Expert witnesses

Solvency expert witness in a fraudulent transfer case: what must the expert prove, and what have courts accepted?

In a constructive fraudulent transfer case the plaintiff wins only if two financial facts are proved: the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value, and the debtor was insolvent when it made the transfer or became insolvent because of it. A solvency expert proves or disproves both with numbers. Federal courts in Michigan, Utah, California and Delaware have shown which analyses carry that burden and which do not.

An economist from behind compares a tall file stack with a short one, a small house model between

What does a solvency expert do in a fraudulent transfer case?

The expert answers the financial elements of the claim: whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value and whether it was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result.

A trustee or a creditor who sues to avoid a transfer without proving intent to defraud relies on constructive fraud. In the Revstone Industries bankruptcy, decided on January 10, 2019, Judge Brendan Linehan Shannon of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware listed the elements of such a claim brought under 11 U.S.C. 544(b) and 550 and the Delaware fraudulent transfer statute: a transfer of the debtor's interest in property, no reasonably equivalent value in exchange, insolvency at the time of the transfer or as a result of it, and an allowable unsecured creditor, the predicate for a claim under section 544(b).

Two of those elements are financial, and the court in Revstone stated who must prove them: "the Trustee has the burden of establishing each element" by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense does not have to prove solvency; it has to keep the plaintiff from proving insolvency. A defense expert can therefore limit the work to testing the plaintiff's numbers, or offer a full solvency opinion of his own.

The work splits into two questions that need different evidence. Value received is a comparison of what the debtor gave and what it got in the specific transaction. Insolvency is a picture of the debtor's whole financial position on one date. The sections below take each question in turn, then the date, the projections, the people who may testify, and the report.

How does the expert measure reasonably equivalent value?

By comparing the fair value of what the debtor gave with what it received on the transfer date. In Global Technovations (E.D. Mich. 2011) the debtor paid $21.6 million for stock worth $6.9 million.

Onkyo U.S.A. Corp. v. Global Technovations, Inc., No. 10-12781 (E.D. Mich.), was decided by Judge Marianne O. Battani on March 31, 2011. Global Technovations, Inc. (GTI) had bought all the stock of Onkyo America, Inc. (OAI) from Onkyo, closing on August 31, 2000, for $13 million in cash and $12 million in promissory notes. After GTI went bankrupt, it sued under 11 U.S.C. 544(b) and the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to avoid the purchase as a fraudulent transfer.

The district court noted that "the term reasonably equivalent value is not defined in the statute." Courts look at good faith, at the disparity between the fair value of what was transferred and what the debtor received, and at whether the transaction was at arm's length. Citing Bakst v. Levenson (In re Goldberg), 229 B.R. 877 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998), the court added that "if the debtor received 70% or less than the value given, the debtor has established a lack of reasonably equivalent value."

The bankruptcy court had found that GTI paid $21.6 million, counting the notes at a present value of $8.6 million, and received stock worth $6.9 million. Onkyo argued that GTI also received indirect benefits from the acquisition. The district court rejected the argument: "The indirect benefits were an illusion." It affirmed the judgment of $6,100,000 plus interest and costs.

Value has to be something the law recognizes. In Wilson v. Dunn, No. 2:12-CV-599 (D. Utah), Judge Tena Campbell held on May 6, 2014 that a promise of future care given in exchange for a house was not reasonably equivalent value, because under the Utah fraudulent transfer statute "value does not include an unperformed promise made other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business," and the transferee had no care business. The court wrote that the consideration "was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the Draper Home."

Which insolvency tests does the expert apply?

A balance sheet test at fair valuation and, where the statute provides it, a presumption of insolvency for a debtor generally not paying its debts as they become due. Other provisions reach debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay.

In In re Mendez, Adv. No. 06-1111 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.), Judge Whitney Rimel stated the balance sheet test under the California statute in her findings of February 29, 2008: "a debtor is insolvent if, at fair valuation, the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all the debtor's assets." She added the second rule: "a debtor who is generally not paying his or her debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent." The Utah court in Wilson v. Dunn quoted the same presumption from the Utah statute.

The words "at fair valuation" direct the expert past the ledger to the value of each asset and each debt on the transfer date. Book values are a starting point that the expert has to test, asset by asset.

