Expert report review
How do you challenge a fire investigator's origin and cause opinion under NFPA 921 and Rule 702?
A fire investigator's opinion is challenged on the method, the data and the link between origin and cause. Federal courts apply Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the courts discussed here measured the work against NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations. A New Jersey court kept an origin opinion and excluded a cause opinion built on negative corpus. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected a cause opinion resting on facts missing from the record.

On what grounds can a fire investigator's opinion be excluded?
On the conditions of Rule 702: helpful specialized knowledge, sufficient facts or data, reliable principles and methods, and a reliable application of those methods to the facts of the fire.
Rule 702 lets a qualified expert testify if the proponent shows the court that it is more likely than not that four conditions are met: (a) the expert's specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact; (b) "the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data"; (c) "the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods"; and (d) the opinion applies those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The burden sits with the party that offers the investigator.
The 2023 amendment addressed courts that had treated the sufficiency of an expert's basis and the application of the method as questions for the jury. The committee note states: "These rulings are an incorrect application of Rules 702 and 104(a)." A motion against a fire investigator can therefore attack the data behind the origin and the step between the origin and the cause, and the judge rules on both.
Fire investigation is technical work, and the Supreme Court brought it under the same test in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, decided March 23, 1999. The Court called the test of reliability "flexible" and said the Daubert factors "may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, decided June 28, 1993, those factors were testing, peer review and publication, the known or potential error rate, the existence of standards controlling the technique, and general acceptance.
Do courts measure a fire investigator against NFPA 921?
The courts in Ordonez-Lima, Hoog and Unitrin did. The New Jersey court called NFPA 921 the standard guide for fire investigations and held that an investigator who claims to follow it must apply its contents reliably.
In State v. Ordonez-Lima, decided March 21, 2024 by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, the judge wrote that "NFPA 921 is the standard guide for conducting fire and explosive investigations" and that "an expert who purports to follow NFPA 921 must apply its contents reliably." Under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702 and In re Accutane, the court looked at the whole method: "Methodology, in all its parts, is the focus of the reliability assessment, not outcome." It found that the investigator "did not adhere to NFPA 921."
In Hoog v. Dometic Corp., decided March 22, 2024 in the Western District of Oklahoma, the parties did not dispute that NFPA 921 was the industry standard for fire and explosion investigations and agreed that its 2017 edition applied. The court described the guide as one that "incorporates the scientific method, which requires the consideration of alternate hypotheses," and found that the challenged investigator "followed the scientific method in considering and excluding several hypotheses of origin." The motion to exclude him was denied.
The same guide can carry the other side's case. In Unitrin Preferred Insurance Co. v. Dobra, 2013 IL App (1st) 121364, the defense expert tested both experts' hypotheses by applying NFPA 921 to the scene photographs, and the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the admission of his testimony.
A review first records which edition of NFPA 921 the opposing investigator cites. The ANSI webstore lists the 2024 edition as the latest, and the NIST OSAC registry shows a revision of the 2024 version in development at NFPA.
What is negative corpus and why do courts reject it?
Calling a fire incendiary because no accidental cause was found, without evidence of how it was set. NFPA 921 says the process is not consistent with the scientific method and should not be used.
The New Jersey court in Ordonez-Lima quoted the guide on this point. The practice "is referred to by some investigators as negative corpus," and "the negative corpus process is not consistent with the scientific method" and "should not be used." The same opinion recognized that "the process of elimination is an integral part of the scientific method", so the problem lies in the last step: treating the absence of an accidental cause as proof of an incendiary one.
The court then applied it to the record. The investigator placed the point of origin in the doorsill area of a front porch. For the electrical hypothesis he "inappropriately relied on another investigator's net opinion excluding an electrical cause," which the court found unreliable without metallurgical analysis. For the incendiary conclusion he "relied on speculation instead of supporting evidence."
