Expert report review
Hot work fire: how does a reviewer check a report that blames welding, cutting or a contractor's torch?
A report that blames hot work has to place the origin where the welding, cutting or grinding was done, show how sparks, slag or heat reached a fuel, and explain the time between the end of the work and the fire. OSHA requires a fire watch for at least half an hour after welding or cutting. In an English case, a contractor's cutting started a fire about 100 minutes later, and the owner's claim still failed.

What counts as hot work, and why are hot work fires disputed?
Welding and cutting are covered by OSHA's rule at 29 CFR 1910.252. Disputes start when the work is of another kind, when several crews worked at once, or when the fire appeared long after the work ended.
Section 1910.252 of Title 29 governs welding, cutting and brazing in general industry, and paragraph (a) is titled fire prevention and protection. Its precautions are written for the sparks, slag and heat that welding and cutting produce.
Not every alleged hot work fire involves a torch. In Boatman v. Comcast of the South, L.P., No. 3:17-CV-536 in the Eastern District of Tennessee, a Comcast installer drilled a large hole through the 26-gauge steel siding of Boatman Automotive, a repair shop in Knoxville, on June 16, 2017, to run a cable. The building was reported on fire on June 19, 2017. The plaintiff alleged that the drilling was hot work and violated NFPA 51B. The defense disputed it, and the court did not decide the question: it left the applicability of NFPA 51B to cross-examination.
Whatever the work, the review asks the same questions as for any other cause: where the fire started, what ignited what, and whether the other causes were excluded with data.
What do the OSHA rules require before and after welding or cutting?
Movable fire hazards removed or guarded, combustibles relocated at least 35 feet, openings protected, the area inspected and the precautions authorized, and a fire watch kept for at least half an hour after the work ends.
Under 29 CFR 1910.252(a)(1)(i), if the object to be welded or cut cannot be moved, "all movable fire hazards in the vicinity shall be taken to a safe place." Where fire hazards cannot be removed, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) requires that "guards shall be used to confine the heat, sparks, and slag, and to protect the immovable fire hazards." If neither can be done, under (a)(1)(iii) "welding and cutting shall not be performed."
Paragraph (a)(2) sets the details. The floor is swept clean for a radius of 35 feet, and combustibles are relocated at least 35 feet from the work site or covered and shielded. Floor openings and cracks that cannot be closed, and cracks or holes in walls, open doorways and open or broken windows, are protected so that sparks cannot reach combustibles beyond them. Before the work starts, the area is inspected by the individual responsible for authorizing cutting and welding, who sets the precautions, "preferably in the form of a written permit."
A fire watch is required in four situations under (a)(2)(iii)(A): appreciable combustible material in the building construction or contents closer than 35 feet; combustibles farther away that are easily ignited by sparks; wall or floor openings within a 35-foot radius that expose combustible material; and combustible materials adjacent to the opposite side of metal partitions, walls, ceilings or roofs. The fire watchers have extinguishing equipment, are trained to use it and "watch for fires in all exposed areas."
The time rule is one sentence: "A fire watch shall be maintained for at least a half hour after completion of welding or cutting operations." Paragraph (b)(4)(vii) adds that after welding the welder marks the hot metal or warns other workers in some other way.
How long after hot work can a fire start, and how does the report explain the delay?
OSHA requires the fire watch to continue for at least 30 minutes after the work. In the English Murphy's Wharf case smoke appeared about 100 minutes after cutting ended, and in Boatman the fire came three days after the drilling.
United Marine Aggregates Ltd v G.M. Welding & Engineering Ltd [2012] EWHC 779 (TCC) was decided in the Technology and Construction Court in London by Mr Justice Edwards-Stuart on April 2, 2012. The fire broke out on Sunday, February 3, 2008, at an aggregate processing plant at Murphy's Wharf, Greenwich, on the Thames. The defendant's men had cut 20 nuts off bolts with an oxy-propane torch, used an angle grinder on tube flanges and welded lifting lugs.