The statutes add tests for a debtor that is not yet balance sheet insolvent. In Wilson the court held the transfer fraudulent under two sections of the Utah statute: one based on insolvency, and section 5(1)(b), which refers to debts "beyond his ability to pay as they became due." In Global Technovations the bankruptcy court found that after the acquisition GTI's liabilities exceeded its assets by at least $12.2 million, and GTI's expert, Van Conway, testified that the transaction left GTI "unable to pay its debts as they came due as of the date of closing."

An expert retained for a fraudulent transfer case therefore asks counsel at the start which statute and which tests the complaint pleads. The answer decides whether the report needs one balance sheet, a cash flow projection, or both.

Why must the analysis speak as of the transfer date?

Because the statute asks about the debtor's condition when the transfer was made. Courts have rejected insolvency proof built on schedules filed years later and accepted valuations based on what management knew at closing.

In Mendez the trustee challenged the transfer, on April 21, 2003, of an undivided one-half interest in a house in Fresno, California. The parties stipulated the house was worth about $300,000, so the half interest was worth about $150,000, and the transferee paid nothing. The court found the transfer was for less than reasonably equivalent value.

The trustee still lost. To prove insolvency he relied on the bankruptcy schedules, filed about two and a half years after the transfer. The court wrote: "The Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof by relying upon schedules filed 2 ½ years after the date of the transfer." The trustee had not considered whether the debts listed in the schedules were still collectible in 2003 under the statute of limitations, or when the debtor last paid them. "The Plaintiff's assumptions are insufficient to meet his burden of proof," the court concluded, and judgment went to the defendant.

Global Technovations shows the other side of the same rule. Onkyo argued that the bankruptcy court had relied on hindsight. The district court disagreed: the bankruptcy court "did not rely on hindsight," and the court quoted the Chomakos decision: "The critical time is when the transfer is made." The indirect benefits were valued as of closing, on information OAI's management had at the time.

When the plaintiff cannot fix the exact date, the expert can measure both candidates. In Wilson the court found the transferors insolvent on both possible transfer dates and held the transfer fraudulent without deciding which date was correct.

Whose projections should the solvency expert use?

Projections that the court can find realistic as of the transfer date. In Global Technovations the court discounted a valuation built on the company's projections and accepted one built on trailing twelve-month EBITDA.

The two experts in Global Technovations valued OAI differently. Onkyo's expert, Jeff Risius, used OAI's projections, which the bankruptcy court found unrealistic and discounted; he concluded that the transaction did not leave GTI insolvent. GTI's expert, Van Conway, used OAI's trailing twelve-month EBITDA as the basis for projecting future performance.

The bankruptcy court preferred this method as reliable and the "least speculative means by which to evaluate OAI's reasonably expected future performance," and the district court affirmed.

The court did not discard Risius's work altogether. The present value it gave the promissory notes, $8.6 million, mirrored Risius's opinion. The district court explained: "There is no requirement that the trier of fact must adopt an expert's opinion in its entirety." An expert whose final conclusion is rejected may still supply an input the court accepts.

For a party choosing a solvency expert, the lesson is in the inputs. An expert who builds the analysis on a projection should explain who prepared it, when, for what purpose, and how it compared with actual results available on the transfer date. Rule 702(b) asks whether the opinion rests on sufficient facts or data, and a projection the court finds unrealistic fails that question.

Can the debtor's owner or a family member testify about solvency instead of an expert?

As a fact witness, yes; as an expert, only with a timely report. Courts have given lay solvency opinions little weight and barred an undisclosed witness from testifying as an expert.

In Revstone the defendants offered declarations from two people, Hofmeister and McClarty, about the value of the debtor's assets. The court accepted that Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay opinion testimony, but wrote that "the Court assigns little weight to the lay opinions of Hofmeister and McClarty." It cited "the complexity of a solvency analysis, particularly in this large Chapter 11 case," found that the declarations "provide a dollar value without any explanation or supporting evidence," and that the opinions were "uninformed by any generally accepted valuation methodology."

The trustee's expert, Mr. Lukenda, fared differently. The court found him qualified to perform the analysis and found that he applied generally accepted methodologies, relying on values paid for the assets and on values assigned by independent auditors. Summary judgment on insolvency went to the trustee.

In Wilson v. Dunn the defendants' son, Trent Erickson, was offered as an expert on the family's finances. No expert report had been submitted by the disclosure deadline, so the court treated his opinion as unallowed expert opinion and considered him only as a fact witness. The plaintiff's expert, Barbara M. Smith, whom the court described as "a CPA and valuation expert," had prepared a report the court called "persuasive" and "a logical, informed opinion," and she had considered the defendants' contrary facts in a rebuttal report.

