Expert witnesses
Spearin doctrine: when does the owner bear the cost of defective plans and specifications, and what does the contractor's expert have to prove?
Under the Spearin doctrine, an owner who gives the contractor plans and specifications impliedly warrants that work built to them will be adequate. The rule comes from a 1918 Supreme Court decision about a sewer at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. A contractor who relies on it proves three facts: the owner supplied the design, the contractor followed it, and the defect in the design caused the extra cost or the failure.

What is the Spearin doctrine?
An implied warranty by the owner. If the contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor is not responsible for the consequences of defects in them.
The Supreme Court stated the rule on December 9, 1918, in United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis. The Court began with the ordinary rule of fixed-price contracts: a party who agrees to do a thing that can be performed "will not be excused or become entitled to additional compensation, because unforeseen difficulties are encountered."
The Court then stated the exception. If the contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner, "the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications."
Contractors use the rule in two directions. As a claim, as in White v. Edsall and Penzel below, it supports recovery of the added cost of working around a defective design. As a defense, as in Lake Hills below, it answers an owner's suit for defective work when the work was built as drawn.
What happened in United States v. Spearin?
A contractor relocated a sewer exactly as the Navy's specifications required. A hidden dam in a connecting sewer caused it to burst and flood the dry dock excavation. The government bore the loss.
The contractor, Spearin, agreed to build a dry dock at the Brooklyn Navy Yard for $757,800, following plans and specifications prepared by the government. A 6-foot brick sewer crossed the site and had to be relocated. The specifications fixed its dimensions, material and location. Spearin built it accordingly, and the government accepted the relocated section as satisfactory.
About a year later a heavy rain coincided with a high tide. Water backed up, and internal pressure broke the relocated sewer in several places, flooding the excavation. An investigation found a dam 5 to 5 1/2 feet high inside a connecting 7-foot sewer. The dam was not shown on the plans.
Spearin refused to resume work unless the government repaired the sewers or took responsibility for the damage. After 15 months of investigation and correspondence the Secretary of the Navy annulled the contract. By then Spearin had spent $210,939.18 and received $129,758.32. The Court of Claims awarded him $141,180.86, including $60,000 of lost profit, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court held that the provision prescribing the character, dimensions and location of the sewer "imported a warranty that if the specifications were complied with, the sewer would be adequate."
Does the warranty cover every specification?
No. The Federal Circuit applies it to design specifications, which dictate how the work is to be done. Performance specifications set a result and leave the method to the contractor, who then carries the risk.
In White v. Edsall Construction Co., 296 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2002), Judge Rader wrote that the implied warranty "attaches only to design specifications detailing the actual method of performance." Performance specifications, by contrast, set "an objective without specifying the method of obtaining the objective."
A Spearin dispute therefore starts with classifying the disputed requirement. For example, a drawing that fixes the size and spacing of reinforcing steel details the method of performance. A clause that requires a slab to carry a stated load and leaves the reinforcement to the contractor sets an objective. In White v. Edsall the disputed requirement was the number of pick points drawn for each door, and the court treated it as a design specification.
When the requirement is a design specification, the contract "carries an implied warranty that the specifications are free from design defects," as the same opinion puts it.
Do site-visit and verify-before-bidding clauses shift the risk to the contractor?
General clauses do not. Spearin held that the usual clauses requiring builders to visit the site and check the plans do not overcome the owner's responsibility. Only express and specific disclaimers do.
In Spearin the contract required the contractor to examine the site and to check the plans. The Court answered: "This responsibility of the owner is not overcome by the usual clauses requiring builders to visit the site," to check the plans and to inform themselves of the requirements of the work.
White v. Edsall applied that to a drawing note. In May 1996 the Army awarded Edsall a fixed-price contract for a facility to house Montana National Guard helicopters, with two hangars closed by tilt-up canopy doors weighing about 21,000 pounds each. The Army's drawings showed three pick points for lifting each door. After award the door subcontractor found the three-point design unworkable, and in April 1997 the contracting officer approved a four-point design. Edsall claimed $70,000 in added costs.
One drawing carried a note that the canopy door details "MUST BE VERIFIED BY THE CONTRACTOR PRIOR TO BIDDING." The Federal Circuit held that only "express and specific disclaimers" overcome the implied warranty, and that this note did not clearly alert the contractor that the design itself might be flawed. A bidder must ask about patent ambiguities, but that duty "does not require them to ferret out hidden or subtle errors in the specifications." The court affirmed the award of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals to Edsall.
What must the contractor prove?
That the owner supplied the plans and specifications, that the contractor built according to them, and that defects in them caused the extra cost or the faulty result. Where the contractor's own deficient work contributed, the defense is not complete.