The judge found that hot cutting in the screening house was finished by or shortly before 8:15 am and that the cutter stayed in the area until shortly before 9:30 am. Smoke was first seen at about 9:55 am, and the fire brigade was called at 10:01 am. The judge found that the fire was caused by a globule of molten steel from the oxy-propane cutting, and that a one-hour watch could not detect the transition from a hidden smouldering fire into a flaming fire.
In Boatman the plaintiff's expert, Tim Dunn, explained a three-day gap by a smoldering fire in sawdust that the drilling had lodged in the insulation. The court left the weaknesses of that opinion to cross-examination and the jury.
A reviewer does not reject a delayed ignition theory because of the delay. The reviewer checks whether the report names the first fuel, the place where it lay, the mechanism that let it smolder, and physical evidence of that smoldering at the origin, and whether the times in the report match the work records and the witness accounts.
Which hot work started the fire when several crews were working?
The origin decides it. At Murphy's Wharf the experts placed the origin in two buildings where different work was done, and the judge chose between them using the wind direction and a point the experts agreed on.
Miss Russell placed the origin in the screening house, where the bolts were cut. Mr Townsend placed it in the scalping house, where tack welding was done: hot work in the underpan, in his view, ignited the top of conveyor CV6, and a "trench effect" spread the fire.
The judge rejected that theory. The wind was blowing the opposite way to the direction Mr Townsend had assumed, and his answer on the eddy effect was "a little too glib to be convincing". The experts agreed: "We agree that the fire did not significantly develop in the Scalping House until after the conveyor belt (CV6) had broken." The judge accepted Miss Russell's opinion and found that the fire started in the screening house and spread to the scalping house.
For a review this case gives a short list of checks. Which crew worked where, and when each stopped. Which way the wind blew, from a record, not an assumption. What each witness saw and from where. Where the experts agree, as they did on the conveyor belt at Murphy's Wharf.
How is a fire watch proved or disproved?
By records and testimony on who watched, for how long and with what equipment. At Murphy's Wharf the judge found that a fire watch was kept for more than 60 minutes after the cutting, and the owner's claim failed.
OSHA's rule makes the fire watch a separate duty: the watcher has extinguishing equipment and watches all exposed areas. At Murphy's Wharf one worker was the dedicated fire watch during the welding of lifting lugs. For the bolt cutting, the judge found that the colleague who was cleaning the central rail could not at the same time keep a proper fire watch. He held that this would have mattered only if the fire had broken out during the cutting, and it did not.
A witness, Mr Marshall, agreed that someone must remain on site after hot work is finished. The judge found that a fire watch was kept for more than 60 minutes after the cutting, that the defendants were not in breach by failing to leave a man in the area for longer than an hour, and that a smouldering fire going undetected for more than an hour and a quarter was not reasonably foreseeable. The cutter, he found, had exercised reasonable care and skill. The claim was dismissed, and on May 14, 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed the owner's appeal ([2013] EWCA Civ 516).
The review compares the report's account of the fire watch with the permit, the time sheets, phone records or messages that fix when the crew left, and the depositions. A report that assumes no fire watch was kept, without a source, gives counsel a point to test. The Murphy's Wharf judgment adds a second point: a report can place the origin at the hot work and still leave open whether the precautions met the duty owed, which is a question for the court.
Does a hot work ignition theory need testing to reach the jury?
Not always. In Boatman the court held that testing is not required for an opinion consistent with NFPA 921, and it left the defense experts' drilling tests, which differed from the event, for cross-examination.
Dunn had done no physical testing and no arc mapping. The court found him qualified, noted that he reviewed the electrical evidence and considered lightning and accelerants, and held that adherence to NFPA 921 supports reliability while a departure from it is not automatically disqualifying. The challenges went to weight.