The ruling split the opinion. The investigator "may testify that the fire's area of origin was the porch." He "may not offer his opinion that the cause of the fire was incendiary." A review of an arson or coverage report follows the same split: it accepts or contests the origin on its own data and then asks what positive evidence supports the named cause.
How does a review test the causes the investigator ruled out?
It lists every hypothesis in the report and checks the data used to exclude each one. The Rule 702 committee note asks whether the expert adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations.
The note to the 2000 amendment of Rule 702 lists factors that courts have used, among them whether the expert "unjustifiably extrapolated" an accepted premise into an unfounded conclusion, whether the expert "adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations," and whether the expert is being "as careful as he would be in his regular professional work" outside paid litigation work.
Elimination tied to the origin has been accepted. In Hickerson v. Pride Mobility Products Corp., No. 06-1647, the Eighth Circuit on December 13, 2006 reviewed an investigator who fixed a point of origin from burn patterns and fire, heat and smoke damage and then eliminated the devices that were not in the area of origin or had no power source. The court held: "We can find nothing unreliable in this accepted and tested methodology."
In Savage v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., No. 3:00cv1158, the District of Connecticut on May 30, 2003 admitted a fire marshal's opinion after finding that he had ruled out other causes and weighed several facts together. In Ordonez-Lima, by contrast, the electrical cause had been excluded by another investigator without metallurgical analysis, and the court refused to accept that exclusion as reliable.
A review table has four columns: hypothesis, data the opposing investigator cited, test performed, result. A hypothesis with an empty test column is the point a motion or cross-examination can use.
What if the cause opinion goes beyond the data?
A court may exclude it. Under Joiner a judge may find too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion, and the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected a cause opinion that rested on facts missing from the record.
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, decided December 15, 1997, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another." A court need not admit opinion evidence "connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert" and may find "too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Joiner also set the standard of appellate review for such rulings: abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court of Virginia applied the same idea to a fire on January 13, 2006 in Blue Ridge Service Corp. of Virginia v. Saxon Shoes, Inc., Record No. 050896. The court assumed, without deciding, that a wastepaper box sat under the workbench where the investigator placed the origin. The investigator concluded that discarded smoking material caused the fire, yet "the record contains no evidence that any employee of Blue Ridge smoked inside the building." The court called the opinion speculative and entered final judgment for Blue Ridge.
The 2023 note to Rule 702 puts the limit in one sentence: "each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of the expert's basis and methodology." Certainty is a different matter. In Savage the court admitted an opinion stated as more probable than not and quoted Daubert: "arguably, there are no certainties in science."
Can a fire opinion survive if scene evidence was lost?
It can. In Hoog the court treated a dispute over cleared debris as a matter of weight for cross-examination and did not exclude the investigator on that ground.
In Hoog the challenged investigator placed the origin at a pile of lumber that had been cleaned up before he could test it, and he declined to give an opinion on the cause. The court found that "spoliation is a contested issue with conflicting testimony on both sides" and that this "raises a matter of weight and not admissibility." It cited the NFPA 921 instruction that "[c]are should be taken to preserve all evidence."
The same order dealt with an argument that the investigator was biased. The court declined to consider it because it was raised for the first time in a reply brief, and added that "evidence of bias is not a proper basis for exclusion of expert testimony."
A party can ask for access before the debris is removed. Rule 34(a)(2) provides for a request to enter property "possessed or controlled by the responding party" to "inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property," and the written response is due within 30 days after service.
Can the investigator's qualifications be challenged?
Yes, field by field. The Eighth Circuit let a fire investigator testify on origin while barring opinions on product design, and a New Jersey court looked at his certification and at how much of his work involved fires.
Rule 702 admits a witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." The qualification is measured against the opinion offered. In Hickerson the defendants argued that the investigator was not qualified to identify a defect. The Eighth Circuit answered that he was not offered as an engineering or product design expert and allowed his origin opinion and the inference drawn by elimination, without opinions based on product design.
