Expert report review

Deposing the opposing forensic linguist: which questions test the report?

The other side's forensic linguist can be deposed once the written report is served, for one day of seven hours unless the parties or the court set more time. The questions come from the report: which texts were compared, which features were counted against what reference data, what counsel supplied and how strongly the conclusion is worded. Two federal opinions on one FBI examiner, Van Wyk (2000) and Zajac (2010), show which answers decided what the jury heard.

A linguist from behind sits at a deposition table with a closed dictionary

When can the opposing linguist be deposed?

After the written report is provided. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) permits the deposition of any expert whose opinions may be presented at trial, and Rule 30(d)(1) limits a deposition to one day of 7 hours.

Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads: "A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial." When Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a written report from that expert, the deposition may be conducted only after the report is provided. A linguist retained only as a consultant is treated differently: under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), "Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert" retained in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial.

The procedure is in Rule 30. The party that wants the deposition must give "reasonable written notice to every other party" with the time and place, and must state in the notice how the testimony will be recorded: audio, audiovisual or stenographic. The parties may agree, or the court may order on motion, that the deposition be taken by telephone or other remote means. Unless stipulated or ordered otherwise, "a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours," and the court must allow more time if it is needed to examine the witness fairly.

The National Institute of Justice course Law 101: Legal Guide for the Forensic Expert describes who is in the room: the lawyers for both parties, a court reporter, the expert and sometimes a videographer. "Juries and judges are never present at a deposition," and the examination "is usually conducted by opposing counsel." Under Rule 30(c)(2) an objection "must be stated concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner," and a lawyer may instruct the linguist not to answer only in the cases that rule lists, such as preserving a privilege or enforcing a limit ordered by the court.

What should the notice ask the linguist to bring?

Every text the report lists as considered, the known writings, the reference corpus or database, the marked working copies and the billing records. Drafts of the report remain protected under Rule 26(b)(4)(B).

Rule 30(b)(2) provides that when a subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the deponent, the materials designated for production "must be listed in the notice or in an attachment." The list follows the report. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires the report to contain "the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them," meaning the opinions, "any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them," the witness's qualifications with "a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years," a list of cases in which the witness testified as an expert in the previous 4 years, and "a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case."

For a linguist the working copies hold much of the method. In both Van Wyk and Zajac the same examiner marked features in color. In Van Wyk he color-coded issues in four categories. In Zajac he used "different colored pens," and the court noted that he did not explain the criteria behind the markings and that there was no evidence of how they affected the results. A notice that names the marked copies puts those criteria on the record before trial.

Rule 26(b)(4)(B) protects drafts of the report. Communications between the retaining lawyer and the linguist are protected too, except to the extent they relate to compensation, "identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided" and the linguist considered, or "identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided" and the linguist relied on, under Rule 26(b)(4)(C). If counsel chose the known writings or named a suspected author, those communications fall within the exceptions for facts, data and assumptions, and the linguist can be asked about them.

What should be asked about qualifications and prior testimony?

Training in linguistics, who taught the method, outside review of the witness's reports, publications in the last 10 years and testimony in the last 4 years. Van Wyk found no recognized certification standard for forensic stylistics.

The report lists publications and prior testimony, and the deposition asks for the rest: degrees, coursework in linguistics, who trained the witness in the method, and whether anyone outside the retaining side has checked the witness's reports. In United States v. Van Wyk, decided by Judge Bassler of the District of New Jersey on February 8, 2000, the government's expert was FBI Special Agent James R. Fitzgerald, assigned to the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The court agreed with the defense that there is "no universally recognized standard for certifying an individual as an expert in forensic stylistics." The government cited one publication on forensic stylistics, an article by Gerald McMenamin, and no sources outside the FBI had reviewed Fitzgerald's reports.

The NIJ course page Preparation for Cross-Examination lists the lines a cross-examiner takes against a forensic expert, among them: attack the field of expertise, attack the witness's qualifications, expose bias, attack the fact basis, change the hypothetical questions, impeach with learned treatises and journals, and attack the witness head-on with prior contrary writings. The page says prior writings and prior testimony are of highest value when they reach factual or professional conclusions that contradict the expert's current testimony.