The defense experts tested the theory. Dr. Donald Hoffman drilled 26-gauge siding on a wood frame, watched it with a thermal imaging camera and concluded that drilling is "Not a competent ignition source." Dr. Harold Deatherage tested cold-rolled steel and concluded that drilling was unlikely to generate enough heat to start a fire. The plaintiff moved to exclude both, and the court denied the motion: the plaintiff's points about differences in the siding, the bit and the timing were left for cross-examination.
Fire Captain Whitaker and investigator Anthony Fultz found no electrical evidence and reached a different conclusion on the origin than Dunn. A reviewer working on such a case sets the competing origins side by side with the burn pattern evidence for each.
Can a fire expert say that the contractor broke the hot work rules and is responsible?
The expert can describe what the standard requires and what was done. In Boatman the court struck an expert's opinion that assigned responsibility to the plaintiff as an improper legal conclusion.
The Boatman order dealt with several such opinions. A defense expert, Terry Orr, could explain why the opinions of the plaintiff's expert Roger Goins were deficient but could not call them unreliable or say that Goins had failed to render an expert opinion. The court struck the third opinion of Tracey Bellamy, which said the plaintiff was responsible for overseeing the hot work, as an improper legal conclusion and as irrelevant after the comparative fault defense was withdrawn. Bellamy's opinion that the standard Tennessee mandates is Chapter 35 of the International Fire Code, not NFPA 51B, was allowed as rebuttal.
A review written for litigation follows the same line. It states which provision of 29 CFR 1910.252 or NFPA 51B the work had to meet, what the record shows was done, and whether the departure could have produced the ignition at the origin. Who is liable, and in what share, is for the court.
What does a reviewer check in a report that blames hot work?
The origin against the work locations, the ignition path between the work and the first fuel, the time between the end of work and discovery, the fire watch, the 35-foot zone and openings, and the alternative causes.
The reviewer marks on one plan where each hot work task took place, where the report puts the origin and where the first fuel was. If the origin is outside the 35-foot zone, the report has to explain how sparks or heat got there: through an opening, by conduction through a metal wall or roof, or by falling slag.
The reviewer then builds a timeline from the work records, the witnesses, the alarm and dispatch records and any video. The report's account of the delay is tested against it.
Alternative causes come last. In Boatman the investigators considered lightning, accelerants and the electrical system. A report that blames hot work without addressing the wiring, appliances and smoking materials in the area of origin has the gap the review describes, with the page of the report where the discussion should be.
What does IAE do when the opposing report blames hot work?
IAE prepares reviews of the opposing investigator's report for subrogation, product liability, arson defense and coverage disputes in US courts, and expert reports on the client's questions. Up to 5 business days.
The review lists each hypothesis the opposing investigator considered, checks what data excluded the others and which NFPA 921 edition was applied, and traces every artifact to its examination. In a hot work case the client sends the opposing report with its exhibits, the hot work permit and fire watch records if they exist, the contract and time records for the work, and states whether the fire scene still exists.
The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The signed review is issued within up to 5 business days once the format and cost are confirmed; cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.
Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and passed the council's attestation under the published Criteria Matrix; the Member ID or QR code in the document opens the specialist's record. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome. Materials are not passed to third parties without the client's consent. A review is evidence the court weighs with the other materials; neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm.
Sources
- 29 CFR 1910.252, General requirements (welding, cutting and brazing), paragraph (a) fire prevention and protection (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Boatman v. Comcast of the South, L.P., No. 3:17-CV-536, memorandum and order on Daubert motions, Doc. 138 (E.D. Tenn.) (Justia)
- United Marine Aggregates Ltd v G.M. Welding & Engineering Ltd [2012] EWHC 779 (TCC) (The National Archives, Find Case Law)
- United Marine Aggregates Ltd v G M Welding & Engineering Ltd & Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 516 (Court of Appeal, May 14, 2013) (The National Archives, Find Case Law)
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