Expert report review
Can a fire expert rely on another investigator's findings?
A fire origin and cause expert may base an opinion on facts or data that other people gathered, if experts in the field would reasonably rely on them. In State v. Ordonez-Lima a New Jersey court kept an investigator's origin opinion and barred his finding that the fire was set, because he had relied on another investigator's exclusion of an electrical cause reached without metallurgical analysis.

What does Rule 703 let a fire expert rely on?
Facts or data the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the field would reasonably rely on that kind of data, it need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence lets an expert base an opinion on facts or data "the expert has been made aware of or personally observed." The data need not be admissible if experts in the particular field "would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data." If the data "would otherwise be inadmissible," the proponent may disclose them to the jury "only if their probative value" in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
The Advisory Committee's note names three sources of facts or data: "the firsthand observation of the witness," "presentation at the trial," and "presentation of data to the expert outside of court." Its example is a physician who works from "statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians" and other doctors, and who "makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them."
The same note sets a limit. The rule would not warrant admitting "the opinion of an 'accidentologist'" whose basis was statements of bystanders. The test is what experts in the field reasonably rely on, and a reviewer of a fire report applies it to each piece of data the opposing investigator did not collect personally: the fire department's notes, another investigator's exclusions, a laboratory's results, an engineer's findings.
What happened when an investigator relied on another investigator's exclusion?
The court barred the cause opinion. In State v. Ordonez-Lima the investigator relied on other investigators' on-scene exclusion of an electrical cause, made without metallurgical analysis of the wiring, and the court found that reliance unreasonable.
State v. Ordonez-Lima was decided on March 21, 2024 in the Criminal Part of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, by Judge Ostrer, a retired appellate judge sitting on recall. The State's investigator, Detective Anthony Sturchio of the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office, wrote that "Electrical fire cause was ruled out by investigators based on their on-scene examination." He also quoted another detective's finding of "no indication of electrical outlets, extension cords or faulty wiring in the area of origin." Sturchio was "unaware of any metallurgical analysis of the wires."
The defense expert, Dr. Vytenis Babrauskas, testified that "you cannot determine whether electrical wiring was faulty or not without taking the wiring into evidence," and that wiring goes to "a competent metallurgical laboratory for expert examination." The court held that Sturchio "inappropriately relied on another investigator's net opinion excluding an electrical cause of the fire," and that in doing so he "deviated from the scientific method that NFPA 921 prescribes."
Under New Jersey's Rule 703, the court explained, an expert may rely on others' opinions only if they are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." The State, the court held, had not shown that a fire science expert applying NFPA 921 would rely on another investigator's conclusion "reached without metallurgical analysis, that a fire had no electrical cause." Sturchio could still testify that the area of origin was the porch and the point of origin was "in the area of the doorsill." His opinion that the fire was incendiary, and his opinion that all accidental causes were eliminated, were barred.
When have courts let fire experts build on another expert's investigation?
When the underlying investigation was reliable. In a wildland fire case the District of Idaho wrote that "Experts are permitted to rely on the reports of others" and admitted experts who built on that investigation.
In United States v. Idaho County Light and Power Cooperative Association, Inc., Magistrate Judge Candy W. Dale of the District of Idaho ruled on February 7, 2020 on a motion to exclude the origin and cause opinions of U.S. Forest Service Captain Jill Forth. The defendant also asked the court to exclude four other experts as derivative of her investigation. Forth had relied on witness interviews, written statements taken by a Forest Service special agent and the initial report of the local fire incident commander, who said the fire "started at the base of the power pole."
Both sides agreed that Forth purported to apply NFPA 921, so the question was whether she applied it reliably. The court held that the alleged deviations were matters that "go to the weight to be accorded to her opinion regarding the point of origin of the fire." Her report recorded that the origin area "contained micro burn indicators consisting of grass stems, protected fuel around rocks and staining on the rocks."
Because her opinions were reliable, reliance on them was no ground for exclusion. The court wrote that "Experts are permitted to rely on the reports of others" and that "Reliance upon other experts' opinions is permissible." One of the other experts, Mike Cole, agreed that she "correctly identified the origin of the Sheep Fire" while he "took issue with some aspects of Captain Forth's investigation." Another, the court noted, "Dr. Stevick developed his own hypothesis" from his own examination of the wire and a metal fragment. The court left the defendant free to cross-examine each expert on reliance and method at trial.
Can a fire investigator adopt an engineer's conclusion about how the appliance failed?
Not as his own opinion. In Goens v. Southern Union Co. a fire investigator who based his failure opinion entirely on an engineer's opinion could testify about the area of origin, not about the mechanism of failure.
Goens v. Southern Union Co. concerned a fire attributed to a water heater. On June 23, 2010, Chief Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. of the Western District of Missouri ruled on motions to exclude four experts. The plaintiffs' fire investigator, Larry Jennings, "bases his opinion entirely on the opinion of Mr. Martin" on the mechanism of failure. Carl Martin was a mechanical engineer with specialized knowledge of water heaters and flame roll-out.
The court divided the opinions. Jennings could testify about the area of origin and a water heater malfunction, but not about the mechanism of failure. Martin himself stayed in the case: the defense argued he did not meet NFPA 921, and the court treated that as an attack on the factual basis of his opinions, for cross-examination. A defense investigator's statements that relied on two gas company employees were stricken as improper vouching.
The division follows the source of the data. The part of Jennings's report on burn patterns and the location of the fire drew no objection. The failure mechanism came from Martin, and the court left that opinion to Martin.
