Expert report review
Daubert and forensic linguistics: what have federal courts admitted and excluded?
Federal judges test a forensic linguist under Rule 702 and Daubert like any other expert. In two reported authorship cases, Van Wyk (2000) and Zajac (2010), the courts did not exclude the linguist outright: they admitted comparisons of textual features and barred the conclusion that the defendant wrote the questioned text. A reviewer builds a motion on the same points: data, method, application and the wording of the conclusion.

What standard does a federal court apply to a forensic linguist?
Rule 702 in the version in force since December 1, 2023, read with Daubert. The party offering the linguist must show the court that each opinion more likely than not meets the rule's four conditions.
Rule 702 lets a qualified witness testify to an opinion if the proponent shows the court that it is more likely than not that the expert's specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, that the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, that it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the opinion applies those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The 2000 committee note to the rule lists the factors from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, decided June 28, 1993: testing, peer review and publication, the known or potential error rate, the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, and general acceptance. In Daubert the Court also wrote that "the focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."
Four years later, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, decided December 15, 1997, the Court qualified that line: "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another," and a court may find "simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." The court in Zajac used that phrase when it excluded part of a linguist's testimony.
The committee note to the 2023 amendment says that many courts had treated the sufficiency of an expert's basis and the application of the method as questions of weight, and calls those rulings "an incorrect application of Rules 702 and 104(a)." A linguist's data and its application are now admissibility questions that the proponent has to carry.
Why did the court in Van Wyk bar the authorship conclusion?
Because forensic stylistics had no known error rate, no recognized standards, no meaningful peer review and no agreed number of samples. The court admitted the comparison of markers and excluded the authorship opinion under Rule 403.
In United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515 (D.N.J. 2000), the opinion dated February 8, 2000, the government first offered FBI Special Agent James R. Fitzgerald as a forensic stylistics expert, then withdrew that label and offered him as an expert in text analysis. He compared letters known to be the defendant's with threatening letters of disputed authorship.
Judge Bassler granted the defense motion in part. Fitzgerald could point out "markers" shared by the known and questioned writings and say how frequently or infrequently, in his experience, he had seen a particular idiosyncrasy. He could not tell the jury that the defendant wrote the questioned letters. The court gave as reasons the lack of a known error rate, of recognized standards or accreditation, of meaningful peer review and of an agreed number of samples needed to establish authorship, and it held that an expert's verdict on authorship would carry an unwarranted appearance of objectivity, so Rule 403 excluded it.
The court also barred testimony based on the defendant's history and the circumstances of the victims, treating it as propensity evidence under Rule 404(b). A linguist's report that mixes textual features with facts about the suspect's life invites the same objection.
The government relied on an article by Gerald McMenamin that describes stylistics as an applied science. Given the few published cases and journals, the novelty of the field and its approval only by law enforcement, the court could not determine "whether the McMenamin article is merely self-legitimized."
What did the court in Zajac admit and exclude?
It admitted the linguist's qualifications and method, allowed specific similarities between two letters, and barred the common-authorship opinion, opinions on the author's age and native language, and the analysis of a third letter.
In United States v. Zajac, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1340, decided September 2, 2010, the government offered the same James R. Fitzgerald, who had retired from the FBI and worked as a violent crime consultant and forensic linguist expert, on three letters and three envelopes. He had followed the protocol in McMenamin's Forensic Linguistics, marking features with colored pens, and examined punctuation, spelling, grammar, themes and items such as an asterisk used for a footnote. He concluded "with a likelihood bordering on certainty" that one person wrote the letters.
The defense called Professor William Eggington, who argued that the sample was too small and the analysis biased. Judge Waddoups admitted Fitzgerald's qualifications and treated bias as a matter of weight. He found that the steps Fitzgerald took were recognized in the field and wrote that Eggington's attacks on the methods and bias "go more towards application and weight than invalidation of the protocol as a whole."
The exclusions came under the application prong. The court excluded all testimony on the Downers Grove letter, finding "the analytical gap between the data and opinion proffered too great to be admissible": the asterisk, the sentences beginning with "And" and the phrasing did not support the conclusion, and the threat database behind the asterisk comparison "provides questionable support." It allowed testimony on similarities between the Hinsdale and Salt Lake City letters, among them seven similar phrases and the fact that both letters refer to something the police did wrong, make a threat and mention an earlier bombing, and barred the opinion that one person wrote both. It also barred opinions that the author was a native English speaker in his or her mid-thirties or older, and testimony about envelope similarities.
Can the jury compare the writings without a linguist?
Yes. Rule 901(b)(3) lets either an expert witness or the trier of fact compare a questioned item with an authenticated specimen. Van Wyk kept the expert's comparison because it could assist the jury in that task.
Rule 901(b)(3) lists as an example of authentication "A comparison with an authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact." The advisory committee note says the example treats all comparison situations alike, governed by Rule 104(b). The jury can read the known and questioned letters side by side.
Gerald R. McMenamin of California State University, Fresno, in a 2006 presentation to the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, sorted authorship decisions into three groups: decisions often cited as refusing linguistic authorship testimony, among them United States v. Clifford (1983) and Van Wyk; more than 60 decisions admitting expert testimony by non-linguists on features such as document format, capitalization, spelling, punctuation and word choice; and decisions admitting such evidence from linguists.
For a reviewer this changes the question. The linguist's added value lies in features a lay reader would miss and in a count of how common they are. A report that lists only features any juror can see, then states a conclusion, offers the court little reason to admit the conclusion.
What counts as sufficient facts or data for a linguist?