In Ordonez-Lima the court noted that arson work was a "relatively small part" of the investigator's duties and that he "has yet to earn the group's certification" as a fire investigator. It still admitted his origin opinion and excluded the cause opinion for failure to follow NFPA 921.
In Unitrin the trial court first barred the defense expert and then admitted him after an offer of proof. The appellate court relied on his education, research, training and work on developing NFPA 921 and wrote: "We find that Dr. Mowrer is qualified to testify as an expert regarding the cause and origin of the fire." It distinguished Bloomgren v. Fire Insurance Exchange, where a volunteer fireman's cause and origin opinion had been admitted in error, because volunteer firemen "are not in the field of fire science or fire cause and origin."
When is a rebuttal fire report due?
Absent a stipulation or court order, within 30 days after the other side's expert disclosure, when the report is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter.
Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) sets the default: rebuttal evidence is disclosed "within 30 days after the other party's disclosure." Expert evidence that is not offered solely to contradict or rebut falls under the general deadline of Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(i), "at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial."
A retained reviewer who will testify delivers the full report of Rule 26(a)(2)(B): all opinions with the basis and reasons, the facts or data considered, exhibits, qualifications with publications from the previous 10 years, the cases with testimony in the previous 4 years and the compensation. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(A), the other side may depose any expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.
A reviewer who only advises counsel stays protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(D) as an expert "retained or specially employed" for trial preparation who is not expected to testify. Counsel can use that review to prepare the deposition and the motion and decide later whether to designate a rebuttal witness.
Who decides whether the opinion reaches the jury?
The judge decides admissibility under Rule 702. Once an opinion is admitted, the remaining attacks go to its weight through cross-examination, contrary evidence and instructions on the burden of proof.
In Daubert the Supreme Court named the tools for the second stage: "Vigorous cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."
In Unitrin the plaintiff argued that the defense expert had taken over the jury's role. The appellate court disagreed: "The jury is free to accept or reject expert testimony." The jury in that case had found that the contractor's actions were not a proximate cause of the fire.
Whether an investigator is excluded, limited to the origin or heard in full is decided by the court, and an appellate court reviews that ruling for abuse of discretion under Joiner.
What does IAE do when a party needs to challenge a fire report?
IAE prepares reviews of the opposing fire investigator's report and fire origin and cause expert reports on the client's questions. The signed document is issued within up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.
The fire origin and cause page describes the review: the reviewer lists each hypothesis the investigator considered and checks what data excluded the others, and checks which NFPA 921 edition the investigator applied and how each rejected origin and cause hypothesis was ruled out. The page covers subrogation, product liability, arson defense and coverage disputes in US courts.
The client sends the opposing report with its exhibits, the scene record and photographs, and states whether the fire scene still exists. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The draft is checked for facts. Cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix. The Member ID from the document opens the specialist's category, specialization, attestation date and record status on the status check page or by QR code. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case.
Materials go through the contact form or to info@iaexperts.com and are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A review is evidence that the court weighs together with the other materials. Neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome or influences the decision. IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy.
Sources
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, with Committee Notes (LII)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
- General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)
- State v. Ordonez-Lima, Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, decided March 21, 2024
- Hoog v. Dometic Corp., No. CIV-20-00272-JD (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2024), copy of the order
- Unitrin Preferred Insurance Co. v. Dobra, 2013 IL App (1st) 121364
- Hickerson v. Pride Mobility Products Corp., No. 06-1647 (8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2006)
- Savage v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., No. 3:00cv1158 (D. Conn. May 30, 2003)
- Blue Ridge Service Corp. of Virginia v. Saxon Shoes, Inc., Record No. 050896 (Va. Jan. 13, 2006)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (LII)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34 (LII)
- NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, 2024 edition (ANSI Webstore)
- NIST OSAC Registry: NFPA 921, Revision of 2024 Version, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations
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