Expert witnesses
State of the art defense in product liability: what must the manufacturer's expert prove about the technology available when the product was made?
The state of the art defense asks what a manufacturer could have known and built on the day the product left its hands, not on the day of the injury. Six states examined here define the term in different words, attach it to different dates and place the burden on different parties. In each of them the proof is historical and technical, and it is given by an engineer or scientist who can date the technology.

What is the state of the art defense?
A rule that measures a product's design or warnings against the scientific and technical knowledge that existed when the product was made or sold. Depending on the state it is a complete defense, an exemption or evidence for the jury.
Florida states the idea in one sentence. Under section 768.1257, in an action based upon defective design brought against the manufacturer, "the finder of fact shall consider the state of the art of scientific and technical knowledge and other circumstances that existed at the time of manufacture, not at the time of loss or injury."
The rule answers a recurring fact pattern. A product is sold, years pass, the technology improves, and a person is injured by the older unit. At trial the plaintiff's engineer describes a safer design. The defense asks whether that design could have been built, or that risk could have been known, on the earlier date.
Because the legislatures did not copy one another, counsel begins with the statute of the forum state. The sections below compare six of them.
How do states define the state of the art?
Arizona speaks of knowledge in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture. Nebraska speaks of the best technology reasonably available. Missouri defines it as a danger that was not known and could not reasonably be discovered.
Arizona Revised Statutes 12-681 defines the term as "the technical, mechanical and scientific knowledge of manufacturing, designing, testing or labeling" a product "that was in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture."
Nebraska Revised Statute 25-21,182 describes conformity with "the generally recognized and prevailing state of the art in the industry" and then defines the phrase: "State of the art as used in this section shall be defined as the best technology reasonably available at the time."
Missouri takes a different object. Section 537.764 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri says that state of the art "means that the dangerous nature of the product was not known and could not reasonably be discovered at the time the product was placed into the stream of commerce." The definition concerns knowledge of the hazard, not the available engineering.
New Jersey does not use the label in its statute. N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3 exempts a manufacturer or seller if, at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, "there was not a practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product."
Is it a complete defense or only evidence for the jury?
In Arizona and Nebraska it is a defense to liability. In Missouri it is a complete defense only to strict liability for failure to warn. In Florida the finder of fact must consider it.
Arizona places it first in a list of affirmative defenses. Under A.R.S. 12-683, "a defendant shall not be liable if the defendant proves" that the defect is alleged to result from inadequate design or fabrication and that the plans or designs, or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting, testing and labeling, "conformed with the state of the art at the time the product was first sold by the defendant."
Nebraska's section says that proof of conformity "shall be a defense" in an action based upon negligent or defective design, testing or labeling.
Missouri limits the reach. Under 537.764, the state of the art "shall be a complete defense and relevant evidence only in an action based upon strict liability for failure to warn of the dangerous condition of a product." The section adds that nothing in it limits an injured party's action for negligence.
New Jersey attaches an exception to its exemption. Under 2A:58C-3(b), the exemption does not apply if the court finds, on clear and convincing evidence, that the product is egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous, that the ordinary user cannot reasonably be expected to know its risks or the product poses a risk of serious injury to others, and that the product has little or no usefulness.
Which date controls?
The date named in the statute: the time of manufacture in Florida, the day the product left the manufacturer's control in New Jersey and Texas, the first sale in Arizona and Nebraska, entry into the stream of commerce in Missouri.
Florida's section names "the time of manufacture, not at the time of loss or injury." New Jersey refers to "the time the product left the control of the manufacturer." Arizona's defense refers to "the time the product was first sold by the defendant," while its definition refers to the time of manufacture. Nebraska refers to the time "the specific product involved in the action was first sold to any person not engaged in the business of selling such product," that is, the first sale of that unit to a buyer outside the trade. Missouri refers to the time the product "was placed into the stream of commerce."
For a product that passed through a warehouse and a distribution chain, these dates differ. The expert's first task is therefore a timeline for the unit in suit: serial number, build date, shipping date and date of first sale. Every source the expert cites for the available technology is then checked against the controlling date.
Who has the burden of proof?
In Arizona and Missouri, the party asserting the defense. In New Jersey the manufacturer pleads and proves the state of the art; the plaintiff proves a reasonable alternative design. In Texas the claimant proves feasibility as part of the claim.