The Washington Supreme Court set out the burden in Lake Hills Investments, LLC v. Rushforth Construction Co., No. 99119-7 (Sept. 2, 2021), an en banc opinion by Justice Madsen. The owner of a mixed-use property of several buildings sued its general contractor for defective work in eight areas, including cracking of a garage floor slab. The contractor answered that the defects came from the owner's plans.
The jury instruction required the contractor to prove that the owner provided the plans and specifications for the area of work at issue, that the contractor followed them, and that the defect resulted from defects in them. The court wrote: "An affirmative design defect defense is a complete defense if the damage is solely due to the design." The next sentence of the opinion reads: "However, if the defects were caused by a combination of deficient performance and deficient design, then it is not a complete defense."
The court reversed the Court of Appeals, which had ordered a new trial over the wording of that instruction. A net judgment of $9.2 million for the contractor, including $5.8 million in attorney fees and costs, had been entered after a two-month trial. On the slab, the contractor's expert had testified that the plans caused the cracking by the reinforcement they required, and the court wrote: "The jury was entitled to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations."
Is expert testimony required to prove that the plans were defective?
Not always. The Missouri Court of Appeals held in 2017 that a contractor needed neither expert testimony to prove substantially deficient plans nor proof that the owner fell below a standard of care. The contractor still had two qualified experts.
Penzel Construction Co. v. Jackson R-2 School District, No. ED103878 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Feb. 14, 2017), arose out of an addition to Jackson High School. The school district's architect had subcontracted the electrical plans to an engineering firm. The electrical subcontractor, Total Electric, bid $1,040,444 on those plans. The notice to proceed, dated September 18, 2006, gave 550 days. Total Electric finished about May 27, 2009, and attributed a sixteen-month delay to defects and omissions in the electrical plans.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the district. The Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion by Judge Colleen Dolan and adopted the doctrine for disputes with governmental entities: "a Spearin claim is an acceptable vehicle for bringing a cause of action in Missouri."
Two holdings concern proof. The claim rests on an implied warranty, and the court wrote that the contractor "need not show the District fell below a reasonable standard of care to prevail on its Spearin claim." The court also wrote: "Penzel was not required to produce expert testimony to prove the Plans were substantially deficient." The court noted that many of the alleged problems could be understood by lay jurors. The eight categories of defects alleged included plans that did not call for emergency ballasts and did not show all the water heaters and circulating pumps that required wiring.
The contractor still had experts. Joseph Manzi, the president of a construction and project management company and a registered professional engineer in five states, and Myron Bernard, a former senior vice president of two electrical contractors with over sixty years in construction, were both found qualified to testify about the electrical plans, although Manzi does not consider himself an electrical engineer. Manzi described the defects as numerous and cumulative.
How are the extra costs proved?
By tracing each cost to a defect where the records permit it. Where they do not, some courts accept the modified total cost method, which has four conditions and can be adjusted downward by the jury.
Total Electric said that the "sheer volume and variety of interfering and disruptive events" made it highly impractical to track its damages by individual defect. In Penzel the Court of Appeals called the traditional total cost method "incompatible with Missouri contract law" and held that the modified method "should not be prohibited in Missouri as a matter of law."
The modified method has four conditions. The losses are impossible or highly impractical to determine with reasonable accuracy. The contractor's bid was realistic. Its actual costs were reasonable. And the contractor was not responsible for the added expenses.
The second condition, the bid, was the subject of expert testimony on both sides. Manzi normalized the competing bids for scope differences: Total Electric's adjusted bid came to $1,264,604, which the 2017 opinion describes as "only 3.3% (or $41,196) lower than the next lowest bidder."
The case was tried after remand. The contractor sought $1,531,248, and the jury awarded $800,000. In the second appeal, No. ED108821 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. July 20, 2021), the district challenged the exclusion of its own expert, David Lynn Whitt, who would have testified that Total Electric's bid was 19.2% below the next lowest and therefore unreasonably low. The trial court had excluded that opinion as beyond the scope of the opinions Whitt gave at his deposition. The Court of Appeals found no prejudice to the district in the exclusion and affirmed the judgment on all points; the trial court had awarded $630,884 in attorneys' fees.
What changes when the contractor takes part in the design?
In an unreported 2026 opinion, the Appellate Court of Maryland upheld a finding that the owner warranted an HVAC design about 80% complete when the design-builder was hired. Texas law excludes the design-builder's own part of the design.
In Turkish-American Community Center, Inc. v. Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC, No. 1390, September Term 2024 (App. Ct. Md. May 13, 2026), an unreported opinion read here in the copy published by the law firm Bradley, the owner of a Turkish-American community center in Lanham, Maryland, sued its general contractor over the heating and cooling systems and water penetration. The contract was written on an owner and design-builder form.
