Examinations

Ambiguous contract language: can a linguist testify about what a clause means?

In US courts, whether a written contract is ambiguous and what legal effect it has are questions of law for the judge, and the courts in the cases below refused expert testimony on what a clause legally means. A linguist can still describe how the sentence is built: which words a modifier reaches, what a comma does, which noun a pronoun points to. Whether the linguist is heard depends on which side of that line the testimony stays.

Colored acetate strips lie across a blurred contract clause, a linguist's hands at the edge

Who decides what a contract clause means?

The judge decides whether a clause is ambiguous, as a question of law. In New York, evidence from outside a clear written agreement is not admissible to create an ambiguity in it.

New York's highest court stated the rule in W.W.W. Associates, Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, decided December 27, 1990. Judge Kaye wrote for the Court of Appeals that extrinsic and parol evidence "is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a written agreement" that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face. The next step of the reasoning is a single sentence: "Whether or not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts."

The same opinion says that such a writing "should as a rule be enforced according to its terms." The court reads the document first. Evidence from outside the document, including an expert's view of the words, cannot be the thing that creates a second reading of a clear clause.

State contract law sets the details, and the sentences quoted above are New York law. The federal order in the Coyote Portable Storage case discussed below notes that Florida law governed the franchise agreements in that dispute.

For a linguist the order of questions matters. Ambiguity is decided by the judge as a matter of law. An expert opinion that a clause is ambiguous asks the judge to accept a legal conclusion from a witness, and the courts in the cases below refused.

What happened when a grammar expert read a franchise clause?

In Coyote Portable Storage v. PODS (N.D. Ga. 2011) the court barred a legal-drafting teacher whose analysis of syntax and punctuation PODS relied on to call a royalty definition unambiguous. It held that construing the contract was the court's job.

Franchisees of PODS, a portable storage company, sued over the way royalties were calculated. One dispute turned on the definition of "Net Sales" in the franchise agreements: did it exclude money received through the cross-country move program? PODS retained Ross Guberman, a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School who teaches an advanced seminar on legal drafting. He analyzed the syntax and punctuation of the definition and applied the canon noscitur a sociis. Relying on his opinion, PODS asserted that the definition of Net Sales was unambiguous when the rules of grammar are properly applied.

Judge Amy Totenberg granted the franchisees' motion to bar the testimony in an order dated May 16, 2011, Case No. 1:09-CV-1152-AT. The order calls Mr. Guberman "an expert grammarian retained to address the grammatical nuances of a sentence at issue" and finds that he "does not simply state the applicable rules of grammar as portrayed by Defendant." It states the rule this way: "The construction of a contract is a matter of law for the court, and expert legal opinion is not admissible."

Two more passages of the order bear on linguists. Admitting the testimony "would give the appearance that the court was shifting to the expert the responsibility to decide the case." And absent a need to clarify or define terms of art, science or trade, "expert opinion testimony to interpret contract language is inadmissible." For that rule the order cites decisions of the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, Marx among them.

The ruling also had a procedural ground: the court found that PODS had not designated Mr. Guberman early enough in discovery. On the substance, the order adds that "Mr. Guberman's expert opinions do not create ambiguity in the Franchise Agreements."

Can a linguist testify that a clause is ambiguous?

Courts have refused such testimony. In Phillips v. Harris (1994) the Supreme Court of Alabama held that whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law, so an English Ph.D.'s affidavit could not decide it.

Linda Kay Jones Phillips sued Edgar E. Harris and other property owners to determine who owned the minerals under 160 acres, a question that turned on the mineral reservations in a 1939 deed. She offered an affidavit from Lucinda B. Coulter, who held a Ph.D. in English from Purdue University and had editing experience. Dr. Coulter stated that "the two 'less and except' clauses within the two paragraphs quoted directly contradict one another."

In Phillips v. Harris, 643 So. 2d 974, decided July 1, 1994, Justice Steagall wrote that the threshold issue of whether a deed is ambiguous "is a question of law to be determined by the trial court," citing Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Baldwin County Sewer Authority, Inc., 480 So. 2d 1171 (Ala. 1985). A witness, expert or lay, cannot give an opinion that amounts to "a legal conclusion." The court rejected the argument built on the affidavit and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The affidavit said that two clauses contradict each other. Put in legal terms, that is a statement that the deed is ambiguous, and the court treated it as a legal conclusion. A deed conveys land and a franchise agreement is a contract, yet the Alabama court and the Georgia court in Coyote applied the same rule: ambiguity is for the judge.

What can a linguist examine in a disputed clause?

The structure of the sentence: which words a modifier or a limiting phrase reaches, what a comma or a conjunction does, which noun a pronoun refers to, and how the same word is used in other clauses.

Lawrence M. Solan wrote about this work in "Linguistic experts as semantic tour guides," published in 1998 in the International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law (vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 87-106). The article examines linguists testifying in US courts on the meaning of statutes, contracts and transcripts of recorded conversations. Its abstract assigns linguists "the role of the tour guide" and says that judges need not be concerned about linguists taking over the roles of judge and jury as ultimate interpreters, "provided that the linguist's testimony is appropriately circumscribed."