Arizona's text places the burden on the defendant: the defendant is not liable "if the defendant proves" the defense. Missouri's section says the defense "shall be pleaded as an affirmative defense and the party asserting it shall have the burden of proof."
New Jersey's Model Civil Jury Charge 5.40D-4, approved in April 1999 and revised in October 2001, tells the jury that the defendant "has the burden of proof to establish that the technological state of the art" at the time the product left its control did not permit a reasonably safer alternative design. If the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must show that the product did not conform to feasible technology. The charge notes that the defense must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.
Texas reaches the same subject through the plaintiff's case. Under section 82.005 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a safer alternative design that "was economically and technologically feasible at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller by the application of existing or reasonably achievable scientific knowledge." The section does not apply to drugs and devices as defined in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
The allocation decides which side must retain the historical expert first. Where the manufacturer carries the burden, a defense presented through counsel's argument alone has no proof behind it.
What separates technical feasibility and practicality?
In Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp. (2000) the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a manufacturer who disputes only the practicality of the plaintiff's alternative, and not its technological feasibility, has not raised the state of the art defense.
Ronald Cavanaugh put down a portable circular saw. The saw traveled about eighteen inches across the floor and ran over his foot, and he lost a toe. He alleged a design defect and proposed an alternative: a saw with a blade brake. The manufacturer's expert testified that a blade brake would make the saw more dangerous, so it was not practical or feasible. The jury returned a verdict of $160,000 for the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court decided the appeal on May 24, 2000, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Verniero, 164 N.J. 1. It held that a defendant relying on 2A:58C-3(a)(1) must properly interpose the defense in its pleading and "must establish the state-of-the-art at the time of distribution." The statute does not alter the plaintiff's burden to show a reasonable alternative design.
The court then separated two ideas the statute joins with the word "and." A manufacturer "challenging only the practicality of the alternative device and not its technological feasibility" has not asserted the defense. Skil had challenged the practicality of the brake; in the words of the Appellate Division quoted in the opinion, the defendant "did not challenge the technological availability of a blade brake in 1988." The court held that it was error to give the jury the state of the art charge in the form the trial judge used, found no unfair prejudice to Skil, and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division as modified.
For the expert the distinction fixes the assignment. An opinion that a brake, a guard or a sensor would have created other hazards answers the plaintiff's risk-utility case. An opinion that the component did not exist or could not be manufactured on the controlling date is the state of the art defense.
Is industry custom the same as the state of the art?
No. Nebraska's statute speaks of the prevailing state of the art in the industry but defines it as the best technology reasonably available. New Jersey's model charge warns that compliance with industry standards does not mean the product is safe.
The two ideas are easy to confuse, because the same witnesses testify about both. What competitors were doing on the controlling date is custom. What could have been done with knowledge then in existence is the state of the art.
Nebraska's definition points to the second: "the best technology reasonably available at the time." Arizona's does too: knowledge "in existence and reasonably feasible for use." A manufacturer that shows only that its design matched other products on the market has proved custom, and the plaintiff's expert can answer with a patent, a paper or a competing product that used the safer feature before the controlling date.
New Jersey's model charge has a part headed "State of the Art/Common Standards." It tells the jury that "Compliance with common practice or industry standards does not mean" the product is safe, and that the product "may still be found to be defective in design."
Texas adds a neighboring rule. Under section 82.008(a) there is a rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer or seller is not liable for injury caused by the formulation, labeling or design of a product if it establishes compliance "with mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted and promulgated by the federal government" that applied at the time of manufacture and governed the risk that allegedly caused the harm. That is a government standards defense, with its own proof, and an expert on the applicable federal standard addresses it.
Can the plaintiff use the manufacturer's later design changes?
Not to prove the defect. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 excludes subsequent measures offered to prove a defect in a product or its design, but lets the court admit them to prove feasibility if feasibility is disputed.
Rule 407 provides that when measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury less likely, evidence of them "is not admissible to prove" negligence, culpable conduct, "a defect in a product or its design" or "a need for a warning or instruction." The second sentence opens an exception: the court may admit the evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or, "if disputed," proving ownership, control, "or the feasibility of precautionary measures."
The exception meets the state of the art defense head on. A manufacturer that says a safer design was not technically feasible on the controlling date has put feasibility in dispute. Its own later adoption of that design may then come in on that issue. Defense counsel weighs this before the expert writes that the feature could not be built.
Missouri's statute stays neutral on the point: section 537.764 "shall not be construed to permit or prohibit evidence of feasibility in products liability claims."