Can a laboratory analyst's findings reach the jury through another expert?
In a criminal case, not as support that holds only if the analyst's statements are true. In Smith v. Arizona the Supreme Court held that such statements come in for their truth under the Confrontation Clause.
In Smith v. Arizona, decided on June 21, 2024 in an opinion by Justice Kagan, an analyst named Rast had prepared typed notes and a signed report and then stopped working at the laboratory. A substitute analyst, Longoni, reviewed her records and testified to them. The Court held that when an expert conveys an absent analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and "the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth." It wrote that "Longoni thus effectively became Rast's mouthpiece."
Arizona argued that its Rule of Evidence 703 admitted such statements only to help the jury evaluate the opinion. The Court held that "Evidentiary rules, though, do not control the inquiry into whether a statement is admitted for its truth." Whether the statements were testimonial was sent back to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The Court added that forensic experts like Longoni can still "play a useful role in criminal trials," for example by testifying from personal knowledge of the laboratory's practices or by answering hypotheticals.
In an arson prosecution the question can arise for two kinds of borrowed findings: a laboratory result on fire debris and another investigator's exclusion of accidental causes. Smith governs the first in a criminal trial, and Rule 703 and Ordonez-Lima address the second.
What must the opposing report disclose about data from other investigators?
The facts or data the expert considered, under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), which includes every report, photograph, interview and laboratory result the expert took from others. Rule 705 lets the cross-examiner require disclosure of the underlying facts or data.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them" and "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them." A report that says "electrical causes were eliminated" without naming who examined the wiring and how does not state the basis of that finding.
At trial Rule 705 lets an expert state an opinion without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, "But the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination." The 2000 committee note to Rule 703 states that the judge "must give a limiting instruction upon request" when otherwise inadmissible underlying information is disclosed, and that "the underlying information is not admissible simply because the opinion or inference is admitted."
The material itself is requested under Rule 34(a)(1), which lets a party ask to "inspect, copy, test, or sample" designated items, including the wiring, the appliance remains and the debris samples the other investigators collected.
When does borrowed data make the opinion unreliable?
When experts in the field would not rely on that kind of data, or when the borrowed finding was never tested. Rule 702(b) requires sufficient facts or data, and the court rules on that first.
Rule 702 requires testimony "based on sufficient facts or data" and "the product of reliable principles and methods." The 2023 committee note places on the proponent the burden to show it is "more likely than not that the proffered testimony meets the admissibility requirements," and rejects the view that "arguments about the sufficiency of an expert's basis always go to weight and not admissibility."
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner (December 15, 1997) the Supreme Court held that nothing in Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a court to admit opinion evidence "which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." A borrowed exclusion is the other investigator's ipse dixit unless the record shows what that investigator examined.
The New Jersey and Idaho rulings differ on that point. In Idaho the underlying origin work was documented and found reliable, and the experts who relied on it were admitted. In New Jersey the exclusion had no laboratory work behind it, and the opinion that rested on it was barred. Ordonez-Lima quotes NFPA 921 on the standard: "Determination of the ignition source must be based on data or logical inferences drawn from that data," and "Speculative information cannot be included in the analysis."
How does a reviewer trace each borrowed finding in the opposing report?
By listing each finding the opposing expert did not make personally, the person who made it, what that person examined or tested, and whether the opposing expert checked it. Untested findings are marked as the weak points of the opinion.
The reviewer reads the opposing report sentence by sentence and marks every statement of fact that the investigator did not observe or test, such as an exclusion of electrical activity, a laboratory finding of an ignitable liquid or a witness account of where flames were first seen. For each one the review records its author, the document it comes from, the date, and the method behind it.
Then the reviewer asks the Rule 703 question for each item: would a fire investigator applying NFPA 921 rely on this kind of data in this form? A laboratory report with methods and chromatograms differs from a one-line summary of it. An exclusion recorded with photographs, arc mapping and laboratory examination of the wiring differs from an exclusion "based on their on-scene examination."
The last column shows what the opinion loses without the item. If the cause opinion survives without a borrowed exclusion, the item is minor. If the cause opinion depends on it, as the incendiary finding did in Ordonez-Lima, the review places that item first.
What does IAE do when the opposing fire report rests on other investigators' findings?
IAE prepares reviews of the opposing investigator's report for subrogation, product liability, arson defense and coverage disputes in US courts, and expert reports on the client's questions. Up to 5 business days.
The review lists each hypothesis the opposing investigator considered, checks what data excluded the others and which NFPA 921 edition was applied, and traces every artifact to its examination. The signed review is issued within up to 5 business days once the format and cost are confirmed.
The client sends the opposing report with its exhibits and states whether the fire scene still exists. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. Cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix; the Member ID or QR code in the document opens the specialist's record. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A review is evidence the court weighs with the other materials; neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm.
Sources
- State v. Ordonez-Lima, Ind. No. 22-03-0196-I (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Mercer County, Mar. 21, 2024)
- United States v. Idaho County Light and Power Cooperative Association, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00391-CWD, memorandum decision and order (D. Idaho Feb. 7, 2020) (GovInfo)
- Goens v. Southern Union Co., No. 09-0422-CV-W-FJG, order (W.D. Mo. June 23, 2010)
- Smith v. Arizona, No. 22-899 (U.S. June 21, 2024)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 703, with committee notes (LII)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, with committee notes (LII)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 705 (LII)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34 (LII)
- General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (LII)
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