Prior testimony is traced through the list Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(v) requires. Transcripts from those cases record how the linguist described the limits of the method under oath, and the deposition asks whether that description has changed.

Which questions test the texts the linguist compared?

How many texts were compared, which were known and which questioned, who supplied them and how authorship of each known text was established. Zajac excluded every opinion about a letter the data did not support.

In Van Wyk the examiner worked with twenty-two letters sorted into known typings, known writings, questioned typings and questioned writings. Neither the expert nor the government identified how many samples are needed to reach a conclusion on probability of authorship. That gap was one of the reasons the court gave for barring the authorship opinion.

In United States v. Zajac, decided by Judge Clark Waddoups of the District of Utah on September 2, 2010 after a four-day Daubert hearing in March 2010, Fitzgerald, by then retired from the FBI, compared three one-page letters, referred to in the opinion as the Downers Grove, Hinsdale and Salt Lake City letters, along with three envelopes. No writing of known authorship was available, so every document was questioned, and the opinion offered was that the letters shared one author. The defense linguist, Professor William Gregory Eggington of Brigham Young University, cited Carole Chaski's work for the view that at least five documents are needed for author attribution.

The court admitted testimony on similarities in phrasing, punctuation and usage between the Hinsdale and Salt Lake City letters. It excluded all testimony about the Downers Grove letter, finding "the analytical gap between the data and opinion proffered too great to be admissible," and excluded the opinion that the two remaining letters had one author. The deposition questions follow those rulings: how many texts per candidate, written in which period and genre, and with what proof of who wrote each known text. Rule 901(b)(3) speaks of comparison "with an authenticated specimen," so the authorship of every known writing is a separate question.

How should the features and the reference data be questioned?

Ask what each feature is, how often it occurs in writers outside the case and where that frequency comes from. In Zajac the court called the support drawn from the CTAD database questionable.

In Van Wyk the examiner sorted features into four groups: punctuation and spelling, threat language, "interesting phrases," and correct or incorrect "trip" phrases, with pairs such as there and their, to and too, your and you're. The court let him point out specific similarities and idiosyncrasies and testify to how frequently he had seen a given idiosyncrasy. That frequency came from his own casework, and the deposition asks how many cases it covers and where they are recorded.

In Zajac Fitzgerald testified that "just because something is standard, does not make it common," that no minimum number of features is needed to reach a conclusion, and that he focused on "what is more commonly accepted or preferred in formal writing situations." Beyond his experience he gave no stated basis for his comparisons. The court found the support drawn from the CTAD database "questionable," had little information about how it was built or how texts were selected, and wrote that there was "no basis from which the court can conclude that CTAD represents a database of standard usage."

Those answers give a deposition its list. For each feature, the source of the statement that it is rare. For each database, who built it, from which texts, and whether those texts match the questioned writing in period and genre. For each feature counted as shared, whether it also appears in writers who are not candidates. Of the nine thematic examples Fitzgerald offered in Zajac, the court found that only one showed consistency between the Downers Grove and Salt Lake City letters, and called that similarity "not significant."

What should the linguist be asked about the strength of the conclusion?

Which scale the conclusion uses, whether the method was tested on texts of known authorship and with what results. The 2023 note to Rule 702 tells forensic experts to avoid claims of absolute certainty when the method is subjective.

Rule 702, as amended in 2023, requires the proponent to show the court that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and applies those methods reliably to the facts of the case. The committee note says "each expert opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of the expert's basis and methodology." It adds: "Forensic experts should avoid assertions of absolute or one hundred percent certainty," or to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, "if the methodology is subjective and thus potentially subject to error."

In Zajac the examiner concluded that the letters were written by one person "with a likelihood bordering on certainty." In Van Wyk neither the expert nor the government identified a known rate of error. The deposition asks the linguist to name the scale used for conclusions, whether the scale is published, whether the method has been tested on texts of known authorship and with what results.

The note also rejects rulings that treated "the critical questions of the sufficiency of an expert's basis" and the application of the method as questions of weight and not admissibility, calling them "an incorrect application of Rules 702 and 104(a)." Answers about the scale and the testing go into a Rule 702 motion. In Zajac the court wrote that "lack of bias is not required for expert testimony to be admissible" and treated bias as a matter of weight, so answers about bias are kept for cross-examination at trial.