In a contract dispute the tour covers the features of a sentence that produce more than one reading. A modifier placed after a list may attach to the last item or to every item. Items joined by "and" may be conditions that must all be met, while items joined by "or" are alternatives. "Including" before a list may introduce examples drawn from a wider group. A relative clause or a pronoun may have two possible antecedents. A term defined in one section may appear in another section in its everyday sense.

Each of these points is a description of the text that the other side can check against grammars, dictionaries and usage data. Which reading the contract carries is not the linguist's question. Coyote marks the boundary from the other side: the expert there moved past grammar rules to a conclusion about what the definition meant, and the court found that he offered an opinion on the legal effect of the provision.

Are technical and trade terms treated differently?

Yes. The rule applied in Coyote bars expert interpretation of contract language absent a need to clarify or define terms of art, science or trade, so a term of that kind opens the door to expert evidence.

The disputed sentence in Coyote came from a definition of "Net Sales," and Mr. Guberman acknowledged that it was "a common accounting term." A term of art in accounting, insurance or engineering takes its meaning from the practice of that field, and a witness from the field can describe that practice.

In Marx, Friedman was qualified as an expert in securities regulation. The error the Second Circuit found lay in his opinions on the legal meaning of the contract terms and on the legal significance of the facts.

A linguist's part in a term-of-art dispute is narrower. The linguist can show how the word is used in general English, with dictionary entries and examples from collections of texts, so that the general sense and the field's sense sit side by side in the record. Which sense the contract adopted is not a question the linguist answers.

Which words should a linguist's report on a clause avoid?

Legal labels for the clause or the evidence: ambiguous, unambiguous, enforceable, breached, relevant. A federal court in Texas struck a rebuttal expert's statement that an issue was not relevant as a conclusion of law.

In Ihde v. HME, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-00585, in the Eastern District of Texas, Glenn Ihde sued for breach of contract and quantum meruit over unpaid fees for steel detailing services. His expert, Kerri Olsen, was qualified in steel detailing document control and project management. Her rebuttal report said that "[s]oftware licensing is not relevant to the issues being discussed in this case." The court struck that part of the rebuttal as a legal conclusion and quoted the Fifth Circuit: "An expert may never render conclusions of law."

The court also struck Ms. Olsen's attempt to answer the engineering opinions of two other experts, finding her unqualified on that subject because her experience lay in document control and project management, and admitted the rest of her rebuttal.

Wording that stays within linguistics describes the construction and its alternatives without a verdict on the clause: which nouns a modifier can attach to, what the comma separates, where else the term occurs and in what sense. Whether those facts make the clause ambiguous, and what the clause obliges a party to do, remain with the court.

If the linguist relies mainly on experience, the 2000 committee note to Rule 702 requires the witness to "explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached." A report can meet that requirement by naming the grammar, the dictionary or the usage data behind each statement about the sentence.

If a linguist will not testify, how is the analysis used?

Through counsel. A linguist retained to prepare for trial and not expected to testify is a consulting expert under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), and the other side ordinarily cannot discover that expert's facts or opinions.

Rule 26(b)(4)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that ordinarily a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert retained in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. The exceptions are Rule 35(b) and a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

Ambiguity is argued to the judge as a question of law. A consulting linguist's description of the sentence can go into counsel's brief on that question, into the questions counsel puts to the other side's witnesses and into the choice of clauses and documents placed before the court.

A linguist who will testify is disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2), and a retained witness signs a written report. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) lists its contents: a complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered, exhibits, qualifications with a list of publications from the previous 10 years, the cases with testimony in the previous 4 years, and the compensation.

Under Rule 26(b)(4)(C), communications between counsel and a testifying expert are protected except those about compensation, facts or data that counsel provided and the expert considered, and assumptions that counsel provided and the expert relied on. If counsel told the linguist which reading of the clause the client prefers, that assumption can be discovered.

What does IAE prepare in a dispute over contract wording?

An IAE linguist prepares a report on the client's questions about the disputed clause or a review of the opposing linguist's report. The document is issued in up to 5 business days after the format and cost are confirmed.

Contract wording is one of the subjects on the IAE forensic linguistics page: a disputed clause is read for scope, syntax and punctuation. IAE puts questions to the linguist about the language of the text and leaves legal conclusions to the court. The questions are confirmed with the client before work starts.

IAE confirms the format, cost, deadline and the specialist from the public registry within one business day, and the client approves the candidate and the CV before work starts. For cases with tight deadlines there is a 48-hour rush. The specialist confirms in the document that he or she has no interest in the outcome of the case.

IAE is not a law firm and does not advise on case strategy. Whether the linguist testifies or consults, and how the analysis is used in the case, are decisions for the client's attorney. Materials are sent through the contact form or to info@iaexperts.com and are not passed to third parties without the client's consent.

Sources

Read also

All articles

Expert examinations

Ready to discuss your case?

Send the materials: the secretariat will confirm the format, cost, deadline and the specialist within one business day.

Expertise request

Received

Cost and timeline estimate

WorkReview of an opinion
TimelineUp to 5 business days
ExpertIAE registry member