The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed judgment for the contractor. The owner's request for proposals had described its engineer's mechanical, electrical and plumbing designs as approximately 80% complete. The contract recited that the contractor would base its services on the existing design and that the owner was not aware of errors or omissions in it. A witness for the contractor testified that the remaining work was coordination. On that record the trial court's conclusion that the owner warranted the HVAC design was not clearly erroneous. The court also upheld the determinations that the owner had waived most of its claims in a May 2015 settlement agreement and that its claims, filed on December 4, 2019, were time barred under the three-year limitations period for breach of contract.
On the warranty point the court relied on the preamble of the contract, the 80% statement in the request for proposals and trial testimony that the HVAC design had essentially been finalized before the request was issued. The opinion names the Spearin doctrine and describes it as established by the Supreme Court over a century ago.
What does the Texas statute add?
Since September 1, 2021, chapter 59 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code states the rule by statute, adds a written disclosure duty for the contractor and forbids waiver. Design-build work and critical infrastructure are excluded.
Section 59.051(a) provides that a contractor "is not responsible for the consequences of design defects in" plans, specifications or other design documents provided to the contractor by a person other than the contractor's own agents, contractors, fabricators, suppliers or consultants. The contractor also "may not warranty" their accuracy, adequacy, sufficiency or suitability.
Section 59.051(b) adds a condition. Within a reasonable time of learning of a defect, the contractor must disclose in writing any known defect that it discovered, or that it reasonably should have discovered "using ordinary diligence, before or during construction." Ordinary diligence is the observation a contractor would make in the reasonable preparation of a bid or in fulfilling its scope of work, and the statute says it "does not require that the contractor engage a person licensed or registered" as a design professional. Under 59.051(c), a contractor who fails to disclose "may be liable for the consequences of defects that result" from that failure.
The chapter applies only to contracts for construction or repair of an improvement to real property. Section 59.002 excludes critical infrastructure facilities and the part of a design-build or engineering, procurement and construction contract for which the contractor is responsible. Section 59.003 states: "This chapter may not be waived."
Which experts does a Spearin dispute need?
A design professional of the discipline at issue to show the defect and its effect, a scheduling expert for the delay, and a cost expert for the damages. Each opinion has to pass Rule 702.
The defect witness matches the drawing: a structural engineer for a slab or a lifting detail, an electrical or mechanical engineer for building systems, a geotechnical engineer for soil. That witness addresses three questions: whether the requirement was a design specification, whether the work was built to it, and what the defect caused.
The time and cost witnesses answer the conditions of the damages method the forum accepts. A scheduling expert separates delay caused by the design from delay caused by the contractor. A cost expert tests the bid and the actual costs.
In federal court, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the expert's knowledge will help the trier of fact, that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data and reliable principles and methods, and that the opinion applies them reliably to the facts. The written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states all opinions with their basis, the facts or data considered, exhibits, qualifications with publications of the previous 10 years, testimony of the previous 4 years and compensation.
How does IAE find an expert for a defective plans dispute?
In the request choose the case type Construction and describe the project, the drawing or specification in dispute and the forum. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and prior testimony.
The IAE page on construction expert witnesses lists 7 specialties: structural engineering, geotechnical engineering, architecture, building envelope, MEP systems, cost estimating and scheduling. On that page architects compare the design with the code in force for the project, cost estimators price the repair scope the engineers define, and scheduling experts analyze delay. The page notes that state courts apply their own rules on expert admissibility, so the request names the state and the court.
The request form asks for the field of expertise, the case type, the state and court, the firm's side, the expert disclosure deadline, the parties and their counsel for the conflict check, and a short description of the case. The form asks not to include privileged or sealed information. Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that field by the deadline.
The search is paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment. Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. Within 5 business days the firm receives 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years. If no candidate fits, the second search is free; if IAE finds no candidates, it refunds the fee. IAE is not a law firm: case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.
Sources
- United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) (LII, Cornell Law School)
- White v. Edsall Construction Co., 296 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Justia)
- Penzel Construction Co. v. Jackson R-2 School District, No. ED103878 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Feb. 14, 2017) (FindLaw)
- Penzel Construction Co. v. Jackson R-2 School District, No. ED108821 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. July 20, 2021) (Missouri Courts)
- Lake Hills Investments, LLC v. Rushforth Construction Co., No. 99119-7 (Wash. Sept. 2, 2021) (Washington Courts)
- Turkish-American Community Center, Inc. v. Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC, No. 1390, Sept. Term 2024 (App. Ct. Md. May 13, 2026), unreported opinion (copy published by Bradley)
- Texas Business and Commerce Code, chapter 59, Responsibility for Defects in Plans and Specifications (Texas Legislature)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII, Cornell Law School)
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