Expert witnesses
Consulting expert vs testifying expert: what can the other side discover?
A testifying expert is named to the other side, signs a report and sits for a deposition. A consulting expert hired to prepare for trial is shielded: under Rule 26(b)(4)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the other side reaches that expert's facts and opinions only through Rule 35(b) or on a showing of exceptional circumstances. Federal district courts disagree about an expert who was designated to testify and then withdrawn.

What is the difference between a consulting expert and a testifying expert?
A testifying expert may present opinions at trial and is disclosed, reported and deposed. A consulting expert is retained to prepare for trial, is not expected to testify and is ordinarily beyond discovery.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sort experts by whether the party may call them. Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to disclose the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 or 705. Once named, that person is a testifying expert, and Rule 26(b)(4)(A) lets the other side depose any person identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.
Rule 26(b)(4)(D) covers the second group: experts retained or specially employed by a party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial who are not expected to be called as witnesses. The paragraph opens with the words "Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert" of that kind. Lawyers call such a person a consulting expert or a non-testifying expert.
The shield depends on retention for the case. The advisory committee note to the 1970 amendment leaves out "an expert who is simply a general employee of the party not specially employed on the case." An engineer on the party's staff who was not specially employed for the case falls outside the rule, and the general discovery rules apply to what he knows.
A third group testifies without a written report. Under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), a party that will call such a witness discloses the subject matter of the testimony and a summary of the facts and opinions. The 2010 committee note names as frequent examples "physicians or other health care professionals" and "employees of a party who do not regularly provide expert testimony."
What does the other side receive from a testifying expert?
A signed report with six required items, then a deposition. The report states every opinion and its basis, the facts or data considered, exhibits, qualifications, prior testimony for four years and compensation.
An expert retained or specially employed to give expert testimony in the case, or an employee whose duties regularly involve giving expert testimony, delivers a written report prepared and signed by the witness (Rule 26(a)(2)(B)). The report contains a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years; a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.
The scheduling order sets the dates. Without a stipulation or an order, the disclosure is due at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial. Evidence intended solely to contradict or rebut the other side's expert evidence on the same subject matter is due within 30 days after that disclosure (Rule 26(a)(2)(D)).
The deposition comes after the report. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) says that if a report is required, "the deposition may be conducted only after the report is provided." The 1993 committee note expected that, because the report comes first, "the length of the deposition of such experts should be reduced." Unless manifest injustice would result, the party taking the deposition pays the expert a reasonable fee for the time spent responding (Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i)).
Which communications with a testifying expert stay protected?
Drafts of the report and most communications between the attorney and a reporting expert are work product. Communications about compensation, facts or data the attorney provided and assumptions the attorney supplied remain discoverable.
The 2010 amendments added two protections. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) extends work-product protection to drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), "regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded." Rule 26(b)(4)(C) protects communications between the party's attorney and any witness required to provide a report.
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) has three exceptions. Communications are discoverable to the extent they relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony, identify facts or data that the attorney provided and the expert considered, or identify assumptions that the attorney provided and the expert relied on. The committee note keeps "more general attorney-expert discussions about hypotheticals" outside the third exception.
The protection covers communications "regardless of the form of the communications, whether oral, written, electronic, or otherwise," and it extends to communications between the attorney and the expert's assistants. It stops at reporting experts. The note states: "The rule does not itself protect communications between counsel and other expert witnesses, such as those for whom disclosure is required under Rule 26(a)(2)(C)."
The committee explained the change by the practice that grew up under the 1993 version of the rule. The note records that "Costs have risen," that attorneys may "employ two sets of experts," one for consultation and one for testimony, and that lawyers "feel compelled to adopt a guarded attitude toward their interaction with testifying experts."
What remains discoverable from a testifying expert after the 2010 amendments?
Everything the expert considered, testing of material and notes of that testing, and the development, foundation and basis of the opinions. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) protects only communications with the party's attorney.
The committee note asks courts to read "facts or data" broadly, "to require disclosure of any material considered by the expert, from whatever source, that contains factual ingredients." The duty covers the facts or data the expert considered, including material the expert did not rely on. The note adds that "Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) do not impede discovery about the opinions to be offered by the expert or the development, foundation, or basis of those opinions." The expert's testing of material involved in the litigation, and notes of any such testing, "would not be exempted from discovery by this rule."
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) covers communications between the party's attorney and a reporting expert, including the expert's assistants. An expert's emails about the opinions with a colleague, a subcontractor or the client's own employees are not communications with the party's attorney, so that rule does not shield them.
When can the other side reach a consulting expert?
In two cases only: under Rule 35(b), when the expert examined a party's physical or mental condition, or on a showing of exceptional circumstances that make it impracticable to get the same facts or opinions by other means.
The first exception refers to Rule 35(b). A party examined under a court order, or by agreement of the parties, may request the examiner's written report, which must set out in detail the examiner's findings, "including diagnoses, conclusions, and the results of any tests." By requesting and obtaining the report, or by deposing the examiner, the examined party waives any privilege it has over testimony about all examinations of the same condition (Rule 35(b)(4)). If the report is not delivered, the court may exclude the examiner's testimony at trial.