Enough comparable text to support the specific opinion. Zajac found no support for common authorship from three documents, and Van Wyk noted the field had no agreed number of samples.
Rule 702(b) requires that the testimony be "based on sufficient facts or data." In linguistics the data are texts: the questioned writing, the known writing of each candidate and, for any claim that a feature is rare, a reference set of other writers.
Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) makes the report list the facts or data the witness considered, so the reviewer can count what the linguist had. In Zajac the court noted that a five-document study by Carole Chaski addressed author identification rather than identifying similarities, and that Fitzgerald offered no support for concluding common authorship from three documents.
Rule 703 lets an expert rely on facts or data that experts in the field would reasonably rely on in forming an opinion on the subject, even if those facts are inadmissible. A reviewer can ask whether linguists in the field would accept a comparison built on the number and type of texts in the report.
Blake S. Howald, in a 2009 AAFS presentation, wrote that linguistic research in author and voice identification is empirically based and that law enforcement, judges and lay jurors hold common misconceptions about language. The reviewer's task in a given case is narrower: to show whether this report's texts were enough for this report's opinion.
How strongly may a linguist word the conclusion?
Only as strongly as the method supports. The 2023 committee note says each opinion must stay within what a reliable application of the basis and method can support, and forensic experts should avoid claims of absolute certainty.
The 2023 committee note to Rule 702 states that "each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of the expert's basis and methodology." It adds that forensic experts "should avoid assertions of absolute or one hundred percent certainty" or of a reasonable degree of scientific certainty if the methodology is subjective and thus potentially subject to error.
Fitzgerald's wording in Zajac, "with a likelihood bordering on certainty," is the kind of conclusion the court did not let reach the jury for the two letters it allowed him to compare. The same court let him describe the similarities.
The note also limits the objection: "nothing in the amendment requires the court to nitpick an expert's opinion in order to reach a perfect expression of what the basis and methodology can support." A reviewer who challenges the wording ties it to a specific gap in the data or method.
Does the other side's linguist change the Daubert outcome?
In Zajac the defense called a linguist who argued that three letters were too few, and the court barred the common-authorship opinion and the analysis of one letter. Edward Finegan describes a defamation trial where his testimony reached the jury.
In Zajac the defense linguist, Professor Eggington, argued that the sample was too small and the analysis biased, and the court's rulings on the Downers Grove letter and on common authorship followed the sufficiency and application lines.
Edward Finegan, in a 2021 article in Language and Law / Linguagem e Direito, describes Cohen v. Hansen in the federal district court in Nevada, where the trial judge allowed him, as the plaintiff's linguist, to testify before the jury, which awarded Cohen $38.3 million. He writes that the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a decision marked not for publication and that the basis of Hansen's appeal "was unrelated to the linguistic issues."
Edward K. Cheng, in a 2013 symposium article, writes that "courts often treat the Daubert factors more as incantation than as actual requirements" and give expert testimony a "hard look" for intellectual rigor. A rebuttal linguist who explains which step of the opposing analysis cannot be checked gives the court something specific to look at.
What should a Daubert motion against a linguist ask for?
Specific limits tied to specific opinions: bar the authorship verdict, bar opinions on the author's traits, or bar analysis of a text where the data run out, as the courts did in Van Wyk and Zajac.
Neither court excluded the linguist entirely. Both kept the comparison of features and cut the conclusions that went beyond it. A motion can ask for those limits in the alternative to full exclusion.
Daubert lists the alternatives to exclusion: "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." A rebuttal report keeps its use at trial if the motion is denied.
The motion lists each opinion, the page of the report where it appears, the Rule 702 condition it fails and the evidence for that failure: the missing reference set, the uncounted feature, the third letter that the method did not reach. The court rules opinion by opinion, and whether the opposing linguist is excluded, limited or heard in full is for the court.
What does IAE do when a party challenges a forensic linguist?
An IAE linguist prepares a review of the opposing linguist's report for a federal or state case, in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.
The IAE forensic linguistics page offers a report on the client's questions and a review of the opposing linguist's report. Questions are confirmed with the client before work starts, and IAE puts questions to the linguist about the language of the text and leaves legal conclusions to the court.
According to the page, the review checks whether the report states each opinion with its basis and reasons and lists the facts or data considered, as Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) requires, whether the texts compared were enough for the opinion, and whether the method was reliably applied, the tests of Rule 702(b) and (d). Absent a stipulation or court order, the rebuttal report is due within 30 days.
IAE's general description of a review lists six questions: method, completeness of the examination, soundness of the conclusions, the expert's competence, form and procedure in the case's jurisdiction, and whether the report can be relied on.
Sources
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 and committee notes (Cornell LII)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 703 (Cornell LII)
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 901 and advisory committee note (Cornell LII)
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (Cornell LII)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (Cornell LII)
- General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (Cornell LII)
- United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515 (D.N.J. 2000) (Justia)
- United States v. Zajac, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (D. Utah 2010)
- McMenamin G. R., The Admission of Expert Linguistic Evidence in Cases of Disputed Authorship, AAFS 2006, J8
- Howald B. S., Forensic Linguistic Expert Testimony in the Authentication of Language Evidence, AAFS 2009, E11
- Finegan E., Expert testimony by linguists in U.S. courts: An illustrative case of practices, Language and Law / Linguagem e Direito 8(1), 2021
- Cheng E. K., Being Pragmatic About Forensic Linguistics, Journal of Law and Policy, vol. 21, issue 2 (2013), p. 541
- Supreme Court of the United States, order of April 24, 2023 amending Federal Rules of Evidence 106, 615 and 702, effective December 1, 2023 (congressional package)
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