit the seller to replace the product with a brand new one within a reasonable time of notice of revocation." The court listed "subverted confidence of the buyer in the reliability of a major purchase" among the situations that cut off cure by repair. In Kesner the court said in a footnote that later promises to cure "will not prevent the buyer from revoking."
How fast must the buyer revoke, and may the buyer keep using the goods?
Within a reasonable time after discovering the ground and before a substantial change in condition not caused by the defects. Johannsen rejected a blanket ban on continued use, while Hays found acts of dominion inconsistent with revocation.
Hays turned on timing. "In view of the seasonal nature of the toy business and the somewhat faddish demand for certain toys, this delay in giving notice was unreasonable." The court added that "the buyer's subsequent acts of dominion over the goods are inconsistent with such claimed revocation."
Johannsen took the opposite view on use and held that no blanket rule bars a revoking buyer from further use of the goods. Reasonableness was a jury question, and the court named the factors: the seller's instructions after revocation, the buyer's hardship, mitigation, prejudice to the seller and bad faith. The tractor ran 120 hours in all, about 90 of them after the written revocation of September 19, 1977, while the dealer made service calls on September 28, October 2 and October 9 and told the buyer he could finish fall work. In Durfee the buyer drove the Saab 6,300 miles, wrote to Saab-Scania on March 18, 1975 that he would not submit the car for further repairs and has since kept it "in a garage." Kesner noted in a footnote that using a defective vehicle after discovering the defect may lead to a finding that the buyer waived it.
The statute's own limit, a "substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects," calls for an expert record of condition. The expert notes the state of the goods at revocation, the hours or miles since, and which damage came from the defect and which from later use.
What does the buyer recover after revoking, and who values the use?
Courts have returned the price with incidental damages, sometimes less an offset for use. Durfee awarded $5,651 plus $116.30, and in Johannsen the trial court relied on expert testimony to deduct use and depreciation of the tractor.
In Durfee the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the exclusive repair-and-replacement remedy had failed of its essential purpose under section 336.2-719(2), so the buyer could revoke and recover the $5,651 price and $116.30 in incidental damages. Lack of privity did not protect the distributor: "The lack of privity between the parties does not relieve Saab-Scania of liability."
In Johannsen the trial court entered judgment for the purchase price less an offset, and the Supreme Court explained that "the trial court, based upon expert testimony, allowed the defendants a setoff for use and depreciation of the tractor." The court upheld it under the restitution rule that "a party seeking rescission of a contract must return or offer to return" what it received. The offset is a valuation question: what 120 hours of use and the time since delivery took from the value of a $26,000 tractor.
The result can also go the other way. In Gappelberg the court held that the seller kept a right to cure by replacement, so the buyer was not entitled to damages under section 2.711 of the Texas code.
What does IAE do when a buyer revokes acceptance or the seller contests it?
An IAE expert reports on whether the goods were defective when delivered, whether the failure came from manufacturing or misuse and what the goods were worth as accepted, in up to 5 business days.
The IAE product defect service covers warranty and supply disputes in US courts: an expert report on the client's questions or a review of the opposing expert's report. The expert reads fracture surfaces, wear and repair marks to decide whether a failure is a manufacturing flaw or misuse. Testing likely to change the item follows ASTM E860-22. Each question is tied to the warranty rule or the testing standard behind it.
The client sends the contract or invoice, the delivery and acceptance dates, the repair orders, the notice of revocation if there is one, photographs of the goods and any opposing report, and describes the task through the Request a quote button on the service page. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The signed PDF is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush for tight deadlines.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry, can be verified by Member ID or QR code and confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A report is evidence that the court weighs with the rest of the record. Neither IAE nor the expert guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.
Sources
- Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382 (Or. 1976)
- Kesner v. Lancaster, 378 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1989), No. 18246 (Justia)
- Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977)
- Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1981)
- Gappelberg v. Landrum, 654 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App. 1983), No. 05-82-00575-CV
- Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wn.2d 343, 474 P.2d 270 (Wash. 1970)
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