Expert report review

Who pays for a review of the opposing document examiner's report, and can the cost be shifted to the other side?

The party that retains a document examiner to review the other side's report pays the examiner. In federal court that fee rarely moves to the loser as costs: Crawford Fitting v. J. T. Gibbons binds courts to the witness fee limits of 28 U.S.C. 1821, now $40 a day. Rule 37(c)(2) is the exception written for documents. A party that refused to admit a genuine document can be ordered to pay the expenses of proving it.

Hands slide a plain check beside a closed document folder and a loupe under a lamp

Who pays for a review of the opposing document examiner's report?

The party that retains the reviewer, under its own agreement with the examiner. No federal rule sets the rate, and a consultant's review fee is not among the costs that a clerk may tax under 28 U.S.C. 1920.

A review of the other side's questioned document report is ordered by one party for its own case. The attorney or the client signs the engagement, sends the report and the produced file, and pays the fee that the examiner and the client agree. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not fix what a document examiner charges.

Whether that money can later be recovered from the other side depends on the statutes that govern costs. Section 1920 of title 28, as the Supreme Court quoted it in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., begins: "A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following." The list names fees of the clerk and marshal, fees of the court reporter for a transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case, "(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses," fees for exemplification and copies of papers, docket fees, and "(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters." A fee paid to a consultant who reads the opposing report and advises counsel is not on that list.

The rule on who receives costs was quoted in the same opinion in the 1987 wording of Rule 54(d): "Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." A prevailing party recovers the items that the statute lists. Everything else, including most of what it pays its own experts, stays with the party that incurred it unless a statute, a rule or a contract moves it.

In practice the budget for a review is planned as the party's own expense. The two routes that can shift part of it, Rule 37(c)(2) and a contract with an express clause, are discussed below.

Can the winning party recover its document examiner's fee as costs?

Only up to the statutory witness fee, unless a statute or contract expressly provides more. Crawford Fitting held that federal courts are bound by the limits of 28 U.S.C. 1821 and 1920 when taxing a litigant's witness expenses.

Crawford Fitting was decided on June 15, 1987. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "We hold that absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant's witness as costs, federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920."

Section 1821 sets the witness fee. In 1987 the attendance fee was $30 a day. The current text of 28 U.S.C. 1821(b), in the United States Code as of Public Law 119-138 of November 3, 2026, reads: "A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day's attendance." The same subsection pays the fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance. Under 1821(a)(1) the fee goes to a witness "in attendance at any court of the United States."

For a document examiner who testifies for the winning side, the taxable amount is therefore the attendance fee and the allowances of section 1821, not the examiner's bill for the examination, the report or the review. A reviewer who never testifies does not reach even that line.

The opinion treats court-appointed experts differently. It observes: "There is no provision that sets a limit on the compensation for court-appointed expert witnesses in the way that § 1821(b) sets a limit for litigants' witnesses." The Court concluded that a federal court may tax expert fees above the statutory limit only when the witness is court-appointed. The holding also leaves room for "explicit statutory or contractual authorization": a contract between the parties that expressly provides for expert fees, or a fee-shifting statute that does, is read on its own terms.

When does Rule 37(c)(2) make the other side pay for proving a document genuine?

When a party was asked under Rule 36 to admit that a document is genuine, refused, and the requesting party later proved it. The court must then order reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, unless one of four exceptions applies.

Rule 37(c)(2) reads: "If a party fails to admit what is requested under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves a document to be genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in making that proof." The next sentence is mandatory: "The court must so order unless" one of four conditions is met.

The four exceptions are: "(A) the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a); (B) the admission sought was of no substantial importance; (C) the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on the matter; or (D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit."

The advisory committee explained the purpose in its 1970 note: "Rule 37(c) provides a sanction for the enforcement of Rule 36 dealing with requests for admission." The rule "is intended to provide posttrial relief in the form of a requirement that the party improperly refusing the admission pay the expenses of the other side in making the necessary proof at trial."

For a disputed document, the expenses of making the proof include what the party spent to prove genuineness: the examiner who examined the original, the report, the testimony and the attorney time spent on that proof. Rule 37(c)(2) is one of the few places in federal civil practice where an examiner's fee above the $40 attendance fee can be shifted, and it works only if a request for admission was served first.

How does a request for admission set up a claim for the examiner's fees?

The party serves a written request to admit the genuineness of the described document and attaches a copy. An unanswered request is admitted after 30 days, and a denial that later proves wrong opens the Rule 37(c)(2) motion.