How does the defense work in failure-to-warn cases?
There the question is what was known or reasonably discoverable about the hazard. Missouri makes that a complete defense to strict liability for failure to warn, with the burden on the party asserting it.
A warning case turns on knowledge of the danger, so the historical question changes. The Missouri definition asks whether the dangerous nature of the product "was not known and could not reasonably be discovered" when it entered the stream of commerce.
New Jersey's model charge, citing Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429 (1984), notes that in strict liability warning cases the defendant bears the burden of proving that the information was not reasonably available, because the defendant is in the superior position to know the technology of its field.
The expert for this version of the defense is usually a scientist: a toxicologist, an epidemiologist or a physician who can reconstruct what the published literature and the manufacturer's own testing showed on the relevant date. The plaintiff's expert performs the same search with the opposite aim.
What does the court require of the state of the art expert?
Under Rule 702 the proponent must show that the opinion rests on sufficient facts or data and reliable methods, reliably applied. For a historical opinion the facts are dated sources, and the report must list them.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires the proponent to show the court that it is more likely than not that the expert's knowledge will help the trier of fact, that the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, that it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the opinion applies them reliably to the facts of the case.
For this defense, sufficient facts are documents that carry dates: publications, standards, patents, test reports and products that were on the market by the controlling date. An opinion about what the industry knew thirty years ago that cites no dated source gives the court no facts or data to test.
The written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them," the facts or data considered, the exhibits, the witness's qualifications with publications of the previous 10 years, cases in which the witness testified in the previous 4 years, and the compensation.
How does IAE find an expert on the state of the art?
In the request choose the case type Product liability and name the product, its year of manufacture and the feature in dispute. Within 5 business days IAE sends 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and prior testimony.
The IAE page on product liability expert witnesses covers defects in vehicles, medical devices, consumer products and industrial equipment and lists 8 specialties, among them failure analysis, materials science, electrical engineering, product design, vehicle crashworthiness, human factors, and warnings and instructions. For design claims the page names engineers from the product's industry, who address which other designs were available when the product left the manufacturer. The page notes that state courts apply their own rules on expert admissibility and on proof of defect, so the request names the state and the court.
The request form asks for the field of expertise, the case type, the state and court, the firm's side, the expert disclosure deadline, the parties and their counsel for the conflict check, and a short description of the case. The form asks not to include privileged or sealed information. Within 1 business day IAE replies whether it can search in that field by the deadline.
The search is paid in advance, and candidate names and CVs come after payment. Each candidate confirms in writing that he or she has no ties to the parties or their counsel. Within 5 business days the firm receives 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates, testimony in the last 4 years and publications in the last 10 years. If no candidate fits, the second search is free; if IAE finds no candidates, it refunds the fee. IAE is not a law firm: case strategy and the decision to retain an expert stay with the attorney.
Sources
- Florida Statutes § 768.1257, State-of-the-art defense for products liability (Florida Senate, 2025)
- N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3, exemptions from liability in product liability actions (Justia, New Jersey Revised Statutes)
- New Jersey Model Civil Jury Charge 5.40D-4, Design Defect: Defenses (New Jersey Courts)
- Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 164 N.J. 1 (N.J. 2000) (Justia)
- Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-683, Affirmative defenses (Arizona Legislature)
- Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-681, Definitions (Arizona Legislature)
- Nebraska Revised Statute § 25-21,182 (Nebraska Legislature)
- Revised Statutes of Missouri § 537.764, State of the art (Missouri Revisor of Statutes)
- Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, chapter 82, sections 82.005 and 82.008 (Texas Legislature)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 407 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 (LII, Cornell Law School)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (LII, Cornell Law School)
Read also
All articles
Toy injury expert witness: small parts, age grading and ASTM F963 in a children's product case
A toy injury case usually turns on a short list of questions: was the toy meant for a child under three, did any part fit inside the federal small
Machine guarding expert witness: what does the engineer examine when a worker is hurt by an unguarded machine?
When a worker is hurt at the point of operation of a machine, the case usually turns on the guard: how the machine was designed to keep hands out
General vs specific causation: which experts does a drug or toxic exposure case need?
In a drug or toxic exposure case the plaintiff proves causation twice. General causation asks whether the substance can cause this kind of injuryExpert witnesses
Need an expert witness for your case?
Describe the question, the case type and the court. Within 5 business days you receive 2-3 candidates with CVs, hourly rates and lists of prior testimony.