Should the linguist be asked about intent, case facts or legal standards?

Yes, to fix the boundary of the opinion. Van Wyk barred testimony on history and victimology, Zajac barred case information and the author's age, and the note to Rule 704 keeps exclusion of opinions framed in legal criteria.

In Van Wyk the government also sought testimony on external evidence. The court barred testimony on history and victimology as disguised propensity evidence under Rule 404(b), and under Rule 403. In Zajac the court held that case information, such as the latent print evidence that tied Zajac to the investigation, was outside Fitzgerald's expertise, and excluded his testimony that the author was a native English speaker in his or her mid-thirties or older. It also excluded his comparison of the envelopes, which it described as standard and unremarkable.

Under Rule 704(a) an opinion "is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue." The advisory committee note draws the line with a will: the question "Did T have capacity to make a will?" would be excluded, while a question whether T had sufficient mental capacity to know "the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty" would be allowed. For a linguist the first kind of question is whether a post is defamatory or a clause unambiguous; the second kind is how the words are built and how a reader parses them. In a criminal case Rule 704(b) bars an expert from stating an opinion on whether the defendant had a mental state that is an element of the crime or of a defense.

At deposition each conclusion in the report is taken in turn with the same question: which linguistic feature supports it. A conclusion that rests on case facts, on a party's history or on a legal label, with no feature named, goes into the motion.

How is the deposition used at trial, and who pays for the linguist's time?

Any party may use it to contradict or impeach the linguist, and for any purpose if the court finds the witness unavailable. The party seeking the deposition pays the linguist a reasonable fee under Rule 26(b)(4)(E).

Rule 32(a)(2) lets any party use a deposition "to contradict or impeach the testimony given by the deponent as a witness." Under Rule 32(a)(4) a party may use the deposition of a witness for any purpose if the court finds, among other grounds, that the witness is dead, is "more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or trial or is outside the United States," or cannot attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity or imprisonment. Under Rule 30(e)(1), on request, the linguist has 30 days, counted after the officer gives notice, to review the transcript and sign a statement of any changes.

At trial Rule 705 lets the linguist state an opinion and the reasons for it "without first testifying to the underlying facts or data," but "the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination." Under Rule 703 an expert may rely on facts or data that experts in the field would reasonably rely on, even if those facts are not admissible. A statement in a treatise or journal may be read to the jury under Rule 803(18) if it is called to the expert's attention on cross-examination and the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission, by another expert's testimony or by judicial notice; if admitted, it "may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit." The deposition is the place to ask which books and articles the linguist accepts as reliable.

Rule 26(b)(4)(E) provides that, unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require the party seeking discovery to "pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery." The rate appears in the compensation statement the report must contain under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(vi).

What does IAE do when a party prepares to depose the other side's linguist?

A linguist from the public IAE registry reviews the opposing linguist's report: which texts were considered, whether the method can be tested and whether the conclusions go beyond the data. The document is issued in up to 5 business days.

IAE's page on reviewing the opposing forensic linguist's report describes the work for a party facing the other side's linguist on a disputed statement, a contract clause, a trademark or an anonymous message. The reviewer checks which texts the linguist considered, whether the method can be tested and whether the conclusions go beyond the data. Each point in the review is tied to a page of the opposing report and to a rule or a court decision. The page names three formats: a review of the opposing report, a rebuttal report and grounds for a Rule 702 motion. Among the uses of a review in court it lists the deposition of the opposing expert after the report under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and disclosure of the underlying facts on cross-examination under Rule 705.

The reviewer works from the opposing report with every exhibit, each text the linguist lists as considered under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), the known writings used for comparison and any reference texts. Facts, data and assumptions that counsel gave the opposing linguist are discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4)(C). Materials are not passed to third parties without the client's consent.

A linguist from the public IAE registry prepares the review. The client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts, and the document is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed. Rulings on motions belong to the court, and neither IAE nor the reviewer guarantees the outcome.

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