Under Rule 36(a)(1) a party may serve on any other party "a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters" within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), including "the genuineness of any described documents."

Rule 36(a)(2) requires each matter to be separately stated. A request to admit the genuineness of a document must be accompanied by a copy of the document "unless it is, or has been, otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying."

The answer has a deadline. Under Rule 36(a)(3), "A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served," the party to whom the request is directed serves a written answer or objection; the parties may stipulate to a different time or the court may order one. Under Rule 36(b), "A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established" unless the court on motion permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.

The 1970 note gives two purposes for admissions: "first to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated from the case," and second, narrowing the issues. For a contract or a promissory note whose signature or date is disputed, a request served early either removes the issue or fixes the point from which the expenses of proof are counted.

When is it reasonable to refuse to admit that a document is genuine?

When the party had a reasonable ground to believe it might prevail on the point. The 1970 note says the test is not whether the party won at trial but whether it acted reasonably in believing it might.

Exception (C) of Rule 37(c)(2) excuses a party that "had a reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on the matter." The 1970 note states: "the true test under Rule 37(c) is not whether a party prevailed at trial but whether he acted reasonably in believing that he might prevail."

Rule 36(a)(4) adds a duty that bears on the same question. A party that pleads lack of knowledge as its reason for neither admitting nor denying may do so only if it "states that it has made reasonable inquiry" and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is not enough. Otherwise the answer must specifically deny the matter or explain in detail why the party cannot admit or deny it.

For a party that suspects a document, a review by a document examiner before the answer is due is part of that inquiry. If the review finds that the opposing examiner worked from a copy, that a dating result rests on an unstated threshold, or that no examination of the original has been done, the party has recorded a ground for its denial. If the review finds nothing, the party knows before trial that a denial may cost it the other side's expenses of proof.

Rule 37(c)(2) speaks of proving "a document to be genuine or the matter true." The side that says a document was altered or backdated can use the same tool: it may ask the other party to admit specific facts about the document and, if they are denied and later proved, move for the expenses of that proof.

Who pays for a document examiner appointed by the court?

The compensation of court-appointed experts is a taxable cost under 28 U.S.C. 1920(6), and Crawford Fitting found no statutory cap on it. The court decides how the cost is shared and taxed.

Item (6) of section 1920, as quoted in Crawford Fitting, lists "Compensation of court appointed experts" among the costs a judge or clerk may tax. The Court contrasted that item with the $30 daily limit that then applied to a litigant's own witnesses: no provision sets a comparable limit for court-appointed experts.

When the parties' examiners disagree and the court appoints a neutral examiner, the neutral's compensation falls under item (6) and can be taxed with the other costs. A party's own reviewer remains the party's own expense whether or not a neutral is appointed. The reviewer's work on the neutral's report is part of that private engagement.

What determines what a review of a document examiner's report costs?

The volume of the report and the produced file, whether the reviewer needs the original or images of it, and the deadline. A review written for counsel costs less than a report prepared for disclosure and testimony.

A review reads the opposing report, the examiner's notes and images and what is available of the questioned document. A short report on one signature with a complete file takes less time than a dating report on several entries with chromatographic and solvent results for each sample.

The second factor is the use. A review that counsel uses to prepare questions for the opposing examiner stays a consulting engagement. A reviewer who will testify also prepares for deposition and trial, and those hours are added to the engagement.

The third factor is time and access. A review ordered close to a court deadline has to be finished within it, and if the reviewer has to see the original, travel and handling add to the work.

How does IAE price and deliver a review of a document examiner's report?

IAE confirms the format, cost, deadline and specialist within one business day after receiving the materials. The signed review is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed, with a 48-hour rush.

The IAE review page for questioned documents is written for attorneys facing the other side's report on alterations, substituted pages, ink or dating. The reviewer reads the report and the produced file against ANSI/ASB Standards 011 and 035, the SWGDOC ink comparison standard and Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

The client sends the opposing report and the produced file and describes the task. The secretariat confirms receipt the same day. Within one business day IAE confirms the format, the cost, the deadline and the specialist from its registry; the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. The document is issued in up to 5 business days depending on the volume, and cases with tight deadlines have a 48-hour rush.

Every specialist is a member of the public IAE registry and can be verified by Member ID or QR code. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case. Neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome, and IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy, including on whether to serve requests for admission or move under Rule 37(c)(2).

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