The two cases point the same way. A party that intends to contest solvency needs a qualified expert, disclosed on time, with a method the court can follow.

What must the solvency expert's report contain, and what if it has to change?

Every opinion with its basis, the data considered, exhibits, qualifications, prior testimony and compensation under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). A late new opinion risks exclusion; in Global Technovations the sanction was the cost of a second deposition.

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a retained expert's report to contain "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them," "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them," any exhibits, the witness's qualifications with publications from the previous 10 years, a list of cases with testimony in the previous 4 years, and a statement of compensation.

The Global Technovations record shows what happens when the report answers the wrong question. Conway's original report treated GTI together with all its subsidiaries. At his deposition he "admitted in his deposition that he had never been asked to render an opinion on whether GTI itself was rendered insolvent by the transaction." GTI then offered a new opinion on GTI alone.

The district court found that "GTI did not comply with Rule 26 in accordance with the deadlines established in the scheduling order." The bankruptcy court had determined that Onkyo "had not been prejudiced in its ability to prepare for trial," and instead of excluding the opinion it ordered GTI "to pay the costs incurred by Onkyo for having to depose Conway again." The district court found no abuse of discretion.

The safer course is to fix the entity, the date and the test in the engagement before the report is written. A solvency opinion about a consolidated group does not answer whether one entity, the transferor, was insolvent.

Can an audit opinion or an owner's financial statement replace the solvency analysis?

No. In Revstone the court held that an audit opinion without a going concern statement was not enough to rebut an expert's detailed findings of insolvency.

The defendants in Revstone argued that the 2010 audit opinion lacked a statement of substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern, so a reasonable jury could find the company solvent. The court was not persuaded. It wrote that "the fact that an Audit Opinion lacks a going concern statement is not sufficient to rebut the detailed and specific findings in the Lukenda Report," and that even if the company had a going concern value at the time of the transfers, "it does not necessarily follow that Revstone was solvent."

Audited statements remain a source. The expert in Revstone used the values independent auditors had assigned to assets. The difference lies in the question: the audit tests whether a period's statements are fairly presented, the solvency analysis tests the debtor's position on the transfer date at fair valuation.

Owner-prepared financial statements face a second problem. They are prepared by a party with an interest in the outcome. The expert who relies on them tests them against bank records, tax returns and other documents, because Rule 702(b) asks whether the opinion rests on sufficient facts or data.

How is a solvency expert retained in a bankruptcy case?

A trustee employs the expert with the court's approval under 11 U.S.C. 327(a), on an application under Bankruptcy Rule 2014 that discloses the expert's connections. A creditor or defendant retains its own expert directly.

Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lets the trustee, "with the court's approval," employ "attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons." Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) requires the application to state the need for the employment, the reasons for the selection, the services, the proposed compensation and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge, the person's connections with the debtor, creditors and other parties in interest, with a verified statement of the person to be employed.

A defendant in an avoidance action, or a creditor who opposes the trustee, is not limited by section 327 and retains a solvency expert as in any other civil case. The expert's report, deposition and testimony follow Rule 26 and Rule 702.

Rule 702 sets the qualification bar: knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, with the proponent establishing to the court that it is more likely than not that the opinion rests on sufficient facts or data and reliable methods reliably applied. The experts the courts accepted in Revstone and Wilson, a solvency analyst who used generally accepted methodologies and a CPA with valuation credentials, met that bar with a method the court could follow.

How does IAE find a solvency expert for a fraudulent transfer case?

In the request, choose the case type Commercial dispute and name the calculation needed: solvency on the transfer date. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and lists of prior testimony.

The IAE page on commercial litigation expert witnesses lists solvency among the specialties and describes the work of solvency experts: whether the debtor was insolvent at the time of a transfer under 11 U.S.C. 548. The page notes that state courts apply their own rules on expert admissibility and asks firms to name the state, the court and the type of calculation in the request.

The search costs $2,000 per case, paid in advance. Within 5 business days the firm receives 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years, and within 1 business day of the request IAE replies whether it can search in that field by the firm's deadline.

Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. If no candidate fits, the second search is free. The firm chooses the expert, who bills the firm directly or through IAE under the agency option, and the expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. IAE is not a law firm: case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney, and neither IAE nor the expert guarantees the outcome of the case.

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