The second exception requires exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
A party that wins such discovery pays twice. Rule 26(b)(4)(E) requires it to pay the expert a reasonable fee for the time spent responding and, for discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses it reasonably incurred in obtaining the expert's facts and opinions. The 1970 committee note explains the second payment: the information "is of direct value" to the discovering party.
The same note fixes the scope. The provision "is concerned only with experts retained or specially consulted in relation to trial preparation," and it "precludes discovery against experts who were informally consulted in preparation for trial."
What happens when a consulting expert is designated to testify?
The shield of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) ends. The expert writes a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report listing the facts or data considered, including material received while consulting if the expert considered it, and the other side may take a deposition.
Designation changes the governing rule. Once a party identifies the expert as a witness whose opinions may be presented at trial, Rule 26(b)(4)(A) applies and the expert may be deposed after the report is served. The report lists the facts or data the witness considered, and the 2010 note reads that duty as reaching any material considered, whether or not the expert relied on it.
The consultant's file therefore follows the expert into the testifying role. Documents the attorney sent during the consulting stage are facts or data the attorney provided; if the expert considered them, communications identifying them fall within the exception in Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii). Drafts of the report remain protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(B), and the attorney's other communications with a reporting expert remain protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(C).
The 2010 note gives the reason attorneys kept two sets of experts under the 1993 rule: disclosure of their collaborative interactions with expert consultants "would reveal their most sensitive and confidential case analyses." Two roles mean two engagements, two sets of fees and a conflict check for each expert.
Can a party withdraw a testifying expert and shield the expert again?
Courts divide. Callaway Golf (D. Del. 2002) treated a withdrawn expert as a consultant reachable only on exceptional circumstances. West (D.N.H. 2017) compelled the deposition and quoted the Seventh Circuit: disclosure of the report ends the opportunity to reclassify.
In Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas (D. Del., No. 01-669), Callaway told Dunlop on July 22, 2002, a little over a week before the scheduled deposition of its expert Dr. Mehta, that it was withdrawing him as a testifying expert and would use Dr. Smits instead. Dunlop wanted the deposition. Callaway argued that Dr. Mehta was now a non-testifying expert who could not be deposed without exceptional circumstances. The order cites the rule by its pre-2010 letter, Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge found a common theme in the case law: converting a designated trial expert into a consulting expert generally insulates the expert from discovery absent exceptional circumstances. The only prejudice Dunlop asserted was expense and time, and she wrote that it "may be solved by allowing Dunlop the opportunity to review Dr. Smits's report and supplement its expert reports." Her order of August 14, 2002, stopped short of closing the door on the deposition. If Dunlop still wanted it, Dunlop had until August 22 to submit a letter of no more than three pages explaining the "practical, trial based reasons for his limited deposition" and Dr. Mehta's "relationship to the parties, if any, independent of his position as a consulting expert." Callaway could respond by August 28. If the limited deposition went forward, that fact "will not be determinative of his testimony being admissible at trial": the court would analyze the testimony under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and exclude it if cumulative.
The District of New Hampshire went the other way in West v. Bell Helicopter Textron (No. 10-cv-214-JL, order of October 4, 2017). One of the defendants, GPECS, had designated Bruce Millar as an engineering expert, and he testified at the 2013 trial. Before the retrial GPECS served a supplemental Millar report under the court's schedule, the plaintiff noticed his deposition, and three days before the deposition GPECS withdrew the supplemental report.
Judge Joseph N. Laplante granted the motion to compel. He held that Millar may be deposed anew although GPECS had withdrawn the supplemental report, and he ordered the parties to confer and schedule the deposition no later than October 25, 2017. The judge relied on Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and quoted the Seventh Circuit's 2009 decision in SEC v. Koenig: "Disclosure of the report ends the opportunity" to reclassify the expert. He noted that there "appears to be some dispute" about experts re-designated as consultants and left the question open, because GPECS still intended to call Millar on a narrower basis. The order also cites the First Circuit's 2008 decision in Jasty v. Wright Medical Technology, which affirmed the denial of a motion to compel trial testimony from an expert the opposing party chose not to call.
How does IAE find an expert witness for a case?
Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in the field by the deadline, and within 5 business days it sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and lists of prior testimony.
The request form on the IAE expert witness page asks for the field of expertise, the case type, the state and court, the firm's side, the expert disclosure deadline, the parties and their counsel for the conflict check and a short description of the case. Firms are asked not to include privileged or sealed information. The search costs $2,000 per case, paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment.
Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. The CVs come with hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years, the lists that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires in a testifying expert's report. If no candidate fits, the second search is free, and if no candidates are found, the fee is refunded.
The firm chooses the expert, who bills the firm directly or through IAE under the agency option. The expert's hourly rate never depends on the outcome of the case or on the content of testimony. IAE is not a law firm: whether an expert will consult or testify, and the decision to retain one, stay with the attorney.
Sources
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery, with committee notes (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 35, Physical and Mental Examinations (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas, Inc., No. 01-669, order of August 14, 2002 (U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware)
- West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 10-cv-214-JL, 2017 DNH 215, order of October 4, 2017 (U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire)
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Need an expert witness for your case?
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